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ABSTRACT 
 
Taking the case of an initiative in participatory conservation in Kailadevi Wildlife 
Sanctuary, Rajasthan, the thesis focuses on the implementation processes and ideas of 
participatory conservation in protected area management in India. 
 
Informed by theories of political ecology and anthropology of development, the thesis 
analyses ‘the politicized environment’ of biodiversity conservation and protected area 
management in India. Tracing trends from the colonial era to the present-day 
preoccupation with conservation, it examines the political and socio-economic roots of 
the various discourses on conservation and protected areas, their impacts on communities 
and the manner in which these continue to underpin the current context of protected area 
management.   
 
The study demonstrates that the terrain of participatory management of protected areas is 
a complex tapestry of discourses, policies, actions and counter-actions involving multiple 
actors at the international, national and local levels and which has to be understood in 
terms of its colonial and post-colonial history. Against this backdrop, the thesis analyses 
the continuing struggles between and within agencies over knowledge making, meaning 
and   power. 
 
In the main, the study argues that notion of participatory conservation, taken to be 
‘inherently good’ and packaged into formulaic approaches in policy literature, easily 
lends itself to appropriation and misrepresentations in the politicized environment of 
protected area management. It demonstrates how the multiple agencies, through 
sustaining representations of the “success” of such initiatives, actually sustain, reinforce 
and legitimise the hegemonic notions of protected areas and the exclusion of communities. 
The thesis concludes that participatory approaches in their implementation lead to further 
entrenchment of state authority and work more decisively against the interests of the 
communities and are counter-productive to conservation.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
aantri/taradi  plains  
adhyaksh   president  
agle-bade   ancestors  
akal   drought  
anth ki duniya an idea used to convey the complexities and vastness of the 
world beyond the region of Kailadevi 
badi kho  specific kho adjacent to Nibhera 
bad jots   big land  owners  
bhook   starvation  
bhedwale  Goat-herders and owners  
charagha  pasture  
chara   fodder  
chaumasa  monsoons  
cheriwalen  goat herders  
chori – chippe  stealth  
chowkie   check post 
dang   hilly forested area 
devi-devta   god and goddess 
dhok   Anogiessus pendula  
dongar   forested hillocks  
dhor-maweshi  livestock 
doriwale  ‘people of the thread’ or land surveyors 
gameshri An expression invented by the community connecting 
‘game reserve’ with ‘sanctuary’ as the identity of a new 
entity for wildlife conservation. 
gaon ki sanstha  organisation of the village 
gola barud   explosives 
gorelog   white people or foreigners 
ghee   clarified butter 
haq   right  
imarti Lakdi  construction timber  
jalau lakdi  fuel wood  
janglat   Forest Department 
katha   edible substance from the bark of Khair (Acacia catechu) 
kho   forested river gorges  
khoj   Cattle heads  
khad   Manure 
khirkaries  Cattle camps 
khoj   Herd  
kohar   Fodder enclosure built by the Forest Department 
kulhadi bandh  Ban-axe  
kulhadi khusana Confiscating the axe  
kulhadi bandh panchayats  Ban-Axe Councils  
log-bag   people  
maharaja   king  
manhani  defamation 
manjuri   permission 
naka   check post 
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padyatra  foot march 
patels   head representative of any community groups  
patel panchayat council of patels  
patwari   village-level Revenue Department functionary 
pesari   measure of grain roughly equivalent to 1 kg 
pokhar   pond 
pucca   solid 
pura   hamlet 
rundh   fodder enclosure 
rundhiya  Forest Guard under Karauli State 
samhu   group 
samitis   committee 
samaj    society /community  
sammelan  meeting gathering 
samvat   Times, also the Hindu calendar  
sanchuri  An area where strict restrictions on resource use apply 
sanstha   organsiation or NGO 
sarkar   government  
shikargah  hunting reserves of the King 
sivaychak  revenue land  
taradi    plains area  
ujar   wilderness 
vanni   forest  
Van Suraksha Samitis  Forest Protection Committees 
zamindari  system of land ownership 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Protected Area Management: The ‘New’ Paradigm  
 
India is one of 16 mega-diverse countries possessing 60-70% of the world’s biodiversity, 
besides being a significant player in global policy initiatives in biodiversity conservation.1 
The country also has an extensive network of legally declared protected areas (PAs), 
comprising National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries, established under the provisions of 
the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.2 In 2004 there were 92 National Parks and 500 
Wildlife Sanctuaries covering an area of 15.67 million hectares or 4.5% of the country 
(MoEF 2004). The PA network in India has been among the most important means of 
protecting and conserving biodiversity.  
 
In India, like in most other biodiversity ‘rich’ countries,
3
 the PAs inevitably overlap with 
habitation of communities that are, either significantly dependent on, or are enclosed 
within, these PAs. It is estimated that in India, almost three million people live within 
PAs, comprising mostly of tribal and mix-caste communities. According to a national 
survey done in the 1980s, 69% of the PAs had human population and 64% reported the 
presence of community rights, leases or concessions over land and forest resources 
(Kothari et al. 1989).  
 
The ‘isolationist’ approach to the process of establishment of PAs has imposed severe 
constraints on the livelihood needs of communities besides generating considerable local 
hostility and conflict with state authorities on the one hand and between communities and 
wildlife on the other.4 Jackson and Roy (1993) summed up the situation as follows: 
All of India’s protected areas are virtual islands surrounded by villages and 
agricultural land, where people are desperately short of basic resources for life, 
                                                
 
1
 India took over the chairmanship of the group of Mega-diverse Countries in February 2004 (MoEF 2004) 
2 The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 972 has been amended on several occasions since it was promulgated. In 
2003 two new categories of PAs have been introduced: Community Reserve and Conservation Reserve.  
3 See Anderson and Grove (eds.) (1987) and Hulme and Murphee (2001) for Africa. See Colchester 
(1995;2002) for Asia and Southeast Asia. Also see Kemf (ed.) (1993) and Amend and Amend (eds.) (1995). 
4 This is popularly referred as ‘people-wildlife conflict’ 
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such as firewood, building material and grazing areas for their livestock. 
Inevitably, they invade reserves and come into conflict with the authorities. 
Poaching of animals, timber and forest produce is rife and cattle and goats are 
found in most reserves. Resentment at the wildlife authority attempts to control 
the situation has exploded in violence against officials and guards’ (as cited in 
Kemf, 1993).  
The growing conflict between conservation and communities has led to the observation 
that “…conservation approaches that tended to alienate dependent communities assured 
neither sustainable environmental conservation nor social gains for local people.” 
(Ghirmire and Pimbert 1997: 16) As a result, in the 1980s and 1990s there has been an 
attempt to find alternate ways of managing PAs.  
 
Susan Braatz (1992), in a World Bank strategy paper, suggested that there was need for a 
policy change to consider involving local people in PA management. The need for a more 
inclusive model of PA management has also resonated at other conservation forums. The 
IVth World Congress on National Parks and Sanctuaries,5 held in 1992 in Venezuela, 
identified ‘community participation and equality in the decision making process’ as 
critical in resolving conflict of interests. In 1996 the World Conservation Congress and 
General Assembly of the IUCN adopted a resolution on ‘Collaborative Management’, 
which asked countries to consider adopting ‘participatory’ approaches in biodiversity 
conservation (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996).  
 
A participatory approach to PA management, often referred to as the ‘New Paradigm’ 
(Madhusudan and Raman 2003; Kothari et al. 2004), has been articulated in policies in 
different configurations including ‘co-management’, ‘participatory management’ or 
‘collaborative management’ (Pimbert and Ghirmire 1997; Kothari et al. 1998; 2001; 
Kothari and Borrini-Feyerabend 2002; Kalpavriksh 2004; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). 
The paradigm shift emphasises community participation and the need to reconcile the 
conservation imperative of PAs with the livelihood requirement of resource-dependent 
communities. The Vth IUCN World Parks Congress held in 2003 in Durban, South Africa 
saw a shift “towards a much more participatory inclusive model of protected areas, in 
which indigenous and local communities are seen to be critical participants, their own 
                                                
 
5 The World Parks Congress (previously the IUCN World Congress on Protected Areas) is a decadal event 
for setting the agenda for protected areas world-wide. Previous Congress’ have had an impact in increasing 
the protected area network, focusing resources on biodiversity conservation, and viewing community 
participation in conservation as a part of the solution. 
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conservation initiatives are given due recognition and various forms of governance 
(including government, community, private, and collaborative) are given legitimacy” 
(Kothari et al., 2004: 4).  
 
Over the years, with increasing strength, the co-management advocates have argued for 
communities to be involved as significant power-sharing stakeholders in PA management. 
With an emphasis on ‘governance’ in co-management practices, institutionalising 
community participation through building of local institutions is seen as indispensable to 
address issues of social justice, equity, sustainable resource use and strengthening 
community-based and community-run initiatives (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000)
6
  
 
While there had been several suggestions, mostly from conservation and research 
organisations, to reconsider the approach to PA management in India, the first time it was 
taken cognisance by the Government of India was under the India Ecodevelopment 
Project (IEDP) in 1993.
7
 The IEDP strategy was to enable the Government to ‘begin to 
address the special issues regarding participatory management of protected areas’ (World 
Bank 1996).  
 
Based on a case study of participatory conservation initiatives in Kailadevi Wildlife 
Sanctuary (KWS), a part of the Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan, this thesis 
examines how participatory conservation projects work and the meaning of ‘success’ at 
the level of policy and practice. 
 
Participatory Conservation in Kailadevi  
 
Established in 1983, the Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary covers an area of 674 sq. km, and 
together with Sawai Mansingh Sanctuary, forms the buffer zone of the 1,334 sq. km 
Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve. The Sanctuary falls in the Vindhya ranges of Rajasthan, a 
                                                
 
6 Perhaps, the most exhaustive and instructive compilation of debates, issues, and strategies on co-
management is to be found in Sharing Power: Learning by Doing in Co-Management of Natural Resources 
Throughout the World  (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004). 
7 The India Ecodevelopment Project was supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) of the World 
Bank for seven Tiger Reserves (including Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve) and two additional National Parks, 
across the country. 
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region rich in shale, sandstone and limestone (Das 1997). The rugged terrain, popularly 
referred to as the dangs (a hilly forested area), comprises a mosaic of rocky hills, deep 
valleys, plateaus and broken ground with an average elevation of 310 msl with the highest 
point at 923 msl. The Sanctuary is bound by the river Chambal (which separates the 
Sanctuary from the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh) to the south and river Banas 
to the west.  
 
The Reserve falls within the semi-arid zone of north-western India (Rodger & Panwar 
1988) with mainly scrub and dry-deciduous forest dominated by dhok (Anogeissus 
pendula). Other trees found here, include salar (Boswellia serrata), gurjan (Lannea 
coromandelica), palash (Monopserma butea) and ronj (Acacia leucophloea). The 
vegetation is also characterised by a predominance of ber (Ziziphus sp.) and Euphorbia sp. 
scrub, found mostly in the open areas. Once rich in faunal life, the Kailadevi Sanctuary 
now nurtures a depleted but important population of sloth bear, leopard, blue bull and 
hyena, besides other wildlife. Even though Kailadevi is part of the famous Ranthambhore 
Tiger Reserve, the local population of tigers is negligible compared to the healthier 
population in Ranthambhore National Park, to the south of the Sanctuary. In 2001, there 
were unconfirmed reports of sighting of  three tigers made by the Forest Department (FD) 
The main attraction of the Sanctuary are the khos (thickly forested valleys) that are 
considered to be rich reservoirs of floral and faunal diversity and play an important role in 
sustaining landscape-level biodiversity (FD 2000; Singh  2000; Das 1997).  
 
Until the 1980s, the forests of Kailadevi were subject to considerable pressure and 
exploitation. The British, and subsequently, the Government of India’s, forest policies 
have allowed the area to be extensively used for revenue (especially, timber extraction 
and charcoal making). Under the princely state of Karauli, the forests formed the hunting 
grounds of erstwhile kings, British officers and the royalty. The forest area was mined for 
shale and sandstone until 1985, an activity that still continues in the protected forests 
surrounding the Sanctuary. The forests were also home to the Moghiyas – a traditional 
hunter community. Their activities in the Sanctuary area were completely banned only in 
1990. The Moghiyas are known to have actively aided poaching activities in the area (FD 
2000, pers comm.). Apart from severely depleted wildlife, tree species like khair (Acacia 
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catechu) and karaya (Stericula urens), that were once common in this region, have now 
become rare due to commercial exploitation in the past8.  
 
Despite a history of exploitation and depletion, the forests of Kailadevi, continue to be a 
significant resource base for the communities living in and around the Sanctuary. The 
exact number of villages in and around the Sanctuary area is not accurately known. While 
a Project Tiger report
9
 stated 15 villages inside and 146 outside the Sanctuary area, in my 
own research (from 2000-2002) the number of villages inside the Sanctuary was fixed at 
36. Most villages are inhabited by multi-caste communities, dominated either by the 
Meena or the Gujjar communities. Meenas, classified as a Scheduled Tribe (ST) are 
considered to be mainly agriculturists while the Gujjars are an agro-pastoral community. 
Although both the communities are Hindus, the Gujjars are not considered within the fold 
of the Hindu caste system and are officially classified as Other Backward Classes (OBCs). 
According to a report10 prepared by the Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF) of 
Kailadevi Sanctuary, the area supported an estimated 987 households with a total 
population of 11,000 (Singh, 2000).  
 
Agro-pastoral activity is the mainstay of the local economy. The forests of the Sanctuary 
area are a source of fodder, fuel wood, and construction timber for the local communities. 
Life for the villagers in the Sanctuary is a harsh struggle for survival. Water is scarce and 
the region is prone to frequent droughts. Poor soil quality, small land holdings and 
scarcity of water makes the area unsuitable for agriculture. According to the Forest 
Department (Singh 2000), only 3.2% of the land area is available for agriculture, of which 
only 433.17 ha is irrigated. Pastoral activities, once widespread, have significantly 
declined over the years. In 2001, Project Tiger reported 52,730 heads of cattle dependent 
on the Sanctuary forests. Until recently, the Rebaries, a migrant sheep-herding 
community from western Rajasthan, were also dependent on these forests for fodder.  
 
Between 1996 and 1997 Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary became known for a community-
initiated forest protection institution, known locally as kulhadi bandh panchayat (literally, 
                                                
 
8 This section is drawn from Das (2007) and (Kothari et al. 1997) 
9 http://projecttiger.nic.in/ranthambhore.htm 
10 Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary: People's Participation in Biodiversity Conservation (unpublished) 
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axe-ban council). This initiative was brought to attention through an action-research 
undertaken at the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA),11 New Delhi (Das 
1997; Kothari et al. 1997). The IIPA research project formed a key component of the 
ongoing debate on participatory management of PAs in India, aptly called Towards 
Participatory Management of Protected Areas. The main aim of the IIPA project was to 
explore the scope for collaboration between communities and the state (represented by the 
Forest Department) for joint management in three selected PAs
12
 across the country. At 
the end of the research project, the IIPA team concluded that “the prospect of 
participatory or joint management in this PA (Kailadevi Sanctuary) seems very real” (Das, 
1997: 85). 
 
Within a short period of the research findings being published, kulhadi bandh panchayats 
(KBP) gained in symbolic import among the advocates of community-based conservation. 
It was added to the burgeoning evidence of the efficacy of community-based management 
being documented from other countries (See Ghai and Vivan 1992). This was followed by 
citation of kulhadi bandh panchayats as an example of effective successful community-
based conservation (Wadhwa 1996; Kothari et al. 2000; Fabricus 2001; Baviskar, 2003; 
Saberwal 2003).  
 
Equally significant, but with far greater consequences for the Government policy, was the 
selection of Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve as one of the sites for India Ecodevelopment 
Project (IEDP) in 1996. India Ecodevelopment Project became a part of the conservation 
debate in India at about the same time that Kailadevi Sanctuary and its unique kulhadi 
bandh panchayats were gaining in prominence. Although IEDP was not primarily a 
community-based conservation project, it had a mandate for engaging people’s 
participation in conservation. It aimed to foster biodiversity conservation by addressing 
both, 'the impact of local people on the Protected Area and the impact of the Protected 
Area on local people' (World Bank 1996). 
 
                                                
 
11 IIPA is an autonomous institution focussing on capacity building for good governance and civil society. 
It provides for the study of public administration, strengthening policy making, and for service delivery 
(http://www.iipa.ernet.in).  
12 Besides Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary, the other PAs were Dalma Sanctuary in Bihar and Rajaji National 
Park in Uttarakhand. 
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At the time of initiating field work for this thesis, two non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) were also operating in the Sanctuary: Society for Sustainable Development 
(SSD), based in Karauli adjacent to Kailadevi Sanctuary and Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) 
adjacent to Sariska Tiger Reserve.
13
 Both the agencies profess a mandate for ‘sustainable 
development’ and have undertaken government and donor-supported resource 
management projects with the local communities inside Kailadevi Sanctuary. The growth 
and expansion of these organisations in the area was simultaneous to the implementation 
of the India Ecodevelopment Project.  
 
Despite the presence of a thriving local institution like kulhadi bandh panchayats, the 
IEDP as well as the two NGOs, preferred to establish their own mandate for people’s 
participation by setting up new village-level institutions. The Forest Department (FD) set 
up Ecodevelopment Committees (EDCs) under IEDP while SSD and TBS set up Village 
Development Committees (VDC). In time, both the Forest Department and the NGOs 
staked claim on the institution of kulhadi bandh panchayat, as an example of the ‘success’ 
of their own initiatives at collaborative management.  
 
Unpacking the ‘Success’ of Participatory Conservation  
 
My association with Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary began in 1996-97 as a researcher 
working for the IIPA research project. At the time, when I started my field research and 
spent about a week in the village of Nibhera (among other villages), the area had not 
witnessed a single development project and the local NGOs were yet to make their 
presence felt. The animosity between the people and the Forest Department was fairly 
high. Under the IIPA project an attempt was made to hold a first-ever face-to-face 
meeting of the FD staff and a representative body of the villagers. However, the officials 
failed to put in an appearance despite agreeing to do so. 
 
In 2000 I revisited the area to commence my field work for this thesis, focusing primarily 
on Nibhera village. Having observed the possibility of participatory management in my 
                                                
 
13 Sarisak Tiger Reserve in Alwar District is about 126 km from Karauli, to the north of Kailadevi 
Sanctuary.  
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earlier association, I was keen to see whether the idea could actually be implemented. 
Especially enthused by the claim of ‘success’, I focused on how the processes of 
institutional building synergised with the people’s own attempt at protecting the forests 
through KBPs. I was particularly interested to know how institutionalised participation 
had affected the issues of access to resources that were at the heart of ‘people-wildlife’ 
conflict recorded by the IIPA project (Kothari et al. 1997).  
 
I soon became aware of the co-existence of contradictory and conflicting narratives 
regarding the activities and institutions set up by the NGOs and the FD in the village of 
Nibhera. Much of this narrative was expressed in the form of clarifications the villagers 
sought from me, which conveyed a sense of mistrust and uncertainty in the very 
institutions they were expected to be part of. Alongside the narrative of ‘success’ being 
articulated at different levels there were also murmurs of discontent. While on one hand 
‘people’s participation’ in the protection of forests through the ban-axe movement was 
being highlighted at academic and practitioners’ forums and in the media, on the other 
hand there were regular instances of clashes between the villagers and the FD over the 
cutting of trees.  
 
The contrast was even more keenly felt because between 2000 September and 2001 
January I was constantly moving between the villages in the Sanctuary and conferences 
and seminars on IEDP being held in Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan and Delhi. My Delhi 
visits also provided a chance for meeting and holding interviews with key functionaries 
associated with IEDP. I was simultaneously also meeting with staff of the NGOs 
operating in the Kailadevi Sanctuary area. 
 
In unravelling the contradictory practices and narratives on the participatory conservation 
in Kailadevi Sanctuary, the principal aim of this thesis is to analyse how participatory 
conservation initiatives work in a hitherto exclusionist context of Protected Area 
management; why are narratives of ‘success’ sustained despite the different agencies 
being aware of the contradicting realities; and what are the outcomes of such conservation 
projects for communities and conservation. 
 
With an actor-oriented approach this thesis looks at how each agency – the communities, 
Forest Department, NGOs, and the World Bank – engages with participatory conservation, 
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including in this particular case, kulhadi bandh panchayats. Through oral histories and 
ethnography of their organisational cultures, the processes of project implementation, 
inter and intra-agency interactions and the multiple domains of interaction outside of the 
project design, the thesis identifies various interests, stakes, compulsions and 
interpretations that inform the engagement of different agencies.  
 
The thesis aims to make a case for contextualising participatory conservation discourses, 
operations and outcomes within the broader political dynamics of Indian wildlife 
conservation as embodied in Kailadevi Sanctuary. The thesis argues that new paradigms 
and practices around participatory conservation in protected area management in India are 
built on foundations that remain deeply entrenched in past ideologies of conservation and 
power-relations between and within agencies. It shows how current global concerns with 
biodiversity conservation and participatory approaches, that involve international aid 
agencies and NGOs, offer a politically opportune platform for a renewed articulation of 
these conflicts.  
 
More importantly, arguing from the highly politicised context of environment and 
development embodied in the PA context in India, the thesis focuses on discourses of 
participatory conservation and their local level institutionalization, showing how these 
serve as an instrument of political opportunism working to the detriment of both, 
communities and conservation.  
 
Analytical Framework  
 
Political Ecology and the Politicized Environment  
Political ecology as a discipline is better defined by its distinct analytical approach rather 
than as a specific theory. Over the years, political ecologists have borrowed from an 
eclectic range of critical social theories to focus on politics in an effort to understand 
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environmental problems,
14
 as Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue, the need for political 
analysis is paramount in the measure that environment is politicised.  
 
The field of political ecology and anthropology are not necessarily distinct. In fact, the 
roots of political ecology emerged as a critical response to cultural ecology, a branch of 
anthropology popular in the 1960s and 1970s.15 Subsequent anthropological research and 
critical theory around development and environment, have significantly contributed to 
developing analytical complexities and depth of the field. Reflecting the umbilical links 
to anthropology, Bryant and Bailey (1997) observe that third world political ecology can 
be characterised as being geography based research field that nonetheless maintains 
strong links to anthropology and sociology. Many of the critical work in this field have 
come from anthropologists or sociologists (Colchester 1997; 1994; 2002; 2003; Moore 
1996; Horowitz 1987; 1990; Peluso 1992; 1993; Guha 1992; 1989; 1997; 2000; and 
Redclift 1984; 1987; 1992).  
 
For Blakie and Brookfield (1987) whose book Land Degradation and Society had a 
definitive influence in the development of the field and set the trend for much of the 
research that followed, the idea of political ecology combined “ecology with a broadly 
defined political economy” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 17). However, as many 
authors (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Peet and Watts 1996) have argued that much of the 
political-ecology research in the 1970s and 1980s, predicated on political economy, was 
characterised by economic determinism. According to Moore (1996) the political ecology 
of this period, influenced by neo-Marxism, was characterised by a “structural legacy”16 
and had insufficient politics.  
 
                                                
 
14 See Robbins (2004), Watts and Peet (1996) and Bryant and Bailey (1997) for an overview of how the 
discipline has evolved over the years and the range of research it has covered.  
15 Cultural ecology, also known as ecological anthropology, sought to explain the links between cultural 
form and environmental management practices in terms of adaptive behaviour within a closed ecosystem. 
As Robbins put it, within this field humans would be seen as a part of larger system, controlled by universal 
forces, energy, nutrient flows, calories and the material struggle for subsistence.  Notable in this area are the 
works of Steward (1955), Vayda and Rappaport (1968), Rappaport (1968). 
16 See Peet and Watts (1996) for a more detailed analysis and criticism of this landmark research by Blakie 
and Brookfield.  
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From the 1990s, however, political-ecology research has been driven by an engagement 
with the larger intellectual environment, drawing on a wide range of critical theories like 
post-structuralism, discourse theory, gender theory, environmental history, peasant 
studies, green materialism, and as Peet and Watts (1996: 9) add, “…the realities of a 
panoply of post-socialist transitional states”. 
 
The research in this field, in engaging more explicitly with politics, has varied from re-
theorising of political ecology in terms of Marxism, to relating politics in the domestic 
sphere (focusing on households and gender relations), to environmental conflicts. The 
studies have varied from what Peet and Watts (1996: 10) state are “…efforts at 
integrating political action – whether everyday resistance, civic movements, or organised 
party politics – into questions of resource access and control”, to “…the much needed re-
interrogation of the term ecology in terms of, not stability, but, chaotic fluctuations, 
disequilibria and instability”. Included within this ambit, is the field’s predominant focus 
on analysis and deconstruction of the discursive practices and discourse making around 
environmental concepts and issues, as well as, the institutional spaces of negotiation and 
contestations engaged in environmental conflicts.  
 
This thesis, focussing on the ‘politics’ of participatory conservation, draws on political 
ecology’s analysis of environmental problems as ‘politicised environments’. As Bailey 
and Bryant (1997: 28) state, “…central to the idea of politicised environment is the 
recognition that environmental problems cannot be understood in isolation from the 
political and economic contexts within which they are created”. This thesis, in locating 
the discourse on wildlife conservation, particularly participatory conservation, attempts to 
locate it in the historical perspective of the environmental regimes that have affected 
Kailadevi Sanctuary as well as in the current perspectives of international policies and 
politics of biodiversity conservation.  
 
In analysing a ‘politicised environment’ Bryant (1998) argues for an actor-oriented 
approach to understanding the politics of ecological conditions and crisis. In a politicised 
environment, statuesque is seen as an outcome of political struggles and interests; the 
emphasis is on the multiplicity of actors and interest that characterise these contexts. 
Arguing that environmental conflicts are conditioned as much by the micro-politics at the 
local level as by their ‘contextual sources’ involving broader actors – the state, 
 
 
21
international institutions, etc. Moore (1996) is of the opinion that political ecologists 
focus on both, situated local-level proximate actors and the non-placed actors operating at 
the regional, national or global level. Recognising the sheer variety of the stakes that may 
be involved in a context, Robbins (2004) argues that political ecologists would benefit 
from a ‘…broader examination of all producers of nature, including ministry chiefs, SUV 
drivers, forestry professionals as well as herders, farmers and wood cutters to traditional 
concerns’.  
 
In a politicised terrain of contesting actors, interpretations and agendas, what really 
defines the politics are the relations of power. Bryant (1998) suggests that power, for a 
political ecologist, is a key concept in the effort to specify the topography of a politicised 
environment; and analysing unequal power relations between the actors is central to the 
research of the Third World political ecology. Power dynamics in a politicised 
environment manifest in various ways – in attempting to control the access of other actors 
to diversity of environmental resource; in attempting to marginalise the weaker groups; in 
attempting to regulate ideas of environment; and in how environment problems are 
framed, prioritised, solutions proposed and resources allocated.  
 
Drawing on these analytical strands of political ecology, the thesis analyses the 
constituents of ‘politics’ in the working of the participatory conservation initiative in 
Kailadevi Sanctuary. Perhaps, seminal in this analysis is how environmental problems are 
framed; whose environmental narratives prevails; and what instruments of power and 
negotiation are operational in asserting these narratives. Notions like ‘conservation’ and 
‘participation’ in the context of PAs bear different meanings for different actors; politics 
lies in the process through which these disjunctive narratives are force-fitted into project 
frameworks, contested and imposed.  
 
‘Ethnography of Development’  
In analysing how participatory conservation projects work in a politicised environment, I 
have drawn specifically on the critical literature of anthropology of development. From 
the early 1990s the focus of anthropology of development, broadly defined as ‘socio-
scientific analysis of development as a cultural economic and political process’ (Grillo, 
1997: 2), has been to recognise the multiplicity of voices present in development – to 
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recognise that the development process that spans international organisations, nation-
states, civil society organisations and local communities is thought, spoken about and 
acted upon differently by different actors (Croll and Parkin 1992; Hobart 1993; Pottier 
1993)
17
  
 
The more dynamic understanding of this perspective, however, remained shadowed by 
according discourses a hegemonic and decisive role in development outcomes. This was 
influenced principally by the works of Escobar (1991; 1995) and Ferguson (1994) who 
borrowed on Foucault’s (1972), analysis of discourse i.e. statements and practices through 
which truth and legitimacy is created about certain referents, in order to bolster the 
interests of those participating in its making. Within this perspective, development is 
viewed as an efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of 
power over, the Third World (Escobar, 1991). For Escobar (ibid.), development is a 
‘discursive formation’, an instrument of neo-colonialism and thinking of its terms of 
discourse makes it possible to maintain the focus on domination. Thus, studies based on 
discourse theory considered development as a powerful and hegemonic process 
dominated by western ideologies, making victims of those on whom they are imposed; a 
means of extending state control.  
 
These perspectives of development studies have however been increasingly critiqued as a 
‘development myth’ (Grillo 1997) that sees development as a monolithic enterprise, 
heavily controlled from the top, all powerful and ‘beyond influence.’ Critics of the 
discourse theorists have analysed development not just as a policy but also as actors, 
organisations, cultures and processes. Within this framework, development enterprises are 
seen as being multi-vocal, multi-sited, and as interfaces between various actors and 
agencies where actors and agencies exert significant influence on outcomes (Long and 
Long 1992; Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Crewe and Harrison 1998; Long 2001; Mosse 1996; 
1998; 2001). The understanding on location and exercise of power is also more dynamic 
i.e. power positions are seen as relative and contextual.  
                                                
 
17 The idea of differential experiences and discourses of environment and management, that forms one of 
the core arguments of political ecology, largely owes its basis to anthropological research of Croll and 
Parkin (1992) that not only probed the existence of the multiple discourses of environment, but also talked 
of it in  relation to the ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’,  perspectives that were to dominate environment and 
development studies.  
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Much of these studies, influenced by an ‘actor-oriented ’approach (Long and Long, 1992; 
Long, 2001) have, as Mosse (2004: 666) puts it, a focus on ‘project interfaces’, or 
‘frontlines’, the life worlds of workers and the inter-locking of intentionality of the 
developers and the ‘to-be-developed.’ An actor oriented approach as argued by Long 
(1992: 5) enables one to study the multiple and co-existent realities of World Bank 
officials, technical experts, ministers, civil servants, councillors and functionaries, NGOs 
(from the North and South), local people (women and men), and even of a radical peasant 
leader.  
 
One of the principal advantages of these genres of research is the focus on everyday 
processes and practices of development initiatives, breaking down monotheistic 
representation of agency or power. Not only are there multiple ways of envisioning and 
analysing development problems and solutions (like most discourse theorists and other 
anthropological critiques), but also that the process of development itself is influenced 
and shaped by its multiple actors and agencies, besides by its most powerful actors and 
their policies (Long and Long, 1992; Crewe and Harrison, 1998), This also rejects the 
notion that development is guided by any single set of ideas or discourse (Grillo 1997). 
Within this perspective, development processes are not given a priori, but as they occur 
through the complex web of networks and relationships, as ‘complicated interactions’, 
and through the multiplicity of voices within it.  
 
The analytical framework of this thesis draws substantially from Mosse’s (2004; 2005) 
most recent and relevant contribution to the anthropology of development. Through 
detailing his observation of a donor-funded project in India, with which he had been 
associated for over twelve years, Mosse’s main aim is to show how development works.  
 
Mosse (2005: 3, citing works of Li 1999; Latour 2000 and Quarles van Ufford 1988a; 
1988b; 1993; 2003)) argues for a ‘new ethnography of development’ that “blurs the bold 
contours drawn by both rational planning and domination /resistance frameworks.” As 
Mosse (2004:644) states- “in a variety of ways the new ethnography of development is 
distinctly uncomfortable with monolithic notions of dominance, resistance, hegemonic 
relations and the implications of false consciousness among the developed (or 
developers)”. The new ethnographers, as Mosse argues, look not for the relations between 
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project prescription and its implementation but, at what the multiple agencies make of the 
‘authorised script’ or the ‘public transcript’ which are usually ‘something quite different’ 
(the hidden transcript). Ethnographer’s interests according Mosse should be in the 
relationship between the ‘monotheistic privilege’ of dominant policy models and the 
‘polytheism of scattered practices surviving below.’ 
 
An ethnographic approach to development practice in essence enables one to present 
more effectively the agency and perspective of the actors themselves. It therefore allows 
an understanding of the varying interests, the contests over them and the negotiation and 
collaboration involved between the multiple actors in securing their respective interests.  
The analytical framework of this thesis is very much in keeping with this new 
ethnographic approach to development. Taking an actor oriented approach, this thesis 
examines the rhetoric of policy, its success and the practices as ‘social processes’ – it 
looks at the who, how, what and why in analysing the practices and processes through 
which a community-initiative becomes the rallying point and a ‘success’ story.   
 
In analysing the narratives of success (by the different agencies) of kKulhadi bandh 
panchayat in Kailadevi, despite the existing contradictions, the thesis as a whole 
reinstates Mosse’s principal argument (2004:639)  
…although development practice is driven by a multi-layered complex of 
relationships, and the culture of organisations rather than policy, development 
actors work hardest of all to maintain coherent representations of their actions as 
instances of authorized policy, because it is always in their interest to do so.   
In analysing policy in practice, in unpacking how integrated conservation and 
development work, an ethnographic approach enables to focus more clearly on the key 
role that the development bureaucracy plays in shaping the outcomes. Equally examining 
state-led projects and the NGO initiatives, the thesis draws on Quarles van Ufford’s 
(1988a; 1988b) work, and the more recent work of Mosse (2005; 2004; Bebbington et al. 
2007), to accord a centrality to the politics engendered by the multi-agent and multi-
layered development bureaucracies on project formulations and its ground-level 
operations. In analysing why and how representations of ‘success’ serve the different 
actors, the thesis focuses specifically on the role and the compulsions of organisational 
culture, inter-organisational partnerships and the multiple levels of interface between the 
agents.  
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An ethnographic approach to development also enables a more nuanced and sophisticated 
analysis the agency of communities in the practice and outcome of projects. As Mosse 
(2005: 7) observes, fundamental to the new ethnography of development approach is that 
“governance brought by development schemes cannot be imposed; it requires 
collaborations and compromise” primarily because “success is fragile and failure a 
political problem.” Li (1999) argues that the need for enrolment of communities in the 
sustaining the representations of “success” affords them a certain political leverage. In the 
case of Kailadevi, while there is collaboration, it affords no direct political leverage. It is 
better interpreted within Scott’s (1985; 1990) framework of ‘everyday forms of 
resistance’. The thesis attempts to make a case for the complex realities and responses of 
‘conserving’ communities, who amidst their discursive categorisation and representation 
by donors, NGOs and the Forest Department, continue to strategise for survival; they 
have to find their negotiating spaces through choosing where and whose representation to 
endorse.  
 
In the context of participatory conservation in a PA, the thesis warrants a more complex 
understanding of policy discourse and its impact on practice. In the case of Kailadevi, it is 
argued that policy discourse and its disjuncture with existing field realities necessitate 
contradictions or make policy models un-implementable at the level of practice. By not 
taking into account the institutional culture and constraints of an organisation like the 
Forest Department, IEDP prescriptions end up having unrealistic expectations from it.  
 
Also while policy may not necessarily shape the practice, policy discourse itself is 
implicated in the politics of conservation. The discourse of policy (or policy ideas and the 
alliances it brings with it) have significant implications in foreclosing debates and 
possibilities on issues by not accounting for them in the very definition of the problem. In 
the case of IEDP, even as the idea of participation revolved around meeting livelihood 
needs, the issues of peoples right on land and resources were never a part of the project 
framework. It is as Mosse (2004: 663) notes “…policy discourse generates ‘mobilizing 
metaphors’ (in this case participation) whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of 
conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological differences, allow compromise 
and the enrolment of different interests.” (Emphasis in original)  
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Thus, if practice ultimately produces policy, i.e. interprets events to reinstate policy ideas, 
then the power of policy discourse to undermine the interest of the weak or allow the 
more powerful to retain their position is retained. For example, IEDP in its success story 
projected that people were willing to give up use of Sanctuary resources in return for 
development benefits from the project and thus meeting the clause of ‘reciprocal 
commitment’ as prescribed in project design. This ‘success’ of the policy model 
legitimizes similar measures for future policies on wildlife conservation and people’s 
access to resources. It reinforces the conservationist’s agenda to exclude people from the 
use of forest resources in lieu of petty infrastructural development benefits. Thus, as we 
shall see, although conservation policy ideas are negotiated through its practices, the 
‘public transcripts’ sustained by the powerful and subordinate, finally reinforce the 
function of policy as a dominant and legitimate discourse that enable expansion of state 
and bureaucratic control. Despite the participatory rhetoric and involvement of NGOs, the 
isolationist-conservation ideologies embodied in projects remain unchallenged. In my 
understanding, in this sense, while policy ideas may not directly drive implementation, 
they definitely underpin the direction in which the world of project-driven practice is 
moving.  
 
Fieldwork  
 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted in intermittent phases between September 
2000 and February 2002. The fieldwork in Kailadevi Sanctuary in general, and Nibhera 
village in particular, was conducted over three phases starting 2000 December – 2001 
March; 2001 May – July; 2001 December - 2002 February. The field work also included 
extensive interviews with the Rajasthan Forest Department, NGO representatives and 
other informants. Travel was also required to Jaipur and Bharatpur to access Forest 
Division Working Plans and other records. Archival research was done in the State 
Archives in Bikaner in October 2001. In the time away from fieldwork in Nibhera and 
Kailadevi Sanctuary, I also interviewed several policy makers, activists, Project Tiger 
officials and World Bank staff located mostly in New Delhi.  
 
This ethnographic study at the village level was conducted primarily in the village of 
Nibhera, considered an appropriate village to live in and study since it represented a 
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mosaic of interventions from the Forest Department, District Administration and NGO, 
besides the peoples own initiative in natural resource management. Both the NGO and the 
FD had a strong presence in the village. Nibhera was taken to be an example of a village 
where the implementation of the Ecodevelopment Committee (EDC) component of the 
IEDP was most successful, and as a result in all formal occasions conducted by the FD, 
the members of Nibhera EDC were invited to participate. The Society for Sustainable 
Development (SSD), the Karauli-based NGO had opened its field office in Nibhera, 
staffed by a Community Worker and a Project Coordinator, in order to implement one of 
its first development projects. This also enabled a level of acceptance for SSD in the 
Kailadevi area, which has since claimed to have implemented several activities related to 
empowerment of women, micro-finance, soil and water conservation and improving 
agricultural practices.  
 
Although the initial intention was to cover more than one village, given the nature of my 
study that required oral histories, understanding of the nuanced interaction between the 
communities, the conduct of FD and NGO work at the village level and an understanding 
of the ‘hidden script’ of village response and action, the long-term stay and study of a 
single village was preferable. Following incidents and events connected to Nibhera’s 
resource management and issues related to the FD, I also spent several days in the 
villages of Chauria Khata, Lakhruki, Rahar and Morechi.  
 
It is important to mention the multiple positionalities that evolved during the course of 
research spanning multiple sites and agencies. The politics of position was intrinsic to 
framing of my research as well as practice. My association with the area in general and 
the village Nibhera in particular, as part of the IIPA research in 1996-1997 had a 
significant impact on the initial fieldwork and responses. My role during the IIPA 
research was both that of a researcher as well as of advocate of participatory management 
of natural resources.  
 
So far as the Rajasthan Forest Department was concerned, I was seen as an actor ‘on the 
side of the people’. This was largely due to the fact that during the course of my IIPA 
research, that entailed short periods of stay in the villages, I had intervened in several 
conflicts between the Department and the people and had been in a position to influence 
outcomes in the favour of the villagers. One of the fallout was that it was made 
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mandatory that I seek formal approval from the highest authority, the Principal Chief 
Conservator of Forests (PCCF), Rajasthan Forest Department, Government of Rajasthan, 
to conduct my research. This delayed my village stay almost by three months in 2000-
2001. As part of the permission subsequently granted, it was required that I be 
accompanied by a Forest Guard at all times and submit a quarterly report to the 
Department. This need was, however, dispensed with by default, although it did 
significantly affect my research with the local Forest Department at Karauli. Accessing 
data and information from the Department was a long negotiated process. Certain 
documents like the India Ecodevelopment Project registers were not made available to me 
even to the very end of my research in 2002. The fact that I had access to the 
Ranthambhore National Park headquarter in Sawai Madhopur, threatened the local 
officials of Kailadevi who feared that I would report the discrepancies in implementation 
of Project activities to their superiors.  
 
It is for this reason that although the local officials were cordial, they were often guarded 
in what they said in my presence. It was almost after six months from the start of my 
research that I was able to establish an informal relationship with some of the officials, 
when they felt assured that I posed no threat to them and the information they shared 
would be confidential and not shared with higher officials. Also, in time I was able to 
establish a good rapport with local level Forest Department staff. This was primarily 
because I had earned their respect, as a single woman staying under difficult conditions in 
the field. The responses from the officials at Sawai Madhopur were conditioned by their 
position on the Project and their perception of my previous role as an advocate of 
people’s participation. Consequently, officials who were against the ecodevelopment 
approach and its implementation in the Sanctuary were more forthcoming in giving me 
information and documentation of the actual process of implementation. In the 
interpretation and representation of the Departments perspectives, every effort was made 
to corroborate these with documentary evidence. I have also allowed, as far as possible, to 
bring the voices of the officials and allow the narrative to speak for itself.  
 
So far as the villagers were concerned, the research was affected by other positionalities. 
To begin with I was perceived as a person with some influence and position. Associating 
me with my previous visits to the area (during my IIPA related research), not only was I 
seen as someone who had both access and ability to talk to the Department officials but 
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also a person with ‘means’, including the ability to pay for hiring vehicles (in which I 
travelled for the fieldwork) and organise large meetings which included paying for meals. 
It was difficult to explain that my presence and activities were not funded by me but by 
the organisation on whose behalf I had conducted the research. I was also credited with 
enabling the growth of the local NGO. As explained in Chapter 5, the head of the local 
NGO had initially facilitated my field visits during the IIPA research. In 1996 he was an 
independent researcher and a journalist. Subsequent to the IIPA work he established his 
own organisation18. Since the activities of the NGO followed the IIPA project, the 
villagers had assumed that I was somehow associated with setting it up. Thus, at the 
initial stage in 2001, despite explaining my purpose for the stay in the village, the 
villagers had already made several assumptions and also had several expectations. It was 
almost after two months of staying in the village continuously, was I able to effectively 
explain the purpose of my visit and was accepted as a person who was interested in their 
social history and forest dependency. However, till the end of my stay in the area, I 
remained their reliable source of knowledge for the activities of the NGO and the FD in 
the village, as well as a confidante and advisor of their own strategies and responses to 
the external agencies. I saw this as a useful service to render for the largesse and 
hospitality of the village communities. Given the gross misinformation and 
misconception about the India Ecodevelopment Project and its impacts on the lives of the 
villagers, I was inadvertently both a researcher and an activist.  
 
My gender also played a significant influence on the process and outcome of the research. 
As mentioned in the later chapters, women in this area have no acceptance in public 
spaces and forums. As a woman researcher, who was willing to stay in a remote village 
unaccompanied by any man, was not easily accepted by the men of the village. For 
almost two months most men would not even make eye contact with me nor speak to me 
directly. It was the women of the village who allowed me to be a part of their social 
context. I was extremely, and sometimes painfully, cautious of how I negotiated my role 
between being a woman of acceptable social probity and one who nonetheless had to 
move beyond that to be able to part of other forums and contexts. These included those 
from which women were barred such as gatherings of men and their local panchayats. 
After the second month of my stay, an evening meeting was called comprising the village 
                                                
 
18 See Chapter 5 for details.  
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elders and it was declared that I was a person of “good character” and therefore 
acceptable to village. Things changed dramatically thereafter. It was accepted that I 
would meet with men and be a part of their meetings. In fact the elderly and influential 
men of the village would facilitate my participation in the various forums. For example, 
although women are not allowed on the dais on which the informal panchayats are 
conducted, they would arrange for a chair for me to sit close to it so that I could be a part 
of the meeting.  
 
Aware of my multiple positions, the process of research and its interpretation was a 
continuous process of triangulation and corroboration. It was also a process of being alert 
for who was saying what to me and why. So far as possible, in the production of 
knowledge in this thesis, I have tried to let the narratives speak for themselves and not 
arrive at pre-conceived conclusions and judgements. Also I made every effort during the 
course of the research to translate my core findings, as well as important official 
documents, and share it with the researched communities. But it also needs to be stated, 
that while discussions on the findings with the communities, NGO and Forest Department 
were debated, challenged and agreed on, not much of the written material was ever read. 
 
Perhaps the perspective on the NGOs in chapter five can be accused of being harsh and 
biased. This however was inadvertent as findings and evidence lent themselves to such 
interpretations. In many ways I was both an insider and an outsider so far the local NGO 
was concerned. The local NGO, SSD and TBS were both known to me through the IIPA 
research. At that point in time they were perceived by us (the IIPA team) as ideal 
organisations that were working on issues of social justice and development of the village 
communities. Thus, during my doctoral research, both organisations continued to present 
themselves to me in the same vein. I was asked to represent the NGO in their presentation 
to mission teams of donors and other visitors. I also helped them with their 
documentation of case studies that I have discussed in Chapter 5. I, however also shared a 
home with the other staff of the NGOs and who, in time, became my friends. 
Consequently, and inadvertently, I was made aware of the discrepancies between the 
public stance and the private stance of the NGOs as well as of the outright malpractices of 
the NGO in terms of expenditure and implementation of the programmes. I also became a 
confidante of the villagers for their grievances against the NGOs functioning at the 
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village level meetings and their private negotiations with influential individuals outside of 
the meetings.  
 
The findings of the research, especially the position I have taken vis-à-vis the Department 
and the NGOs, was shared with agencies as well as made available in the public domain 
through a publication (Das 2007). Both organisations have not challenged the emerging 
perspectives; they have instead chosen to ignore it as misinformed views and therefore 
unimportant.  
 
Nibhera - The ‘Sanctuary Village’ 
 
Nibhera spread over 6,190 ha, is among the larger villages in the Sanctuary. Owing to the 
presence of vast stretches of forest enclosed within its boundaries and because of its size, 
the FD considers Nibhera as an important ‘sanctuary village’ from a conservation 
perspective. It represents an area which has high ecological value on one hand and a high 
level of human dependence on the other. Sanctuary villages also lack facilities like road, 
transport and electricity. A single metalled road (all others are seasonal) runs through the 
Sanctuary connecting Kailadevi and Karanpur, the two famous ‘temple towns’19 of the 
region. These are also the nearest and the most important trade centres, markets and 
health centres for the villages in and around the Kailadevi Sanctuary. A 3 km dirt track 
connects Nibhera to the metalled road from where Kailadevi is 22 km and Karauli about 
45 km away. The nearest railhead is at Gangapur about 120 km from the Kailadevi 
Sanctuary. The only means of transport in the areas are public and private buses and jeeps 
that ply on the metalled and provide erratic and limited services.  
 
In Nibhera a primary level school has existed for over 30 years but began functioning 
properly only in 1990. In 1997 a middle school was introduced, but until 2001 only seven 
boys were enrolled, despite the fact that the school was meant to cater to eight 
neighbouring villages. Students are reported to have dropped out after middle school 
because of the absence of senior schools in the area. Very few families send their wards 
                                                
 
19 These are not proper townships. However because they have become important as religious and pilgrim 
sites, they attract several hundreds of thousands of devotees every year and they have a lot of infrastructure.  
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to complete schooling in towns further away. There was no comprehensive data available 
on the literacy rates in this area. According to 2001 census information, less than 30% of 
men and 15% of women in Nibhera were literate.  
 
Being a part of the dang and characterized by semi-arid climatic conditions, Nibhera 
suffers from acute shortage of water. Water is intricately tied to their main sources of 
livelihood - agriculture and pastoralism. Scarcity of water affects crop production, fodder 
production and availability of drinking water for both human and cattle population. 
Drinking water is accessed from seven hand pumps in the village, of which only two were 
functional in 2001. The absence of these infrastructural facilities has been used as an 
index of ‘under-development’ of the dang, and a way to define the area and its people in a 
negative perspective both by the people and by external agencies (See Chapters 3).  
 
The multi-jati community of Nibhera 
Nibhera comprises of several jati (caste) communities. Of the 127 households in Nibhera 
65 are of Gujjars. The other caste groups include: Brahmans (priests) 14 households; Nai 
(barber) 6 households; Teli (oil makers) 8 households; Dom (drum beaters) 4 households; 
Chamar or Bairva (shoe makers) 23 households; Lohar or Badai (carpenters & 
blacksmiths) 2 households; and Bhangi (untouchables) 5 households.  
 
Nibhera comprises six hamlets (pura of dhani).
20
 Between these hamlets there are also 
two bastis (settlements that come up between hamlets). Two of the hamlets, Mulla and 
Beech Ka, are at a distance of 100 m from each other while Jheelan and Bhattin are 
located about 500 meters from the main village.  
 
The settlement pattern of these hamlets and the village as a whole is clearly divided along 
caste lines. Jheelan ka Pura and Bhattin ka Pura comprise only of Gujjar households. 
Mulla and Beech ka are larger and more scattered as compared to the above two hamlets 
and are mixed caste settlements. However, within these hamlets the houses of any 
                                                
 
20 The inaccessibility of the hamlets of Bandhan ka Pura and Macchin Ki determined that much of the 
fieldwork undertaken as part of the study was restricted to four hamlets and two bastis that were within 
walking distances of each other. Also, although counted as the revenue village of Nibhera, these two 
hamlets functioned as two separate villages. Their socio-political system was independent of Nibhera.  
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particular caste group are located in clusters, close to each other. Most of the houses of 
Brahmans, Nais, Telis, Badai and some houses of the Gujjars are located in Beech ka 
Pura. Mulla has a more predominant population of the Gujjars. Only towards the outer 
limits of the pura the Doms and a few families of the Brahmans have set up their 
clusters.21 The Bairva basti is located between Beech ka and Mula, and makes the two 
hamlets contiguous. The Bhangi basti is located at considerable distance from the Bairva 
basti, towards the southern limits of the habitation area.  
 
The clustering of a community takes place around kinship ties. As put by the villagers, 
the clans (kutumb pariwar) are constituted of brothers related through their kaka-baba 
(father’s younger and older brother respectively). These ties are referred to as bhai bandi 
(brotherhood ties). Within a hamlet or a basti, the immediate family ties are marked out 
from the extended kinship ties by a clear physical space. The houses of the male sibling 
are always enclosed within the same compound. This unit of settlement is known as a 
bakher. In a hamlet a villager often communicate kin ties to an outsider by referring to the 
bakher, he or she belongs to. 
 
Consistent with the anthropological scholarship on the contemporary understanding of, 
caste, relations in the village reflect both a sense of continuity and change (Beteille 1991; 
Fuller 1996). Evidence of existence of ‘traditional’22 caste values is found in the 
adherence to the commensal restriction between the jatis. These restrictions pertaining 
mainly to eating of kaccha (uncooked or cooked in water, not oil) food, water and sharing 
of bidi (tobacco), formed the basis of a hierarchical ranking in which the villagers place 
the various jatis.
23
 According to this ranking, Brahmans are the highest, followed by the 
Gujjars. Badai, Lohar, Teli and Nai are in the middle level, followed by Doms and 
                                                
 
21 The village has moved to its current location only in the last forty years. Earlier it was located closer to 
the valley and overlooked the Kho. In the old settlement, the village was smaller and fortified stone walls 
with a few opening, much in the style of cities built by the erstwhile rulers of Karauli. People claim that in 
that settlement, the caste groups were never scattered. Each group had a definite cluster. It is in the process 
of moving over a period of 40 years that the houses have got scattered 
22 ‘Traditional’ is often used to refer to the caste ranking and values embodied in the Brahmanical ideology 
of caste as hierarchical system based on the principles of purity and pollution, elaborated in Dumont’s 
(1980) work.  
23 This ranking is acknowledged in conformation to the village polity in public forums but not necessarily 
accepted. The Bhangis, Chamars and Doms consider the adherence to this ranking and the commensal 
restrictions as an attribute of the illiterate and uneducated aging population of the upper castes; a part of 
their ‘village mentality.’ The Gujjars, on the other hand, while asserting the superiority to the castes lower 
to them, also contest the superiority of the Brahmans.  
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Bairvas. Bhangis are the lowest. Marriages take place only between the same castes; there 
is both village exogamy as well as sub-caste (gotra) exogamy.  
 
In Nibhera, the local narratives on the past culture do allude to the existence of a jajmani 
system, with the Gujjars as the principal jajmans. However it seems the system served 
well in the barter economy where most jatis were committed to their caste occupation. In 
the current scenario however, most jatis have given up their caste occupations and have 
gained access to other forms of livelihood and wage earning opportunities. The most 
prominent patron client relationship that continues is between the Brahmans and the 
Gujjars. The Brahmans serve as family priests to the Gujjars. On auspicious occasions in 
the household, the patrons Gujjars symbolically worship their family priests, feed them 
and give them gifts of clothes, money and grain.24 The sanctity of this relationship is 
reflected in the significance it has acquired in the current conflict in the village. The other 
jajmani relations are tenuous and inconsistent, evoked mainly during marriage and death 
ceremonies. 
 
Bayly (1999: 324) in analyzing the changing nature of caste relations in recent times, 
concludes that irrespective of the variability and fluidity in the ‘pecking order’, a 
distinction between high and low or ‘clean’ from ‘unclean’ caste continue to operate 
among several caste communities. The caste relations in Nibhera are consistent with this 
analysis. Conformation to the local ranking, though not so apparent in the everyday social 
interaction between the jatis, is evident mainly in the village ritual life. The logic of 
commensal restriction hinging on issues of purity and pollution is often hinted at rather 
than asserted.
25
 But the most visible pollution barriers continue to be maintained against 
                                                
 
24 See Raheja (1988; 1989) for a complete discussion on the jajmani relationship and its political and ritual 
significance in structuring caste relations. Raheja analyses the jajmani relations of the Gujjars of Pahansu 
village in UP to counter Dumont’s (1980) understanding of caste-relations as being strictly hierarchical; an 
aspect purely of the religious domain and one that accorded Brahman all ritual supremacy.  
25 The distinction between ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ caste became apparent through an incident in which I 
became implicated in a caste-row in the village. Because of the availability of separate room to house 
myself, I had opted to stay with a Brahman family. In the initial days of my field work, I was keen not to be 
identified with the Brahmans alone, and made it a point to visit all the communities and spend time 
introducing myself and establishing a rapport. On one such occasion I had accepted tea in the Chamar 
settlement. Nothing was told to me but the Brahman and Gujjar took offence that the Chamars, taking 
advantage of an outsider, had dared to breach the commensal restrictions of their community. I was never 
again offered anything either to eat or drink by the Chamar community. The idea of offering tea to an 
outsider and its acceptance are the many ways through which the Chamar community contests the ranking 
and discrimination without challenging the village authorities directly.  
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the Bhangis. Because of the existing taboo against touching the Bhangis, other than 
Bairvas and Doms, all other caste groups maintain a physical distance from them. The 
settlement of the Bhangis, for the same reason, is located at a distance from the main 
village settlement.  
 
Articulation of caste inequality and discrimination were rare in public forums because of 
growing awareness of the legislations against such acts (cf. Fuller 1996). The Chamars 
and Bhangis had used these legal provisions against caste-based discrimination to get 
access to the village pond. Also, some upper caste members in the area have had 
defamation suits filed against them by the Schedule Caste groups. There have also been 
certain movements by the larger jati samaj of Chamars and Doms in the area to 
consciously dissociate from their traditional caste occupation, considered a prime maker 
of their inferior position.  
 
As several scholars
26
 have observed in the context of caste in contemporary rural India, 
caste is only one aspect of social relations evident in Nibhera. It overlaps and at times is 
supplanted by other important aspects of their social relations. For instance, despite 
obvious attempts at rejecting, and covert attempts at contesting their caste ranking, the 
Chamars, still desist from openly challenging the claimed superiority of the other castes. 
This is not because of their position in the caste hierarchy, but because they are obliged to 
the upper-caste through debt relations. The identity of the village as a social unit remains 
central to dealing with the conflicts that arise with other villages in the area. At the level 
of the village, the communities come together on issues that pertain to the village as a 
whole, including inter-personal and inter-community disputes. These matters are usually 
dealt by the informal (non-state) village administration, referred to as the nyaya 
panchayat
27 (justice panchayat) comprising heads of the village called patels.28  
 
There are also other forms of cooperation between the communities. There is a form of 
communal labour referred to as lahas. For instance, when a new roof is laid on an 
individual’s house, he calls for lahas, wherein one male member from each family 
contributes his labour. In turn the host family holds a feast. Lahas is also a form of 
                                                
 
26 See Bayly (1999) 
27 See Chapter 3 for details.   
28 Patel is a title given to senior members who represent their communities in the panchayat meetings. 
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displaying social solidarity and most households, if not in conflict with the host family, 
feel obliged to attend. Also in an economy marked by resource scarcity, pooling labour to 
maximize output has created alliances across castes. There are close associations between 
some of the Gujjar and Chamar families whose fields are adjacent to each other and who 
have pooled capital and labour to build and maintain a common water source for 
agricultural use.  
 
Political Hierarchy and Conflicts Within  
More relevant than caste is the status of the communities in the political hierarchy of the 
village. The positions in this hierarchy while related to caste have been re-defined by 
other markers--education, changing economic circumstance and proximity to centres of 
power in the outside world.  
 
Politically, Gujjars wield the maximum power in the village. Their political dominance is 
rooted in the fact that their ancestors (Gujjars of Jheelan) founded the village and were 
responsible for conducting some of the affairs of the Karauli princely state at the village 
level. Nibhera was a khalsa village, under the ryotwari29 tenure, paying its revenue 
directly to the princely State. At the village level a member of the Gujjar community was 
responsible for the collection of revenue and was conferred the title of mehte. As the head 
of the village and the officially appointed representative, a mehte was held in great 
respect in the village and also fulfilled several social obligations at the village level. 
Although the role of a mehte was made redundant after Independence, the Gujjars often 
refer to the title in reinforcing the fact the village is essentially a Gujjar village and the 
other caste thrived mainly as service providers.  
 
In the present set up, the mehte continue to fulfil their social responsibility but do not 
enjoy the same kind of political powers. The leadership position of the patels is as 
prominent today as it was earlier. In the earlier days patels were given authority for their 
wisdom, fairness of judgment and the respect they commanded in the region. In this 
respect too, the Gujjars are dominant. Some of the best-regarded patels from the bygone 
era had been Gujjars from Jheelan. Although, some of the descendants continue to carry 
                                                
 
29 Prevalent in some parts in parts of British India, under ryotwari tenure, the land taxes were directly 
collected from the cultivator (ryot)  
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the mantel, the criteria for their political prominence have changed. They are now judged 
by levels of education, oratory skills and proximity to formal political and bureaucratic 
systems.  
 
The most respected patels amongst the Gujjars are Bhanta of Jheelan and Govind Gujjar 
of Bhattin. Bhanta is the only individual of his age who has studied up to class 12. He is 
considered to be knowledgeable about village history, Gujjar ancestry and duniya ke 
baatien (affairs of the world). He has been regularly dealing with the district 
administration on matters pertaining to the village. Govind, although only educated up to 
5
th
 grade, has worked outside of the village and has access to the local FD with whom he 
has worked in various capacities. There are other senior members of the village who 
speak with authority on issues within the village, but always look to either Bhanta or 
Govind for the final word. The Gujjars have the maximum number of patels and tend 
therefore to dominate most village meetings. Both Govind and Bhanta were also amongst 
my key informants.  
 
The only other caste group that contend with the force of the Gujjars are the Brahmans. 
They are much fewer in number. Even though some of the families have lost their 
economic affluence, at one time the Brahmans were economically equally strong. The 
position that the Brahmans enjoy partly follows from the fact that their forefathers were 
among some of the most highly regarded patels. More importantly, especially under the 
current circumstances, their political status comes from their access to state run political 
mechanisms. One of the Brahman families has held the position of the sarpanch for many 
generations.  The other important patel among the Brahmans is Kirori Pandit, my earlier 
host and a key informant. He enjoyed popularity because one of school-mates had been 
elected a member of the state legislative assembly (MLA). With his aid Kirori Pandit had, 
on many occasions, been able to get several development projects for the village. Because 
of this Kirori was also well acknowledged among district officials.  
 
What works further in the favour of the Brahmans, is what Srinivas (1991: 308) identifies 
as “…an element of dominance which is becoming increasingly important in rural India, 
namely, the number of educated persons in a caste and the occupations they pursue.” 
Amongst the younger generation, the Brahmans are by far the most educated. Jagdish 
Sharma, the primary school teacher (and my host), has completed a college degree. Radha 
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Raman the other younger Brahman boy was in the second year of college and nurtured an 
ambition of becoming a sarpanch (elected village council head) some day. In terms of 
occupation five Brahman households had family members in government jobs within the 
village itself (two primary school teachers, one post man and one post master).  
 
The Chamars, amongst the poorest in the village, also have a significant population. Their 
social and economic position parallels their political position. The Chamars have had 
influential patels in the past but were not held at par with the other patels. Their political 
position within the village remains subordinated despite the fact that the current sarpanch 
of the village is from their community. Buddu Chamar (also a key informant) won the 
elections on reserved seat for the scheduled castes. The other caste groups were unwilling 
to recognise the authority accrue to the position. The Gujjars and Brahmans claim that his 
win was incidental and purely because they chose to throw their weight behind him. They 
contended that he is a weak leader and on his own merit he would have stood a chance. 
They argue that they supported him not because of his merit but because they wanted the 
seat of the sarpanch to remain in the village. The Chamars never assert themselves 
politically, except when they are discussing issues among their own community. They are 
diffident and as mentioned earlier indebted to most of the high caste communities. Thus 
they prefer to take a neutral stand although they feel strongly about the discrimination 
they experience.  
 
The communities of Telis and Doms because of low numerical strength feel unable to 
take a position on any of the conflictful issues in the village. Unlike Doms who tend to 
avoid the panchayats, the Telis make their presence felt. Bhangis are conspicuous by their 
absence in any political forum of the village. The five households of the Bhangis all 
belong to a single family. Goat rearing enables them to hold their own economically.  The 
younger generation prefers to keep themselves out of the village politics rather than face 
symbolic social discrimination.  
 
The political positioning of the Nais defies both their caste position and their numerical 
strength. They have only three household and are economically poor. Nonetheless, their 
presence in the village leadership is quite significant of the achievements of individual 
personalities. Bhairon Lal Nai always represents his community. He is very vocal and 
politically keen. He draws his strength from the fact that his family has always been 
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favoured by the FD and can interact with district officials. He is considered 
knowledgeable, clever and crafty by the other communities. He is always consulted by 
the influential patels of the village. Further, one of his sons, a young lad of 17, worked as 
a Community Worker with SSD. Their influence notwithstanding, the Nais stay in 
deference with the upper caste.  
 
It is important to point out that the nyaya panchayat (justice panchayat) serves as the 
public space where the social and political hierarchies are played out. The meetings are 
held in a raised platform call anthain (seat of judgment) and one is not allowed to show 
disrespect to it. The position that the various communities occupy on the anthain clearly 
indicates the social and the political position of the communities. For instance, the 
Brahmans and the Gujjars always sit on the forefront. The members of the other castes, 
barring a few, always take positions behind them. The Chamars are not allowed to sit on 
the anthain at all and the Bhangis never attend the nyaya panchayat. Women are also not 
allowed to attend proceedings of the nyaya panchayat. 
 
Between the communities, the political and social hierarchies are always a source of 
discontentment and conflict. This is also because as Fuller (1996: 13) notes that although 
caste inequalities are less articulated or apparent in public domains, “…relational 
hierarchical values as expressed in purity rule remain salient in private domestic domain.” 
For example, although Buddu Chamar is allowed to enter Masterji’s house, he is only 
allowed to sit on a chair in the inner courtyard of the house, he is never offered the cot 
(khat) to sit on, he is served tea in a glass earmarked for use only by him and has to rinse 
it himself before leaving. As differences between the castes are narrowed in the economic 
and political arena, such symbolic markers are used to reinstate ranking in the village’s 
social contexts.   
 
 Chamars never openly challenge any of the upper caste but constantly rail against their 
discriminatory practices. Some of their elders, led especially by Buddu, the current 
sarpanch, are acutely aware of their rights and privileges as a reserved category. They 
grudge the upper caste their economic affluence and understand that their state of 
impoverishment is more on account of the social exploitation in the past. Their 
constitutional and political empowerment has considerably narrowed the scope for their 
exploitation. Most of the other castes are highly contemptuous of the Gujjars. They feel 
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totally dominated by them and even accuse them of being thieves and liars. This is 
especially articulated in the context of agricultural land encroachment and acquisition of 
buffaloes. They are also accused of conducting unfair nyaya panchayat and of practising 
partisan politics.  
 
At the time of this field work, Nibhera was divided over a dispute between the Gujjars 
and the Brahmans. The conflict started over a land dispute between Bhanta Gujjar of 
Jheelan and Kirori Pandit of Beech Ka. Over the years it has snow balled into a serious 
caste conflict, inviting the intervention of their jati samaj. The Gujjars have declined the 
purohit (priest) services from the Brahmans. The Gujjars and the Brahmans no longer 
participate in each other’s social functions or eat together.  The other smaller castes, like 
the Telis, the Nais and the Badai and Doms have rallied their support around the 
Brahmans. Individually these communities may have at some point had issue with Gujjars 
and have felt unable to garner the support. By rallying around the larger alliance of the 
Brahmans they felt that they will be able to use the support to address the grievances they 
have against the Gujjars. This factionalism is often referred to as palti bazi. Although 
both communities are unwilling to give up their position on the issue, they agree that this 
kind of factionalism adversely affects the potentials of ‘development’ (vikas) of their 
village.  The extent to which these conflicts are reflected in people’s engagement with the 
development workers and forest department officials will be reflected in the various 
chapters that are to follow.   
 
Livelihoods 
Multiple occupations and multiple resource dependence marks the livelihood practices of 
the people of Nibhera. The communities are mainly agro-pastoralist, dependent on 
agriculture, cattle and goat rearing. The resources of the Sanctuary are absolutely crucial 
for their livelihood and the presence of the FD has further accentuated the existing short 
fall of resources. 
 
The communities’ dependence on the resources of the Sanctuary has been dynamic in 
nature, dictated by the larger social, political and climatic history of this region. Thus 
although there are strains of continuity to be found, the above factors have affected 
significant changes in their livelihood as it was practiced at the time of this research. 
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Pastoral activities have declined and agriculture has intensified and the pressure on 
agricultural land is increased manifold. While forests continue to be the main sources of 
timber and firewood, market products have increasingly substituted other forest products. 
Both the above features are discussed at length in Chapter 3. Here I will only elaborate 
some of the other significant feature of their livelihood- dependence on non-resource 
based options.  
 
Among non-resource based options, wage earnings are considered most critical for 
survival. Salaried jobs, contractual jobs, borrowing and loans were part of the everyday 
economy of some of the communities. These means have emerged as an alternative to 
forest-based livelihoods that have over time become inadequate to meet all needs. Hence 
if livelihood needs of the people have to be understood in its entirety, these sources have 
to be understood properly, especially because the various communities have differential 
access to resources, and the lower end of the wealth continuum depend more on the non-
resource-based sources.  
 
Wage labour (majuri) is a critical means of survival for large number of families in the 
village. With a short supply of resources and frequent droughts, more and more families 
(especially the poor and average income families) are substantially dependent on wages 
for their livelihood. For most of the Bairva community wages contribute to more than 50% 
of their livelihood and there are people like Bhagbati Rana a 30 year old Dom who 
claimed that 75 paisa of every rupee that he spent was earned as wages.  
 
Within the village people worked as daily wagers for the civil works that the panchayat, 
the NGO and the FD offered in the village. This is primarily in the form of manual labour 
for the construction and repair of watershed structures. The villagers earned 
approximately Rs. 45 for eight hours of work. These opportunities, being subject to the 
sanctioning of works were not a dependable source. Agriculture is a more substantial 
source of wages. There is usually an exchange of labour between families referred to as 
goi. Families with less land prefer to work for wages rather than exchange labour. They 
are hired by neighbouring villages as well. The wages for agriculture are kept at a low of 
Rs.20 so that people can afford to hire. Sometimes wages are paid in kind, in the form of 
measures of wheat and rice. 
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The real wage opportunities are to be had outside Kailadevi Sanctuary. Many young men 
from the poorer families of the Gujjars and Chamars stay away for months working as 
labourers in stone quarries operating in the areas adjoining the Sanctuary.30 Working as 
unskilled labourers these men earned up to Rs.7-8,000 over a period of 3-4 months. Every 
year, about 20-30 people, in the age group 17 – 35, travel out further, to distant cities in 
Rajasthan, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi. They work as 
domestic helps, construction labourers and as ‘stone setters’ (setting marbles on floorings 
of houses and offices). As skilled labourer one earned Rs.200 a day. Living in groups and 
on minimal expenses in the cities, they were able to save between Rs.10-14,000 over a 
period of 4-6 months. For some families back in Nibhera, these remittances are the only 
source of income.   
 
Until recently wage labour was always looked at as the occupation of the poor and the 
lower castes. The Brahmans and Jujus never had anybody work for wages. However the 
need for cash income to survive is pushing all communities towards wage labour of one 
kind or the other. As Kerri Pundit commented- “nowadays everybody does wage labour; 
we would have starved otherwise in these days of droughts”. Working as a daily wage 
labourer in the village was considered to be less respectful than working in the distant 
cities. Thus with the exception of one young Brahmin man , who is very poor and works 
in and around the village, most Brahman families dependent on wages, have their boys 
working in distant cities. Most wage earning members of Jujus work in the mines. Only 
about 4 Gujjar men work in the distant cities; unless compelled to, Jujus do not like 
sending men too far from their homes. The younger generation of the big landholders 
(bad jot) and the large cattle owners also look towards availing of wage earning 
opportunities. As Radheshyam Gujjar, a badjot and owner of 12 buffaloes put it—“when 
we have less work in the fields we do majuri, who dislikes cash (rupiya) these days”.  
 
Women earning wages was also common and was considered a critical input to the family 
economy. Women worked only in Nibhera and the nearby villages. Given the importance 
of wage earnings, norms regarding the restriction on women’s mobility were changing, 
                                                
 
30 This region is rich in shale and sandstone, which is quarried and exported to other parts of the country. 
On the declaration of the Sanctuary, most mines inside the Sanctuary were abandoned.  
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even at the cost of earning the disapproval of the elders in their communities. Sharda a 
young Brahmin woman counters the opinion of the elders- 
Let it not look good what can I do? If I don’t do majuri how will my family fill 
its stomach? I have three little children to feed and only some un-irrigated land. I 
have no cattle. Will they look after me?  
In fact the projects that the various agencies were carrying out in the village were 
appreciated more for the wage opportunities they generate then for the end objectives. In 
the beginning, both men and women would often interrupt my questioning by saying- 
What good are these talks? Get us some ‘real’ (asli) benefits (faida). Get some 
work to the village so that we can earn some wages and fill our stomachs 
Salaried opportunities are few and as mentioned earlier, most of them have been taken by 
Brahmans. With frequent droughts, poor agricultural yields and inability to hold much 
livestock, a steady monthly income is by the villagers as a “means of assurance” 
(bhorosa). Some of the young boys in the village studying in class 10 and 12 aspired to 
have salaried jobs. The options they weighed were between “becoming a master, 
enrolling in the army or being picked up by some NGO (sanstha)”.  
 
Debt and borrowing was also an aspect of their livelihood strategies. The significance of 
borrowing can be gauged by the fact that some of the poorer families in the villages have 
debts to the tune of Rs.100, 000. According to Hareth Bairva (50) who has a debt of Rs. 
60,000: 
We don’t have money, there has been no produce in the past three years and how 
do we buy grains? We have to borrow for our daily needs of the household-for 
grains, oil, salt, clothes etc. 
Even the more able families have to borrow to meet the bigger expenses involved in 
festivals and rituals. For example bhat odhana is a practice where a bride’s maternal 
uncle has to make a substantial contribution to the wedding and present gifts to all close 
kin who attend the marriage. People spend up to Rs.10, 000 on such ceremonies. The 
death feast (nukta) involved even more. 
 
As is being increasingly recognized there is a direct correlation between migrant labour 
and debts (Mosse et al. 2002). Jagdish Master, whose two younger brothers work in 
Bengaluru, explains- “We keep borrowing and repaying and keep getting our work done”. 
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Also as mentioned earlier, the debt relations played a decisive role in the factional politics 
of the village.  
 
When the livelihoods of communities mentioned here is  read along with Chapter 3 it 
becomes clear that the livelihood patterns are neither traditional nor subsistence oriented. 
The patterns of resource use have shifted and economic activities are oriented towards a 
cash economy. The livelihoods are marked by scarcity of land water and forest resources. 
Every available opportunity for alternatives means are being pursued by the younger 
generation.  
 
Thesis Layout  
 
The rest of the thesis is set out in seven chapters.  
 
Based on the analytical framework outlined in the introductory chapter, Chapter Two 
analyses three key issues that underpins the politics in participatory conservation in India- 
‘Conservation’, ‘Participation’ and ‘Community’. Section one focuses on the discursive 
formation of ideas of conservation and environment across the colonial divide in India. It 
argues that the discourse on conservation that dominates management models need to be 
seen in relation to power positions of the multiple actors involved in conservation and the 
type of knowledge that it privileges. It argues that dominant conservation models and its 
articulation of nature or resources tend to be in clear opposition to the perception of 
resource dependent communities whom these management models aim to govern. 
Through a discussion on various discourses on participation and its operationalisation in 
the field of conservation in India, section two  focuses of why participation has come to 
be seen as the ‘new orthodoxy ‘and the tyrannical potential it embeds. Section three 
focuses on the notions of communities that dominate conservation practices and the 
agency exercised by communities in both resisting and shaping the outcome of 
participatory conservation projects.  
 
Chapter Three discusses kulhadi bandh panchayats in terms of its significance for the 
communities, its origins and its operation prior to the intervention of the external 
agencies. . It focuses on the making of ‘environmental subjects’ (Agrawal 2005) owing 
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not to government strategies for conservation but to their dependence on the forest 
resources, the   increasing scarcity of resources and impingement by the local sheep 
herding community.  In outlining the structure and operation of the KBP this section 
locates KBP within the local governance practice as distinct from that of the State. The 
Chapter outlines the larger narrative of kulhadi bandh panchayat by relating it to its 
socio-cultural significance for the communities. It traces the resource relations of the 
people to their emplaced identity. In doing so it emphasises on why structures like EDC 
are inadequate for encompassing practices like KBP and therefore fail to generate any 
ownership or belonging among the community groups.  
 
Chapter Four focuses on Forest Department and Project Staff’s approach to the 
implementation of the participatory conservation initiative. The principal argument the 
chapter makes is that while the agenda for participation and conservation remained 
unchanged, the department capitalised on the symbolic import of participatory 
conservation to meet their institutional and individual targets. The agenda of participatory 
conservation was co-opted within the bureaucratic and imperialistic culture of forest 
management. The process of implementation that endeavoured to co-opt kulhadi bandh 
panchayats proved counterproductive to both conservation and community participation.  
 
Chapter Five focuses on the NGO initiatives in Kailadevi and their engagement with both 
Eco-Development Committees and kulhadi bandh panchayats. This chapter raises a few 
critical issues pertaining to the roles NGOs are associated or identify with in facilitating 
the process of participatory conservation. The chapter demonstrates   that NGO missions 
often emerge in the relation to ‘fundable’ issues; propelling their survival on agendas on 
community-based conservation, NGOs in Kailadevi have a valuable stake in advocating 
community-based conservation and upholding representations of  their successful 
implementation (especially if they are involved as facilitators). The chapter also 
demonstrates that NGO positions on issue are less driven by their commitment to 
upholding the interests of people they claim to represent and more on the ‘development 
context’ within which they operate i.e. the larger network of its funding and support 
organisations.  
 
Chapter Six focuses on the responses of the communities groups to the participatory 
initiatives and the attempts at co-opting their initiative on kulhadi bandh panchayats. It 
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analyses three key areas- peoples’ understanding and interpretation of the States 
intervention vis-à-vis their resource use and rights, locally established institutions (EDC 
and VDCs) and undermining of KBP these interventions have brought about.  The 
Chapter argues that people interpret the present in relation to the past and see these 
externally-aided interventions as yet another means of tightening control over the 
communities’ resource. The Chapter concludes that people consent to and confirm the 
success of the imposed models of participatory conservation not due to making of 
environmental subjects but primarily as a strategy of survival under extremely threatened 
circumstances.  The Chapter also focuses on continued relevance of kulhadi bandh 
panchayats.   
 
The final chapter provides the main conclusions of the thesis. 
 
An Epilogue has been added, covering the period of the last decade, to provide an insight 
on the state of Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve, the villages in which the primary research 
was conducted and the issues that continue to influence the direction of conservation in 
India. 
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Chapter 2 
The Politics of Participatory Conservation 
 
Introduction  
 
Protected Area (PA) as a means of conservation, both in its ideology and legislation is 
premised primarily on keeping human beings and wildlife apart. Pressure exerted on the 
resources by dependent and resident communities are seen as the principal threat to 
wildlife conservation. These measures of conservation impose restrictions or completely 
deny access to lands, resources and livelihood, to dependent communities. In addition, the 
communities continue to suffer the threats from wildlife. Crop-raiding, cattle-lifting and 
fatal attacks on human beings by wildlife are reported from all parts of the country. Such 
measures have generated considerable hostility among dependent communities as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. It is believed that the outcome of exclusionary 
measures is now proving counter-productive to meet conservation objectives. Especially 
so because local communities are now seen as being complicit in the active destruction of 
forests and wildlife, aiding and abetting poaching activities, illegal felling, setting off 
forest fires and other such activities.  
 
The India Ecodevelopment Project (IEDP) perceives these human-wildlife conflicts 
largely as ‘adverse impacts’ - of wildlife on people and vice-versa and thus propose 
participatory measures to address them. This chapter argues that these measures are 
predicated on a simplistic understanding of the issues of conservation and resource 
conflicts. They deny the complex historical, social and political contexts in which these 
conflicts are entrenched. Ideas of conservation, participation and communities embodied 
in the project principles, in reality are highly contested, implicating issues of power and 
control over nature. 
 
Ideologies of conservation embodied in protected areas have evolved through a long 
socio-cultural and political history of colonial and post –colonial India and essentially 
privilege one vision of nature against the multiple others, imposed through textual and 
institutional instruments of power. The human-wildlife conflicts, especially the hostilities 
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of dependent communities against the State are elements of contesting these visions and 
impositions. The institutional enforcement of the privileged vision of the State as well as 
the oppositions to it is firmly entrenched in the terrain of ‘conflict’ of PAs in India.  
Projects like Ecodevelopment with ideas of participatory conservation do not provide any 
real solutions as they do not necessarily supplant these conflicts; they are implicated in it 
and provide new idioms of contestation and instruments of legitimatizations.   
 
This chapter, drawing on studies in political ecology, environmental history and 
anthropology outlines the politicized environment of protected areas in India. It focuses 
on ideas of conservation, participation and communities and their problematic 
applications both conceptually and in practice in India with specific reference to 
participatory conservation in general and protected areas in particular.  In outlining these 
aspects it provides the framework within which the implementation of the participatory 
initiative in Kailadevi pans out in the rest of the thesis.  
 
Conservation and Conflict  
The political context of conservation is set by what definition is given to it, by whom and 
through what process. As Neumann points out (1992: 86; also see 1998) conservation is 
not only about conflicts over access and control of resources, but also contests over 
“meaning, symbols,   aesthetics and imaginations of how nature “ought” to look.  How 
‘nature’ ought to look is dictated by not so much what is ‘natural’ but by the imposed 
cultural values of some (Cronon 1996; Neumann 1998). Promulgations of discourses on 
conservation and related ideas have been consistently linked to the emergence of new 
authorities and institutions empowered to manage and control (Stott and Sullivan 2000; 
Fairhead and Leach 1996; Grove 1995).  
 
Science and scientific knowledge has been handmaiden in such discursive administration 
of power. However as has been well argued by many scholars, knowledge whether 
scientific or indigenous is socially and politically situated (Agrawal 1995; Stott and 
Sullivan 2000). Much of the predominant scientific narratives either on biodiversity or 
sustainability derive their legitimacy from what Stott and Sullivan (2000) refer to as the 
‘Big Talk’ of science. They argue that while ecological sciences are significant and have 
a basis,   much legitimacy is drawn by “using the language, if not the practice” (ibid:  5).   
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Within the above framework, the concept of Protected Areas and their establishment, to 
use Neumann’s (1992:87) words, ‘are impositions of one cultural vision to the exclusion 
of another, transforming through political history one form of landscape into another and 
alienating and marginalising resident communities’. Most nature reserves that have 
originally emanated from the Yellowstone National Park in the US and transported by the 
British to their Colonial domains beginning with Africa, have turned -“complex cultural-
environmental landscapes of production into commoditised landscapes of tourist 
consumption, where environment and society are artificially partitioned….”(Robbins 
2004:148).  According to Robbins (ibid: 150) conservation and control thesis – 
Control of resources and landscapes has been wrested from local producers or 
producer groups (by class, gender, or ethnicity) through the implementation 
efforts to preserve “sustainability” “community” or “nature”. In the process, 
officials and global interests seeking to preserve the “environment” have 
disabled local systems of livelihood, production and socio-political 
organisations.  
Given the origin of nature reserves, Neumann (1998:9), in relation to his study on Arusha 
National Park in Tanzania, argues that one needs to conceptualize national parks or 
protected areas “not simply as threatened by social, political and economic forces beyond 
their control but as active socio-political forces in their own rights” as most PAs is 
“overlain by and implicated in an historical struggle over land and resources.”    
 
Analysing environmental conflicts through a historical perspective as  both a material and 
a discursive struggle,  many political ecological studies have demonstrated that  in many 
resource conflicts (both in PA and non-PA forests)  what most authorities see as issues of    
encroachment, illegal access to resources and an issues of unsustainable demand of an 
ever expanding population on resources of ecological significance, the local community 
see as issues of loss of ancestral land, ownership, cultural identity and threats of wildlife 
attack on their lives and livelihood (Robbins 2004; Brockington 2002;Neumann 1998; 
Peluso 1992;1993; Stevens 1997). Emphasising the historical contingency of 
environmental conflicts Fairhead and Leach (1997) have argued in the case of Guinea that 
conservation becomes very clearly a question of social or political choice about what 
vegetation or biodiversity forms are desirable at any given time in social history. Thus 
focussing on the extraordinary mismatch between the ‘locally lived history which has 
shaped local priorities and conservationist’s representations of it’ they conclude that local 
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conflicts and antagonism towards forest conservation cannot be addressed or understood 
outside of its specific historical context.  
 
In India Protected Areas as artifices of conservation as we know them today owe their 
origin to British India. The evolution of the ideas of conservation and wildlife protection 
are embedded in policies and practices of British India mostly privileged concerns of state 
making, game hunting, commercial and material needs. In establishing their physical and 
moral control they had a debilitating impact on the resource dependent communities-
dispossessing them of and delegitimizing their resource dependent livelihood practices. 
Independent India reinforced this process further with its expanding networks of PAs. 
Much of what is now considered as ‘pristine’ landscape or ‘wilderness’ of PAs in India 
have emerged through bitter and conflictful histories of state imposed ideas of 
conservation and local resistance of resource dependent communities(Saberwal et al. 
2001; Rangarajan 2001; 1996; Tucker 1998; Khare 1998; Kothari et al.1995;).   
 
Wildlife Conservation in British India. 
 
According to Sivaramakrishnan (1995) the rhetoric of conservation, environmental 
protection and sustainable development, commonplace in current international debates on 
forests were generated in the colonial projects of laying the foundation of state 
management (Also see Saberwal et al. 2001). The Act of 1878 that established the 
categories of reserved protected and communal forests was a manifestation of the 
unprecedented extent of state control that marked the colonial policies of forest 
management.  
 
A large part of colonial State Forestry (governed by the Act of 1878) was justified by the 
discourses of scientific knowledge pertaining especially to the issues of conservation and 
environmental protection. The two most significant discourses that underwrote the 
colonial policies were ‘dessicationism’ and ‘scientific’ forestry. The conservation agenda 
of the former was professedly to do with agrarian prosperity and social stability. The 
principle proponents of this discourse Alexander Gibson and Hugh Cleghorn from 1837 
onwards drew attention to the connection between deforestation and drought. Protection 
of forests was now seen to be essential for maintaining water supplies and safeguarding 
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agricultural prosperity. Scientific forestry dominated the discourses of conservation in the 
early and later parts of the 19th century (Grove 1995; Rajan 1998; 1994)  
 
Arnold and Guha (1995) have stressed that “…the lexicon of colonial forest management 
is crowded with words like conservancy and scientific forestry which need to be 
understood in their political, economic and ideological context.” It has been argued that 
the forestry policies of colonial India were adopted predominantly to serve it’s the 
material and strategic interest (Guha 1983; Guha & Gadgil 1992) According to Skaria 
(1997) the discourse of scientific forestry that justified the state takeover of forest 
management from the last few decades of the 19
th
 century had as its main concern 
production of revenue maximization.31 The immediate need for bringing into effect the 
Act of 1878 was an assured supply of good quality timber for the establishment of the 
railway network. This was subsequently combined and replaced with revenue needs.  
 
Sport hunting primarily meshed with the drive to assert control over produce from 
government-owned woodlands. For the imperial rulers and the Indian aristocracy hunting 
was not only the most prestigious of all sports but offered both a social and apolitical 
platform for the rulers. Hunting was an important consideration as it held wide vistas of 
meaning and possibility. As Mackenzie (1988: 168-9) puts it: 
Hunting represented a historic cultural interaction via which the British were 
able to build social bridges with the Indians, particularly the Indian aristocracy. 
They consciously sought to inherit the mantle of the Mughals through an opulent 
and highly visible command of the environment, as well as to establish relations 
with princely states through an apparently shared enthusiasm. The civil 
administrators saw it as obligation, a source of prestige, a route to understanding 
his district and people… Europeans regarded it almost a professional 
requirement.  
According to Tucker (1991) the restriction on access to game through the Act of 1878 
was the start of the ‘fledgling national park movement’. The delegated provisions of the 
                                                
 
31 Grove (1995) however contends that the earlier dessicationist theory had more genuine conservation 
concern than it is given credit for. According to him the ideological commitment of a section of colonial 
officials to conservation was more than a justification for the commercial interest of the empire in obtaining 
timber. He contends that the earlier conservation-scientist agendas of Cleghorn and Gibson had more to do 
with agrarian prosperity and social stability. However he too agrees that it was the economic exigencies of 
the 1857 period that saw a turn in policies on forest protection from broader social concerns of the early 
nineteenth century official like Cleghorn to a production-centred agenda. Other studies have also argued 
against materialist exploitation being the sole purpose of colonial forestry policies (Rajan 1994; Rangarajan 
1996; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999; Saberwal, 1999). These studies point to several local, institutional and other 
factors instrumental in shaping some of the colonial forestry policies in different parts of British India.  
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legislation enabled the Forest Department to make regulations which would restrict the 
hunting rights of the indigenous forest inhabitants and confirm the position of the forest 
officers as protector of their property (timber stocks); and later in the century, to 
administer the hunting resources of the forest by dividing them into shooting blocks 
which would be opened and closed depending on the apparent fluctuation of the faunal 
population (Rangarajan 2001; Tucker 1991). The Indian royalty adopted British game 
laws for their hunting reserves and thus prohibited any human interference or use of the 
reserves resources by dependent communities (ibid).  
 
In this context it is important to note that the issue of wildlife conservation figures very 
little in the early writings of the Indian Forest Department (Rajan 1998). According to 
Tucker (1979), during the period of colonial rule it was a section of foresters, hunters, 
naturalists and Indian aristocrats who were responsible for whatever little wildlife 
conservation took place. The extent, to which wildlife entered their official engagement, 
was either in the context of the debates about farm-forest conflicts or discussions about 
sport hunting. Thus, as Mackenzie (ibid.) argues prior to the late 1930s conservation was 
more in the nature of preservation of ‘game’ (not wildlife in its totality).  
 
In 1934 the Indian National Parks Act was promulgated embodying “…many years of 
experience of game laws and their implementation” (Tucker 1991: 45).  Focusing mainly 
on the sport hunter the Act had provision for seasonal access and restricted entry of 
visitors and issuing of licenses. The Act was otherwise silent regarding resident tribals 
and peasant communities (ibid.). The promulgation of the National Park Act and the 
policies of conservation that followed were influenced by international experience. In 
Africa the British adopted the creation of national parks as a model of conservation based 
on the model of Yellowstone National Park in the US. The apparent success of this model 
in Africa led to its subsequent introduction in India. In the1920s the England-based 
Society for Preservation of Fauna turned its attention to India. The Society began to press 
for the systematic study of Indian fauna, causes for its decline and preservation, the 
tightening of game laws, the appointment appropriate officials and the establishment of 
protected areas. A number of game hunting reserves maintained by the Indian aristocrats 
were converted into sanctuaries. In fact a number of PAs established in Independent India, 
including the Ranthambhore National Park, were carved out of previously declared 
sanctuaries and Reserved Forests (Rangarajan 2001; Saberwal et al. 2001). 
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Differing Idioms and Restrictive Regimes  
The British policies of forest management and game laws had a profound impact not only 
the hunting rights of forest dependent communities but also on their access to resources, 
their livelihoods and their identities. The game laws of princely India were also equally 
harsh (Gold & Gujjar 2002; Rangarajan 2001; Tucker 1991). The idioms and contexts 
with which communities expressed their resource relations were entrenched as much in 
their social and religious domains as in their economic domains. This differed from the 
predominantly economic and scientific construction of nature that pervaded colonial 
ideologies (Skaria 1998; Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Tucker 1998). An example of how 
differences of perception shaped policies to the disadvantage of local communities, and 
which continues even today, is the existing classification of Major and Minor Forest 
Produce. The categories emerged from a classificatory mechanism employed in the 
silvicultural practices of scientific forestry, which according to Tucker (1998: 465) has 
shown that in the case of Western Himalayas the official definition of Minor Forest 
Produce was minor only in monetary terms “…though by no means minor in the range 
and diversity of biological species or their human uses for rural subsistence and some 
trade.” The denial of access to ‘minor forest produce’ was the root cause of social unrest 
in the Himalayan forests and continues to simmer to this day.  
 
These differences prevailed over laws pertaining to wildlife as well. For the hunter-
gatherer tribal communities, hunting was both, a means of livelihood and a part of their 
ritual domain. Colonial game laws, however, defined all hunting practices of the locals as 
detrimental and summarily banned them all. The basis of the ban was largely on 
prejudiced moral and cultural values towards indigenous hunting practices. While large 
mammals were regularly hunted as ‘vermin’ and other animals as ‘game’, the decline of 
game species continued to be attributed to destruction brought about by the ‘natives’ 
(Rangarajan 2001). Hunting without firearms was considered cruel and, as competitors to 
the same resource, hunting communities had to be checked. The conservation of game 
was essentially to ‘end cruelty, especially by low caste shikaris (hunters) and tribals’ 
(ibid.).  The game laws being introduced in India interfered with practices of ritual 
hunting, as in the case of the Marias of Bastar and the Chenchus who were left fairly 
crippled so far as means of survival was concerned (Furer-haimendorf 1943a; 1943b) 
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The promulgation of the Act of 1878, and the subsequent Acts along with the introduction 
of European system of jurisprudence, notions of property and the significance attached to 
the written word, redefined customary rights and established a whole new regime of 
rights. Baden Powell, in crafting the Act of 1878, made a distinction between ‘rights’ and 
‘privileges’ for the first time. ‘Rights’ could not be abrogated without compensation but 
had to be written in the settlement records. ‘Privileges’ on the other hand were always 
regulated and could be terminated but where allowed were alienable. He averred that 
villagers, who from time immemorial were accustomed to graze their animals in the 
nearest jungle lands, did not acquire rights by prescription because they used the forest 
without any distinct grant or license. As the local community defined the network of 
rights, responsibilities and privileges through symbolism and social organisation and 
economic activity, they were not recorded on parchment. Thus all customary rights were 
converted to privileges and hence were made expendable (Guha 1989). For example, the 
Baigas were denied their rights to shifting cultivation because according to the positive 
law and settlement code they had no title to proprietary right or to occupancy right to the 
land they claimed as their own (Elwin 1939). 
 
Colonial policies that justified the State takeover of forests also had significant adverse 
impacts in terms of how it redefined the communities and their livelihoods. Terms like 
‘tribal’, ‘caste’, ‘forest dwellers’ and others, that are common place in the discourse of 
traditional communities vis-à-vis forest rights, have emerged through a history of colonial 
intervention and colonial anthropological writings that patronized Eurocentric theories of 
cultural evolution. These terms that negatively implicate the people who they represent 
were often used in determining their rights vis-à-vis conservation and forestry.  
 
Padel (1998) states that “anthropological writings constructed an image of tribal people as 
‘at a low level of civilization’ or ‘in a primitive state of development’, and so implicitly in 
need of civilization.” According to Skaria (1997: 268) “the colonial list of tribes emerged 
from such process of primitivization or of the invention of primitive societies.” 
Subsistence hunting which was considered as being the lowest stage of evolution was 
associated with the tribal. Their dependence on shifting agriculture was viewed as 
antecedent of settled agriculture. Their mode of subsistence was taken to be wasteful, 
unproductive and reflective of laziness. The forest or hills were perceived as the wild 
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portions of the land, away from ‘civilization’, associated with the plains or riparian areas. 
Absence of literacy, codified laws and dependence on customary laws were instead taken 
as criteria for classifying communities as tribes. It was these criteria and other attributions 
of masculinity, wildness and racial affiliations that were used to impose imagined 
categories on the populations and hence the making of arbitrary distinctions between 
those categorised as castes and tribes (Dirks 1989; Skaria 1997).  
 
The negative images had a status of scientific facts, and so in effect they served to justify 
the ‘subjection’ or ‘pacification’ of tribes, ‘opening of their territories’ with roads and the 
forest policies adopted against their interests. In the case of Baigas, preventing of shifting 
cultivation was not so much as to save forests from destruction as to ‘civilize’ the people 
and make them useful members of the commonwealth. Categorisation of certain 
communities as ‘criminal tribes’ in British India  paralleled the effort of the colonial 
regime to civilize and settle them as well as to gain effective control over their forests 
(Bhattacharya 1995; Nigam 1990).  
 
Protected Areas in Independent India 
 
As summarised by Khare (1998: 88) the colonial conservation policy was a) governed by 
elitist concerns for game species and the colonial need for timber; b) increasingly relied 
on exclusion of humans and human activities from reserved areas; and c) barring a few 
exceptions, was apathetic to the plight of tribal and other communities whose livelihood 
depended on the natural resources of such reserved areas. The post-colonial policies have 
seen little change in terms of decentralization of management; on the contrary ‘policies 
and procedures of the colonial period were further strengthened during the post- 
Independence era. According to Kothari et al. (1998: 21) the colonial provisions of the 
1927 Forest Act continue to be in force and therefore impacting forest and wildlife 
management in India.  
 
Up to the 1970s commercial exploitation and both regulated and unregulated hunting by 
aristocrats continued in many forest areas including those designated as national parks 
and sanctuaries. Availability of modern amenities like automobiles and firearms, 
breakdown of hunting regulation of princely states and the commercial lure of the animal 
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and timber trade, led to greatest loss of both forests and wildlife in Independent India. 
(Saberwal et al. 2001; Ward & Ward 2002). The Indian Wildlife Board was established as 
early as 1952 by the first Prime Minister of the country, Jawaharlal Nehru, but comprised 
mainly of erstwhile maharajahs, prince, aristocrats, tea and coffee planters, who were all 
also keen hunters. Thus, admittedly they were concerned about wildlife conservation; 
their concern was to protect them from the local, forest dependent, communities. The 
other concern was to ensure that provisions related to sport hunting should not be 
compromised in all policy directives. For instance, the Wildlife Board that met for the 
first time after its constitution stalled any attempt to stop tiger shooting during the 
breeding season in Rajasthan (Rangarajan 1996).  
 
It was only in the 1970s, fuelled by the personal interest of the then Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi,32 responding to the concerns of international conservation trends33 and some 
Indian conservationists, that the network of protected areas for wildlife conservation was 
consolidated. Between 1969 and 1973 several regulatory measures and key projects were 
undertaken, laying the foundation for the exponential growth and establishment of PA 
network in Independent India. The Wild Life (Protection) Act, under which sanctuaries 
and parks are established and governed, was promulgated in 1972. The Act established a 
13-step legal process for the establishment of national parks and sanctuaries and banned 
all commercial activity in the designated areas. It also imposed strict restrictions on the 
extent of human use permissible in PAs.   
 
In 1973 Project Tiger was launched with the declaration of nine tiger reserves34 across the 
country as “…it was inevitable that the tiger would be central …a prime target for sports 
                                                
 
32 Indira Gandhi had been a keen member of the Delhi Bird Watchers Society and was also hugely 
influenced by her close association with a new generation of wildlifers in the Bureaucracy, especially MK 
Rajinthsinh, an Indian Administrative Service officer and Kailash Sankhla, an Indian Forest Service officer 
(Rangarajan 2001; 1996). Rajinthsinh was central to drafting of the Wildlife Act of 1972. It thus that 
Kothari et al. (1995), speaking on the irrationality of not addressing the human aspect of wildlife 
conservation, have argued that the apathy to the local communities comes from the fact that most of the 
legislations have been designed urban elite naturalist and conservationists.   
33 The 10th IUCN General Assembly was held in Delhi in 1969. The primairy focus of the various experts 
from across the world, participating in the conference was to put the Indian Tiger on the ‘endangered’ list. 
Mrs. Gandhi is consolidation of the strict preservationist approach received its inspiration from this meeting 
(Rangarajan 2001).   
34 ‘Tiger Reserves’ are not a legal category under any existing forest or wildlife law. The purpose of 
declaration is more notional and to focus attention on these areas both administratively and financially. 
Thus, Tiger Reserves were a natural choice in selecting areas for the World Bank supported India Eco-
development Project.    
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hunters, it was transformed into the symbol for the preservation of wildlife” (Rangarajan 
2001: 95) Project tiger was one of the largest wildlife conservation project in world, it 
was for its time in the early 1970s, one the first wildlife conservation projects in India 
funded through international support (the World Wildlife Fund raised almost a million 
dollars for the Project). It also established the concept of a ‘core area’ where “…all 
commercial activity including forestry was halted and the protection of nature took 
precedence over the generation of revenue.” (Saberwal et al. 2001: 41). On the other hand, 
Project Tiger also set the trend for the exclusionary policies that would mark the 
development of wildlife conservation and set the tone for the bitter environment vs. 
development debate in India:  
Project Tiger played a key role in broadening ecological perspectives. It was 
clearly a single species scheme to start with, but the position accorded to the 
tiger in the food chain generated a logic that took the scheme further, ‘Do 
nothing’ to interfere with nature was a philosophy that allowed dead trees to be 
home of wood-peckers and owls; in the end of the category ‘vermin’ gave wild 
dogs the right to live off deer. Total preservation was soon extended to lands 
beyond those of the tiger. The first executive head of the project went on to help 
establish a desert national park in the Thar. The lions of Gir Forest won a lease 
of life as their habitat and prey were given better protection by the state 
government of Gujurat (Rangarajan 2001: 101)  
 
The mid-1970s onwards saw an exponential growth in the number of national parks and 
sanctuaries in the country. Between 1975 and 1980 the numbers increased from 131 to 
224 and by 1995 the PA network comprised of about 500 national parks and sanctuaries 
(Khare 1998; Kothari et al. 1995) The Wild Life (Protection) Act and the establishment 
of PAs marked continuity with colonial policies in terms vesting full control to the Forest 
Department and effecting a complete separation of human beings and wildlife. In fact 
these measures were considered more punitive:  
What is ironical is that the notion of biological diversity –of saving the entire 
spectrum of life from the elephant to the pangolin –was accompanied by a 
hardening of attitudes to the resident peoples of the protected areas. In the 
national parks, there were no rights of residence or access….The notion was 
simple: the exclusion of local land users was essential if nature was to survive 
unscathed. Policy makers were convinced theirs was the only possible response 
to a crisis situation. However, from a brief survey of the past it is evident that 
they were deeply conditioned by their reading of history (Saberwal et al. 2001: 
41-42)  
The declaration of core zones under Project Tiger was accompanied by the relocation of 
villages from Kanha, Ranthambhore and Gir national parks. The resettlement process was 
shoddy involving the Forest and Revenue Departments, neither of which were oriented to 
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resettlement and rehabilitation, and perhaps created among the first ‘conservation 
refugees’ in the country. The land provided for agriculture was not arable and many of the 
material benefits promised were never delivered. However, the expanding PA network 
continues to displace thousands of people across the country (Kothari et al. 1989). In 
some cases, like the Keoladeo National Park in Bharatpur, the declaration of the Park in 
1982 led to criminalising the resource activities35 of the communities overnight (Saberwal 
& Rangarajan 2003). A nation-wide survey conducted by IIPA
36
 in the 1980s revealed 
that more than 55% of PAs had people living inside them and 80% had people living 
around them. More than 40% of the PAs had affected the traditional rights and leases of 
communities, especially grazing rights, fodder extraction, timber extraction and Non-
Timber Forest Produce (Kothari et al. 1989). The extent of damage caused by wild 
animals can be gleaned from the following:  
In a mid-1980s survey, 63 of the 206 PAs surveyed in the county reported human 
injuries or deaths caused by wild animals; in West Bengal alone, 189 human deaths 
caused by tiger attack were reported over the period 1979-84. On average, wild 
animals, wild elephants kill thirty to fifty people a year in south India, similar 
numbers in West Bengal, five to ten in Uttar Pradesh, and over fifty in Assam, much 
of this during bouts crop raiding. Crop losses and destruction of property due to 
rampaging elephants are widely reported from each part of these parts of the country-
worth Rs.6.5 million between 1981-83 in south India and much higher levels 
recorded in north east. Crop losses to blackbuck in parts of Rajasthan, nilgai 
populations in Haryana, black bears in the Himalaya, and chital and wild boar 
populations in many parts of the country are also well known. Livestock losses are 
similarly high-with animals being killed by lions, tigers, and leopards in various parts 
of the country. A minimum of 622 cattle were killed by tigers or leopards between 
1974 and 1983 near Bandipur Tiger Reserve. (Saberwal et al. 2001:73-74).  
These impositions have been met with violent resistance from local communities all 
across the country. In Keoladeo National Park, the forceful entry and use of resources led 
to police action and firing where nine villagers lost their lives (Saberwal & Rangarajan 
2003). Similar conflicts were reported from all over the country - Rajaji National Park in 
the north; Nilgiri Bioshpere Reserve in the south; Betla Tiger Reserve in east and Nal 
Sarovar Sanctuary in the west (See Guha & Gadgil 1995; Sivaramakrishnan 2003). 
Incidents of arson have also been reported from Kanha National Park in Madhya Pradesh 
                                                
 
35 Keoladeo National Park, is an artificial wetland that was also used by the surrounding villages to graze 
buffaloes. The buffaloes would help keep grass levels low in the marshy area and create open water 
passages across the wetland. This in turn would attract hundreds of species of migrant wild fowl from 
Siberia, including the endangered Siberian Crane, eventually earning it the World Heritage Status from 
UNESCO. In an attempt to enforce Keoladeo’s national park status, grazing was abruptly terminated 
leading to a violent standoff between the Forest Department and local communities.   
36 This was the first systematic attempt in India to asses the status of management of national parks and 
sanctuaries and to identify issues that required policy intervention of conservation was to succeed. 
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in 1989 and Nagarhole National Park in Karnataka in 1992 where protesting local 
communities set fires to large parts of the reserve (ibid). 
 
Adding to these complexities have been the developmental (read industrial and 
commercial) demands on the resources within PAs. Many of these areas are not only rich 
in biodiversity but also in minerals. Succumbing to industrial demands several PAs have, 
in part or entirely, been de-notified to enable activities such as mining and quarrying to 
take place. Darlaghat Sanctuary in Himachal Pradesh was denotified for a cement 
company, a mining company in Kudermukh National Park in Karnataka was given fresh 
mining leases even after its declaration as a National Park (Kothari et al. 1995; 2001). 
Industrial pressure is seen as a common threat to both the livelihoods of local 
communities as well as to biodiversity itself. It was not until the 1990s that there was 
recognition of the common threat and in some cases agencies across the divide of the 
people vs. wildlife debate came together to address these issues in the context of PAs 
(Kothari et al. 1995). 
 
As the instances of poaching, encroachment and de-notification mentioned above indicate, 
the ‘state’ as such has not been entirely effective in pursuing its policy of ‘guns and 
guards’. The administrative responsibility of managing the PAs is that of State Forest 
Departments. As many scholars have pointed, whether in colonial times (Rangarajan 
1996; Saberwal 1999; Sivaramakrishnan 1999) or in Independent India (Baviskar 1998b; 
Saberwal et al. 2001; Saberwal and Rangarajan 2003; Thapar 1998) the Forest 
Department has never been able to exercise its full authority vested under the Wild Life 
(Protection) Act. Within the Forest Department the objectives of its two Wings 
(Territorial Wing for commercial forestry and Wildlife Wing for conservation) have to be 
reconciled. There are no separate cadres so officers are often cross-posted to from one 
Wing to another. The frontline Forest Department staffs are often left to interpret 
Departmental policies, besides being inadequately equipped or trained to take on their 
protection duties. It is not uncommon for Forest Guards to have empathy with village 
communities whom they have to police rather than for the wildlife they are expected to 
protect (Vasan 2006).  
 
One of the most difficult factors to contend with is political interference at different levels 
that seeks to compromise the efforts at wildlife conservation. Often the Department’s 
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work to protect a PA is undone by local politicians who would be keener to secure their 
vote banks in the local communities than to secure the ecological security of the area. The 
Ministry of Environment and Forest at the national level often has to defer to the demands 
of the other Central Government Ministries concerned with industries, commerce, power 
and infrastructure.  The political support of Indira Gandhi that led to the expansion of PAs 
until the 1980s dwindled significantly under the successive governments. As Saberwal 
and Rangarajan (ibid.) point out “…Forest Departments and the Ministry of 
Environments and Forests have been consistently weak players within the Indian 
bureaucracy.”       
 
In summing up, two issues are of importance. First, given the history of creation of PAs 
in India, people-wildlife conflicts in India are not just a matter addressing ‘impact’ issues 
that threaten wildlife conservation, as for instance sought by IEDP. These conflicts are 
more between one set of human beings with another and emerge from differing ideologies, 
meanings and power struggles that are rooted in history. The conflicts are not only about 
contested claims over resources and livelihood but more fundamental issues of belonging, 
identities, dispossession and impositions of meanings. Second, the management of PAs 
are not driven by an all powerful, cohesive and well trained authority. The ability to 
manage a PA or implement any project therein is constrained by several broader 
organisational, political and bureaucratic forces within which they are located. Thus 
people-wildlife conflicts are not one dimensional, instead they are underpinned by a 
complex of socio-political and historical issues of which economics and livelihoods are 
only a part.  
. 
This analysis has significant implications for the rest of this thesis. First, the history of 
regimes and differing meanings through which the notion of ‘Protected Area’ has evolved, 
including its inherent disadvantage to local communities, significantly informs the 
implementation of any new management approach. Communities interpret new 
management approaches by relating them to the past history of struggles and threats. 
These interpretations in turn inform their responses to such approaches and influence their 
likelihood of succeeding or failing. Also, irrespective how projects frame the basis of 
conflict, for communities these continue to be struggles over meanings of identity and 
rights. Alternative livelihoods are seen as yet another means of leveraging these issues but 
not necessarily replacing them.  
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The past remains entrenched in the politics of the present for the State, but more so 
because the discourses of conservation and communities used in the present are in 
continuity of their colonial antecedents.  The history of management and control also has 
a significant bearing on the institutional memories and practices of the implementing 
agencies such as the Forest Department. Departmental bureaucracy continues to operate 
with the framework of the same inherited colonial systems of management. For instance, 
the Departments complete rejection of the importance of the forests for the people was 
reflected in a conversation with the Assistant Conservator of Forests, Karauli: 
I wonder why these people (inside PAs) want to live in these sub-human conditions 
in the hilly tracts of Kailadevi? The forests are depleting and have practically nothing 
to offer… What do they get by living here? If I had my way, I would make them 
wear shirts and pants and send them off to schools in the cities and that would set 
their lives on a road to development. I too came from a village, but if I had insisted 
on staying there then would I ever have made to it to my position here today?” 
(Assistant Conservator of Forests (Wildlife Wing), Karauli Forest Division 15th 
September 2000) 
One also encounters statements at the official level that echo the colonial discourse which 
branded Gujjars as ‘wild, hill dwelling… thieving community’ (Bingley 1899; Rose 1970) 
Perceiving the dangs as a dacoit prone area has a clear implication for the perception and 
prejudices against the Gujjars and an imagined geography of the region. The popular 
official narratives in this region imply that Gujjars have an inherent ‘ability’ to become 
dacoits because of their profession and because they can easily navigate the dense forests. 
The level of illiteracy prevalent in the dangs is attributed more to the ‘nature and 
mentality of the forest dwellers’ rather than an inherent failure of the state to deliver on 
basic education and other development services.  
 
The second implication is in terms of the several pressures that work on the actual 
functioning of the Forest Department and its impact on the implementation of projects 
like IEDP.  The Departments ability to implement the Project cannot entirely be attributed 
to its ‘statist’ attitude. The institutional networks within which it functions, its own 
marginalised position within a state structure and the political compulsions of producing a 
‘success story’ is what leads to the unfolding of the Project at the field level in a manner 
that tragically fails both conservation and communities. 
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Participatory Approach: Discursive Practices  
 
The term ‘participation’ was derived from radical ideas challenging the developmental 
orthodoxy of centralised ‘top-down’ development policies (Cook & Kothari 2001; 
Gardner & Lewis 1996) Conventional development programmes were perceived as being  
technocratic and imposed change without taking the real concerns of the people into 
account. These policies were critiqued essentially as instruments of domination and 
subjugation (Esteva 1992; Escobar 1992, Grillo & Stirrat 1997). According to Rahnema 
(1992: 121) the Participation Action Research theorists as a rule conceptualised 
participation as the only way to save development from degenerating into ‘bureaucratic, 
top-down and dependency institutions.’ The evolution of the participatory development 
discourse, and in particular its methods for rural/rapid appraisals, influenced by the work 
of Robert Chambers (1992; 1995; 1997) were meant to democratize the process and make 
it more inclusive.  
 
The spirit of participation in development received strength from its usage in the Popular 
Participation Program of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) as means of the powerless to re-distribute ‘both control of resources and 
power in favour of those who live by their  own productive labour’ (Kaufman & Alfonso 
1992: 6) The definition of participation has been further refined as ‘collective efforts to 
increase and exercise control over resources and institutions on the part of groups of those 
hitherto excluded from control’ (ibid.).  The notion sought to include people as 
participants in the planning and implementation of development programmes. The 
process of involvement was to empower ‘socially and economically marginalised’ people 
to take decisions and thus direct the course of their development (Gujit 1998). 
Participatory approaches in development also received legitimacy for being relevant, 
sustainable and empowering (Cook & Kothari 2001).  
 
But the practice of participation worked itself out quite differently and the concept of 
participation, as used in development discourse, has been criticized on several grounds, 
especially for the way it deals with power politics (see Bastian & Bastian 1996; Cook & 
Kothari 2001; Mosse 1994; Nelson & Wright 1997). Different ideologies and interests 
defined the multiple ways in which participation came to be practiced in the delivery of 
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development. The diverse approaches have been broadly categorised as participation as a 
means and participation as an end (Nelson & Wright 1997; Oakly 1991). The former is 
largely seen as a functional, instrumental and restrictive form of participation in 
development - where the communities facilitate achievement of pre-determined goals and 
objectives. Nelson and Wright (1997:6) put it as, “…to accomplish the aims of a project 
more efficiently, effectively or cheaply.” As ‘end’, participation was meant to empower - 
“…where a community group set up processes to control its own development.” (op. cit.) 
Given the proliferation of different notions of participation and practice, some have 
rightly argued against the existence of distinct categorisation (Mosse 1996), where it may 
be useful to understand the power relationships between ‘members of community as well 
as between them and the state and agency institution’ (op. cit.) The critics of participatory 
development have argued that participation is largely used as a legitimizing instrument in 
what continues to remain a top-down approach, concealing the power politics implicit in 
the processes.  
 
For example, the prolific development of participatory research methodologies like Rapid 
Rural Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), Participatory Learning and 
Action (PLA), have been used to enable communities to contextualise management 
strategies by voicing their needs and choices. However, what is often taken as ‘local’, 
‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ is often an outcome of the interface in the ‘battlefields of 
knowledge’ and the power positions that underline them (Hobart 1993; Long & Long 
1992; Mosse 1994) Cook and Kothari (ibid.) argue that ‘tyranny’ i.e. the unjustified 
exercise of power, is both a real and a potential consequence of participatory development, 
counter-intuitive and contrary to its rhetoric of empowerment. It is thus that some view 
participation as the ‘new orthodoxy’ (Stirrat 1996: 67).  
 
It is the attempt of this thesis to take on a more critical perspective by examining how 
participatory processes and policies work at the field level, and tend to lean towards the 
tyrannical implications of participation. At the most basic level, participation reinforces 
an increasingly popular observation that ‘despite the emphasis on participation and 
benefit sharing, many of the new projects replicate more coercive forms of conservation 
practice and often constitutes an expansion of state authority into the remote rural areas’ 
(Baviskar 2003; Neumann 1997).  
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Participation and Conservation  
 
Participatory approaches in conservation have been significantly influenced by the 
Common Property Resource literature that focused on communities and collective action 
manifest in institutional arrangements and management systems for sustainable and 
equitable use of natural resources (Agrawal 1999b; Baland & Platteau 1996; Bromley & 
Cernea 1992; Jodha 1992; Ostrom1990, 1992, 1999; Wade 1988). This body of literature 
has focused on several aspects of rights regimes, types of resources, composition of 
communities, types of institutional arrangement and their operations. Ostrom (1999) and 
others (Baland & Platteau 1996; Wade 1988) have attempted to outline several conditions 
for effective collective action by communities (See also Agrawal 2001). For example, for 
Wade (ibid.) ownership and scarcity of resources are important conditions while Ostrom 
(1990, 1999) sets out certain ‘design principles’ pertaining to issues of defined boundaries, 
cost-benefit analysis, collective choice, conflict resolution mechanisms among others.  
 
Some of these principles and conditions have been instrumental in informing donor-led 
projects on institutionalisation of community participation in conservation (Agrawal 1999, 
2001a; Li 2009). This has resulted in approaching community participation more as a 
technical matter, or as Pimbert and Pretty (1997) put it a ‘blueprint’, rather than a 
process-driven approach. There are, however, several problems with regards to the CPR 
literature. One of the main arguments has been that the variables that have emerged in 
relation to specific resources and communities may not hold true across the board 
(Agrawal 2001b). In addition, the focus is only minimally on the “external social, 
institutional and physical environment” (ibid: 1655) and they have been “relatively 
inattentive to issues of power and the larger socio-political context within which most 
common property are embedded” (Agrawal 200lb: 181; IIED 1994; Mosse 1997). The 
problem arises from the fact that ‘resources management’ does not by itself imply 
‘conservation’ and requires an understanding of the dynamic nature of management 
practices. Participation does not always emerge from premeditated systems and may even 
evolve from everyday practices. As Li (2009: 274, citing Campbell et al. 2001:595) states: 
Common property literature emphasizes ‘possible positive outcomes rather than 
field complexities’.  The emphasis is on formal, rule-based systems governed by 
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perfected ‘design principles’  fails to connect to conditions in which resources 
are low value and rights complex, contested, and overlapping. Nor does it 
adequately grasp the uncertainties of ecology or social relations, or the 
possibility that what appears to be rational landscape design or ‘management’ is 
the serendipitous outcome of everyday practices that have quite disparate 
motives. 
The analysis in this thesis of the community-initiative of kulhadi bandh panchayat in 
Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary, as an example of management of common property 
resource, bears out some of the critical observations regarding participation made above. 
This is also why the process of its incorporation into the FD and NGO-led local 
institutions proves to be disjunctive.  
 
Agrawal (1997: vii) in reviewing the community-based forest management practices 
prevalent in the 1990s emphasises, “community-based conservation is unavoidably about 
a shift of power as well as about how power is exercised, by which loci of authority, and 
with what kinds of resistance.” The conflict emerges as Stevens (1997) suggests as much 
from what definition is given to the problem of conservation, as from the definition given 
to the process of participation by various interest groups. Participatory conservation 
involves multiple interest groups including government agencies, NGOs, international 
agencies, activists, conservationists and the local people being affected by 
implementation of such policies. Perhaps the complexities of agencies and agendas that 
characterise participatory conservation context are best captured by Li’s (2009) concept 
of ‘assemblage’ used to described community-forest management. According to Li (ibid: 
263) community forest management is “an assemblage that brings together an array of 
agents (villagers, labourers, entrepreneurs, officials, activists, aid donors, scientist) and 
objectives (profit, pay, livelihoods, control, property, efficiency, sustainability, 
conservation).” 
 
In this field of differing agendas, agencies and differential power positions, ‘participation’ 
serves as a symbolic capital and strategic tool to enable agencies to refract even while 
they appear to adopt a shift. Who participates in conservation is largely underpinned by 
the ideologies of conservation being pursued and the positionality in the power structures 
of those who pursue it. It is thus that Jeffery and Sundar (1999: 19) point out, “…terms 
like participation (as also community and civil society) in the field of development tend to 
have layered, multiple linguistic histories and their use in any context must be assessed 
critically i.e. one must raise the question of why participation is such a central value and 
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how is it constructed so that ‘participation’ can be managed?” The sheer number of ways 
in which participation has been practiced or conceptualised in conservation is evident 
from the typology provided by Pimbert and Pretty (1998: 65) where participation includes 
‘passive participation, information giving; consultation, material incentives, functional 
and interactive participation and self-mobilisation.’  
 
As stated by Pimbert and Pretty (1997), the official standpoint of many countries with 
regard to participation is still seen as a means to achieve externally desirable conservation 
goals. Hence, while recognizing the need for people’s participation many conservation 
professionals place clear limits on the form and degree of participation. In the case of 
Kailadevi Sanctuary, participation gains favour because of pragmatic purposes of easing 
out of the infrastructural and maintenance responsibility of the Forest Department and as 
Mosse (2001) argues, for negotiating relationships with donors and underpinning 
positions within policy debates. Despite all the rhetoric of participation, the Forest 
Department has not demonstrated any desire to relinquish or even share control and 
authority.  
 
Participation as a means of empowerment largely finds institutionalised expression 
mainly through the establishment of local level institutions. Perhaps the most visible and 
manageable form of participation of communities (their potential to democratize 
governance) is thwarted by the process of what Li (2009) refers to as ‘rendering 
technical’. The attempt to institutionalise participation (a key focus of this thesis) has 
been largely prescriptive and even restrictive in extent. Glossing over tensions that exist 
between the actors and the complex social processes involved in communities, the 
process of institutionalisation aims to, “…represent the unruly array of forces and 
relations on the forest edge as bounded arena in which calculated interventions will 
produce beneficial results” (ibid.: 270). Formed through project prescriptions these 
institutions tend to reconfigure community institutions as per the requirement of the 
projects and what it expects these institutions to do, trimming out the politically sensitive 
issues of rights, ownership and access. There is also a disjuncture with assumptions about 
communities and the power dynamics within. These institutions are more about what they 
‘ought to be’ rather than what they are.  
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The institutions tend to have a functional role in enabling the smooth implementation of 
the projects. Consequently, they not only pose operational limitations, but are culturally 
inappropriate and viewed as a means of imposing external control (Hailey 2001). 
Implementers of participatory development tend to develop parallel structures, ignoring 
the existing forms of more socio-culturally appropriate and acceptable forms of village 
organisation. These imposed structures serve to co-opt people and their resistance in the 
implementation of externally defined agendas. Their claim is to empower communities to 
the extent they can negotiate with external agencies (government, donors and others) on 
equal terms. However, the channelling of these powers draw on the dominant political 
and judicial systems, streamlining these institutions in the mould of the dominant 
paradigms. Thus, rather than creating truly decentralised structures of empowerment they 
serve merely as another form of centralisation of power in the hands of individual 
government departments (Vasvada, Mishra & Bates 1999)  
 
Participatory Conservation in India  
 
In India the official participatory approaches to forest management or conservation have 
rarely enabled a shift in power in terms of access, control or ownership. Official positions 
on these issues have been defined as ‘statist, centralised and bureaucratic’ (Baviskar 
1998). The position of the State on participatory approaches in India is evident in the 
implementation of the Joint Forest Management (JFM) policies.  JFM was introduced in 
1990 through a Government Order to operationalise provisions of the National Forest 
Policy of 1988. It was widely acknowledged as being among the first overt statements of 
government that recognised the livelihood needs and rights of communities. Reversing 
the earlier trends, JFM intended to provide a space for the participation of the forest 
dependent communities (Khare et al. 2000; Poffenberger & McGean 1996; Saigal 2003) 
Under JFM, the Forest Department and the village community enter into an agreement to 
jointly protect and manage forest land adjoining villages and to share responsibilities and 
benefits. Institutionalised participation of community was sought through bodies formed 
specifically for this purpose.37 However as the critiques of JFM have noted:  
                                                
 
37 These institutions have been variously referred to as Forest Protection Committee, Joint Forest 
Management Committee, Community Forest Management Committee,  
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….whether government foresters support it or not, the extent of Forest 
Department control within JFM is significant. Most importantly, village 
organisations in most states have no autonomous status and can be dissolved by 
the forestry department. The transfer of decision-making authority to local users 
implies a corresponding reduction in the power of the forestry department and, 
unsurprisingly, this continues to be resisted by many forest bureaucrats. 
Furthermore, over time a plethora of government notifications have created 
major ambiguities about the rights and concession available to forest-dependent 
communities.  (Khare et al. 2000: iv. Also see Jeffery 1999. Jeffery et al. 2001).  
Thus, in transferring only the task of forest protection and not management or utilisation 
to local communities, as Jeffery and Sundar (1999:45) have argued, ‘bureaucracy often 
reinforces rather than abdicates power and furthers the remits of its controls’ (Also see 
Jeffrey et al. 2001).   
 
The reluctance of the Forest Department to either devolve control or authority to 
community structures has been seen noted as the principal problem in realizing any 
meaningful decentralization in JFM (Hobley1996; Jeffrey et. al 2001; Khare 2000; 
Poffenberger 1990). As Jeffrey et al. (ibid.) note that while the overt exercise of authority 
is reduced, it continues to be maintained in the nuances of their interaction (‘performance’) 
with the village communities, for example how authority is affirmed through the sitting 
arrangements during the meetings. It is also explicit in the agenda setting and choices to 
be made through microplans etc. It is thus that some critiques argue –‘the failure of 
donors/ authorities to implement policies on participation is institutionally deep-seated 
and structural’ (Hildyard, Hegde, Wolvekamp & Reddy 2001)  
 
According to Vira (1999) the acceptance of involvement of local communities may serve 
a pragmatic purpose for the department i.e. reduction in conflict; devolution of 
management control; increased territorial control; regeneration of degraded forests and 
international donor support. But devolvement of authority may be resisted because it is 
perceived to reduce authority of the bureaucracy and increase accountability. Vira (ibid. 
265) however rightly points out the need to “…disaggregate the forest bureaucracy, and 
to identify the motivations and interests of officials at different positions within the 
structure” rather than treat it as monolith. It is from this very resistant system that some of 
the more innovative officers provided the initial impetus for the idea of JFM 
(Poffenberger & McGean 1996). However as Jeffrey et al. conclude: 
(There is) evidence of changes in the attitudes of forest staff, with several 
moving towards more participatory positions. Yet even these agents are limited 
by the overall hierarchical structure of the department and other problems (such 
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as frequent transfers and lack of specialisation) continue to bedevil the 
bureaucracy at large.  
 
Participation in Protected Area Management  
 
Participation in Protected Areas is advocated on several accounts- that coercive and 
exclusionary approaches have been counter-productive to the conservation itself; inability 
of authorities to enforce effective protection of parks both in terms of manpower and 
costs; evidence of positive anthropogenic influence in bio-diversity conservation i.e. what 
is often seen as ‘pristine’ nature is often a product of human intervention; the evidence of 
collective action in effective management of common property resources and adverse 
social impacts of exclusionary conservation methods on dependent communities, 
mentioned in the previous chapter (Agrawal 1999; Pimbert and Pretty 1997; Kothari et al. 
1996; Western & Wright 1994).  
 
In India, as in the other parts of the world, the debates on people’s participation in 
Protected Area management have been highly polarised one (Madhusudan & Raman 
2003; Steven 1997; Saberwal & Rangarajan 2003; Shahabuddin & Rangarajan 2007; 
Kothari et al. 1995; 1996; 1998 ). The main arguments against participatory approaches 
to protected areas also referred to by some as ‘preservationism’, have been based on the 
ground that they are, by definition, inviolate zones, and do not permit human intervention. 
Consequently, there can be no arrangement for benefit sharing with the participating 
communities. The improbability of resource sharing and maintaining PAs as inviolate 
zones advocated by wildlife and biological scientist, wildlife conservationist and forest 
officials is attributed to the principle concept underlying the formation of Protected Areas 
– resource use by dependent communities negatively impacts the protected areas and are, 
thus, detrimental to biodiversity conservation. The plea of the advocates is made more 
forceful in light of the large scale loss of species like the tiger and rhino to poaching.38 
They advocate that strict preservation is possible only through the ‘guns and guards’ or 
‘fences and fines’ approach in bounded landscapes free of any form of human 
                                                
 
38 In 1993 about 487 Kg of tiger bones thought be the remains of some 40 poached tigers was hauled in 
Delhi, busting the illegal animal trading rings operating from Delhi and other parts of the country. Tiger 
bones have a high demand in China and South-east Asian countries.  
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intervention (Dey 1996; Johnsingh 2006; Karanth 1998; 2000; Madhusudan & Karanth 
2002; Panwar 2003) Much of the justification is drawn from ecological sciences and the 
fact that between 1970 and 1990, wildlife that was conserved under strict preservation 
saw a significant growth and revival of numbers in India. Debunking the ‘sustainable 
paradigm’ that allows human use of areas protected for wildlife as one propounded by 
“savvy breed of executives schooled in social sciences, business management or law, 
possessing neither a theoretical understanding of ecology nor practical experience in 
wildlife conservation”,  Karanth (2000: 3-8) argues that the “…cumulative effect of this 
paradigm shift in protected area in India as “disastrous” and that a “renewed commitment 
to the idea of strictly protected wildlife reserves seems inescapable.”  
 
Exclusionary approaches have been resisted by various lobbies of activists, civil society 
organisations, environmentalist and conservationist who advocate inclusion in the interest 
of people as well as by academics. While some clearly place priority on human needs and 
issues of rights, the others have proffer evidence of community based conservation- folk 
traditions, sacred groves, community protection of certain birds and animals- across the 
country to advocate for including communities in management (See Kothari et al. 1998). 
They emphasise on ‘traditional conservation’ practices and ‘conservation ethics’ of 
communities, the loss of wildlife owing to ineffectiveness of state management and 
counter-effect of people-wildlife conflicts on conservation (Gadgil & Guha 1992, Gadgil 
& Guha 1995; Kothari et al. 1996; 1998).  
 
Advocates of a more inclusionary approach or sustainable paradigm argue that exclusion 
of humans from nature reserves are based on biased cultural and historical process. 
Countering  the ‘myth of wilderness’ they have shown how several areas which are now 
maintained as pristine nature have evolved through a history of human use and 
intervention. Typical examples have been sited from Himachal Pradesh (Great Himalayan 
National Park), Rajasthan (Keoladeo National Park) and (Madhya Pradesh Kanha 
National Park). They stress on reconciling the conservation needs with the livelihood 
needs of dependent communities and hold the alienation of communities from PAs as the 
reason for the increase in poaching and industrial activities in PAs. (Guha 2003; Kothari 
et al. 1989, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000; Saberwal et al. 2001)   
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The debate on exclusion and co-management in Protected Areas has also revolved around 
the issues of scientific versus indigenous knowledge. While scientists and conservationist 
pay scant regard to local knowledge for its lack of scientific basis or rigour, the advocates 
of an inclusionary approach have questioned the scientific logic for keeping humans and 
wildlife apart. In fact countering the scientific rhetoric for keeping people out of PAs, 
Saberwal and Rangarajan (2003) have argued that the management plans for most PAs 
are based less on the use of actual biological knowledge and more on the fact that the 
laws do not allow human intervention in Protected Area. They cite several examples of 
how some areas where the ecosystem, benefited by human use has suffered when its use 
has been banned through legislative measures, executed with no due considerations of the 
actual biological impact of human use.  
 
The lobby for the shift to a sustainable paradigm has been advocating the notion of ‘Joint 
Protected Area Management’ (JPAM). As stated by Kothari et al. (1996) JPAM is 
defined as: 
The management of PAs and their surroundings with the objective of conserving 
natural ecosystems and their wildlife as well as ensuring the livelihood security 
of local traditional communities, through legal and institutional mechanisms 
which ensure an equal partnership between these communities and government  
Saberwal and Rangarajan (2003: 3) encapsulate the key issues on that characterise the 
debates around PAs in India:  
Concerns in the Indian Wildlife Board are thus increasingly couched in dualities 
of the following kind: should the state manage wilderness areas or should local 
communities? Should people be allowed to use Protected Areas or should areas 
be inviolate? Should ‘western science’ or ‘local knowledge’ provide the bedrock 
of the know-how on which these areas are managed? Should human habitation 
be relocated or not? Should power be devolved or should it, alternately be 
concentrated in a few expert hands? Should parks be insulated from or 
selectively integrated into wider regional economies? Is total protection a 
remedy or a problem? Should the existing systems be repaired and reformed 
from within or replaced with a different one? 
These debates are polarized not only between the State and non-government organisations. 
They are as much contested within as between the multiple agencies. Government 
officials who have been long-time bureaucrats and also served as Secretary, Planning 
Commission of India, in their official capacity have been extremely critical of the 
Governments exclusionary policies. Within the government there are also tensions 
between the central and state governments over whether the forest and wildlife 
conservation should be in the concurrent lists of subjects. Among the NGOs, the World 
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Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), Bombay Natural; History Society, and others have 
been advocates of the centralised model of conservation. This has brought them into sharp 
conflict with other NGOs working on ensuring human rights of communities. These 
differences are evident from the fact that the opposition to the Ecodevelopment Project 
was not unanimous. There have been several NGOs who have preferred to play the 
facilitators role in enabling collaborative management models as envisaged in projects 
like IEDP.  
 
India Ecodevelopment Project  
 
The India Ecodevelopment Project was perhaps the first systematic attempt of the 
Government to initiate a participatory approach in PA management, in so far as it 
recognised the adverse impact of the PAs on people; the need to contain the resentment of 
people for better meeting the conservation objectives of PAs and recognising people as 
‘stakeholders’ in the conflicts surrounding the management of a PA. Ecodevelopment in 
PAs is not considered entirely new in India. Indian forest officials have argued that the 
notion has been practised in India with the establishment of the India Ecodevelopment 
Board in 1983 (Saberwal et al. 2001). This however was mainly focussed on removing 
the pressures of local communities from PAs and looked at relocation as a key element. 
Also the lack of governmental funding, ecodevelopment activities was never undertaken 
in any significant manner until the coming of the World Bank supported Ecodevelopment 
Project.  
 
The ideas embodied in the Ecodevelopment Project find their origin in Integrated 
Conservation Development Projects (ICDP) which have been adopted in different parts of 
the world (Neumann 1997; Wells & Brandon 1992) In the wake of the growing conflicts 
around Protected Areas and other nature reserves that excluded dependent communities, 
notions of ICDPs have evolved in the 1980s as part of a broader effort by policy makers 
(World Bank, National Parks Congress in Bali, WWF) to address these conflicts by 
creating better economic opportunities in the areas around PAs and by enabling greater 
participation of local communities in the management of PAs (Koch 1997; Sanghamitra 
2002; Wells & Brandon 1992). It was meant to reduce the pressures on PAs by 
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developing alternative rural livelihood measures and addressing the development needs of 
dependent communities through adopting participatory approaches. 
 
Most widely used in Africa, ICDP approaches however are critiqued for the promotion of 
exclusionary paradigms, strengthening the State in achieving the same, underpinned by a 
continuance of the cultural and historical prejudices against communities and thus 
“replicate more coercive forms of conservation more coercive forms of conservation 
practice and often constitute an expansion of state authority into remote rural areas” 
(Neumann 1997: 559) 
 
ICDPs often have a significant gap between rhetoric and reality so far as meaningful 
participation of the local communities is concerned (Adams 1995; Karlsson 1998; Wells 
et al.1992) Perhaps the most often quoted example of ICDP is Project CAMPFIRE 
(Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) in Zimbabwe. 
CAMPFIRE was an attempt to harness the economic value of wildlife for local 
communities through promoting tourism and recreation (Koch 1997). The main criticism 
against CAMPFIRE has been that it has continued with the externally imposed models of 
conservation, involving local communities primarily to implement a centrally conceived 
programme. External agencies like tour operators etc are said to have wielded greater 
control and power over the process (Koch 1997).   
 
Also at a broader level the assumption that livelihoods and benefits could substitute and 
be exchanged for resource rights and access is problematic; perhaps a benevolent process 
of legitimizing takeover of State takeover of communities’ rights and land. Incentives to 
enable local participation are also seen to have a beneficiary orientation and as “hire the 
natives scheme” that deflect from issues of power-sharing and devolution of decision-
making (West and Brechin 1991; p3). Also these schemes (as evident in this thesis) fail to 
develop any long-term, sustainable livelihood options (IIED 1994).  
 
The India Ecodevelopment Project was preceded by two pilot projects under Forestry 
Research and Extension Project (FREEP). These two projects were implemented in 
Kalakad Mundunthurai Tiger Reserve (KMTR) in Tamilnadu and in Great Himalayan 
National Park (GHNP) in Himachal Pradesh. Although, officially launched in 1994, they 
were not started on the ground until 1996. The World Bank aided India Ecodevelopment 
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was also launched in 1996 with a total budget of $ 68 million was to be implemented in 
seven PAs - Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve (Rajasthan), Periyar Tiger Reserve (Kerela), 
Simlipal National Park(Odisha), Nagarhole National Park (Karnataka), Buxa Tiger 
Reserve (West Bengal), Palamau Tiger Reserve (Bihar) and Gir National Park (Gujurat). 
During the course of its implementation however, the projects were pulled back in Odisha 
and terminated mid-term in Karnataka because of popular resistance to the forceful 
relocation of local communities being undertaken by the Forest Department in these areas 
(Also see Chapter Four).  
 
Like other ICDP projects, the India Ecodevelopment Project has also been criticised for 
reinforcing the State’s agenda and lacking in any meaningful participation. According to 
Kothari (1997: 28) IEDP was problematic for: 
...virtually having no proposal to revive community rights over land/water/forest 
resources, or to reduce exclusive government control over these resources, or to 
reducing people’s pressure, the assumption being that the local community 
dependence is inevitably destructive. Integration of livelihood requirements with 
conservation objectives within PA is not a major focus 
The implementation of the project has also been heavily criticised in GHNP (Baviskar, 
1998; 2003) and Buxa Tiger Reserve (Karlsson 1999) for only paying a lip service to the 
notion of participation, for reinforcing local power structures among communities, for 
marginalising (or excluding) the marginalised communities, for having a poor 
understanding of the biological aspects of the conservation needs of the areas, for poor 
understanding of local needs, for disregarding the local knowledge and imposing external 
models for institutionalising participation (Chapter Four provides the details of the project 
as conceptualised in India).  
 
In summing up, the practices of participation have been as discursive in conservation as 
in development. Even where the notion participation has been officially adopted, like 
JFM it has meant different things to different people and served primarily the pragmatic 
purposes of the department with limited scope for empowering communities; 
participatory approaches have been reduced to technical and formulaic approaches that 
tend to depoliticize a process with clear political consequences.  The debate on people’s 
participation in protected area management and resource sharing has been a highly 
polarised one. Although the notions of joint protected area management based on similar 
principles as JFM, and has been advocated for over a decade now, the Government of 
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India has been firmly opposed to the idea. That governments and agencies less inclined to 
participatory approaches are increasingly making attempts towards this end is evident in 
with initiatives such as the India Ecodevelopment Project. Experience of eco-
development models in other parts the world and India have been critiqued for further 
marginalisation of communities hold on land, resource rights and implementing a 
centralised notion of participation.  
 
Community 
 
The politics of participatory conservation is located as much in the use of notions and 
practices of participation as in the conceptions of ‘community’. There is a trend in 
external interventions to simplify the social reality of the complex of communities and the 
agency communities bring to the ‘peasant–bureaucrat’ interactions. The shifts, the 
resistance, the self-representations, the negotiations and opening and merging of  spaces 
for contesting intra-community relations and relations with the different external agencies 
defy any simplistic, linear analysis of the relations between ‘people’ and ‘state’ in the 
context of participatory conservation.  
 
Drawing on various theoretical and intellectual traditions, the literature for community 
participation in resource management and conservation have harboured and promoted 
certain notion of ‘community’ as homogenous, apolitical, cites of consensus, bounded 
units, in ‘harmony with nature’ or as those of common interests used in advocating 
inclusion of resource dependent people in resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 
2001)39. Much of the advocacy literature for community participation in India lent 
credence to similar notions (Berkes, F. 1993. 1989; Bhatt 1990, Gadgil & Berkes, Guha 
& Gadgil 1992; Sen 1992; Guha1989)
40
.     
 
                                                
 
39 They provide a comprehensive review of theoretical, intellectual and empirical roots of how now such 
notions of ‘community’ have come to prevail in policy and advocacy literature on community-based 
management. They also trace the idea of community as it evolved theories of structuralism, early theorist of 
social change and modernization.  In terms of conception of community in conservation, they trace its roots 
to historical ecologists, literature on CPR and works focusing on community involvement in conservation.  
40 A comprehensive review of the Indian writing in this tradition on communities and resource management 
is provided by Sinha et al. (1997).  
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Anthropological and sociological literature has dispelled the ‘myth of a community’ both 
in the context of development and especially in the context of natural resource 
management (Agrawal 1997; Agrawal & Gibson 2001; Baviskar 1998; Gujit & Shah 
1998; Grillo 1996; Jeffery & Sundar 1999; Jeffery et al.2001; Li 1996, 1997; Neumann 
1997) Debunking much of the essentialist notions of ‘community’, the critics argue for an 
understanding of ‘community’  as complex entities, comprising of several groups that are 
differentiated by social positions, hierarchies, political and economic power, more 
importantly with differential use of and entitlements to  resources.  
 
Representations of certain simplistic notions of communities have had strategic 
advantages in advocating for the inclusion of people in state programmes for resource 
management and in getting their entity. As Li (1996: 509) argues, representations of 
communities as homogenous and/or in harmony with nature can have symbolic value for 
agencies advocating a greater role for communities; it can provide “points of leverage in 
ongoing processes of negotiation.” For example, in Indonesia, simplified images of 
beleaguered tribes have been used with some success to open possibilities in the policy 
arena, to shift Indonesian state policy in favour of recognition of ‘indigenous community’ 
land rights (ibid). In the Indian context Sinha et al. (1997: 69) contend that “the 
‘traditionalist’ discourse is not only an intellectual formation but an effort to reshape the 
relationship between local people, environment and the environmentalist state”. For 
Baviskar (1998a) these discourses are the ‘political use of symbols’ that selectively 
appropriate some aspects of ‘tribal’ or indigenous knowledge for pursuing their agenda 
against the state and the ‘scientific establishment’.  
 
These notions of communities, that inform policy and project frameworks, lead to 
practices attempting to tailor existing social complexities to simplistic model–they end up 
‘constructing’ spatially and conceptually a manageable unit, assumed to be representative 
and sharing a common interest (Jeffery et al. 2001, Gururani 2002). This is done more in 
service of administrative expediency or as ‘project of rule’ (Li, 1999). In analysing the 
use of ‘communities’ in JFM in India Jeffery et al. (2001: 103) state: 
Social units are often constructed for specific purposes, under specific rules. The 
communities that are basic to JFM policy may be better seen as forms of social 
life that have been created by JFM resolutions, rather than as inherent attributes 
of the people or the places themselves 
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The ‘constructed’ nature of communities in community-based approaches is best captured 
by Pannel and Benda-Beckmann (1998:20, as cited in Li 2009: 275). According to them 
‘community’ as used in community management programmes:  
Compresses individual differences, intentions, and agendas, and presents people, 
in terms of their corporate membership in communities, as somehow singular, 
identifiable, and knowable entities. In assuming an unquestionable spatial 
visibility and temporal viability, the notion that ‘community’ can be a specific 
social achievement or a particular political performance is completely 
disregarded. In the novel form of essentialism communities becomes a new tribe, 
or even worse, the new races of development, environmental or resource 
management discourses.  
However, viewing communities as a ‘unified organic whole ignores how these differences 
affect resource management outcomes, local politics, and strategic interactions within 
communities, as well as the possibility of layered alliances that can span multiple levels 
of politics’ (Agrawal & Gibson 2001: 7). Agrawal (1997) stresses that a more accurate 
understanding of community in conservation can be founded only by understanding the 
divergent interests of multiple actors within communities and that agents within 
communities seek their interest in conservation programmes and their interests and 
identities are often redefined as new opportunities emerge. According to him, “changing 
relationships with external actors allow different political actors within communities to 
play out their differences in new terms, create new alliances, and even create new terrains 
of conflict” (ibid:16; cf. Mosse 1997).  
 
The disjuncture between assumed notions of community and the social reality of complex 
entities have several implications. It is now well established that the new structures of 
governance of resources embodied in local institutions, which impose certain notions of 
communities and their resource relations, misrecognizing the complex tenurial issues and 
differential resource use practices end up legitimizing the exclusion or denial of access to 
certain groups of the communities.  As evidenced in JFM in India, the process of 
institutionalising community participation that ignore inter and intra-community 
dynamics–especially issues of gender and differential dependence- tend to reinforce the 
positions of the more privileged and powerful,  further marginalising the already marginal 
groups (Jeffrey et al. 2001; Khare et al. 2000; Sarin 1998). JFM brings open access 
forests under new regimes as common pool resource and vests control (at least in terms of 
framing the rules and regulations) to community level. As Sarin (1998: 31) points out 
who within communities, and by which process they take decisions about the access rules, 
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determines which individuals or groups within ‘communities’ and households acquire the 
power to define and enforce the ‘community’s’ forest management priorities. As she 
rightly argues, although it is usually the poorest and most marginalised groups within 
communities who are acutely dependent on the forest resources, because and the benefit 
to be earned from timber sale (and political capital to be gained through aligning with 
external agencies) it is often the powerful non-users of forests who have the greatest 
visibility and voice”.  
 
The homogenising of community and their interest in community participation for 
resource management has been particularly exclusionary of women and their equity 
issues. Informed more by a ‘welfare’ approach, the issue of women’s benefit or 
participation has been predicated two issues- dependence on male episteme and an of a 
household as being a nuclear corporate unit where benefits trickle down to all equally 
(Agrawal 1998; Krishna 2003; Sarin et al. 1998). Consequently, women’s participation in 
community institutions have often followed the existing constructs of gender prevalent in 
the given society which provide little space for women’s participation in public or 
political platforms (Jeffrey et al. 2001). Krishna (2003: 19) outlines certain key issues 
that marginalise women and women’s participation in community institutions-‘not 
admitting socio-cultural practices and gender ideologies that restrict women’s autonomy, 
mobility and capacity to participate in NRM are not admitted; lack of recognition of intra-
household and intra-community inequities in the allocation of resource access and 
property rights and not recognising the distinction between resource management and 
resource rights.’ 
 
In JFM practices in India most of these issues are clearly evident. While women have 
taken on resource management aspects like protection and patrolling, “men become 
members and make the decisions regarding which areas to close off from the collection of 
firewood and grazing, or what is to be done with the final harvest.” (Jeffery et al. ibid: 
112). As Sarin et al.(1998; also see Correa 1999; Lock 1999) argues, since women’s 
interests are not represented in decision-making, many of the resource practices like 
firewood and grazing getting restricted and their attempts to get the same gets 
criminalised and poses severe hardships. In the case of Africa, Neumann (1997), citing 
several studies points out how ICDP programmes aimed at tenure reforms in the buffer 
zones clearly disadvantage women, by failing to take cognizance of the fact that gender is 
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a key determinant in the ownership and access, the tenurial reforms exacerbate the gender 
divides and contests over land ownership.  
 
Given the above discussion on heterogeneity of interests and the political implications of 
membership in local ‘community’ organisation for resource management it becomes 
problematic to accept Agrawal’s (2006a) assertion that environmental beliefs and 
variations therein among the resident of Kumaon (western Himalayas) in relations to the 
Van Panchayats, (an instance of effective working of community forest management in 
collaboration with the government), are not contingent on socio-cultural positions of caste 
and gender but the extent of their involvement in environmental regulatory practices. 
However as evidenced in Kailadevi, and as argued above, who is involved and who is left 
out of such regulatory apparatuses is contingent on their socio-cultural position and the 
extent of their dependency on the natural resources. For example, in Kailadevi the 
outcastes - the Bhangi who were dependent on goat rearing and depended on the forests 
were never considered within the institutional framework of either KBP or EDCs.  
 
Also, project constructed ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ communities, that exclude a host of other 
social relationships and that bind a defined set of people to specified resources or areas,  
tend to misrepresent social reality and cause the disadvantaging of other user groups (Li 
1996; Parkes 1999, Baviskar 2003). Parkes (ibid.) points out that local resource 
management necessarily entails a practical political knowledge of outside interested 
parties as well as internal dissension and political opponents within local communities. 
This knowledge, through creation of new alliances with external agencies, is used by the 
local communities who form a part of the Ecodevelopment initiative in Great Himalayan 
National Park as well as in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary to keep out the migratory 
pastoralists sheep herders like Gaddis and Rebari respectively. Migratory pastoralists 
posed a problem of over-grazing to the Forest Departments and competition to local 
communities. Thus, by excluding the migratory pastoralist from the ‘local’ and 
‘traditional’ communities prescribed in the project framework, their access to the 
resources was effectively delegitimized (Baviskar 2003; 1998; cf. Karlsson 1999).   
 
A more significant focus of this thesis however is on the agency of communities in 
shaping the project practices and in turn, its outcomes. It is important to note that the 
politics of participation is not a simplified analysis of relations between the ‘powerful’ 
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and the ‘powerless’ as is also evident in the analysis of this thesis. According to Foucault 
(as cited in Gordon, 1980: 236) - “power is not an institution, a structure, or a certain 
force with which certain people are endowed: it is the name given to a complex strategic 
relation in a given society.”  
 
In India the imposition of hegemonic visions of nature, conservation or environment has 
not been without resistance from resource dependent communities; neither in 
contemporary nor colonial times. The communities have either resisted openly or using 
what Scott (1985) as the more covert “everyday forms of resistance”, including feigned 
compliance, that he calls the “weapons of the weak”. Guha and Gadgil (1989) chronicle a 
number of such movements among resource-dependent communities spanning a large 
time frame. Protests and revolts were seen amongst the hunter-gatherer communities such 
as the Chenchus of Kurnool; the shifting cultivators like the Baigas of Madhya Pradesh 
and also the famous Gudem Rampa revolt among the Koya and Konda tribe that occupy 
the hill tracts of present day Andhra Pradesh. This resistance lasted for almost a century 
and was also present among settled cultivators (non-confrontationist) protests by the 
farmers in the Madras Residency. The authors (ibid: 175) point specifically to the ‘wide 
variety of strategies’ used by different categories of resource users to oppose state 
intervention. They note that the hunter-gatherer and artisans and small dispersed 
communities, lacking in institutional network of organisation, were unable to directly 
challenge forest policies. They did, however, resort to break the new regulations by 
resorting chiefly to ‘avoidance protest’, petty crime and migration. The social conflicts 
resulting from the establishment of PAs in India have already been mentioned. Also the 
repeated protests have had a significant impact on government policies as well as 
conflicts between forest officials. The fear of popular resistance and avoidance protests 
like migration, prevented colonial forest officials from imposing absolute restriction on 
resource access by local communities in some parts of India (Guha & Gadgil 1989; Skaria, 
1999; Sundar 1997).  
 
Besides the ability of authorities, especially the forest department, to keep people away 
from accessing resources (from PAs and non-PA forests), through exercise of 
legalisations and policing has always been compromised (a primary reason for the need to 
include people in conservation). In every part of the world where communities have 
continued to exercise their de facto rights either through establishing kin networks, using 
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political capital with local politicians, through the allegiance with the forest guards, 
through bribes or just on the sly (Vasan 2002; Robbins 2000; Saberwal 1999; Peluso 
1992; Neumann 2002).  
 
In the interaction of the State and communities in the more structured context of 
development and conservation programmes/project, where compliance of communities is 
necessary to legitimize the State intervention as ‘benevolent’ (not coercive) and a success 
(not failure) Li (1999; 2009) accords communities with an a more proactive, engaged and 
knowing agency– one that affords them greater leverage and more powers to negotiate, 
even though the field power remains uneven. She argues because of the inherent 
contradictions between the rhetoric of ‘project of rule’ and the reality, the project of rule 
cannot be imposed, it has to be worked out to appear as if achieved-it has to be 
accomplished. The accomplishment rule she argues requires the engagement of those to 
be ruled in relations of compromise and collaborations, of knowing complicity- 
In development encounters...it is less important that plans and discourses prevail 
than that they engage, providing room for manoeuvre and opportunities for 
compromise, with all nuances of that term. As an agreement between two 
parties, a compromise assumes that agency is distributed, if unevenly; both sides 
have “power to”. It also assumes a level of conscious knowledge and 
understanding of what is being gained and what is being given up (Li 1999:298) 
The relation of compromise, unlike ‘hidden transcript’ of Scott (1990), focuses on the 
vulnerability of the authorities and the fragile nature of bureaucratic schemes. While in 
Scott’s (1990) analysis of ‘arts of resistance’, peasants refrain from speaking “truth to 
power”, and strategise ‘off stage’, in relations of compromise the, ‘state functionaries also 
live lies’ and are vulnerable to the ‘possibility of exposure and disgrace’ (Li 1999).    
Thus in “successful” projects, both the communities and authorities compromise and are 
comprised, providing in the bargain, some spaces for continued access. According to Li 
(2009: 279)  
[A]ssemblage such as community forestry cannot be resolved into neat binaries 
that separate power from resistance, or progressive forces from reactionary ones. 
It is difficult to determine who has been co-opted and who betrayed. Fuzziness, 
adjustments and compromises are critical to holding this assemblage together.  
In analysing the agency of communities, in Kailadevi, villagers draw on a range of 
strategies both direct and indirect, to retain access to their key resources, that comprise of 
compromises, every-day forms of resistance as well as ‘hidden transcripts’. Also, 
‘compromises’ while helps them leverage certain short-term project benefits, in the end 
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are more driven by more coercive threats of relocation. Collaborating with the forest 
officials in sustaining the representation of “successful” KBP compromises the 
communities own hold on KBPs. This nevertheless is done with the hope of averting the 
possibilities of relocation as well as to deflect the surveillance of the guards on the 
continuing use of the axe in the forests. In the end, their access to resources remains more 
“fragile” than that of the bureaucratic scheme. As Brockington (2004) clearly argues, 
despite all the resistance and protest of resource dependent communities, they ultimately 
remain a weak force that can be overpowered by the authorities.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to outline the contested nature of ‘conservation’, 
‘participation’ and ‘community’ both conceptually and in participatory conservation 
practices in India. It sets the politicized context in which any new participatory wildlife 
conservation paradigms are implicated, unfold and their outcomes shaped.  
 
The evolution of PAs in India embodies the cultural politics of forestry practices, state-
making, sport hunting, ecological concerns, and civilizing mission of Colonial and Royal 
India.  The processes through which wildlife conservation has emerged have 
systematically denied, de-legitimized and dispossessed a vast number of resource 
dependent communities from their lands, livelihood practices and identities. But these 
impositions have not been without resistance or conflicts from resource dependent 
communities. Thus, inscribed in each landscape is a history of contested meanings, 
regimes of controls and the de facto practices of resource use and assertion of belonging 
by dependent communities. Independent India reinforced these processes further with its 
expanding networks of PAs. Much of what are now considered ‘pristine’ landscapes or 
‘wildernesses’ of PAs in India,  have emerged through bitter and conflictful histories of 
state imposed ideas of conservation and local resistance of resource dependent 
communities. Hence people-wildlife conflicts cannot be understood or addressed outside 
of its specific historical context as the past remains entrenched in the politics of present 
both for the State and the resource dependent communities.    
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The chapter also highlights the politicized aspects of State management of PAs.  The 
political will or the lack of it at all levels of the government, the marginalized positions of 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the FD within the larger bureaucracy as well 
as the horizontal and vertical divided within the Forest Department itself have played and 
continue to play a significant role in the way decisions are made and PAs are managed. 
While collaborative management is made out to be an issue of the ‘people’s impact’, the 
larger bureaucratic and organizational concerns get a short shrift.  
 
In apparent recognition of the historical injustices done to dependent communities and to 
counter the adverse impacts that people-wildlife conflict have on conservation, 
participatory approaches in wildlife conservation aim to reconcile livelihood of local 
communities with the conservation imperatives. But as in development, participatory 
practices in the context have been discursive in nature and ‘tyrannical’ in their import. 
Participatory forest management experiences in India suggest that participation is adopted 
by a rather reluctant state for pragmatic purposes, primarily in service of its own need and   
involves no real devolvement of control or decision making. The idea of participation has 
helped legitimize what remains  essentially a top-down approach where participation has 
a  vast array of meanings ; even the mere presence of ‘beneficiaries’ suffices as 
participation.  
 
 Participation as a means of empowerment finds expression mainly through the 
establishment of local level institutions.  However as the various experiences on 
institutionalisation of participation in conservation discussed demonstrate, local 
institution building becomes a facilitative process in the expansion of bureaucratic control 
over community managed resources and land. Their potential to democratize governance 
is thwarted by the technical approach taken to their operation and formation; glossing 
over tensions that exist between the actors and the complex social processes involved in 
communities.  
 
While the adoption participatory approaches have been accepted and made possible in 
non-PA forests, the adoption the same in PAs have engendered a highly polarised debate. 
The government, ecological scientists and wildlife conservationists have advocated the 
separation of humans and wildlife as a prerequisite for maintaining viability of species 
and supporting viable ecosystems.  On the other side of the debate are strong advocates 
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for including communities in wildlife management and PA management. The latter justify 
their stand on several accounts - social justice, evidence of favourable anthropogenic 
influence on ecosystem maintenance and a concern for safeguarding industrial interests. 
They argue that dependent communities have a greater interest in maintaining the 
ecosystem and therefore will be better deterrents to poachers and the intrusion of 
commercial and industrial forces into their forest areas.  
 
Integrated Conservation Development Projects like IEDP, the prevalent and popular 
answer to people-wildlife conflict, attempting to meet the needs of communities and 
conservation are critiqued for being as statist as the projects on community forest 
management. They too have been critiqued for enabling the expansion of state control, 
operating on pre-determined agendas and failing to involve communities in decision 
making.  Equally problematic in these projects is the misrecognition of issues of rights 
and belonging. Economic benefits often tend to be used as means of buying out 
community rights.  
 
Finally the chapter focuses on ‘community’- a key protagonist of participatory 
conservation. It  highlights the cultural politics inherent in the use of popular notion of 
‘community’ in participatory conservation and the implications it has both in terms of 
reinforcing social inequities within communities and enabling state projects for advancing 
its own brand of conservation and participation. ‘Community’ rather a denoting a singular 
entity and embodying conservation ethic, comprises of a complex of entities, with 
differing agendas, interests and power positions. The inequities and conflicts often find 
renewed articulation in new alliances and forums afforded by external interventions. 
Finally, the chapter focuses on dynamics of peasant-bureaucrat interaction and the local 
level resistance frameworks. It discussed the kinds of compromises, collaborations and 
negotiations that take place and their impact on the final outcomes of projects.   
 
Given the multiple histories, meanings, agendas, contests and practices that characterize 
the context of participatory conservation in India and elsewhere, in any given context to 
understand the direction in which projects unfold and the politics that underpins it in India, 
it as Peluso (2003: 62) suggests, one would need to ask – 
What are the origins of the problems? How do State and the other powerful 
actors constitute ‘problems’ and their ‘solutions’? How are the various sorts of 
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claims expressed, negotiated and realized? Who benefits and loses from these 
arrangements in ways beyond the obvious changes in direct access to the animals 
under discussion? How and why are power relations shifting in ways that enable 
‘local people’ to express their claims through national and international actors? 
And how have these allegedly ‘new’ voices acquired legitimacy?  
The thesis analyses the community – initiative and its engagement with government and 
non-government participatory conservation initiatives in Kailadevi against an 
understanding of this complex political context and by asking of each practice and 
outcomes, some of these questions.  
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Chapter 3 
Resources, Identities and Forest Protection 
 
Introduction 
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayat served as the mobilising metaphor for all participatory 
initiatives by the external agencies. The main focus of this chapter is to contextualise this 
practice within lives and livelihoods of the people of Nibhera and to extricate it from the 
conservation gaze employed by both, advocates of the isolationist approach and 
community rights. Gaze, according to Foucault, ‘implies an open field, and its essential 
activity is of the successive order of reading; it records and totalizes; it gradually 
reconstitutes immanent organizations’ (1973: 121). 
 
As discussed in chapter two, community initiatives in forest protection and their resource 
relations tend to be appropriated within the traditionalist discourse by advocates of 
community rights. Equally, communities’ relations with sacred sites and practices are 
usually advocated as socio-religious practices of conservation. Alternately, the advocates 
of scientific management tend to appropriate these initiatives within a discourse of 
biodiversity conservation where protection of resources is seen as the opposite of 
utilisation.  
 
This chapter analyses six key aspects – people’s dependence on resources; their landscape 
and identities; acts of forest protection; change in dependency; the emergence of Kulhadi 
bandh panchayat; and the shifting sense of place and identity. The primary purpose in 
analysing these aspects is to locate the people and the forests of Nibhera within their 
locally articulated contexts and demonstrate the inextricable relatedness of the 
communities’ dependence on the forests, their sense of place, their socio-political 
identities and the acts of forest protection. The chapter attempts to establish that in the 
worldview of the local communities there is no dichotomy between forest protection and 
use as there is no duality in wanting to stay in the forests and the need for development 
infrastructure therein. Resource-relations and resource-use practices among the 
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communities are dynamic, experiential and locally evolved practices of nature and 
governance directed towards living and livelihoods and not ‘conservation’.  
 
Directing attention to the origin, structure and function of Kulhadi bandh panchayat 
within the broader framework of communities’ resource-relations and resource-use 
practices, the chapter reinforces the point that ‘institutional base for resource management 
is shaped by cultural and historical context within which the particular resource based 
economy evolves and the social interaction that takes place within these domains are 
constituted in culturally and historically specific ways’ (Mosse, 2003: 4). Hence, it argues 
that principles of communities’ participation in and management of resources (envisaged 
in conservation models) arrived at by ‘abstracting them from the social relations and 
practices through which they are produced’ (Johari, 2007: 49), tend to be ineffective and 
of much disservice to the communities they are meant to serve.  
 
Livelihoods and Forest Dependence 
 
The habitation area of village Nibhera is on a plateau and is surrounded by vast stretches 
of agricultural land. The vegetation is sparse on the plateau. Neem trees and a few 
flowering hedges and shrubs are to be found closer home and in the fields. Further away 
from the habitation, one finds a scattering of bamboor and keekar and a wild growth of 
Ber (Zizyphus sp.) shrubs. Beyond these fields are a slightly denser Dhok (Anogeisuss 
pendula) forests. As one moves further away to the east, west and northwest of the village, 
the forest thickens, the terrain is more undulating and gives way to densely forested 
hillsides. This area is locally known as dongars (hillocks). Between the valley and the 
plateau of Nibhera there are several khos or river gorges. These gorges are very densely 
forested and, according to the local Forest Department, are the richest biodiversity 
reserves of this area. To the south of the village is one of the biggest khos of Kailadevi 
Wildlife Sanctuary, Kudka ki kho and to the west is the Nibhera kho.  
 
As Gold and Gujjar observe for a forest-dependent community in another part of 
Rajasthan, for the people of Nibhera too, ‘livelihood at every level of society was 
enhanced, and benefited from healthy forest cover both then and now’ (2002: 245). For 
each of these caste groups the forest resources are an indispensable source of sustenance. 
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The villagers when asked about the significance of these forests often say, "Our ancestors 
settled here because of the forests". Although there are different versions of the origin of 
the village in terms of which caste settled first, a common lure for all them seems to have 
been the forests. The community of carpenters (Badai) contend that they were the first 
community to settle in the area, lured by good timber available from the Dhok forest. The 
Chamar community claims to have settled here around the same time as the Badai. Their 
ancestors were attracted by abundance of wildlife in the region and the good hides it 
would provide. All the other castes maintain that the Brahman and the Gujjar (Baba 
Balram being the first) were the original settlers. The Gujjars of Nibhera assert that “from 
the very beginning we have grazed our dhor-meweshi (livestock) here as we came here in 
search of good fodder.” 41 
 
As discussed in the later section of this Chapter, the forests have dwindled significantly 
and livelihoods have undergone a significant change. These changes notwithstanding, 
basic survival is still dependent on agro-pastoral activities and the forests remains 
indispensable for sustaining the lives and livelihoods of the communities in Nibhera. In 
response to my question on the ability of the forest to benefit these communities, the first 
three things that most responded to was “chara, jalau kaje lakdi aur imarti lakdi” (fodder, 
fuel wood and small timber). There are several other uses that the forests have for them 
except that they are not as crucial to their existence as these three uses. Govind Gujjar 
sums up the extent to which communities continue to depend on the forests, “Without the 
forests neither will we survive nor will our livestock!” 
 
Livestock rearing and dependence for fodder 
Livestock in Nibhera comprise buffalos, cows, bulls and goats. There are also 5 camels in 
the village used mainly for drawing carts. In Nibhera, Gujjars hold the largest herd (dhor) 
of buffalos. A single unit of their dhor is a khoj. The largest owners are the four brothers 
from Bhattin Ka Pura, who jointly own 40 khoj. Then there are persons like Bhanta and 
his brother Haricharan Kurkawale, who along with their sons own about 25 khoj. The 
                                                
 
41 The early literature on the Gujjars too identifies them as pastoral nomads. Bingley (1978) notes that even 
Jahangir, one of the Mughal rulers of India, as far back as in the 17th century associated the professions of 
Gujjars with milk and curd. As pointed out by Verma (1971) the association of Gujjars with pastoralism 
and with dairy produce has often led them to be strongly identified with lord Krishna. 
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other big cattle owner possess between 8-15 khoj. There are also a few Gujjar families 
like Ramji Lal who do not own any cattle. Equalling Gujjars in the number of buffalos are 
ten Brahman and Teli families. Chamar families have been able to afford cattle only in 
the past ten years and most households own one or two buffalos. Doms and Nais have 
none, having lost theirs to ‘bad times’.  
 
Cows are found mainly with Brahmans and are only a few in numbers. Some families of 
the other caste groups like Nai, Dom and Teli also keep one cow each. One rarely finds a 
cow with a Gujjar. As Pritam Singh Gujjar, proud owner of 20 buffalos explains, “Cows 
are an expensive affair. To look after them along with the buffalo is a problem as they 
have very different requirements. Cows need more looking after. A grazier always has to 
accompany them.” Cows are kept primarily to meet the household milk requirement and 
the maximum that one has is about 4-5 heads. Bulls are kept mainly in pairs or in singles 
and are very few in numbers. 
 
The goat owners or cheriwalen are a growing population. The main cheriwalen are 
Bhangis. They have no land and between the five households in the village, they own 
over 150 goats. Chamars also have a sizeable population of goats between them. 
Although goat rearing is looked down upon as a lower-caste occupation, but because of 
the growing market for meat in the area, some of the poorer Gujjar families have also 
taken to goat-rearing but at a much lower scale.  
 
Livestock rearing supports the local economy in many ways. Apart from meeting their 
daily need of milk, whey and clarified butter, much of the produce is managed for sale. 
Most of the milk is sold at a dairy run by a cooperative at Gangapur City (about 90 km 
from Nibhera and also the nearest railhead). There is a dairy in the village, operated by 
Prakash, a young Gujjar boy, which runs for four months during the monsoons. During 
the monsoons on any given day Prakash claims to collect more than 100 litres of milk. 
Milk is sold depending on its fat content and the minimum price is about Rs. 5 per litre. 
Families also sell milk, curd and whey to each other within the village. Clarified butter 
(ghee) is a priced commodity and is sold in the local markets in Kailadevi and Karauli.  
 
Goats are also reared primarily for sale, with each animal being sold for about Rs.1000. 
Buffalos and their calves are also sold in the local cattle market. A healthy female buffalo 
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can fetch about Rs.10000. Every summer cattle traders (vyopari and banjare) from 
Karauli and Gangapur come to buy their livestock. Even cattle dung, used as manure 
(khad), is sold by truckloads to middlemen who come from the near-by cities.  
 
Thus, livestock rearing by way of cattle wealth is coveted. As Mulla of Bandhan ka Pura 
said once, “I have at least Rs. 2 lakh (around USD 4500) worth of goats and buffalos that 
are grazing in the dang." Even in the wealth-ranking exercise, land and livestock are the 
two main criteria for deciding a household’s wealth. "Salary," (tankha-rupiya) as Basanta 
Gujjar (in his 60s) puts it “is limited, while dhor-maweshi lasts for generations." 
 
Given that these communities have been entirely dependent on pastoralism for 
generations, fodder has been the manna of their lives. The availability and unavailability 
of fodder is an integral part of their paean on the vicissitudes of their lives, marking the 
transition from ‘good times’ in the past to the current ‘bad times’. Forests offer both leaf 
and grass fodder. Dhok leaf is the most preferred leaf fodder. There is a wide of variety of 
fodder grass and is graded as per its nutritional value which is in-turn measured by the 
milk-yield it enables. There is a definite seasonal pattern in the use of the various fodder 
sources and it would seem that the life of a cattle herder is organised around the 
availability of fodder.  
 
The four months of monsoon (chaumasa) from mid-June to mid-September is the season 
of plenty. As Charat Gujjar, of Bhattin ka Pura, a young man in his 30s and a proud 
owner of 20 buffalos describes, “The trees begin to sprout green leaves. Everybody 
invites you to see their dang in chaumasa, and there is greenery everywhere. There is 
grass everywhere. There is lots of milk, curd and ghee!” 
 
The leaf fodder is mostly relied upon at the onset of monsoons. The cattle at this time 
graze in the forested parts of the plateau. Temporary cattle camps called khirkaries are 
also set up in the forests. The cattle camps enclose a wide area so that the buffalos can be 
tethered when needed, with rough stone and thatch shelters for the people tending to them. 
Grazing at this time is referred to as pasar. Since this is also their busiest season for 
agriculture, men with their cattle herd leave as early as 4 a.m. every morning. 
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At the beginning of September, when the green fodder on the plateau area is exhausted, 
men move their cattle camps into kohar – a 400 hectare fodder enclosure that was built by 
the FD some 10 years ago. The kohar is closed to grazing during chaumasa and serves as 
their reserve for the period following the monsoons. Ideally they can graze their cattle 
here until end-October.42  
 
The final movement of livestock takes place after the important festival of Diwali (the 
Indian festival of lights). On this occasion the cattle population is elaborately worshipped 
by the villagers. The ones with larger herds move down to the inner reaches of the 
densely forested badi kho. This is the area that Nibhera claims exclusive grazing rights 
over and where only villagers from Nibhera are allowed to put up their cattle camps. In an 
average year the fodder in this location can last up to December. If the monsoon has been 
good then fodder in this kho can last up to March. 
 
Badi kho is about 4-5 km away from the settlement area of Nibhera. Cattle herders have 
to stay there over night and keep a watch over their cattle to ward off possibilities of 
attacks from wild animals. While the older men stay back in the kho, living on basic 
minimum and sleeping on beds of grass or on the bare earth, the younger men move 
between the kho and their homes on a daily basis. They leave the kho every morning, 
taking the milk to the village on the plateau, and having attended to all the chores in their 
homes, return every evening. 
 
In the years when there is poor rainfall, there is a short migration cycle that commences 
from the month of April. About 30-40 men migrate with their cattle towards the plains 
around Karauli, Gangapur and Sapotra for fodder and water. These areas are locally 
referred to as aantri. The villages in aantri have more water as well as crop fodder, 
usually left standing in the agricultural fields. Cattle herders of Nibhera are allowed to 
graze their cattle here as a part of a reciprocal arrangement. “We go there in the summer 
and they get their cattle here to our dang in the chaumasa. If we do not allow them here, 
why would they allow us there?” says Radheyshyam, the elder son of Ramkilan, who 
jointly with his three brothers owns about 30 buffalos. 
                                                
 
42 The kohar has been under dispute with their neighbouring village. Its maintenance was taken up for the 
first time after a gap of 3 years. As a result, in 2001 the kohar had fodder that lasted only for 15 days. 
 
 
92
 
Fuel wood and Small Timber  
Equally important as fodder is communities’ dependence for fuel wood (jalau lakdi) and 
small timber (imarti lakdi) on the forests. In July of 2001, under the EDC program, the 
FD has distributed LPG connection to 60 families. Of them, some of the families are yet 
to start using it and some are scared to burn-out the first LPG cylinder as the refilling 
would cost Rs.240, an amount that seems too steep. Even though some families have 
started using the LPG, kerosene stoves, crop stalks and dung cakes as fuel, these items 
constitute not a substitute but a supplementary source. As Guddi, my host argued, "These 
things won’t serve our purpose". Their primary dependence is on their traditional hearths 
called chullahs and fuel is a daily need.  
 
Dhok is the most preferred fuel wood species as it burns longer. Increasingly other trees 
like Salar (Bosewella serata), Kekar, Karil, bamboo and Ber (Ziziphus jujube) are also 
being used as fuel wood. Women do most of the fuel-wood collecting at the household 
level.43 Much of the fuel wood collection takes place in the winter months between 
October and February. According to Gaya, a mother of eight young children, “It is the 
time of the year when the wood is dry and easily collected by the womenfolk”. They are 
also mostly free from agricultural activities during this period. The fuel wood is 
stockpiled (tal) for use through rest of the year, especially for during monsoons when 
fuel-wood collection is near impossible. They collect what they claim is "dead and fallen" 
wood, mouthing the expression of the FD. But as the women admit, they have to be 
skilful in “generating" enough dead and fallen wood for collection.  
 
The amount of fuel wood collected is calculated in units of a head load (bojha or gatha) 
and as kori (a bundle of about 10 pieces).44 Fuel wood is mainly collected from the 
plateau forests and the forested hillsides (dongars). Often the proximity of the dongars to 
their hamlets, and availability of fuel wood, determines the preferred collection areas. It 
can also depend on which group a woman may want to join based on their inter-familial 
ties or friendship. 
 
                                                
 
43 Morechi ki Dangaria, which is the furthest hillock, is the only dongar from where men fetch fuel-wood. 
44 Fuel-wood is also extracted by the tractor load and camel-cart load. This is however an illegal activity. 
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The amount of fuel wood used varies according to the size of the family, their cattle 
holding and the season. Often when talking about the amount of fuel wood required for a 
family, the women would state – “the consumption goes up as a family expands… you 
need to make that many more rotis (wheat or millet bread)”. The maximum consumption 
takes place in winter when, on an average, most families use twice the amount of fuel 
wood they would use in the summer. In the winters bonfires in village meeting places and 
in the courtyard of the houses are common and hearths double up as fireplaces inside the 
houses. Buffalo owners use more fuel wood than others. As Dhanbai, a Gujjar woman in 
her 70s put it, "We need to boil larger quantities of milk. Also in winters buffalos are fed 
with a special diet called banth (a kind of porridge that is cooked in large amounts on 
slow fire for long period of time)".  
 
Small timber or imarti lakdi serves as their main resource material for all kinds of 
construction (houses, barn and cattle sheds); for making agricultural implements and 
items for household use. There are only four pucca houses in the village. The remaining 
kuccha houses are made from locally available stones and logs of wood of thinner (Bang) 
and thicker girth (Baranga). Khat-pidi, literally means cot and stool, but refers to a broad 
range of items and implements used in the household (including urns used for storing 
grains or churning butter), shaped from small timber.  
 
Imarti lakdi is preferably got from the kho. As Murari Lohar (late 40s), the only one from 
the caste of carpenters who still continues his profession puts it, “The kho has older trees. 
They are stronger, taller and thicker… they have the right girth for construction.” There is 
a very clear identification of what wood suits what purpose. Dhok is the most preferred 
and is considered an all-purpose and durable wood.  
 
Small timber used for several social and auspicious ceremony are ascribed certain sacred 
and mundane properties to them. Ordinary or madhyam propertied trees (in terms of their 
sacred value) like Gular have defiling attributes and thus can be used only for items of 
mundane and everyday use. Premium (uttam) trees like Kadam are considered to have 
purifying values and are used in rituals and ceremonies (like in the construction of 
marriage podiums or for burning in the ceremonial pyre). Dhok occupies a special place 
in the category of uttam trees. Bodya, an 80-year old Dom says that the Dhok embodies 
the spirits of sages and thus possess life-sustaining qualities. Every household at any point 
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in time has a stock of thinner logs of timber to be given towards the death-ritual called 
daag. When a death occurs in the village, every household has to contribute a big log of 
wood for the pyre. This act is symbolic of inclusion and collective identity of the village.  
 
The number of wooden poles extracted per family depends upon number of factors. On an 
average, a household with 5-8 persons uses about 10-12 poles annually. The poles used 
for construction in a house are rarely changed. However, cots, ploughs and other items 
are changed from time-to-time, especially, since "the wood is not as strong as it used to 
be. One has to replace the cots every one-and-a-half years and the plough every one to 
two years, thus each family ends up procuring wooden poles almost every year".   
 
Fodder, fuel wood and small timber, the main resources of the forests that are 
indispensable to the lives and livelihood of the people of Nibhera, are also the primary 
source of conflict between the Forest Department and the communities. Holding the 
communities singularly responsible for the depleting forests, and in turn its adverse 
impact on the dwindling wildlife population of the Sanctuary, the Department’s efforts 
are directed at curtailing the use of these resources. As we will learn in the Chapter 6, the 
Department has deemed most of the resource use activities of the communities as ‘illegal’. 
Also, through the implementation of the Eco-development and its policy of ‘reciprocal 
obligation’ from communities, the Forest Department has attempted to buy-out or sign-
away the minimal legitimate rights of the people in the forests. Consequently, surviving 
on illegal exploitation of the forest resources, the communities’ are vulnerable to the 
legitimate and illegitimate exploitation of the Department and its guards at all times.  
 
Other forms of dependence on forests 
Besides fodder, fuel wood and small timber there are several other forest products that are 
also used by the local community. Several thorny shrubs are used as hedges around fields. 
The woody pods of plants are used as reinforcing material for tools. Some types of 
grasses are used to weave sheets (tat-pati) from branches and twigs as roofs or walls of 
cattle sheds and barns. The slender branches are used to weave baskets (dhakoli). Fibres 
are procured from barks and hemp of tress, from herbaceous plants and certain types of 
grasses to weave ropes (jebri) of various types. Ropes are required for cot weaving, for 
churning butter, for drawing water from the well, for making pot hangers to store their 
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milk and curd, to tether their cattle and several such uses. Women also collect various 
kinds of seasonal fruits from the forests.  
 
The forests are also a source of materia-medica for the local healers, of which they are 
various kinds. There are Brahmin herbalists (vaid) and non-Brahmin specialised priests 
(bhopas or gothiyas) who also serve as magico-religious healers. The herbalists and 
priests treat both humans and animals and procure most of their herbal ethno-medicinal 
herbs and roots (jadi-booti) from the forests, especially from the kho. The significance of 
these healers and their prescribed herbal medicines cannot be undermined given that the 
villagers prefer to first try out remedies of the local healers before they decide on taking 
allopathic medicines and treatment.  
 
Agriculture and Forest Land  
Agriculture is now one of the major occupations of the villagers, perhaps even bigger 
than pastoralism. Agriculture in the dangs has developed around two primary resources – 
land and water. The Sanctuary area is equally coveted for the forests as it is for the 
agricultural land.  
 
Cultivable land exists both on the plateau and in the valleys below, with most land being 
held on the plateau. Those who have land in both places grow a winter and a summer crop 
each. They harvest dhani (paddy), bajra (millet) and tili (rapeseed) in the winter. In the 
summer they harvest gehu (wheat) and sarson (mustard).  
 
Agriculture in the plateau area of the dangs is mainly rain-fed. Some amount of rainwater 
is harvested through the creation of shallow water reservoirs called pokhars (pond 
reservoirs). These reservoirs provide drinking water for the cattle as well as for irrigation. 
Wheat is grown in the valley with water lifted from open dug-wells using diesel-run 
motors. Not everyone can afford to cultivate wheat as it tends to be capital intensive. 
 
The landholding pattern varies across the caste groups. The big landholding farmers (bad 
jots) are among the Brahmans (e.g. Kirori and Latur) and Gujjars (e.g. Ramjilal and 
Haricharan). They own between 8-10 bigha per household. On an average people own 
between 2-4 bigha per household. However there are also people like Kajjoria and 
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Ramjilal who own less than a bigha. Among the Scheduled Castes, the Bhangis do not 
own any land, while a few Chamar households hold 1-2 bigha of land. Share-cropping 
(sajho-patto) is common among the landless. Kirori owns badia (good) land in the valley 
but being old cannot cultivate and his only son is employed outside the village. Therefore 
he makes his land available for sharecropping to Samanta Nai, who is landless. Kirori 
provides the seed, Samanta cultivates the land and they share the produce in equal halves 
between them. Most bad jots give out their land for share-cropping.  
 
According to the Agricultural Supervisor, Department of Agriculture, Karauli, “The dang 
is no area for agriculture. The terrain is rocky, without water and has poor quality soil. 
Since there is no other means of occupation the villagers continue cultivation this land.” 
Departmental statistics of 199145 indicate that from the total land area of 6,190 hectares 
(24,760 bigha) only 3.6% of the land is actually available for cultivation. Thus, not only 
is the yield poor, but there is an acute shortage of jutayu zameen (arable land) also. The 
Revenue Department records the lowest collection of revenue from the dang region. 
According to the 1991 village primary census, the total collection was only Rs.1301, a 
sum the Tehsildar (administrative officer) considers quite negligible.  
 
Although according to official viewpoint agriculture may be poor in the Sanctuary area, 
people in the sanctuary hold on to it as a primary source of survival in the wake of their 
declining pastoral activities. According to the narratives of the local people, a combined 
effect of failing monsoons, scarcity of fodder, declining cattle population and rising prices 
of grain has led to a gradual expansion and adoption of new practices in agricultural 
activities. 
 
For Dhanbai, an 80 year old Gujjar woman, “agriculture was inconsequential” when she 
came first to the village.  
Who would do agriculture...Each householder (dhani) used to have 100 or more 
heads of buffalo. In one day we used to have over 100 kilos of milk and churn 7 
urns full of ghee. People used to stay with their cattle all day as they used to be 
scared of the tiger and of others stealing their cattle. We had no shortage of 
anything, those were days of great pleasure (khoob mauj ho). 
                                                
 
45 At the time of the research, the data from all the departments was in the process of being computerised. 
Thus unless they had the approval from the Collectorate which had not finished checking the errors, the 
officers were barred from committing any figures for the current years. 
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As per Bhairon Lal Nai, 65, people started paying attention once the situation in the dang 
began to deteriorate and they lost their cattle  
It is in the last 40 years that people started to stay in their lands more. As 
shepherds started coming from outside our cattle started to feel the shortage of 
fodder. We had to start taking our cattle out…the health of our livestock began 
to deteriorate and we lost a lot of them to various kind of epidemic diseases. 
These problems started 25-30 years ago. It is then that our people started to pay 
more attention to agriculture. For a while people managed both with agriculture 
and cattle rearing. Then it started to change as the rains became less, the sheep 
came from outside, and then the fodder started to deplete. Earlier when the 
Samvat bigdo they would sell a pada or a padi (a male or a female calf 
respectively) and manage but now that is not possible anymore. (December 
2000) 
The significance of agriculture increased as it seems to have enabled the villagers to 
survive in an increasing cash-based economy. According Radheyshyam Sharma – 
Now we have more money. Earlier we used to just have curd, milk and roti 
(wheat bread). But now we can eat well. We can buy various kinds of 
vegetables. Now we can cultivate better. Now we have more wells and less land 
tax to pay. We can buy food because we can sell our grains. Before if we sold 
1600 kg of paddy they we would get Rs.400. Now for the same amount we get 
Rs.4000. We can also sell the rice saplings and get fodder from our fields. (June 
2001) 
Better cultivation practices have been, and are being, continuously adapted and adopted 
by the villagers. As Bhairon Lal Nai put it- 
People in our village started to learn new things about agriculture. They saw and 
learnt from the people outside. They figured how wheat and sugarcane were 
being grown in that area. They started to cultivate mustard only in the past two 
or three years. Earlier they did not know what it was. They started cultivating 
Bajra only after the bad times started. Earlier they did not grow Bajra (millet), 
and would concentrate on Dhani (rice). People in the plains grew Bajra, 
especially in the Karanpur area. Here the heavy rains would cut the land and 
drown the Bajra fields. Gradually as the rains became less and less we took to 
cultivating Bajra. (June 2001)  
In the past three to five years the bad jots have adopted several new measures. They have 
started using urea (a chemical fertiliser). Iron ploughshares are replacing wooden 
ploughshares. Tractors are being used to plough the land. Some have started using 
insecticides. Some farmers were induced to use new varieties of rice but having failed 
once, they gave it up. The pokhars are also being deepened and their bunds concretised.  
 
With the increased stress on agriculture, need for land is primary. In the reckoning of the 
older generation the land under agriculture has doubled in their lifetime. According to 
Bodya, an 80-year old Dom – 
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If earlier it was 10 bighas now there are at least 20 bighas (land per family). 
People took up more and more land as the prices of the grains went up and cost 
of living increased. In the last fifty years the farm area has increased manifold. 
Earlier there were only some 10 landholders, now there are more than 35. (June 
2001) 
The Jamabandis (Land and Revenue Records that are maintained village-wise) show that 
the total agricultural land for Nibhera between samvat
46
 2015-2034 (1958-1977) was 495 
bigha and 9 biswa which had increased to 771 bigha and 14 biswa in samvat 2055-2058 
(1998-2001).  
 
Given the need for more land, villagers resort to acquisition in the Sanctuary and 
encroachment on the forest land. This therefore is an issue of great conflict between the 
FD and forest communities. When the FD calls agriculture ‘untenable’ and ‘negligible’ 
people perceive it differently. According Birbal Gujjar – 
These are just excuses to prevent allotment of additional land to us. So what if it 
is bad land. Let them just give it to us and we will manage the rest. (June 2001) 
Besides constantly battling with the FD, the villagers have made several applications to 
the District Collector, who in-turn claims that a vast amount of forest land has already 
been encroached-upon by these people for cultivation. The desire to acquire land and 
claim ownership is at the centre of most conflicts that exist even within the village. In fact 
a land dispute between Kirori Pandit of Beech ka Pura and Haricharan Gujjar of Jheel ka 
Pura has factionalised the village, and as many complain has "doomed their community". 
“It is these conflicts,” according to Jania, “that have poisoned our society…everybody 
wants to steal from the other".  
 
The dependence and resources for the inhabitants of the dang (where the Sanctuary is 
located) cannot be seen in isolation or in abstraction to their worldview of who they are. 
Belonging and identity, and the shifts therein, are rooted in where they live, what they do 
and the changes they witness. As Basso (1996: 7) writes, “For what people make of their 
places is closely connected to what they make of themselves as members of society and 
                                                
 
46 In the Indian calendar, seasons follow the sun; months follow the moon; and days, both the sun and the 
moon. The era in the Indian calendar is called the Vikram Era, or the Vikram Samvat, which began in 57 
B.C. To calculate the corresponding year of the Common Era, 57 years should be subtracted from the 
Indian year if the date falls between the beginning of the Indian year and the end of the Western year 
(http://www.swaminarayan.org/calendar/). 
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inhabitants of the earth”. According to Basso (op.cit) ‘place making is a way of 
constructing social traditions and in process, personal and social identities’.    
 
Emplaced Identities and Resource Relations 
 
Much literature on anthropology of place and space have argued ‘locality’ and ‘place’ are 
made by the interaction of the people with the landscape or space that they inhabit (Field 
and Basso 1996; Lovell 1998). In the case of communities like those in Nibhera who live 
in close proximity to and are dependent on natural resources (forest, water, etc.), the 
interaction between people and their landscape is often seen as a close inter-weaving of 
natural and the social/cultural47. In this interaction between people and their environment, 
defying the dichotomy between nature and culture, “persons and environment are 
regarded as parts of each other and as reciprocally inscribed in cosmological ideas and 
cultural understanding” (Croll and Parkin 1992: 3).  
 
By imputing social, spiritual meaning to their landscape and surroundings, people create 
their sense of place. Emplaced identities (social, cultural and political) are created through 
myths, legends, memories of the inscribed and socialised landscape that include the land, 
forests, animals, humans, the supernatural and the divine. Implicated in their sense of 
place, wherein the sacred and the social are inextricably linked, are rules of engagement 
with resource use and their management. These principles of nature and governance are 
evolved historically, through the lived experiences of the people, informed by their sense 
of being, belonging, practical needs and cosmological worldview, from which they can 
neither be abstracted nor be ascribed a ‘conservation oriented sub-consciousness’.  
 
As revealed in ethnographies of resource dependent communities, myths, legends and 
inscribed memories and their perpetuation become a means of safeguarding the collective 
identities, cultural and territorial boundaries of the communities (Miura 2005; Arhem 
1998; Basso 1996; De Boeck 1998). Belongingness and territoriality for the communities 
                                                
 
47 Haraway (1993) envisions this kind of interaction as ‘social nature’ wherein although the expressed 
relationships transcend any difference between nature and culture, its making is inherently social.  This kind 
of interweaving is not restricted only to forests alone. Similar interweaving of the natural and social cultural 
practices is seen in all forms of resource relations. See Vasavi (1994) for agriculture.  
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of Nibhera is expressed through narratives of origin. In case of the Gujjars, to borrow a 
phrase from Lovell (1998: 2)48, “the centrality of cosmological origins precedes and 
conditions actual territoriality, spiritual well-being and material survival”. The Hindu 
Gujjars of North India have always been associated with buffalo herding (Bingley 1974; 
Verma 1954). In the village however, according to the Gujjars’ myths of origin, as 
narrated by Bhanta, the origin of Gujjars is associated with the Hindu god, lord Krishna 
who is associated with cattle herding. They believe that their god, Devnarayanji is an 
incarnation of Lord Krishna. Hence they claim that buffalo herding is their pre-ordained 
profession, not something that they chose. As Ramkilan Gujjar, over 60 years of age, puts 
it, “a Gujjar is born to herd cattle…whatever else he does is up-to him”. Following from 
this origin, they consider the dang to be their pre-ordained abode. According to Bhanta 
Gujjar, “Barudevji willed that we are born in the dang. It is our fate (bhag)". When asked 
why the dang, the answer from the group discussing the origins of the Gujjar was 
unequivocal-[B]ecause of fodder. What else does a Gujjar need except buffalos and 
fodder?” 
 
The forests also define male personhood. Being a Gujjar is inevitably associated with 
being able to negotiate the forests better than any other community. To the people who 
live outside of the dang area, the dang represents an area that is comprised of 
undifferentiated forests with villages interspersed. However, people who live in the 
villages in the dang area have clear spatial demarcation of the area surrounding them, 
based on the location and use. Thus, amongst the communities in Nibhera, there is a 
difference between the villages (gaon), their inhabited, less forested area to the ujar –the 
interiors of the dense forests
49
. The ujar is associated with the wild and the wilderness. 
Ujar is where not humans but wild animals live. It is the areas where dacoits take refuge 
and malevolent human spirits (prêt atma) live. The ujar is both difficult and dangerous. 
Amongst the communities in the village, the Gujjars are considered to be best adapted to 
negotiating the dangers and difficulties that the ujar poses. Such ability is taken as 
“natural” attribute of the Gujjar; the inevitability is assumed because of the preordained 
nature of their abode and livelihood. For the other communities, and Gujjars themselves, 
                                                
 
48 Who discusses this idea in relation to Australian aboriginals’ plea to the State for restoration of their 
lands to them.  
49 Skaria (1999) explains such spatial distinction among the Bhils of the Gujarat dangs as the cosmological 
distinction that the Bhils harbour between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. 
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this idea is epitomised in their earlier herding practices. In the earlier days, when 
pastoralism was the dominant occupation, most male members of the Gujjar families 
often stayed in the deep recesses of the forests, for months at a stretch, grazing their herd 
of buffalos. This practice is locally referred to as “to stay with buffalos” (bhens mein 
rehna).  
 
Staying with the buffalos also denotes being jangli – associated with the ujar and the 
ability to stay without any human company and live fearlessly with the wild animals. For 
a Gujjar man being jangli and having its associated traits add to the bravado of a man. 
Masculinity is always defined in relation to a man’s ability to negotiate the dangerous and 
the wild nature of the forests. These abilities make the difference between a ‘weak’ Gujjar 
of today and their ‘strong’ ancestors. As Ramcharan, aged 60, remarked – 
What do these other people know of living in the dang? Nobody can stay here 
like a Gujjar can. A Gujjar man can travel any distance at any time of the day; 
he fears no one. In the earlier days our forefathers (agle bade) used to stay with 
the buffalos for months! Dare anybody challenge them, whether spirits or 
animals? If one is a man (mard) one is not scared of the ujar. (December 2000) 
In the ujar is also located their resource rich sites like the dongars, khos and dangs. 
Accessing these resources make people and their cattle vulnerable to the ‘dangers’ of 
these ujars. Marking these territories and protecting the people are sacred groves (vannis) 
and sites marking the abodes of their ancestral and divine spirits (devi-devtas). These sites 
are known as sthans (place). The devi-devtas are enshrined in featureless flat stones that 
are placed atop a rocky platform. Patches of forests surrounding a sthan is designated as a 
vanni and dedicated to the residing deity or ancestral spirit of the sthan. These sacred sites 
root the people to the land. The specificity of the site has much significance for the 
communities of Nibhera. First, these sites have been installed by their ancestors. These 
sites always recall the lineage of specific community groups. According to the 
communities some restless ancestral souls attain peace only when their immediate 
families perform the rituals of enshrining their spirits and worshipping them annually. 
Thus these sacred sites embody and anchor the history, ancestry and kinship ties. Every 
year the familial group, sharing the same lineage or ancestry (kutumb pariwar) 
participates in a jāt (pilgrimage). It is believed that this binding and belonging to the land 
through these sites is created by the volition of the human and divine spirits who make 
their wishes known through their chosen medium (bhopa). Once installed these sites 
cannot be moved. The annual worship, seen as an appeasement of these sprits, are 
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considered vital to the well being of the families both materially (resources and livelihood) 
and physically. The landscape is also dotted with sites and trees that are attributed 
supernatural agency and consciousness. They are considered abodes of spirits of ancestors 
who possessed superhuman qualities when they were alive and come to acquire divine 
attributes on their death. These trees are also worshipped annually by the clan to whom 
the ancestors or divine spirits are affiliated. 
 
As Johari (2007) writes on the local associations of gods and sacred forests among the 
Gujjars of Sariska Wildlife Sanctuary, implicit in these spatial histories, myths and 
legends of spirits and divinities is the politics of resource use whereby inclusion, 
exclusion, and ownership are legitimated through locally constituted and negotiated 
sanctions and norms. The sthans in Nibhera like in other villages of the Sanctuary also 
embed the village’s territorial claim to resource sites as against claims of neighbouring 
villages. When asked how the people were so sure that parthuna dongar (the forested hill 
site where most communities collect fuel wood from) was within their boundaries, Bodya 
Baba promptly replied – 
What do you mean? Who else’s will it be? Have you not seen the bhumia baba’s 
sthan? He belongs to the kutumb pariwar of our village. (January 2001) 
Also, the inscribed landscape reflects the blurred boundaries between humans, spirits and 
gods inscribe a moral landscape. The access to resources or the manners of their uses are 
regulated by rules, which though socially enforced, are based on the sacred sanctions of 
these ancestral sites. As seen among other resource, the communities’ myths and 
shamanic knowledge play a central role in defining their resource use practices and 
regulations (see Arhem 1998; Morphy 1995). This is equally evident among the 
communities inhabiting the Sanctuary. People incur the goodwill or ill-will of the 
supernatural in accordance to their conduct in using the resource. For example in Nibhera 
using the resources of the fodder enclosure (kohar) at the end of the monsoon season is 
commenced with the sanction of the local deity Bhaironji whose sthan stands at the 
entrance of the enclosure. Unsanctioned use is believed to always evoke the wrath of 
Bhaironji who may deprive people of the fodder in the next season. The landscape also 
abounds with stories of how people in the past that had either lost their lives or limbs 
owing to exploitation of unsanctioned use of resources in the forests or vannis. These 
stories of the vannis are akin to Basso’s (1988) analysis ‘speaking with names’ among the 
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Western Apache wherein they serve to ‘affirm the value and validity of traditional moral 
precepts’ regarding appropriate resource use practices.  
 
The loss of forests and persistent droughts are seen as withdrawal of benefits by the active 
agency of nature on account of the improper conduct of the people. As Chiranji Gujjar 
(50) says: 
Our agle bade (ancestors) had always advised us against cutting trees 
indiscriminately. They had predicted bad consequences. These dhoks are abodes 
of sages (rishis). It is because of their merits and blessing that there are rains. 
The noise that comes from cutting trees is the pain of these rishis. If we cut them 
like some of us did where do you think rains will come from? When sins spread 
around who cared for the advice of the agle bade? Now we have to suffer! 
(January 2002)  
Such association of people and its forest, especially in the realm of the sacred tend to be 
framed, celebrated and romanticised within the discourse of ‘traditional/indigenous’ 
practices of conservation emerging from traditional religious belief by the advocates of 
communities rights and participation in management regimes50. However I agree with 
Johari (2007) who citing Tuan (1997:72) argues: 
Maps of gods and memories of trees are thus rooted in specific and dynamic 
relationships formed within an intimate collective of gods, humans, animals and 
trees. They simultaneously refute an idealised and dislocated religious eco-logic 
and a ‘scientific’ ecologic… [I]importantly, they reveal the ways in which nature 
is embodied, experienced and valued….through locally constituted meaning, 
identities and relationships.  
The argument is further reinforced by the fact that in Nibhera although the sacred closely 
inform their principles of resource use and ownership, the rules are dynamic, shifting and 
reconstituted in accordance with time and changing needs wherein the existing rules need 
no longer be inherently ‘sustainable’ or ‘judicious’51 to use of the resources. This is 
evident in some of the thinning vannis. As the resources get scarcer, the rules of 
engagements change. Permission to one of the Devi ki vanni for felling green branches is 
granted through the intervention of the mediums. Also as dependence on agriculture 
increased people moved out of the old village more towards the forest lands and gradually 
created the current settlement of the village. The moving, though seen as a moving away 
from the sense of ‘community’ and breaking away of the social ethos, was considered 
inevitable and legitimated through the desire of the ancestral spirits seeking enshrinement 
                                                
 
50 See Sinha et al. (1997), Guha and Gadgil (1992), Darell Posey (1999).  
51 See Guha and Gadgil (1992).  
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in the new areas. Also, while forest resources were subject to common rules and 
regulations, other common property resources like the common grazing ground 
(charagha) merited no such restrictions and have been completely encroached upon.  
 
Contested Landscape and Forest Protection 
 
Writing on the cultural politics of landscapes, Bender (1993) argues, “landscape is never 
inert; people engage with it, re-work it, appropriate and contest it. It is part of the way in 
which identities are created and disputed”. Space in Nibhera holds memories that 
implicate people and events and as Connerton (1989: 3) observes concerning ‘social 
memories’ – “images of the past commonly legitimise a present social order”. It is 
through collective ‘memories of resistance and struggle’ that residents of Nibhera 
reaffirm reconstitute and contest ownership and territoriality of their land and forests from 
their neighbouring villages.  
 
Much of the glory of Nibhera is attributed to the extent of forests enclosed in its 
traditional boundaries. Kirori Pandit, age 58, claims that none of the other villages in the 
dang have as much forests as Nibhera. As per the extent of forests, he asserts, “There is 
no measure of that! It extends very very far”. The Gujjars are proud of the fact that the 
largest tracts of forests were not given, but were rather bought within the boundaries of 
their village by an act of bravery of their ancestor Baba Balram “more than 500 years 
ago”. Bhanta Gujjar, considered as the most knowledgeable man in the Gujjar community 
of the village, tells the story of Baba Balram: 
In the erstwhile State of Karauli, under the Ryotwari system of land tenure, 
Nibhera was a khalsa village or one that paid its taxes directly to the State. 
Under this system every khalsa village where Gujjars predominated, the State 
appointed a Meheto to collect the taxes and hand them over to the patwari1. Baba 
Balram collected the bhej (tax) from us but refused to pay it to the King saying 
that why should he pay for something on which he had no claim. The King heard 
this comment and sent his sipahis (guards) to get Baba Balram who fled in the 
direction of the Kho. He is believed to have made his way across the river 
Chambal to Madhya Pradesh and into the State of Palpur. 
The King of Palpur was very impressed with him and was willing to send him 
back to Karauli if the King there promised not to harm him. The King of Karauli 
accepted these terms. Upon his return to Karauli, he was produced in the durbar 
where the King declared that even though he had done a wrong by not paying the 
revenue, he was nevertheless a brave man and that he needed such brave people 
in his State. As a reward for his bravery he was willing to grant him whatever he 
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wanted. Baba Balram is believed to have asked for the reinforcement of the 
boundary of his village. The King proclaimed that all the land that he could 
encircle on a horseback in one day would be granted to him. Baba Balram 
encircled what is today considered the boundary of the village in just half a day 
and would have proceeded further. However, when he was moving beyond the 
south-east borders, the people of other villages there pleaded him to spare some 
forests for them and thus, taking pity on them, he did not move any further. 
The extent of Nibhera’s village boundary (med) and the extent of forests it encompasses 
is a key factor in terms of the social and political standing the village enjoys in relation to 
the other villages in the region. The size of the village often underlines an individual’s 
claim to social and political prowess in the region. According to the local narrative, in the 
erstwhile state of Karauli, Nibhera was a “well known” (jāni hui) village. Jania Gujjar, an 
octogenarian, has seen the reigns of the last two maharajas (kings), Ganesh Pal (1947-84) 
and his father Bhompal (1927-47). According to Jania Gujjar: 
Then Nibhera was the biggest village of some 24 villages in and around. This 
was dera village. All important officials from the Karauli darbar used to come 
here and all important events used to take place here in our anthain (a designated 
place where village elders convene their panchayat). (May 2001) 
Interwoven into the establishment of the political territories are the larger societies of the 
people – the web of networks and social ties with other villages. These networks 
constitute their samaj to whom they are tied by marriage, kinship, caste-affiliations, 
jajmani, trade, communal labour and resource relations. These samaj exist at multiple 
levels. These ties have formed within local contexts of social, political and economic 
relations that the forests and dangs have enabled. For example according to Kirori Pandit  
(58) his grandfather was keen that his mother marries into Nibhera because he was very 
impressed by the abundance its forest resources and by the health of the livestock that fed 
on it.  
 
In a region where the economic, social and political identities have been dependent on 
natural resources, particularly forest-based, the forests of Nibhera have always received 
competition from communities both within the region (from the neighbouring villages) 
and areas beyond. Given the significance of the forests to the existence, identity and 
worldview of people therein, the territories of Nibhera have been fiercely guarded, 
contested and expanded. Thus most of the resource sites like the forests of the khos, dang 
and kohar have histories that speak of bloody contests between the villagers of Nibhera 
and the neighbouring villages or communities from outside.  
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The communities of Nibhera have extended tales of how they have always protected their 
forests and resources into legends. The Badi Kho, over which Nibhera has exclusive 
grazing rights, was won after several fiercely fought battles. Bhanta, an evocative 
storyteller, relates the story: 
In the beginning, the Kho actually belonged to a Baba (holy man) from 
Beherda52. Once he needed money so he mortgaged the Kho it to the people of 
Nibhera. When he was unable to pay the money for a long time, he was bound to 
give up the Kho to Nibhera. However, later his intentions changed. The people 
of Beherda did not like the fact that the Kho should come to Nibhera. So they 
tried to take control of it by force. Blood flowed in the valley. Hundreds of our 
people died. We won because we managed to escape by climbing the sidetrack 
in the valley. Then our men got the control. But time and again the people from 
Beherda would come and create problems. Then our ancestors went to the King 
and got a deed that was etched in bronze.53 It gave them exclusive grazing rights 
over the Kho. We paid revenue to the King. Even now we continue to pay Rs.2 
from every family to the revenue department. (May 2001). 
There are other more recent experiences. About 30 years ago the entire village fought a 
group of migrant cow grazers. The cow grazers from the Marwar region (the western part 
of Rajasthan) used the pastures of this region, which they had been doing so since at least 
from the early 20th century. The conflict between the grazers and the villagers arose over 
the fact at in a particular year when fodder was scarce; the marwaris (as the local people 
refer to the cow grazers) let their herds into agricultural fields with standing crop. The 
migrant grazers refused to move even when asked to by individual farmers, and instead 
beat up some people of the village. In response, all the able bodied men of the village 
attacked the marwaris. They ravaged their camps and beat up their men and women. The 
marwaris lodged a complaint with the police. Bimla (in her late fifties), the mother of 
Jagdish Master, recounts what happened thereafter: 
The police came to the village but did not find a single man. The men were all 
hiding in the Kho. They came several times. When the police finally caught up 
with our men…the village as a whole, all seven castes …took the blame. They 
arrested all the men…but could not hold them for long. Eventually they let them 
go. The case went on…the marwaris however dared not trouble our village 
anymore. (May 2001) 
Bimla’s narrative reflects the other significant function of the processes involved in the 
people protecting their forest – the reinforcement. In conflicts with other villages, the 
assertion of ownership also calls forth the assertion of the collective identity of the village. 
                                                
 
52 Beherda is located on the plateau across the Kho. The Kho and the valley in-between divide Nibhera and 
Beherda. 
53 Despite several assurances of its existence, I was never actually shown the bronze plaque that establishes 
their ownership. 
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Thus most narratives of confrontation with the other villages, like in Bimla’s narrative, 
always merit a mention of the presence of “all seven castes”. It is an expression that is 
stressed to imply the significance and the magnitude of the conflict. By this expression 
the narrator points to the fact that it was not a small conflict between a few people, but a 
conflict where the whole village was involved and showed great solidarity in staving off 
the threats.  
 
The narrators of these conflicts always name each of the caste groups involved. To have 
been left out of such conflicts reflects poorly on a caste’s commitment to the cause of the 
village. Even organisationally, in any act directed to resource protection, it is made sure 
that all able bodied men from every household make their contribution. This was evident 
in the conflict with the neighbouring village of Morechi that took place in 2001.  
The conflict was over the FD-sponsored fodder enclosure (kohar). The people of Nibhera 
claim that the enclosure was built within the boundaries of their village, therefore they 
have the exclusive rights over it. Since, in effect, the enclosure has come up on the 
boundary-area between Nibhera and Morechi, the residents of Morechi stake a claim of 
for access and use54. 
 
Till about 1998 the people of Morechi would not comply with the restricted periods of the 
enclosure and forcefully grazed their cattle there. On one such occasion the people of 
Nibhera confiscated their axes and lodged a complaint with the FD. In August 2001, 
Morechi again attempted to break the boundaries of the enclosure. On 2nd August a 
meeting was called in the village and despite the ongoing conflict it was decided by the 
Panchayat that one man from every house of the village in rotation would keep vigil over 
the kohar and prevent other people from encroaching. This conflict was temporarily 
resolved as the nyaya panchayat of Morechi agreed to comply with the requests of the 
Nibhera panchayat.  
 
The display of collective identity and village solidarity in forest protection activities is an 
extension of an aspect that is integral to village social organisation and village polity. In 
                                                
 
54 The traditional boundaries, as villagers recognise them, may vary from the Forest Department records. As 
was made evident in an inter-village conflict over access to ‘village’ forests, the Forest Department 
demarcates the forests as per Blocks. A single Block may contain forests that lie within the traditional 
boundaries of two or more villages. 
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every ritual and non-ritual activities that require them to pool their labour, the 
communities follow the same principle; contributions are made by every household of the 
village. While contribution displays solidarity, the non-contribution by a household or a 
community marks their conflicting position in the village. For example following the 
conflict between the Gujjar and the Brahmin communities, the village never celebrates 
punyo (marking the commencement of the summer and winter agricultural seasons) 
together anymore. Prior to the conflict, all the communities in the village used to 
celebrate this festival together; the Gujjars cooked and the Brahmins conducted the rituals, 
while the other communities helped in their various capacities. Despite the conflict, the 
two issues that constantly test the solidarity of the village are protection of resources and 
the matters pertaining to the village temple.  
 
Establishing territoriality is not just about asserting their political identity but is crucial to 
the reciprocal exchange of resources that takes place as a part of their risk management. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the villages in the Sanctuary, until recently used to 
allow cattle graziers from the plain areas (aantri) to graze in their forest area in exchange 
for being allowed to take the cattle from the Sanctuary to the fields in the villages in the 
plains during the summer when there is an acute shortage of fodder and water in the 
Sanctuary area. 
 
In these exchanges it is important to assert to the outside cattle graziers the territorial 
rights of the village in which they are grazing or the village they receive hospitality from. 
Similarly, asserting territoriality becomes important in the sharing of resources between 
the villages. Nibhera has on many occasions allowed a neighbouring village of Amrapur 
to take logs from their forests as a ‘favour’. However on one occasion when villagers of 
Nibhera caught villagers of Amrapur stealing wood on the sly they reported them to the 
forest ranger who then extracted a fine from the defaulters. As Daujiya Gujjar, an active 
participant in the Panchayat that was called over the Amrapur issue explained: 
If they ask for it and then take, there is no problem. If we give a few logs there 
will not be a huge shortfall in Nibhera…more over we have some of our 
daughters married there. But why should they steal? They feel insult in asking 
from Nibhera that is why they steal…they feel their honour is lost if they ask. 
(June 2001) 
In essence, the forest resources function both as material and symbolic honour. 
Consequently, its protection or sharing is also symbolic of a village’s social position, 
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honour and political position vis-à-vis other villages in the region. Thus establishing 
resource territoriality is also a political act. This is also evident in the present grouse the 
villagers of Nibhera nurture against Beherda. 
 
There have been many intermittent stand-offs with Beherda. The Meenas of Beherda 
regularly extract small timber from the Kho. They also try and graze their cattle by stealth. 
There have been many occasions where, in retaliation, the people of Nibhera have raided 
Beherda at night and have set fire to their fodder stock. When I commented that by 
burning the fodder they disservice to themselves, losing the very fodder they were 
fighting for, Ranji Gujjar replied – 
It is not only about fodder. They have their eyes on the Khos for ages. Today 
they come for fodder, tomorrow they will come for the land and then a few years 
later they will make a claim to the ownership on the land. It is important that we 
teach them a good lesson…let them know that they can never win against us. 
(March 2001) 
The point that I am trying to make in this section is that the idea of forest protection 
assumed in the policy discourses of community-based conservation widely differs from 
what communities make of forest-protection activities. Forest protection is not an isolated 
act directed towards the conservation of biodiversity; conservation as an objective is 
incidental. Further, the act of forest protection emerges from a context that is deeply 
embedded in the social and political organisational structures of the society. It also has 
several perquisites like ownership, reciprocal exchange and livelihood. Denying the 
communities these perquisites and isolating the activity of forest protection from its 
village based social and political context, as is attempted through institutions like EDC, 
do not forbear the same effect or significance for the communities.  
 
Declining Resources 
 
Although lives and lifestyle to a large extent, continue to remain forest-dependent, local 
histories suggests that what remains now is barely a fraction of the “total dependence on 
the forest” primarily because “one cannot see that kind of forest anymore”. The comment 
of the people of Nibhera on the depleting state of forests is always expressed in terms of 
the abundance they enjoyed earlier. Besides abundance, the quality and quantity of the 
forest resources available, and its ‘proximity’ to the settlement are some of the indicators 
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used by the people. By almost all the villagers I spoke to, the primary concern expressed 
in relation to the consequences of the loss of forests was the drastic reduction in the 
availability of fodder. Khuku Teli, over 50 years of age and the oldest among the Teli 
community, recalls: 
What do we have now…nothing! In my lifetime I have seen forests where in the 
month of Sawan and Bhado we used to have grass right up to our doorsteps. The 
chara (fodder) lasted till Holi… even then it never quite ran out. Our cattle used 
to graze in the dang all year round! My father died about 30 years ago in the 
monsoon season. I remember, when the relatives came for the death-feast (nukta) 
to Nibhera, they were particularly troubled because they had to wade through 
fields of grass that grew up to their waist and shoulders! 
Indicative of the state of loss of forests, is the tragic absence of dhok that was “taller, 
thicker and stronger.” Bodya Dom, considered by the villagers to be the oldest person (he 
claims he is over 80 years old) but a man with a sharp memory, tells the state of the 
forests by its density and proximity: 
The forests were terribly dense! We never had to go deep into it to get what we 
needed. In fact, we were afraid because it was so dense. The bangas and the 
barnagas (wooden poles used in the construction of houses) could be found in 
the forests of the plateau itself. Now even in the kho, where the last remaining 
patches of dense forest still remain, we do not find the same quality, as we did 
on the plateau area in the earlier days!” (July 2001) 
Fuel wood in the past was apparently not collected from ‘forests’. Dhanbai Gujjar, an old 
woman of over 80 years of age claims to not have seen any wildlife as she never went to 
the forest. She would go only to collect fuel wood which was always available in her 
“backyard”. Life, she claims, is much tougher for her daughters-in-law who have to “go 
almost three times the distance that she had to in the past for fuel wood.” According to 
Kiori Pandit, 58, everyone has to “travel longer and further to survive in the dang. Even 
then we do not get enough and what we get is of poor quality.” 
 
A combination of complex reasons explains the changes in types, quantity, quality and 
availability of resources. The common refrain to my questions on when and why did the 
forests deplete was – “some were felled by log-bag (people) and some by the sarkar 
(government).” This seems to have occurred in the last 45-50 years. Between these two 
primary causes encompass the changes of several kinds that have swept through these dry 
hills touching the forests and the people of the dangs. The merger of Karauli State, the 
Independence of India from colonial rule, the passage of the forests to different owners 
and administrators and their differing management objectives are among the many factors 
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that have shaped the forests of the dangs. Natural factors such as change in weather 
conditions over the years and a periodically failing monsoon has also had its own impact.  
 
The role of the State is discussed in detail in chapter 6. In analyzing the circumstances 
that led to the initiation of Kulhadi bandh panchayat, it is important to understand in the 
role of the ‘log bag’ as perceived by the villagers. When asked why would people cut 
down the forest only in the past 30-40 years and not in the times prior to that, a 
unanimous response was that the samvat (a calendar year) began to bigdo (go seriously 
wrong). In this context bigdi samvat is used to refer to ‘bad times’ i.e. when the 
monsoons fail. According to Jania Gujjar (over 70 years): 
The years of bad monsoons did it all…when it did not rain and we began to 
starve then the people started to cut the dhok for their cattle! The samvat has 
been particularly bad in the past 25-30 years.  
For Dhapo, the bad samvat began a few years after Bhagwanlal, her eldest son, now 21, 
was born: 
Earlier the people used to cut trees, but only a few. There used to be such heavy 
rains that one did not notice when it would grow back. After Bhagwanlal was 
born the rains started to decrease and people started to cut and lop heavily for 
fodder.  
As a consequence of scanty rainfall, there have been regular droughts (akal) and famines 
(bhook). Having been told about these akals55 that occurred in even the 1950s, I asked 
why there has been felling and severe loss of forest only in the past 30-40 years. Kali Nai, 
an older cousin of Bhairon Lal Nai, explained: 
Earlier these droughts were short lived and not so severe. Most years of scarcity 
were followed by a few years of acchi (good) samvat. Thus we managed 
somehow. Besides in the earlier years, generally things were not so expensive 
and the cost of living was manageable.  
In recent times, whenever we felt a lack of fodder we cut dhok which made it 
worse. Can there be rains without dhok? Dhok are the abode of sages and it is 
because of their merits that we get rains. Our elders asked us not to cut these 
                                                
 
55 Akal (drought) is a part of their history. In the local history the village Nibhera was originally known has 
Nibheri and was settled in the valley. The original inhabitants were Lodhas who were mainly agriculturist 55 
Akal (drought) is a part of their history. In the local history the village Nibhera was originally known has 
Nibheri and was settled in the valley. The original inhabitants were Lodhas who were mainly agriculturist 
and fairly wealthy. However they left because during a particularly severe akal in the past their money 
could not buy them grains. In the current memory of the people, the most severe of all akal has been 
chappania ki akal (literally meaning samvat 1956) There is popular saying that in that area no grain was to 
be found in the four corners of the state. There are famines recorded in 1905-1907. There has been an akal 
in samvat 1996 (1939). That year is still very vivid is the memory of people who claim their age to be in the 
70s and 80s. 
 
 
112
trees. They said these trees have life... the noise that comes out when we cut the 
dhok is the cry of the dhok... it too has life. But we were foolish, the more we 
cut, lesser the rains there were!” 
Most discussion on bad samvat led to the identification of another culprit apparently 
responsible for forest decline – the bhedwale (sheep herders). In the case of the dangs, the 
bhedwale refers to the Rebaries, a migratory sheepherding community who travel from 
the Marwar region of western Rajasthan across into east Rajasthan and north Madhya 
Pradesh. According to Bodya: 
The Rebaries destroyed our fodder resources! We faced a lot of difficulties with 
them around. The sheep ruined the soil… they finished it. With their feet they 
upturn and dig out the soil cover. They finished the soil cover and unearthed the 
stony layer below. Can any grass grow on stony land-without any soil? 
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayats 
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayat today has multiple histories in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary. 
This is more so as it serves as the single most important symbolic capital in the micro-
politics operational in the field between the parties vying to claim credit for its initiation 
and perpetuation. There were, and continue to be, many levels of collective action, and 
not one monolithic community of local users as is often assumed. The kulhadi bandh 
panchayat practice was spurred in different areas of the Kailadevi region at different 
times. However, given the currency the institution enjoyed with the external agencies, 
along with the agencies themselves, different community groups also sought to 
appropriate the history of its origin to their best advantage. In this section I draw on 
narratives of kulhadi bandh panchayat that were collected as a part of the Indian Institute 
of Public Administration research team in 1996-1997 i.e. before the Forest Department or 
the NGOs in the area had undertaken any significant initiatives in the area. These 
narratives are important on many accounts. 
 
First, they are narrated in a context sans the opportunities presented to them by the 
externally-aided initiatives and thus celebrate kulhadi bandh panchayat as a community-
initiative (even in the face of rejection by the Department), with a sense of onus and 
ownership. Second, in contrast to its appropriation as an achievement of projects aimed at 
sustainable development in the more recent narratives, kulhadi bandh panchayats in the 
older narratives are clear on the intent and purpose of the practice. Kulhadi bandh 
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panchayat was also one among the several initiatives (mentioned in the previous section) 
to protect their forests. Uncluttered by conservation jargons, kulhadi bandh panchayats 
were defined as a means of resource management with the stated purpose of managing the 
forests for future sustenance.  
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayat as a practice was a response to the resource crunch experienced 
during the drought of 1985-88. Its immediate cause was the need to protect the forests 
from being used by the Rebaries. Rebaries are numerically the largest migrant group in 
India (Agrawal 1999) and are found mainly in Rajasthan and Gujarat. Although in the 
past the Rebaries were known as camel herders, today many have taken mainly to sheep 
herding. Over the years, owing to various state programs on land reform, agricultural 
development and conservation, the Rebaries’ access to pasture on forest land and fallow 
agricultural fields of settled villagers, has been severely curtailed. Competition over 
decreasing resources and intensification of agriculture has in most cases altered the 
relations between settled agriculturists and the Rebaries from synergism to hostility 
(Kavoori, 1990; Kohler-Rollefson, 1992; Srivastav, 1997; Agrawal, 1999a)56. Kailadevi 
typically reflected this tension and politics between sedentary farmers and Rebaries that 
had intensified around the border areas between Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh (Agarwal 
and Narain, 1985).  
 
In the Kailadevi area, the Rebaries traditionally travelled from the Marwar region of 
western Rajasthan up into east Rajasthan and through the Sanctuary to Madhya Pradesh. 
Apparently, since the early 1970s the Rebaries have been using the Sapotra and Kailadevi 
forests (located at the boundaries between Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh) as their 
transitory route (to Madhya Pradesh), foraging on the forest resources and the fodder 
available on fallow private field. Over the years however, with the establishment of the 
Ranthambhore National Park, Kailadevi Sanctuary and the restrictions imposed by the 
Government of Madhya Pradesh, their access to resources has been dramatically 
restricted. With relative intensification of agricultural practices, extended periods of 
drought and restricted access to the forest resources, settled agro-pastoral communities 
                                                
 
56 There is often has been a relationship of mutual dependency between the settled agriculturists and the 
Rebaries in the past. Farmers, usually raising one crop a year would value allow the Rebaries access to the 
grass in their fallow fields in exchange for the sheep manure. There also engaged in trading over milk and 
sheep wool. 
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had to increasingly compete with the Rebaries over the limited and ever shrinking fodder 
resources. They have consequently been locked in conflict (sometimes violent) with the 
settled agro-pastoral groups of the area. Arriving with an annual herd size of 
approximately 1.5 lakh sheep heads, the villagers saw the Rebaries as the primary cause 
of the resource crunch they faced in terms of fodder availability – a view equally 
endorsed by the Forest Department. Although their entry into the Sanctuary has been 
officially banned since 1983 (the year of declaration of Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary), 
they continued to enter and graze their herds in the forests.57  
 
In 1986, the conflicts led to an organised campaign by the villagers in and around the 
Sanctuary to drive out the Rebaries. This is popularly referred to as the Bhed Bhagao 
Abhiyan (drive out the sheep campaign) (Forest Department, 2000; Kothari et al., 1997) 
There were many violent stand-offs between the villagers and the Rebaries58 in the years 
of the Bhed Bhagao Abhiyan. Dwarka Sharma (40-50yr) a Brahmin with a sizeable cattle 
population and land holding, known for his enthusiasm in tackling the Rebaries, recalls: 
We were all there in large numbers …people had come from Rajour, Kannarda, 
Khujuro. We waited for long hours in the mountains for the Rebaries to show 
up. The bhedwale knew that we were waiting. They were on the other side… 
they had come equipped with laths (sticks) and guns…we were not to be put off. 
We had our guns ready…the Forest Department people didn’t help. The police 
stayed away until after the conflict. There was much fighting, there was 
firing…some of the bhedwale died …some of ours died too. (October 1996) 
Although the ultimate restriction on the Rebaries entry into this area was achieved by the 
active effort of the Forest Department and the support of the people, in the 1980s the 
movement was largely initiated by the communities themselves as their appeal to the 
Department to control the entry of the Rebaries had fallen on deaf ears. While the 
ultimate mobilisation occurred under the patronage of local leaders aspiring to enter party 
politics, for the villagers the movement was a measure to contain the crisis of decreasing 
availability of fodder and forest resources.  
 
                                                
 
57 Complete restriction on their entry into KWS was achieved only in 1996 after much organised resistance 
from the Forest Department 
58 Agrawal (1999) in his study of the Raikas of western Rajasthan analyses in length the issues, the 
politicization and the problems pertaining to the conflicts between the Rebaries and the settled communities 
they encounter in their migratory routes. 
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Kulhadi bandh panchayat was initiated by a group of 12 villages that were at the 
forefront of the movement. Subsequently, it spread to several other villages in the region. 
A resident of a village who spearheaded the movement in 1988 relates the origins of 
kulhadi bandh panchayat as follows: 
We realised that our resources were dwindling not only because of the Rebaries 
but also because of indiscriminate use by our own people. In order to check this, 
we decided to stop the indiscriminate use of the axe in the forests and that is why 
we called it ban the axe movement. (October 1996)  
In 1996 each of the 22 villages I visited (as a part of the IIPA project) inside the 
Sanctuary reported the existence of a kulhadi bandh panchayat. The purpose of the 
institution was to protect and sustain the resource base and was universally clear and 
understood. Thus, as captured in this narrative from a senior member of village Nibhera, 
the rules of operation was aimed at regulated use of resources: 
We started kulhadi bandh some 5-8 years ago. We have strict rules. We allow 
the people to meet their needs of firewood (jalau lakdi) and construction timber 
(imarti lakdi) but only as much as is necessary or needed (jarurat ke kaje or 
kamsaru). Imarat lakdi in large quantities can be bought only in consultation 
with the Panchayat. (November 1996)  
It is important to note that ‘ban-axe’ as a term was employed by the people in a figurative 
sense to denote a ban on indiscriminate felling. They never meant it literally. Ban-axe did 
not mean that they would not carry an axe when in the forest or use it to log and chop 
wood when they needed to. In 1996, and even through the period 2000-2002 while I was 
conducting my doctoral research in the same area, both men and women always carried 
an axe whenever they went to the forests to collect wood. In fact they carried an axe every 
time they crossed the forests. As one of the villagers put it, “Can we do without an axe? 
All our work gets done with this!” As they navigate their lives through the forests, the axe 
forms an inalienable part of their existence. Walking up and down between the valleys 
and plateau of the Sanctuary, often having to cross steep, densely forested paths the axe 
helps the residents not only to clear the thorny entangled outgrowth but also acts as their 
primary form of defence against dacoits and wild animals.  
 
Precisely because an axe is the single most important tool for harvesting fuel wood and 
construction timber, a figurative ban on its use was symbolic of the communities’ resolve 
to control and regulate the use of forest resources. Members were allowed to get 
construction timber only as per their bonafide need (jarurat kaje) and not as they willed. 
They were especially keen to regulate or ban the practice of harvesting green wood for 
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fuel and the logging of whole trees just to reach the leaf fodder. The name ‘ban-axe’ 
probably took its name after the use of the term by the forest administrators of erstwhile 
Karauli who attempted to restrict local communities from accessing forest resources by 
disallowing the carrying of axe into the forests (Lyall 1914). To reiterate, terms like 
confiscation of axe (kulhadi khusana) or ban of axe (kulhadi bandh) are idiomatic of 
regulation, control and punishment, often also used by villagers in resolving inter-village 
conflicts over resource use and management.  
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayats broadly followed a similar pattern of operation and regulation 
across the villages. Nobody was allowed to cut down green trees for fodder. Usually 
meetings were held every month. In the case of first offence the panchayats only warned 
the individual. A fine was levied on a second offence and if the person repeated the 
offence for the third time the offender was socially boycotted (jat-biradiri bahar). 
Depending on the nature of the offence the fine could vary from Rs. 11 to Rs.501 and 
sometimes even more. It was more common to evoke social and religious sanctions 
against offenders rather than imposing monetary fines. 
 
The Panchayats were not only about restricting their own people. They also took up the 
responsibility for stopping the illegal felling of trees by outsiders. On one occasion an 
organised group from three villages had impounded a camel cartload of fuel wood and 
timber wood being smuggled out of the Sanctuary. The villagers of Lakhruki had also 
been successful in nabbing a forest guard’s son involved in smuggling timber wood from 
the Sanctuary (Wadhwa 1996).  
 
The system operated both at intra and inter-village level. The village level kulhadi bandh 
panchayat was responsible for protecting the natural resources within the confines of its 
traditional village boundaries. Inter-village disputes were settled by involving the Kulhadi 
bandh panchayats of all the villages included under a single Panchayat (the formally 
designated local governance unit). Usually inter-village level disputes were first handled 
between the two-concerned villages through the exchange of letters. One of the letters 
from village Nibhera to the panchayat of Morechi (accused of felling trees in Nibhera’s 
forest) stated – 
In our village kulhadi bandh is operational. Our people found members of your 
village cutting trees in our forests. The Panchayat of Nibhera kindly requests 
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you to refrain from such activities. In future if we catch your men cutting trees in 
our forests we will confiscate their axes. (March 2001) 
Although the practice of kulhadi bandh was new, its institutional manifestations were part 
of the village’s existing political and social organisations directed towards resource 
management and use. Kulhadi bandh panchayats are organised and operate along the 
patterns of the age-old and existing informal (that is outside of the official local 
governance system of the Panchayati Raj System) village panchayats that characterize the 
current village administrative and political system. These systems are called into action in 
all forest protection activities, resource conflicts and other socio-political issues of the 
village. Making a distinction from the panchayats which are state institutions of local 
governance under the Panchayati Raj system, the villagers often refer to the village level 
informal panchayats as Nyaya or Patel Panchayats. Essentially, the Nyaya Panchayats 
convened specifically on issues pertaining to the ban-axe practice were referred to as 
kulhadi bandh panchayats. 
 
Nyaya Panchayats have always reflected the traditional social hierarchy and the 
overlapping economic standing of the various communities. The arbitrating authorities at 
these panchayats are patels, a generic name for the representative heads of the various 
caste groups. Although most panchayats include patels from every caste group (‘seven 
castes’) present in the village, the important patels, usually from the dominant castes were 
the main decision-makers of the village. The inclusion of all castes in these panchayats 
was especially important because the forests were considered a common property 
resource. Further, as forest protection was to involve community policing, the villagers 
felt that every member needed to be equally vigilant and responsible. 
 
Notwithstanding the representation of all caste groups’ communities these panchayats 
were replete with practices of social discrimination that operate on an everyday basis. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, in general Gujjars and Brahmans are the dominant communities in 
Nibhera. The communities like the Nais, Doms and Chamars are among the most 
marginalised and owe substantial debts to local money lenders as well as some of the 
relatively affluent Gujjars and Brahmans. Kulhadi bandh panchayat in Nibhera was 
always presided over by the Gujjar and Brahman patels. Although people like Bhairon 
Lal Nai, Bodya Dom and Haricharan Teli were always included and had the right to speak, 
it was understood the final arbitrating authorities would be the Brahman and Gujjar patels. 
 
 
118
Bhangi community considered as ‘untouchables’ were never a part of the decision making 
process.  
 
Women’s access and control over resources are embedded as Leach (1994) suggests ‘in 
wider sets of ideas and social and political relations concerning gender’. Female seclusion 
in the Hindu multi-jati community of Nibhera is very strong. The seclusion is mainly 
manifest in women being denied visible access to domains that are public and male 
dominated like the village panchayat – the central political and administrative decision-
making body of a village. Such prohibitions are indoctrinated as a part of the societal 
norms for ‘appropriate female behaviour’ (Agrawal, 1997: 36). Other than defining it as 
socially unacceptable behaviour, the men in Nibhera justify keeping women (bahu-beti) 
away from public or political space on grounds that the women are “illiterate”, “cannot 
speak”, “are not knowledgeable” , “only know how to squabble” and “aware only of 
chullah-chowki (matters pertaining to home and hearth or what is often conceptualised as 
the ‘domestic domain’)”. Consequently women were not a part of the decision-making 
processes of the kulhadi bandh practice.  
 
Given the above ideological position of women in their society, for a socially and 
politically embedded activity like forest protection women of all communities are absent 
from male narratives and activities pertaining to it. Women have never fought the 
physical conflicts with outsiders or the neighbouring villagers to secure the territories of 
their forests or their village resources. Despite being absent from male dominated and 
visible forums of forest protection, women nonetheless play significant roles from within 
spaces that are considered appropriate for them. The contribution of women is visible 
only in the female narratives of the conflicts. For instance, in the conflict that took place 
with the Marwaris, while the men only mentioned how they took on the Marwaris and 
managed to dodge the law, Bimla’s descriptions gives details of how the struggle of men 
both with the Marwaris and the police was sustained to the point victory – 
The bahu-beti (daughters and daughter-in-law) who were left behind to deal with 
the police when they came for the men. None of the women opened their 
mouths. They said “our men don’t tell us where they go”. But the men would be 
in the forests. We bahu-beti would go in batches and only when we were sure 
that there were no outsiders in the region… We would take food and clothes for 
them. This went on for months. Women are also equal partners in our current 
strategic use of the idea of kulhadi bandh panchayat by men.  
 
 
119
Reflecting the disagreement and discontent with the decisions made in these panchayats, 
people recount that how in the past the patels were “people with virtues of justice and 
fairness and delivered the correct judgement irrespective of the caste of the accused”. 
Most people, individually, irrespective of their caste, alleged that in the current 
environment, the patels are nepotistic (bhai-bandi karen) and are unfair (anyaya) in their 
decision-making in the panchayats.  
 
There have been issues of inequity in terms of access to natural resources. In the past 
Chamar and Bhangi communities sourced drinking water only from the tail end of the 
main stream. They were also not allowed access to the village wells or pond. While the 
Bhangis are still restricted from openly accessing the village pond, the Chamars had to 
fight for the access they have now. Only under the threat of police and courts that the 
upper castes have allowed them access. And in almost all the villages of the Sanctuary the 
dominant caste groups like the Gujjars, Brahmans and Meenas are involved in land 
disputes with the lower caste groups of Nais or Chamars. 
 
Further, the kulhadi bandh practice although was equally applicable to all communities it 
posed unfair constraints on some groups. Women were put to considerable difficulties so 
far as fuel wood collection was concerned; they had to walk much longer distances to 
collect firewood on account of the ban and were initially unhappy about it. Also it was 
particularly restrictive for the goat-herding communities like the Chamars and Bhangis 
who depend heavily on leaf fodder in the lean season.  
 
As a consequence of the existing intra and inter-community politics, the ban on 
indiscriminate felling has come to nought several times in the past. For example, the goat 
graziers belonging mostly to the Chamar and Bhangi community repeatedly defied the 
ban and cut tree for leaf fodder. Repeated warnings from the panchayat did not help, 
since the communities as a whole defied the ban. Seeing the ineffectiveness of the 
panchayat, other communities started violating the ban. Finally, the Gujjar and Brahman 
patels decided to show their prowess. The bargaining power of the Chamars and Bhangis 
was weakened because of their indebtedness to the Gujjars and Brahmans. The latter two 
communities threatened to deny loans to the ‘culprits’ and also demanded an immediate 
payment of their debts. After a year, the villagers made a new resolution, sought the 
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“cooperation” of the Chamars and Bhangis and were finally able to implement the ban 
again.  
 
However, what needs to be pointed out is that while these discriminatory practices and 
differential interests did (and may continue to) hamper the functioning of the kulhadi 
bandh panchayats, the authority of the patels was never absolute. Evident in the 
intermittent dissolution of some of the panchayats is the availability of space for 
negotiation to contest or protest domination and discrimination. Further, inequities 
practiced at the village level can also be challenged within the system. In addition to the 
patel panchayats each community has a large association of their respective caste group 
called jati samaj, an institutional arrangement that could include the same caste members 
from almost all the villages in the region. Most of the intra-community disputes that 
cannot be resolved at the village level are often referred to this samaj. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the jati samajs serve as important forms of political mobilisation of 
communities to rally for their rights either against the communities or against the State. It 
is through the samaj that the Chamars have used legal and constitutional provisions59 to 
gain access to the common hand pumps in the villages and to a right bathe in village 
ponds. As many Gujjars complained, they are careful about how they treat the Chamars 
and the Bhangis as they have on past occasions been prompt in filing cases of 
discrimination against them. However, as we see in the later sections, the new local 
institutions modelled on kulhadi bandh panchayats initiated by the non-governmental 
organisation and the Forest Department, rather than addressing the inequalities, not only 
end up reinforcing them but also offer no avenues for contest. In trying to demonstrate 
their ‘participatory’ nature, it is consensus and not conflict and resolution that is important 
for the new local institutions.  
 
                                                
 
59Article 17 of the Constitution of India abolished ‘untouchability’ and its practice in any form. The 
Constitution strives to remove this practice by making the provision a fundamental right and through 
punishment to whoever practices or abets it in any form. Towards this end, Protection of Civil Rights Act 
1955 was enacted. It has implemented several measures to eradicate this practice from the society. It 
stipulates up to 6 months imprisonment or Rs.500 fine or both. It impresses upon the public servant to 
investigate fully any complaint in this matter and failing to do so amounts to abetting this crime. Article 
17 is available against private individuals as well and it is the duty of the state to ensure that this right is not 
violated (http://hanumant.com/ConstiProvisionsForCD.html). 
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Changing Times and Shifting Identities 
 
Drawing illustration from Indonesia, Li (1996) argues that in the policy arena advocates 
promote images of ‘traditional’ communities as being in harmony with their environment 
primarily as a strategy to defend the rights of the communities. But as Baviskar (1998) 
argues, portraying tribal communities as natural repositories of ecological wisdom may be 
politically correct but does disservice to the people as it misrecognises their changing 
reality. Communities may demand futures that are ‘antithetical to the goal of biodiversity 
conservation’.  
 
In the study of power and politics of communities and their landscapes it is often pointed 
out that the way in which people understand and engage with their worlds will depend 
upon the specific time and place and historical conditions. It will depend on their gender, 
age, class, and caste and on their social and economic situation. Also, no place is bounded; 
a sense of place also evolves in relation to the wider network of interactions, exposure 
and movements (Ferguson and Gupta, 1992; Rodman, 1992; Bender, 1993). This 
subjectivity is clearly apparent in the many ways in which the people of Nibhera represent 
themselves and their location.  
 
The evidence presented in this section indicates a change in some aspects, away from a 
forest-based dependence and towards a more monetised market-based economy. 
Agriculture has gradually replaced pastoralism, although the two are still in common 
practice. The need for monetary income to survive is now pushing many people towards 
migration in search of paid employment. In other cases, capital permitting, people are 
now preferring to move out of the village altogether. The harsh existence of the dangs and 
the desperate need to cope under rapidly changing conditions is taking its toll on the 
people. 
 
In these changing times there is a complex balance between the people’s sense of place, 
their history and what they perceive to be their future and the future of their children 
While most are unwilling to leave their land or their village and take great pride in the 
position it holds amongst other villages they also desperately feel the need for 
infrastructural development and income generating opportunities close home. Both these 
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pictures are equally true for them. This probably reflects on the many dimensions in 
which the communities seek an identity in times where they are compelled into exploring 
new modes of livelihood and lifestyles. Their sense of self-representation is an essential 
tool of survival and reflects both ‘multi-vocality’ and ‘multi locality’
60
. Thus it is not 
unusual for them to appropriate the negative discourses on them and their state of life 
used by development and official agencies.  
 
“We are lying in the hills – we are wild people of the forest! (Hum dang mein pade hain, 
hum junglee log)” is a common refrain among the residents of Nibhera to outsiders 
(including me). Chiranji, a Gujjar of Nibhera says – 
If not junglee (an uncaring dweller of the forest) then what are we? We don’t 
have water, we don’t have roads, we don’t have electricity and we don’t have 
enough grains. We are just like our dhor-maweshi (cattle); we live like the way 
they live in this dang dongar! 
Within this perspective the dang is seen as a neglected forested area lacking in modern 
amenities and economic opportunities. However, when asked if they would leave the 
dang, in an event where the Forest Department comes up with a resettlement and 
rehabilitation package, people like Ramlal Pandit (60), the father of Jagdish Master, are 
clear that they are here to stay –  
Because of the dang we have a cherished life! Where will they find another dang 
for us? Where will they relocate so many villages and give them so much forest? 
Where will we live without our samaj (society)? What will our cattle feed on? 
We are destined to live here and here is where we will die! 
There are similar voices among the younger generation. Radhamohan, the younger 
brother of Jagdish, who works as ‘stone setter’ in Bangalore, says – 
The lives in our village… the space, the forests, the hills are what I want to come 
back to when I am done working in Bangalore. I am saving money to come back 
here so that I can hope for an alternative to farming and cattle rearing.  
Not everyone is so keen though about staying on in Nibhera. Suresh (20s) and Ramesh 
(30s), the sons of the village priest have relocated to Karauli with their mother. The priest 
himself has preferred to spend some more time in the village before joining them. Suresh 
is clear about his reasons to relocate –:  
                                                
 
60 Multilocality and multivocality are used here are in reference to Rodman’s (1992) analysis of the same. 
Of the many of dimensions of multilocal and multivocal explained by her, one refers to how a single 
physical landscape can be experienced and expressed differently by different users or even by the same 
user.  
 
 
 
123
“What’s left in the dang? We live in the city with great comforts. There is a fan 
and we get water from taps. You leave one job today you can do another 
tomorrow!” 
The way of life and lifestyles of the communities, where the ‘plains’ (taradi) and the 
‘world outside’ (anth ki duniya) are constant reference points, are also undergoing 
changes. As often quoted by the men folk of the village, in comparison to the dangs, the 
taradi is a ‘success’ area because “they have water, can grow wheat and chana (gram) in 
plenty, have electricity and all kinds of other facilities".  
 
The resource relations of the people and the changes that it is undergoing, has a 
significant bearing on the people’s responses to these project interventions, especially to 
their adaptation to their circumstances for survival. Unlike the advocates of 
conservationist agendas, for the people of Nibhera there are no contradictions in 
protecting their forests as means of resource sustenance and their desire for better 
development facilities and employment opportunities. Consequently, there are obvious 
discontinuities between the ideas and practices of the external agencies and the people of 
Nibhera. The people have an understanding of these projects as is filtered through their 
existing knowledge base of the 'world' and through the threats they feel of being 
dispossessed from their lands. The FD and the NGOs alternately pose threats and present 
opportunities as far as their livelihood is concerned. Thus, their responses to these 
agencies seem underpinned by a constant, un-stated attempt to negotiate for their own 
security and survival, making use of the options and spaces that the functioning of the 
NGOs and the FD offer.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter primarily aims at contextualising Kulhadi bandh panchayats within the 
resource relations of the communities of Nibhera by focusing on the extent of their 
dependence on the forests, their sense of place, acts of forest protection, their dwindling 
resources and shifting identities.  
 
Though much depleted, the forests still remain the principal source of survival for most 
communities of Nibhera that are predominantly dependent agro-pastoral economies. 
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Livelihood at every level of the society is benefited from the forest cover and land. The 
forests are primary source of fodder, fuel wood, construction timber and land. It also 
provides a plethora of materia-medica and roots, fruits and fibres for everyday use.  
 
The forests, it argues, are not just “resources” but are an in-extricable part of the identities 
and existence of the communities. Defying the dichotomy between nature and culture, the 
locally evolved practices and experiences through which communities create their sense 
of place reflect reciprocal inscription of the sacred, social and secular realms. The 
interweaving of these realms, spatially and temporally inscribed in their landscapes, also 
offer a moral grid to regulate communities’ resource use, stakes and practices. The 
inscribed places, practices and memories that make their landscape are an integral part of 
personhood, kinship, political and social territoriality, and survival. The chapter argues 
that communities resource relations as socially and religiously embedded practices of 
conservation as done by certain traditionalist discourses is misleading and misrecognition 
of the world view of the communities. Conservation, whether in the sacred or secular 
realm, is incidental; implicated in the locally evolved complex of sacred and social 
organisations are rules of nature and governance aimed at resources use and sustenance.  
 
In a region where the economy has been heavily dependent on forest resources, protection 
of these resources from other communities both within the area (from neighbouring 
villages) and outside (from across the region) forms an integral part of the resource 
management strategy and characterises the socio-polity of the region. Competition over 
resources and their protection is central to the histories of origin and settlement of villages 
in this region and are immortalised in the form of popular legends proudly narrated by the 
winning side. In conflicts over resources with other villages, confrontation and protection 
has at stake political territoriality and calls forth the collective identity of the village. 
Establishing territoriality is also crucial to the reciprocal exchange of resources that takes 
place between the villages in the region, as a part of their risk management strategy. In 
essence, sharing and protection of resources are as much a part of their livelihood issues 
as of issues of honour, morality, politics and sociality.  
 
In a time of acute resource crunch brought upon by frequent and consecutive droughts 
and dwindling forest resources, Kulhadi bandh panchayat emerged as a response to 
secure their resources from the threats posed not only by the Rebaries (the migratory 
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sheep herders from western Rajasthan), but also from their own indiscriminate use. More 
importantly ‘ban-axe’ was symbolic restriction of indiscriminate use of the forests by the 
communities themselves. It did not mean a literal ban on the use of axe or a complete ban 
on extraction of forest resources. Ban-axe meant that people could harvest only as much 
as they needed and not as much as they willed. 
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayats were very much a part of the village political and 
administrative panchayats referred to as nyaya or patel panchayats. When these 
panchayats were convened to specifically address the issues of forest protection and use 
they were referred to Kulhadi bandh panchayats. The functioning and operation of 
Kulhadi bandh panchayats, like the earlier forest protection activities of the communities, 
was embedded in the complex of socio-political systems of resource management and 
regulations. They inextricably linked to their social, cultural and political identities. Also, 
there can be no romanticising community institutions. There are conflicts, divisions, 
hierarchies within communities and these are manifest in their institutional practices. 
However, when institutions like Kulhadi bandh panchayats are formed over crisis of 
common property resources, they exist despite the inevitable existence of hierarchies and 
conflict, with some provision to try and address them or contest them. 
 
The point to stress is that forest protection is not an isolated act directed towards the 
conservation of biodiversity; conservation as an objective is incidental. Further, the act of 
forest protection through Kulhadi bandh panchayats emerges from a context that is 
deeply embedded in the social and political organisational structures of society and has 
several perquisites like ownership, reciprocal exchange, livelihood and identities. 
Denying the communities these perquisites and isolating the activity of forest protection 
from its village-based social and political context as is attempted through 
‘institutionalising participation’ does not forbear the same effect or significance. Village 
polities are complex no doubt, but the inequalities therein need to be addressed more 
squarely. This however may not necessarily be done through seeing them as the ‘other’ 
and in need of a uniform structural system predicated on value-based notions of equity 
and justice as is attempted by the current preoccupation with enabling community 
participation and enabling ‘community-based organisations’(CBOs).  
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Communities’ needs for forest resources and their rooting to their landscape goes hand-
in-hand with their changing needs and perceptions about their way of life brought about 
by the dwindling resources and changing livelihoods. In their perspective, there is no 
duality between their need to protect their resources and the need for better 
developmental infrastructures and opportunities for cash-incomes. The importance and 
need for both shapes their response to external intervention. The external intervention 
poses both threats of resource alienation and opportunities for income and development. 
Strategising a survival that enables them to secure both, they negotiate their varying 
responses – allowing appropriation of their initiatives and collaborating in sustaining its 
representations within the dominant discourses of conservation.  
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Chapter 4 
Managing the Sanctuary: Projects and People 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to locate Forest Department’s discourse on kulhadi bandh 
panchayats, within the larger institutional dynamics and organisational politics of donor-
funded projects on wildlife conservation. It also seeks to analyse the implications of the 
implementation practices for issues of participation and conservation.  
 
In analyzing development in practice, it has been argued that how policy translates into 
practice and outcome is less dependent on policy intentions and more on inter and intra 
organisational relationships of the agencies involved i.e. ‘the development bureaucracies 
between intentions and outcome’ (Quarles van Ufford, 1988: 12 and 1993; Mosse, 2005). 
Stressing on the need to focus on ‘various ways in which development organisations 
actually operate’ and the ‘relationships between specific organisations and their 
environment’, Quarles van Ufford (1988) emphasises the need to view development 
bureaucracies not as ‘systems’ with internal coherence and effectiveness but as ‘arenas 
where different constructions of realities interact’.  
 
Organisations however are not monoliths; there are considerable levels of ‘ignorance’
61
 
and differences of objectives and understanding between the higher and lower levels of 
the organisations, with the top levels primarily concerned with the funding and its 
attendant mandates, and the lower levels with their immediate hierarchies and the 
constituency they are directly interacting with. Hence as Quarles van Ufford (ibid.) argues, 
policy making within development bureaucracies becomes a continuous process and 
‘policy goals are constructed and reconstructed’ both between and within organisations. 
Simultaneously, organisations and different levels of organisations work more 
                                                
 
61 Also see Hobart (1993) 
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immediately towards meeting their own ‘system goals’
62
 i.e. those of organisational/ 
individual maintenance and survival.  
 
Different ‘realities’ of the policy arena are a function of the fact that definitions of 
development problem confronted by development organisations are to a large extent 
determined by characteristic of the organisation – what the organisations can actually do, 
and by extension its culture (Epstein 1988). Organisational cultures and organisational 
relationships are integral part of each other; how organisations chart their relationships 
within and between them is to a large extent determined by their specific culture 
(Bebbington et al. 2007). Organisational culture has been analysed variously within 
management and anthropological literature on development with reference to context, 
history, integrative values and power relations among others. The analysis in this chapter 
refers however to a more comprehensive concept of organisational culture provided by 
Lewis et al. (2003). The concept of organisational culture within this framework includes 
a consideration of the socio-political and historical context, the values and meanings 
evolved within the context, the everyday practices informed by these meanings and power 
relations that dominate or counter the workings of it. Equally relevant for this analysis is 
understanding that organisations are not monoliths nor are their ‘culture.’ Organisations 
harbour within them fragmentation and sub-groups and thus fragmented cultures and 
subcultures (Alvesson 1994; Bebbington et al. 2007)  
 
The India Ecodevelopment Project was conceived ostensibly to address usufruct issues 
and conflict over access that bedevilled the PA landscape because of exclusionary 
conservation policies. It was aimed at linking conservation to the development of 
alternative rural livelihood. This was sought to be done through the active participation of 
affected communities and reorientation of the management approach. However the 
project also brought together organisations like the World Bank and the Forest 
Department, both of which have, borrowing a phrase from Bebbington et al. (ibid: 617), 
‘deeply sedimented elements of organisational cultures’ and ‘sub-cultures’ with varying 
organisational goals, interests and interpretation of policy.
63
 Hence, as Mosse 
                                                
 
62 Mosse also refers to it as the ‘shadow goals’ – illegitimate concerns that constantly threatened project 
purposes (2004: 651).  
63 Actor-oriented and network-oriented approach to the study of the implementation of eco-development 
project in Karnataka (Mahanty, 2002) and Tamil Nadu (Rees, 2000) have clearly established the diverse 
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demonstrates in the case of the DFID-funded rain fed farming project in India, in the 
implementation of Eco-development in Kailadevi ‘practices, events and effects of 
development actors are shaped not by policy models but by the relationships, interests and 
cultures of specific organisational settings’ (2004: 1).  
 
The chapter by focusing on the interactions between the World Bank and the Forest 
Department, and the cultural politics of PA management within the Department, analyses 
the practices of the project and establishes how the disjuncture between project goals and 
organisational realities work against the ‘leopard changing its spots’64, along with how 
this disjuncture is ‘managed’ through representational politics with kulhadi bandh 
panchayats as the leitmotif of project “success”.  
 
Section one focuses on the approach of the Eco-development project: its main component 
and the main criticism against it. Section two focuses on the Forest Department of 
Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve and analyses the kind of problems the implementation of 
the project faced owing to some of the contradictions between the project ideals and the 
departmental realities. Section three; looking at the cultural politics of tiger conservation 
locates the marginalized position of the Sanctuary within the larger context of the Reserve. 
Section four traces the discursive contours through which kulhadi bandh panchayat was 
co-opted into the success narrative of the Eco-development project and the ‘system goals’ 
it served. The last, section five, analyses the implications of the project for conservation, 
participation and people; arguing primarily that the project reinforced the way the 
department had always done things.  
 
IEDP: The Approach  
 
As discussed in Chapter two, The India Eco-development Project was conceived as a pilot 
project in June 1994 on the basis of an Indicative Plan prepared by the Indian Institute of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
and divergent interpretations, interests and practices that governed the complex multi-institutional 
implementation process.  
64 Jeanrenaud (2002) observes in her organisational analysis of World Wildlife Fund –‘reflexive relations 
between organizational structures, fund raising and dominant narratives can work against the ‘leopard 
changing its spot’ and help explain the uneven development of participatory approaches with global 
conservation.  
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Public Administration
65
 on behalf of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, 
Government of India (GoI). The project was estimated to cost US $67 million, shared by 
the International Development Association, Global Environmental Facility Trust, GoI, 
and the respective state governments of the PAs selected for coverage under the IEDP.  
 
Contest and Contradiction  
The primary purpose behind the IEDP it seemed was an opportunity to address some of 
the fundamental problems that marred the attempts at conservation of biodiversity 
through the network of PAs66 across the country. As stated in the Staff Appraisal Report 
of the World Bank: 
In response to pressures on protected areas, the Government is now beginning to 
address the special issues regarding participatory management of protected areas 
through a strategy of eco-development. The strategy aims to conserve 
biodiversity by addressing both the impact of local people on the protected areas 
and the impact of the protected area on local people. Eco-development thus has 
two main thrusts: improvement of PA management to conserve biodiversity 
effectively, to involve local people in PA planning and protection, to develop 
incentives for conservation and to support sustainable alternatives to harmful use 
of resources. It supports collaboration between the state forest departments and 
local communities in and around ecologically valuable areas. Ecodevelopment 
addresses the welfare and behaviour of local people and integrates these 
concerns into management of protected areas. It also builds private-sector 
stakeholder support for conservation among NGOs, nature tour operators and the 
general public. (World Bank 1996: p3) 
The project had six components, of which the following three were to be implemented at 
the field level (processes and outcomes of which are analyzed in this chapter):  
 
(a) Improved PA management (US $14 million – 22% of the base cost): 
• improving PA planning processes and building capacity; 
• protecting and managing ecosystems and habitat within the PA; and 
• upgrading amenities for field staff 
 
(b) Village Eco-development (US $34 million – 55% of the base cost) that reduces 
negative interactions of local people on biodiversity and increases collaborations of local 
people by: 
• conducting participatory microplanning and providing implementation support; 
• implementing reciprocal commitments that foster alternative livelihoods and resource 
uses to be financed by a village eco-development program that specify measurable 
actions by local people to improve conservation; and 
• special programs for additional joint forest management, voluntary relocation and 
supplemental investments for special needs 
 
                                                
 
65 IIPA (1993) 
66 The World Bank Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) of the India Eco-development Project provides details of 
some of these issues. 
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(c) Education and awareness, and impact monitoring and research (US $ 5min – 8% of 
the base cost) that develops more effective and extensive support for PA eco-development 
including: 
• promoting public support for conservation through environmental education and 
awareness campaigns; and 
• impact monitoring and research to improve understanding of issues and solutions 
relevant to PA management and interactions between PAs and the people 
 
By way of the projects’ commitment to participatory approach, as is evident above, over 
half the budget was to be spent on the village eco-development component, a departure 
from any previous schemes for wildlife conservation. A major element of the project 
design also included ‘extensive consultation and participatory decision-making involving 
local people, with particular focus on forest dependent and disadvantaged communities’ 
(Mott 1996)
67
  
 
Conversely, (as many critics have also argued) the subtext of this unprecedented scale of 
allocation was that “people’s pressure” was the primary threat to conservation, a 
viewpoint shared with the Statist approach to conservation. Implicit in the strategy was 
that local people needed to be made aware of conservation values of the PA. This is 
further clarified by the conceptualization of strategy of eco-development by the planners 
of eco-development. Singh (1995:2), the chief architect of the eco-development planning 
document prepared by IIPA, defined eco-development as a ‘strategy for protecting 
valuable PAs from unsustainable or otherwise unacceptable pressures resulting from the 
needs and activities of people living in and around such areas’. Singh (ibid) outlined five 
means of achieving the above, of which three focused primarily on addressing the use of 
resources by communities: 
• Identifying, establishing and developing sustainable alternatives to the biomass 
resources and incomes and other inputs being obtained from the protected areas 
in a manner, or to an extent, considered unacceptable.  
• Increasingly involving the people living in and around such protected areas into 
the conservation planning and management of the area, thereby not only 
channelling some of the financial benefits of conservation to them, but giving 
them a sense of ownership towards the protected area. 
• Raising the levels of awareness, among the local community, of the value and 
conservation needs of the protected area, and of patterns of economic growth and 
development which are locally appropriate and environmentally sustainable.  
                                                
 
67 Stated in the letter dated 10 July 1996, addressed to one of the critics of the Project.  
 
 
132
It is important to note that so far as state institutions for management were concerned, 
despite the abounding literature available in the early nineties on the role (historical, 
political and institutional) of the state in engendering these conflicts (see chapter two), the 
emphasis was on strengthening individual and institutional capacities with a focus on 
scientific research, plan improvement, upgrading amenities for staff’ (World Bank 1996). 
So far as ‘people’ within the management framework was concerned it seemed restricted 
to enabling ‘cooperation’, ‘participatory consultation’ and ‘developing benefit sharing 
arrangement’. Issues of rights and entitlements did not enter the framework.  
 
The initiation of the project deeply divided the conservationist lobby in India, including 
those who advocated the inclusion of people and their rights in the management of PAs. 
IEDP was seen as detrimental to both conservation and local communities. The criticism 
levelled against the project brings out the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in the 
project. Conservation scientist like Ullas Karanth and some like Valmik Thapar who 
believed that wildlife in India can be conserved only by creating ‘inviolate zones’ argued 
that ‘eco’ in eco-development emphasized not ‘ecological’ but ‘economic’ (Telegraph, 
1995)68. Their primary contention was that promoting eco-development with the 
Protected Area would compromise its ecological value. They argued that trying to 
promote livelihood activities would introduce market forces, attract more people from 
outside, introduce unviable use of biomass and thus exacerbate the problem. They 
attributed this lack of insight of the project to involvement of social and not ecological 
scientists in the planning of the project.69  
 
The people’s participation lobby on the other hand argued that the ‘neo-colonial character 
and interests of the World Bank project would naturally strengthen the arms of the state 
and the forest department’ (Erni 1997). A leading NGO, Centre for Science and 
Environment and Ashish Kothari of IIPA were the most vocal in their opposition.70 CSE’s 
                                                
 
68 The objections to the project were raised by most conservation scientists in India including John Singh, 
Mr. Ashok Kumar, vice-president of the Wildlife Protection Society of India, Dr. Ullas Kranath and 
included senior government officer (serving and retired) like Director of Project Elephant, Dr. Vinod Rishi 
and S. Deb Roy  
69 This is a summary prepared from the correspondence between the conservationists and the World Bank, 
and the news paper articles published on the issue at that time. Letters between Ullas Karanth and Bank 
were dated 23 July 1996; letters between S.D Roy and Bank date17 June 1996. 
70 Both CSE and Ashish Kothari were seen as collective voice of different groups of NGOs and activists 
that shared the same viewpoint as them. Organisations and people who lent support to the CSE lobby led by 
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main contention was that the project had little to offer in terms of proactive role of 
communities in the project management and that they were not included in the planning 
and design stage of the project. Quite rightly, the critics accused the project of perceiving 
poverty as the main cause of people’s use of resources and not the ‘disempowerment by 
wildlife laws and programmes and the erosion of environmental rights to use their habitat’ 
(Agarwal 1996)71. The criticisms also suggested that participatory approach was being 
used as a mere appeasement tactic and did not address the issues of rights and 
entitlements. Kothari (1996) too criticized the project for continuing to adopt an 
exclusionary attitude, ignoring the rights of local people over land and resources, ignoring 
the root causes of people-wildlife conflict and the lack of institutional structure for the 
involvement of local people in planning and management72. Also, despite the Bank’s 
claim to consultative process, the major criticism was that it reduced such consultations to 
mere ‘public relations’ exercise and the inputs from the various NGOs and concerned 
individuals were not included in revising the plans.  
 
The Bank team in India (especially the Task Manager for Eco-development) responded 
differently to different lobbies, primarily by referring back to the provision of the project 
documents as ‘implementation of the project was to depend on the project document’. 
The responses of the Bank however bring forth the ambiguities and contradiction inherent 
in the Project design and planning. I present here some excerpts of the responses by the 
Task Manager.  
 
In response to the fears of relocation that was raised in Nagarhole National Park by 
several organisations and activist: 
Consistent with the Bank’s Operational Directive 4.20, the project would 
integrate tribal concerns rather than relegate them to a subsidiary tribal 
development plan or component. Site specific planning and monitoring would 
address concerns of legal and usufruct rights and status, traditional economies, 
cultural use of natural resources, livelihood strategies, ability to adapt to new 
economies, attitudes towards conservation, and social distribution of proposed 
project investments and benefits foregone (Jessica Mott, 15 August 1996)  
                                                                                                                                            
 
Anil Agarwal, included Madhav Gadgil, Medha Patkar, Rajni Kothari, George Fernandes, Soli Sorabjee, 
Baba Amte, Walter Fernandes and others.  
71 Letter written by Anil Agarwal to the President of the World Bank on 12 July 1996. CSE carried a series 
of articles during this period on Ecodevelopment raising the issues (a comprehensive compilation is found 
in CSE Director’s Report for 1995-1996).  
72 Letter written to the President of the World Bank on 09/05/1996.  
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In response to Dr. Karanth, the Task Manager wrote what can be read as a contradiction 
to the above assurance: 
The conservation of biodiversity, including these animals is the central focus of 
all project components, including village ecodevelopment. The reciprocal 
commitments arising from village ecodevelopment will include measurable 
actions by local people affecting habitat and mammal survival, e.g. curtailing 
grazing, curtailing fuel wood collection and increased participation in anti-
poaching activities. 
The project design does not preclude encroachment control after the start of the 
project. The project’s provisions resettlement would not preclude routine law 
enforcement activities affecting individuals. Enforcement related to poaching 
control…would continue to be important. PA staff would also be able to prevent 
the establishment of new settlements where there are no customary tribal or 
other rights over the land. The updating of the PA management plans would 
include a review of the current strategy and consider possible improvements, 
such as clearer boundary markings, new arrangements of patrolling etc. (Jessica 
Mott, 14 August 1996).  
Primarily because of these inherent contradictions and lack of clarity in the project 
approach, academics point out that proponents of ecodevelopment fail to ‘analyse 
critically the meaning loaded onto the phrase’ and hence projects based on such concepts 
run a heavy risk of failure (Adams 1995). Calling the ecodevelopment a ‘vague’ concept, 
Karlsson (1999) points to the fact that Staff Appraisal Report is largely conceptual in 
nature, failing to provide any ‘concrete examples’ of how specific components or its main 
thrust – improving wildlife management and living conditions could be achieved. The 
‘framework’ design that should have worked to the advantage of its emphasis on 
participatory planning, allowing plans to emerge in ‘bottom-up’ approach, in its 
implementation had the exact opposite effect – it seemed to serve the interests of the ‘top-
down’ approach. As a result experiences of ecodevelopment led many to question if the 
model has been as open-ended and participatory in practice as in plans (Pandey 2005; 
Baviskar 2003). 
 
Institutional Framework  
Despite acknowledging the ‘bureaucratic rigidity’, the implementation process, by design 
was left in the hands of the ‘governmental structure’. Hence like other international donor 
policy on participatory development (cf. Mosse, 2004: 654), ecodevelopment too had 
‘effects through its imperfect translation into the intention and ambitions of others – the 
institutional interests, operational systems, procedures and organisational culture of 
collaborating agencies, their workers and those recruited as beneficiaries’.  
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The funding for the project was operated by the World Bank (WB), while Project Tiger, 
Ministry of Environment and Forests at the Centre and the Forest Department at the State 
level were the primary implementing agencies. At the national level an Ecodevelopment 
Project Implementation Board was set up for this purpose and was assigned full financial 
and administrative powers to implement the programme. The Board comprised of the 
Inspector General of Forests, Inspector General Wildlife, financial advisor of MoEF, 
advisor of planning commission and controller of aid accounts of the Department of 
Economic Affairs, and a Member of Project Tiger Office was its member secretary. An 
Ecodevelopment Project Steering Committee was also set up at the national level to 
facilitate centre-state coordination and provide policy guidance on project activities and 
work plan. Most importantly the State Governments through their PA authorities were 
responsible for field level project execution. The management of the Ranthambhore Tiger 
Reserve was the responsibility of the officers posted at the Project Tiger Office in Sawai 
Madhopur. The Tiger reserve has a ‘core zone’ (comprising RNP and adjoining areas) 
and a buffer zone (comprising KWS). Each of these zones is under the jurisdiction of a 
Deputy Conservator of Forests (DCF). Each DCF has other officers of various ranks 
under their supervision  – Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACFs), Rangers, Assistant 
Rangers and forest or the beat guards at the  lowest rung of the hierarchy. The overall 
management of RTR, including the coordination of the activities of the two DCFs is 
under the supervision of a Conservator of Forests (CF), otherwise referred to as the Field 
Director with his office in Sawai Madhopur. At the PA level it is these officers who are in 
charge of the execution of the IEDP.  
 
Essentially a colonial legacy, Forest Departments are characterized by centralized 
management (including planning and policy making), strict hierarchical structures, rigid 
rules, procedures and frameworks (Bahuguna 1992; Singh 1992; Palit 1996; Vasan 2006). 
It is known more for its preference for ‘professional conservatism’, with a preference for 
routine and convention rather than local initiative and adaptation’ (Chambers, 1992; as 
cited in Vira, 1999; cf. Palit, 1996). As Vasan (2002: 2146) rightly points out, 
professional identities (that inform the strict hierarchies within) are enabled by ‘a series of 
processes including recruitment, training, uniforms, perks and promotions (or transfers)’. 
These processes also create the institution’s incentive structures. Conservatism and 
incentive (and disincentive) structures underline the need to ‘toe the line’. Also ascribed 
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to it, especially to the lower rungs of the hierarchy is the issue of corruption (Robbin 2000; 
Vasan 2006)73. In the context of a collaborative approach to forest management, Forest 
Department’s unwillingness to change their anti-community attitudes and devolvement of 
control to community institutions is seen as its defining characteristics.  
  
Notwithstanding the highly rigid and bureaucratic structures, where, as Baviskar (2003: 
p287) puts it “decisions and processes are supposed to follow formal rules which 
guarantee consistency and efficiency”, the Departments are not monoliths. As many 
scholars have demonstrated (both in the colonial and post colonial times), departmental 
policy making or quotidian operations are shaped not only by the hierarchical systems but 
equally by the inter and intra-departmental tensions and differences, individualized 
leadership initiatives as well as the influence of the local communities within which they 
operate (Sivaramakrishnan, 1999; Saberwal, 1999; Vira, 2002; Vasan, 2006). For 
example, Saberwal (ibid) points to the influence of institutional politics on policy 
discourses. He demonstrates that Himachal Pradesh Forest Department’s policy discourse, 
justifying the restriction imposed on pastoral Gaddis from using certain pasture lands, 
was based less on the science of it than on their need to reaffirm their control and 
territorial jurisdiction against the claims being contested by the Revenue Department. In 
the contemporary context Vira (2002) demonstrates how the initiatives of individual 
officers had led to the successful implementation of the JFM programme in Madhya 
Pradesh.  
 
Also much attention has been paid to the definitive role that the lower rungs of the forest 
bureaucracy play in implementation and operation of projects or policies. In fact, it is 
often pointed out whether in India or elsewhere, that the tensions between their role 
within the department and the relationship with the local people is what prevents the State 
from implementing its dejure rules effectively (Peluso, 1992; Moore, 1993; Saberwal, 
1999). Given their significant role in shaping the outcome of the ecodevelopment project 
in Himachal Pradesh, Baviskar (2003: 288) writes: 
These actors are generally regarded as mere implementers who carry out 
assigned duties after appropriate training. However, it’s more insightful to see 
                                                
 
73 Both argue this from within an institutional framework wherein extra-legal exchanges evolve and are 
necessitated by the dejure rules of the institutions and the disincentives of the hierarchical structures and 
‘when seen within their social cultural context may not be corruption per se’ (Robbin: p429). 
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field-level workers as policy makers in their own right. After all, 
ecodevelopment as actual practice (as opposed to the version on paper) is 
actively interpreted and applied in specific and contextualized forms by this 
group....The institutional success of ecodevelopment hinges on this layer of the 
forest bureaucracy. 
There are also several other local issues and concerns that the departments have to 
contend with – the demands of industries and infrastructure that lead to de-notification of 
PAs, the nexus between local communities and local politicians in resisting restriction 
imposed on resource use along with the vote-bank politics which prevents political parties 
from taking a decisive stand on the policies being adopted for protected area management 
(Saberwal and Rangarajan 2003; Cedelrof and Rangarajan 2009). 
 
It is evident in the sections below how in implementing the project in Ranthambhore 
project prescriptions were assimilated into the working culture and agenda of the 
governmental structures. The implementation practices remained quite removed from the 
detail procedures of the SAR, especially the aspects which were aimed at enabling 
transparency, participation and inter-agency linkages74. Important for understanding the 
implementation process of the programme, are the above outlined aspects of 
organisational culture, the defacto practices, and the deeply entrenched ideological 
positions of the forest bureaucracy. Also significant are the constraints Department face 
in functioning within the larger bureaucratic structure of the State.  
 
Implementing the Project in Ranthambhore: Troubled Waters  
 
Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve (RTR) has a long history. Ranthambhore National Park 
(RNP) was the game reserve of erstwhile ruler of the State of Jaipur that was declared as 
the Sawai Madhopur Wildlife Sanctuary (SMWS) in 1955. In 1973 when Project Tiger 
was launched in India, SMWS was one of the nine selected tiger areas of the country 
included in Project Tiger. In 1980 a part of the Sanctuary was notified as a national park. 
Under Project Tiger the conservation of Tigers in the Sanctuary improved remarkably but 
                                                
 
74 The monitoring and feedback systems (much emphasized in the SAR in as its commitment to a ‘process-
oriented’ approach and largely to be contracted out) were never put in place anywhere in the 
ecodevelopment sites. The Supervision Missions of the Bank were the only external monitoring exercises 
that took place. Participatory monitoring that was to take place at the local level took place only after the 
mid-term review and was hugely manipulated by the frontline departmental staff.   
 
 
 
138
only through the elimination and alienation of local communities. The presence of 
villages inside the Sanctuary area was seen as hindrance to meeting the conservation 
objectives of the Reserve. Thus, between 1973 and 1979, 12 villages were relocated from 
the forest area within RTR and settled into two settlements near the park. In 1980 the 
reserved forests of SMWS was declared Ranthambhore National Park (Rathore and 
Thapar 1989; Shah and Shah 1996). Since the declaration of the Park, its conservation 
value, measured exclusively by the tiger census has seen many ups and downs. In the 
early 80s the tiger population increased significantly. However, from mid to late 80s to 
the early 90s, there has been a severe loss of tiger population, primarily to poaching. The 
management has lost a number of Forest Department staff in encounters with poachers 
(Jackson, 2003). 
 
One of the major management activities of RNP has been securing the Park against the 
neighbouring and relocated villages who use the forests as a source for firewood and 
fodder. The communities, comprising mainly of Meenas, a Scheduled Tribe (ST), who 
survive on cattle herding, are also known to forcibly enter RNP during the rainy season 
for grazing. There have been many violent stand-offs between the FD and the local 
communities in the past over the issue of grazing. The resident communities that were 
relocated continue to visit their religious sites located within the Park. In addition, there is 
a huge rush of pilgrims who visit the famous temple sites (encompassed by the Park), 
which are a part of the Fort of the erstwhile rulers of Jaipur. The core area of 
Ranthambhore is important and popular wildlife tourist destination. Management of 
tourism in the Park poses its own sets of problems for the Park staff. As the status paper 
reports, other than the expectation of VIPs that park authorities give them extra time and 
care, almost 60% of the management time is spent in tourism management. The revenue 
generated from tourism goes to the State coffers and not to the Park management. 
According to local staff, the State promotes tourism at the peril of the Park. 
 
At the time of the selection of the Park, these problems were particularly pronounced. The 
management felt that given the magnitude of the workload involved in securing the 
Reserve, the support from the State Government was inadequate. Conservation, as some 
of the advocates of RTR continue to appeal, is low on the agenda of the Government and 
suffers from the lack of political will (Thapar 2006). The Park Management was also very 
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unpopular with several NGOs and activist groups who were opposed to the Staff 
imposing restriction on resource use practices of local communities.  
 
All these factors made RNP an appropriate case for the Project. The Project was expected 
to enable a better management of the Park while being able to address what the SAR 
(1996: 100) referred to as the ‘[H]istory of hostile relationships between local people and 
PA authorities, problems of coordination among NGOs and PA authorities, delays in 
terms and processes of resettlement, and increasing pressure on resources from growing 
urban and rural populations’. 
 
Despite the appropriateness of the IEDP for the Park, the Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve 
proved to be a problem site for the World Bank. Although, during the implementation 
stage, the Project had faced problems in most areas75, RTR as per the Banks own 
assessment was amongst the poorest performers. 
 
The implementation of the project and its “lack of performance” in Ranthambhore brings 
to fore the complex, fragmented, multilayered working culture of the forest bureaucracy. 
It highlights the incompatibility of the project goal and the cultural politics of tiger 
conservations that characterise high profile Tiger Reserves like Ranthambhore.  
 
Non-performing State  
In May 2000, the World Bank conducted a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of IEDP76. In the 
Review, RTR came in for severe criticism. The major issue, it appeared, was with the 
Government of Rajasthan (GoR). Although the MoEF had released the funds on time
77
, 
                                                
 
75 This was mostly in the form of protest by NGOs who were of the opinion that the IEDP was detrimental 
to both conservation and local communities. In fact, it was reported that in several areas it was being used 
as a pretext to evict people from PAs. Nagarhole National Park in Karnataka even attracted an Inspection 
Panel of the World Bank to review the Project’s performance. 
76 According to the Bank, the MTR provided an opportunity to review, revise and restructure the project 
according to its objectives and achievable targets within the then remaining time frame of two years until 
the project closure date of June 2002.   
77 Funds are released by MoEF to the implementing states every year and the unspent balance remaining 
with the States at the close of the financial year is revalidated by MoEF in the next year to finance project 
activities. MoEF has to ensure that the revalidated amounts are in turn immediately released by the state 
governments to the project implementing agencies as revalidation does not automatically result in 
availability of funds with the implementing agencies. Additional funds, over and above the revalidated 
amount, are also released by MoEF on the basis of approved project activities for the year. Here again 
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the gross delay on the part of GoR in making the funds available to the implementing 
agency, Rajasthan Forest Department (RFD) had led to an under-utilization of funds. 
Although money was sanctioned in 1996, owing to successive delays by GoR, 
implementation at the field level were initiated only in 1998. Even in May 2000, as the 
Bank had pointed out, GoR was still to release funds that had been sanctioned in the 
Financial Year 1999. Further, the Annual Plan of Operation, on which the budget is 
sought for the functioning of the Departments, had not been finalized nor sanctioned thus 
foreboding further delays in the implementation process. 
 
GoR policies also impeded the implementation of some of the other aspects of the project. 
By the time of the Mid-Term Review, the GoR had not approved a single consultancy 
contract78, it had not approved any study tours or training for staff, it had not supported 
the purchase of vehicles, computers and specialized equipment entitled under the Project.  
 
Further, to foster an integrated approach to PA management, GoR was to facilitate inter-
agency linkages by setting up state level coordinating committee and PA coordinating 
committee. By the time of the MTR, the GoR was yet to set up these committees. The 
Bank was extremely critical of this – 
[T]his clearly shows a lack of commitment and responsibility by GoR towards 
the project. In particular, the mission is concerned that GoR continues to contest 
the need for these consultancies when the entire scope and design of the project 
was prepared in consultation with the RFD and later confirmed by GoR through 
signature to the project legal documents. In light of these fund flow difficulties, 
Bank Management questions commitment and ownership to the project (p2). 
The Bank also had several issues with the RFD. Under Improved PA Management, it was 
mandatory for all PAs to prepare their management plans. The plans were to reflect 
strategies and needs that were in line with the objectives of the Project. In the case of 
RTR, the Draft Management Plan was considered grossly inadequate, lacking necessary 
data and consultancy inputs.  
 
There were also problems with the Eco-Development Committees set in the Park. EDCs 
were responsible for implementing village-level components of the Project (see details in 
                                                                                                                                            
 
MoEF has to ensure timely placement of funds by the state governments at the disposal of the implementing 
agencies (WB, 2000). 
78 Implementation of some of the project objectives (improving planning processes, capacity building, 
microplanning, village ecodevelopment) mandated the contracting of NGOs and expert advisors. 
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section 5). The Bank observed that instead of the agreed 60 only 31 had been set up; no 
technical support had been provided, much of the money had been spent in building water 
reservoirs and the microplans did not clearly focus on the conservation linkages of the 
activities to be undertaken by EDCs. In its MTR the Bank also expressed serious concern 
over the lack of action under the components of ‘Environment Education and Awareness’ 
and ‘Research and Monitoring’. The latter was seen especially important to ascertain the 
impact of the Project and ensure financial sustainability of the project activities.  
 
The Bank was sceptical that in RTR the FD had focused its expenditure on infrastructure 
and paid no heed to the other aspects. It stated that the GoR and RFD were not interested 
in changing their attitudes towards the people and in taking advantage of the holistic 
approach envisaged by the Project. The general dissatisfaction of the Bank is evident in 
words of the then Senior Social Scientist at the WB, India Office, who was also one of the 
team members of the MTR: 
RFD has been very disappointing and dissatisfying. There are several reasons. 
The money from the project was being used as salaries rather than for actual 
work, the disbursement of funds was really slow. They have an attitude problem 
– they believe they know everything and have not, with the exception of one, 
engaged any consultancies as is mandated in the project proposal. Besides they 
have over emphasized the infrastructure component (20 May 2000).  
Based on the findings of the MTR, essentially the non-performance of RTR, the Bank had 
threatened to drop RTR from the IEDP if the GoR did not comply with the terms of the 
Project. Simultaneously, in the MTR the budget for the Park was revised and the total was 
reduced from initial Rs.38.30 core to Rs.19.99 core. These targets were drawn keeping in 
view that June 2002 would mark the end of the project. Post the MTR, after extensive 
discussions with GoR and RFD, the Bank eventually arrived at an extensive list of 
“Agreed Action” with specified deadlines.  
 
Aide Memoir of the Supervision Mission of September-October 2001, reflected a 
marginally positive note, but some key problems that had been stated at the MTR had 
remained. As the report noted: 
Overall the Mission is concerned about disappointing progress to date in 
implementation and completion of agreed priority actions. These delays can be 
attributed to delays in State clearance of financial flows and sanctions for 
essential activities; staffing constraints, including lack of women officers; and 
failure to prioritize and complete essential activities. It is critical that the Park 
staff now focus on meeting agreed targets prior to project completion and the 
State Government afford every means to facilitate this objective. (p2) 
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According to the original agreement, the Project was to conclude in June 2002 and all 
activities had to be brought to a halt by December 2001, giving a wrap-up period of 6 
months. In the latter half of the Project, especially in 2001, there was a flurry of activities 
by the FD at RNP and KWS. The FD had sought to make rapid progress on possible 
targets as a follow up to a request for an extension on the project. The Mission, taking 
note of some of the pending objectives of the Project in RTR, had clearly stated – 
Based on discussions with the Mission, the RFD has submitted a proposal for 
extension of the project. At the wrap up meeting in Jaipur the Bank informed the 
Secretary and RFD that any consideration of an extension of the project for RTR 
would be contingent on performance against specific criteria. (ibid) 
Evident from the discussion in this section, it is clear that notwithstanding the lofty goals 
of the Project, in the implementation of the Project, rather than changing, processes had 
been co-opted by the existing processes of the State bureaucracy and existing agenda of 
the Rajasthan Forest Department. The Department had been most prompt in using the 
project budget allocated to infrastructure building as it enhanced their ‘policing’ and 
‘patrolling’ abilities. Forest posts like chowkies and nakas were set up to enhance “the 
much needed 24-hour vigil” on the forests. These posts also served as the living quarters 
of the beat guards. Also, infrastructure building required no attitude change; it could be 
done without involving ‘people’ and was a tangible achievement.  
 
The Incompatible Goals  
As discussed above, the Project for RTR was designed to address the existing 
inadequacies at the field level and equip the management in an informed manner for more 
permanent solutions. However, as has already been discussed, there were many 
discrepancies between the Project design and its actual execution, especially at the level 
of the State. It was however the field level staff at all levels in the PA that was left to 
handle the consequences of the lofty demands of the Project, policy constraints, inaction 
of the State government and its larger political ambitions. It is important to point out that 
notwithstanding the project, as discussed in the last section of the Chapter, the discourse 
on conservation and participation did not change and the department was expected to 
continue with its regular policing, patrolling and protecting activities of the Park. Thus, as 
some of the officials seemed to suggest, executing the Project agenda under these 
circumstances had made the Project itself a burden for the management; especially in 
handling some of the very issues the Project had set out to address.  
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One of the biggest problems facing the management prior to commencement of the 
Project was the inadequacy of staff (a problem generic to most PAs in India). The 
provision of the field staff was considered inadequate compared to their workload as they 
considered themselves ill-trained and often outnumbered by poachers and ‘miscreants’ 
and without adequate amenities (FD, 2000). Apprised of the situation, the planners of 
ecodevelopment had suggested provisioning or recruitment of additional staff rather than 
entrusting the project responsibilities to the regular staff. Besides, recruitment of 
additional staff was also not feasible as in terms of policy it would not be possible to 
sustain them beyond the project period. With the regular policing and tourism activities 
ongoing in the Park, the staff was already under tremendous pressure dealing with 
existing management problems. For instance, in the year 2000, the Deputy Conervator of 
Forests in charge of the Park had been compelled to fire shots in the air to prevent the 
forcible entry of cattle herders. Protest from the people had ensued and the issue had 
become a concern for the State Government (Rajasthan Patrika, 12 August 2001). Added 
to this was the enhanced tourism attraction of the Park following the visit of the then 
President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton in March 2000. According to the 
DCF (Core), extrapolating from the statistics of a single month, the people visiting the 
park had gone up from 4,000 in the year 1999 to 10,000 in the year 2000. 
 
Along with handling these pressures the existing staff was expected to handle 
implementation of IEDP activities, that too at a formidable pace. The FD was under 
pressure to meet the financial expenditure targets of the Project, which had already fared 
badly following the initial delays. The Chief Wildlife Warden of Rajasthan expressed his 
concerns as follows – 
IEDP has its own problems. Handling the project with the same staff was just not 
possible. Besides, much of our staff gets involved in fire fighting. This is a 
project with heavy targets, thus to keep the money going, the staff have almost 
always been engaged in handling the Project activities. (02/12/2001) 
This implies, what the staff at RTR had been hinting at, they could ‘either let the 
management suffer or the Project suffer’. A clear example of this dilemma is evident 
from the proceedings of a Project-related meeting on what the Bank considers a critical 
aspect of the Project. As has been mentioned above, the Project was so designed and 
provided for the FD to engage a number of consultants, undertake research studies and 
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get technical support for those aspects of the Project that were to enhance the 
management and ecodevelopment of the Park. The Conservator of Forests, the highest  
authority at the level of the RTR,  however in his words points out the practical 
difficulties in this aspect –  
Suppose we engage consultants, then each consultant is equivalent to one Forest 
Ranger. If we engage 30 consultants then the CF has the additional responsibility 
of handling thirty additional Rangers. It is not an easy task. So it is not feasible 
to say that just engage consultants and do your job. Besides spending Rs 10 
crores79, a large sum, may just compromise quality. So we execute only that 
much which is physically possible. We cannot just blindly go ahead and spend 
the money! (12 August 2000) 
Not only was there an acute shortage of staff, but the staff was ill-equipped to 
comprehend the “complex procedures of the Bank that came with their time bound 
targets”. As the one Ranger (under condition of anonymity) pointed out, “A few days of 
training was completely inadequate for us understand the Project. Now well into the end 
of the Project we have not been able to understand even 10 percent of the Project”. 
Unwilling to sound too critical of the Project, the CF summed up the effectiveness of the 
staff in the following words – 
I won’t say that the staff is under-trained. Whatever the objectives were, the staff 
has been trying to meet them effectively. However, as things change, the way of 
managing changes and everything else also changes. So there is always a time 
lag between what we are teaching and what ultimately goes down to the people. 
The only problem that we are facing is that we are not having any new blood. 
Whatever staff we have is very old. There is a bit of problem with their 
education. Whatever they are doing now, they are very good. However, when we 
have to train them for new skills then their educational qualification creates a bit 
of a problem. It takes much longer to teach them new techniques. (21 August 
2000) 
What also the above statement implied was the fact that the forest guards ‘who represent 
the State at the field level’
80
 had to shift gears; known mainly for their policing role, they 
had now to seek the cooperation of the people, which was proving particularly difficult 
given the existing hostility and mistrust between the two parties.  
 
Problems were also imposed by the Project Tiger Office being non-operational. At the 
time of the MTR it was found that the office had failed to provide any policy guidance or 
support to the Projects at the Field level. Thus, as some of the senior staff members of the 
Department pointed out, they were required to implement the Project without any clear 
                                                
 
79 A crore is 10,000,000 Indian Rupees or approx. 222,841.23 USD 
80 See Robbins (2003) and Vasan (2002) also Vira (2005).  
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guidelines. The DCF (Core) rejected the SAR as a guideline as it was essentially an 
internal document of the Bank. As one of the FD documents submitted to the Bank for 
Project assessment points out, “In the absence of operational guidelines a lot of time is 
wasted on sorting out unforeseen situations and devising our own guidelines” (FD, 2001: 
p3). Implementation was also marred by conflicting instructions from the State 
Government and the World Bank.  
 
The project practices were also shaped by the differences that existed between the staff at 
the field level. The CF of RTR, while aware of the ‘pragmatic problems’ of the project, 
was still keen on meeting the Bank targets. The Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) on the 
other hand was criticizing the project openly (see his comments on micro-planning). He 
felt that the project was too ambitious and explained that there was no point spending just 
to meet the financial targets. He felt that the Bank was interventionist and adopted 
‘bullying’ tactic in a domain that was best left to the Department. As the DCF pointed out: 
If the WB has investment in the area then they have a say in related activities 
whether or not they fund those activities. RNP has to seek permission from WB; 
it is an important clause in the Project. It takes away the sovereignty of the FD. 
(1 December 2001) 
As a result, the CF and the DCF had reached a stalemate. The DCF was seen as ‘non-
compliant’ as he was unwilling to meet the EDC targets. Also he had ensured that the 
staff prioritized the protection activities over the project activities often leading to the 
non-availability of staff for training and other activities of the project. The patrons of the 
Park like Valmik Thapar sided with the DCF, and, since the former had been exemplary 
in staving off the local population encroaching on the forest area, the CF could not pull 
rank.  
 
Tiger Politics: The Neglected Sanctuary  
 
In September 2000 when I was making my initial enquiries with senior officials to get a 
background on Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary, I was actively discouraged from choosing 
the Sanctuary as my field area. On hearing that I wanted to base my field study in 
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Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary, the then Director of Project Tiger
81
 had remarked, “What a 
place to choose! You will only get an adverse image…that’s no area for any conservation 
study!” (Sen82, pers. comm. 12 August 2000). Valmik Thapar, a renowned conservationist 
who has been associated with RTR for several decades, was equally dismissive about my 
plans to work in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary. According to him, “Kailadevi is a 
Sanctuary for namesake…it is not worth being called a Sanctuary. It has been written off 
by all those who are associated with conservation and wildlife protection!” (Thapar, pers. 
comm. 7 August 2000).  
 
According to some of the official narratives, the conservation value of KWS is marred 
largely by two factors: a) The presence of human intervention; and b) the consequent lack 
of any significant wildlife population in the Sanctuary area (read tiger). According to the 
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF)83, Rajasthan:  
Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary was established as a buffer to the Ranthambhore 
National Park (RNP), even though it was not an ideal one. It was established to 
take the spill-over of tigers from RNP. However, because of human interference 
it could never be an ideal place for tigers. (12 February 2001) 
The neglect of Kailadevi reflects the institutional politics implicit in big mammal 
conservation and its tiger counts. Tiger conservation became an important project of the 
State and central government owing to the big cat’s institution as India’s national animal. 
Conservation significance of a place, strategies and funding issues came to be defined by 
the tiger census. Hence tiger count becomes as issue of knowledge and power. Tiger 
count becomes focus of much contestation – including the processes by which these 
numbers are generated. Project Tiger Office remains the source of official figures. Given 
its institutional imperative, it has always been in the interest of PTO to generate inflated 
figures of tiger population. As Johari (2007) and Ward and Ward (2002) note, tiger counts 
are deeply implicated in the incentive and disincentive structures that characterize the 
                                                
 
81 Project Tiger is an initiative of the Ministry of Environment, Government of India that commenced in the 
mid-70s and was prompted by the imminent threat of extinction of tigers in the country. It was actively 
supported by late Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India. Several PAs where the tiger is found 
have been declared as ‘Project Tiger Reserves’. Tiger Reserves are not legal entities, but such areas do 
receive closer attention and additional resources to aid management. The Project Tiger Directorate of the 
MoEF oversees the management of Project Tiger Reserves across the country. 
82 Mr. P.K. Sen was the Director of Project Tiger at the time of the research.  
83 In the hierarchy of the Indian Forest Department, the PCCF occupies the highest position. The PCCF is 
in-charge of all forest areas of the state. In some states, such as in Rajasthan, a PCCF (Wildlife), also 
known as the Chief Wildlife Warden, is appointed who is exclusively in-charge of PAs while another PCCF 
is in-charge of all other forest areas. 
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organisational culture of departments and Project Tiger Office. At the time of the 
initiation of the Project, KWS was said to have no tigers. The first compilation of animal 
census was done in the Status Paper submitted to the Bank towards an assessment for 
inclusion of the Sanctuary in the Project. The census then noted that the Sanctuary had 11 
tigers. Although none of the senior official believed these figures, they never opposed it 
openly as it served to reiterate the importance of the Reserve for tiger conservation. 
 
Following the low significance accorded to the conservation value of the Sanctuary, its 
management and infrastructure have also been long neglected by the offices of Project 
Tiger at Sawai Madhopur as well as by officials at the State level. According to the ACF 
who had been in the area since 1989 – 
Till 1991 the Sanctuary was ‘just like that’. It was declared a Sanctuary but in 
terms of facilities nothing changed. We had no facilities to manage it against the 
sheep herders, poachers, miners or anybody else! (10 October 2001) 
Designated as buffer zone in 1991, the management of the Sanctuary was entrusted to the 
Project Tiger Office in Sawai Madhopur. While there was some effort to bring into effect 
some of the wildlife regulations, no additional infrastructure was made available to the 
Sanctuary. Further, it seemed to lack any serious official attention from Sawai Madhopur. 
As one of the Rangers had complained: 
Who comes here? We do not get to see the senior officials here. If at all they 
come, it is once in a blue moon! They have all they need there…they have jeeps, 
computers, wireless, they have all the privileges! (16 September 1996) 
In 1996 though, a position of Deputy Conservator of Forester (DCF) existed for KWS, the 
concerned officer was reluctant to shift. As the ACF explained, coming to Karauli was 
seen as ‘demotion’ and a ‘punishment posting’. According to him, since the place offered 
no challenge, there was not much scope for furthering one’s career as one hardly gets 
noticed by the seniors. He himself had been, as he put it “languishing” in this area since 
1989.  
 
The extent and intensity of neglect experienced by the local staff is well captured in 
Annual Plan Operation (1998-1999), prepared by the office of the Deputy. Conservator of 
Forest (Buffer): 
The Buffer Division, since its creation in 1991, had its office and headquarters in 
Sawai Madhopur. However, with the increase in staff at Sawai Madhopur office, 
the head quarters of this office was transferred to Karauli in November 1997. 
Thereafter this Division does not have any office building and other 
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infrastructure whatsoever. The problem is further compounded by the fact that 
Karauli is small and undeveloped town and therefore, even rented 
accommodation and other facilities are hard to find. Hence, while one part of 
Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve might have strong infrastructure and management 
tools, the other part (in fact the larger part) is not only poor and emaciated (sic) 
but utterly devoid of infrastructure. So much so that even drinking water is 
scarce. Students of Psychology and Management will observe that such unequal 
and un-proportionate (sic) distribution of management tools and facilities within 
one Tiger Reserve may lead to a situation of ‘Investment Imbalance Syndrome’, 
which is bound to affect the human resource. Hence, it is imperative to undertake 
corrective measures soon and create infrastructure so as to bring it at least at par 
with other wildlife protected areas of India and Rajasthan. (p1) 
This neglect was a source of constant rancour between the Sanctuary staff in Karauli and 
the Park staff in Sawai Madhopur. For the latter the Park was synonymous with the 
Reserve; the needs and importance of RNP dominated all debates pertaining to the 
enhancement of the future of the Reserve
84
.  
 
The neglect of the Sanctuary is also taken to be symbolic of existing hierarchy and its 
assertion within the forest bureaucracy. All senior officials at Sawai Madhopur belong to 
the Indian Forest Service cadre while the staff in the Sanctuary is from the Rajasthan 
Forest Service. As the ACF often remarked – “[T]hey will obviously get the attention… 
after all they are from the IFS!” In my many trips to various meetings with the staff of FD, 
the conversation amongst them would centre on the discrimination in the infrastructure 
available to them and to their peers in the Park. It would often come down to petty details 
like petrol allowance.  
 
In the constant refrains of the staff regarding the state of management of the Sanctuary, 
there is an underlying aspiration to match up to the status of the Park. On several 
occasions officials at various levels have claimed: Our sanctuary has even better 
potentials than RNP. They are not giving us an opportunity to show it! 
                                                
 
84 In September 2000 an International Symposium on Tiger Habitat Conservation: Vision 2000 and Beyond 
was organised by the Project Tiger office in Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve and an NGO called Tiger Watch. 
Although the Symposium was to focus on tiger habitats all over India, other than the specific presentation 
by participants, most informal discussion ended up focusing on RTR and that too on RNP alone.  On the 
last day of the Symposium, the Deputy Conservator of Forests (Core), a recipient of several conservation 
awards for efficient management of the Park, even went as far as to suggest, “It would be valuable if the 
participants gave their suggestions for the better management of Ranthambhore National Park. He was 
however checked sharply by the representatives from Tiger Watch that the management plan pertains to the 
“whole of RTR and not just the Park alone”. His apathy to the buffer zone was clear.  Doubting the very 
basis of the existence of the Sanctuary, he states, “KWS, physically or in reality, does not function as a 
buffer for RTR.”  
 
 
 
149
 
IEDP: System Goals  
 
It is against this background of neglect, paucity and aspirations that the extension of the 
IEDP to the Sanctuary had assumed an all-pervading importance for the long-term staff 
like the ACF. It offered an opportunity for the local staff in KWS to wrest for itself a 
reputation as good as RNP but also independent of it.  
 
The extension of the IEDP to KWS significantly improved its infrastructure. The table 
below (FD, 2001)85 indicates the assets built under the project: 
 
The work done under the provision for ‘Improved PA Management’ (Table 107) 
 
Construction of Building 31 
Ordinary Roads  5 
Wireless Tower  4 
Fire Watch Tower 7 
Soil Conservation Activities  4 
Core Breeding Centre  1 
 
 
A deluge of attention also accompanied the infrastructural boom. The CF and other staff 
from Sawai Madhopur now visited the Sanctuary regularly. Local staff took great pride in 
the fact that the Sanctuary was visited not only by officials from Sawai Madhopur and 
Jaipur but also “big people” from the World Bank. As discussed below, the then State 
Minister of Forest and Environment also had an opportunity to visit the area. Owing to 
the visits of Ministers and Bank officials as well as to the setting up of the district level 
committee, the social standing of the local FD staff among the district administration was 
considerably enhanced. The ACF and DCF regularly interacted with the local politicians 
who also had to be a part of the six monthly project public review meetings.  
 
                                                
 
85 This is a translation of the original document that is written in Hindi. It had been prepared as an internal 
note to be submitted to the Project Tiger Office in Sawai Madhopur for inclusion into the Progress Report 
of the Project,  
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With the opportunities made available by the projects, the ACF and some of the Foresters 
felt vindicated. In fact encouraged by the rapid investments and constructions in 
Kailadevi, the local staff aspired to make KWS equal to RNP, if not better –  
You will see Priyaji, one day when you come back you will be surprised at how 
the Sanctuary would have tuned out!! It will leave Ranthambhore National Park 
far behind. Now nothing can stop us. Once we control the pressure of the people 
on the Park, we are bound to get back our former glory. This place will have 
many more tigers than Ranthambhore!  
The underlying desire to pit the Sanctuary against the Park is also manifest in the 
operations at the field level. A ‘Nature Interpretation Centre’, constructed under IEDP, 
has become an object of pride amongst the local staff86. The DCF and the ACF who took 
a personal interest in the construction of the building have, by their own admission, 
sought to design it along the lines of Jogi Mahal87. Aspiring for a similar setting for the 
Centre, plans were afoot in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary to build an artificial lake and to 
nurture a ‘deer park’ in its vicinity.  
 
Co-opting Kulhadi bandh panchayats  
 
Under the ‘Village Ecodevelopment’ component of IEDP, each protected area was 
expected to set up village-level ecodevelopment committees or ‘EDC’. Describing the 
need and efficacy of such committees the project document states – 
The project would operate at the level of a single village or hamlet constituted 
into an Ecodevelopment committee (EDC)…as the best units for planning and 
community action. (World Bank, 1996a: 118) 
These committees were constituted in accordance with State Government circulars 
specifically issued to enable project requirements. Typically in all EDCs, Foresters are 
appointed as the member secretary, while people from the communities fill other 
positions. These committees were deemed responsible for the formulations of the site- 
                                                
 
86 The State Minister for Environment and Forests inaugurated ‘Nature Interpretation Centre’ amidst much 
pomp and show. An interpretation centre is symbolic of the growing ecological significance of a nature 
reserve and is also available only in the better known PAs in India.  
87 Jogi Mahal was a rest house of the erstwhile rulers of the Jaipur State used during their hunting 
expedition to Ranthambhore. It is now used as the forest guesthouse reserved exclusively for guests of the 
State and key people associated with the conservation of the Park.  Located at the border of the Lake and 
shaded by one of the oldest Banyan tree in the region it serves as a great tourist attraction and adds to the 
scenic beauty and symbolic status of the Park. 
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specific micro plans, supposedly a participatory approach to planning and decision-
making.  
 
Benefits from the project could accrue to individuals (through income generating 
activities, energy saving devices, etc.) as well as the whole community (such as soil and 
water conservation structures, enclosures, approach roads, community halls, etc.). In 
Kailadevi the main focus has been on construction of soil and water conservation 
structures. In return for these ‘benefits’ being provided by the Forest Department, 
communities had to make ‘reciprocal commitments’ to generally assist the Forest 
Department in conservation and protection of the forests. It needs to be reiterated that the 
Village Ecodevelopment component attracted almost 55% of the project funding (World 
Bank, 1996), as it was the embodiment of the project’s commitment to involving ‘people’ 
in conservation, an apparent remedial measure to the earlier exclusionary approaches to 
Protected Area management.  
 
In this section I focus on how the kulhadi bandh panchayats initially dismissed as 
insignificant, was gradually, through discursive practices were co-opted to render the 
ecodevelopment initiative at the village level a “success”, which in turn afforded a certain 
level of “success” to the IEDP itself. Aligning kulhadi bandh panchayat with EDC, the 
official mandate for institutionalizing local participation, allowed for the popular 
narrative of kulhadi bandh as a community practice to be appropriated within the 
institutional context of the project, thereby enabling it to be claimed as a measure of 
“success” in community mobilization. When analyzed in the context of the politics 
inherent in externally aided, multi-layered and multi-organisational projects, the gradual 
co-option of kulhadi bandh panchayats as project achievement is informing.  
 
As Mosse (2004) concludes in the context of a British government aided project in rural 
India, representing “success” of projects and policy models (even when practices 
sustaining such representations of success run counter to the very policy models) remains 
vital to serving the multiple and often contradicting needs of the multiple actors involved. 
Kulhadi bandh panchayats, made popular in the post-IIPA research context, as effective 
and successful community-based forest protection and as an embodiment of people’s 
participation, remained crucial at many levels. In the course of IEDP its proponents 
(especially World Bank and state Forest Departments) increasingly came under criticism 
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for the “failures” of the project at some sites (Kothari et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2000; 
Baviskar, 1998; Karlsson, 1999), especially vis-à-vis the reported alienation of local 
communities. At this juncture, practices like kulhadi bandh panchayat, an ideal of 
community-based forest protection, was represented as a reciprocal commitment made by 
them in lieu of receiving project ‘benefits’ and was seen as a popular vindication of the 
project ideology.  
 
For the Forest Department, representing kulhadi bandh panchayat as a part of the popular 
appreciation of the village ecodevelopment component served several agenda that it had 
with the World Bank and within its own bureaucracy. Co-opting the institutional structure 
enabled them to claim a degree of effective implementation of the project, especially at a 
point when Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve and the Government of Rajasthan had been 
criticized by the Bank for poor performance and threatened with the possibility of 
premature termination (as discussed previously). The narrative of kulhadi bandh 
panchayat as a community-based practice served to represent the Department’s ability to 
meet with the IEDP need for bringing about “attitudinal change” amongst Forest officers 
towards a more ‘participatory’ and ‘inclusive approach’. Thus in the official discourses 
on kulhadi bandh panchayat there is a sustained attempt to give the Department credit for 
the initiation and maintenance of the practice.  
 
At the Sanctuary level, presenting kulhadi bandh panchayat as a “success” story of IEDP 
was important to for its ‘system goals’. Presentation of kulhadi bandh panchayat as a 
project achievement helped sustain the unprecedented and much desired investment in 
infrastructure development of the Forest Department for the Sanctuary as well as 
opportunity for advancement of personal career goals of individual officers.  
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayats provided the Department with an almost readymade village 
level institution that complied with all the requirements of setting up ecodevelopment 
committees as mandated by IEDP. These panchayats were significant not only because 
they had their origins in the community but also because the idea of a ban-axe lent itself 
easily to being defined as a “reciprocal commitment”. The co-option was gradual, 
coinciding with an increased understanding of what is defined as people’s participation 
and the compulsions to demonstrate success.  
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Prior to the commencement of IEDP in 1996, the targets of the Forest Department, as per 
the orders of the Government of Rajasthan, were very different. As an extension of the 
participatory approach embodied in Joint Forest Management (JFM), the State 
Government had mandated the formation of Van Suraksha Samitis (Forest Protection 
Committees) in the parks and sanctuaries that were still inhabited by people88. In 1992, 
Kailadevi Sanctuary was brought under the direct supervision and control of Field 
Director, Project Tiger Ranthambhore with the creation of a Buffer Zone Division 
headquartered at Karauli. 
 
During my fieldwork in Kailadevi Sanctuary in 1996, it was clear that the Department’s 
attempt to establish these samitis had met with little success, having succeeded in setting 
up only six samitis in a Sanctuary of over 30 villages. The Assistant Conservator of 
Forests (ACF), a rank below that of the DCF, was the main person in charge of the 
Sanctuary89. The ACF was keen to show himself as an effective officer, to be considered 
for a promotion as well as a chance to be transferred out of the Buffer Zone Division (see 
previous section). Since these samitis were a Department mandate, the ACF was 
determined to promote them as against any other initiative. Consequently, he was 
dismissive of the existence and efficacy of the kulhadi bandh panchayats, which, 
following IIPA's research, were receiving popular coverage. As he had stated to me in a 
conversation in 199690 – 
You are confusing the ideas. There are Van Suraksha Samitis that have been 
established by us (the Forest Department). The kulhadi bandh panchayats are the 
peoples own panchayat. It must be a part of some internal issues of the village. 
In fact, it is of no real significance (12 September 1996) 
In 1997 when IEDP was extended to the Sanctuary (after initially being proposed only for 
Ranthambhore National Park) the local Forest Department was required to undertake 
project preparatory activities i.e. mobilize people for setting up EDCs. During this phase 
in order to substantiate their official claim of success of their previous program, the 
                                                
 
88 JFM works through the formation of village level Forest Protection Committees. These FPCs undertake 
forest protection activities and in return are entitled to some benefits from the forest that they protect.  
However as mentioned in Chapter 2, the extension of the JFM principles to PAs is limited to the formation 
FPCs and forest protection..It did not entail issues of resource use and benefit sharing. 
89 In the same year, although a Deputy Conservator of Forests (DCF) had been assigned to Kailadevi, the 
officer continued to operate from Sawai Madhopur.   
90 Even in 1995 when the first written acknowledgement was made of people’s initiative at forest protection 
in the Sanctuary area, the FD had claimed that it was being done through VSS that the FD had established 
in the villages. (Sachdev, 1995) 
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Department first attempted to rename all the existing kulhadi bandh panchayats into 
VSSs. This was clearly evident in meetings that took place in February 1997. The local 
NGO had convened a meeting of the kulhadi bandh panchayat in village Nibhera. At this 
meeting the ACF, disregarding the basis of the forum, said that the government had 
sanctioned a sum of money for the benefit of the people but the villagers could take 
advantage of it only if they were willing to organize themselves into Van Suraksha 
Samitis. When the NGO interjected that the village already had a kulhadi bandh 
panchayat, and that this was a meeting of the very institution, the ACF stated – 
We will not henceforth call it kulhadi bandh panchayat. We will now call it Van 
Suraksha Samiti. (11 February 1997) 
Following this meeting a VSS was established in Nibhera. However, as the village 
register shows, a month later it was once again converted into an Ecodevelopment 
Committee. It seemed at that time that the idea of kulhadi bandh panchayat did not appeal 
to some of the Department staff because it did not reflect their involvement in any 
identifiable manner. Unlike the VSS where a Forester was to be the member-secretary, 
the kulhadi bandh panchayat had no scope for the involvement of the Department. When 
I visited Nibhera in June 2000 keen to know how the kulhadi bandh panchayat was 
functioning, the ACF had stated, “[T]here are no kulhadi bandh panchayats now. They 
have been converted into EDCs.”  
 
Perhaps at this point the local officials failed to appreciate the appeal a practice like 
kulhadi bandh panchayat had in the broader discourse on people’s participation that 
formed the basis of IEDP. It probably missed the ‘indigenous’ and ‘local’ nature of the 
practice, the usage of which often lends legitimacy to ‘participatory’ approaches. 
However the lessons were learnt fairly quickly, as within a span of 6-8 months the whole 
discourse on kulhadi bandh panchayat had changed once again. 
 
Therefore, towards the latter half of 2000 and in 2001, the existence of kulhadi bandh 
panchayats in Kailadevi was no longer being denied; in fact it was spelling the success of 
EDCs and the efforts of the Forest Department! In an international symposium co-
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organized by RTR, in September 2000
91
, the only significant mention the Sanctuary 
received pertained to “…the exemplary achievement of the project”, i.e. the kulhadi 
bandh panchayats!
92 In their narrative, the Forest Department, the more powerful agent, 
had systematically albeit subtly, reconstructed the agency and history of kulhadi bandh 
panchayats. While the people were credited with the onus of having taken up such a 
practice in their Panchayat, the Department reserved for itself the credit of initiating and 
mobilizing the people towards it. Kulhadi bandh panchayats were now projected as 
“reciprocal commitment” made by the people in lieu of the benefits received from IEDP. 
When the efforts were made at stopping the sheep herders, a promise had been 
taken that they would be stopped only if the local people promised not to cut the 
forests. Until then it was common practice to cut a dhok trees 4-5 feet from the 
ground to use the leaves for fodder, while having no use for the wood of the tree 
itself. Then they were made to understand that if they broke the leaves with their 
hands rather than cutting the tree it would give a lot more leaves for a much 
longer period. If the tree is not cut down then it is possible to get fodder for the 
whole year. People began to understand this and when they were convinced that 
the FD authorities had stopped the sheep herders from entering into their area, 
they also decided to keep their promise and agreed to form the kulhadi bandh 
panchayat.” (Tyagi and Singh, 2000: 4)93  
In the official discourse, the origin of kulhadi bandh panchayat was traced only as far 
back as 1997, to a specific meeting held in Rahar, a village where IEDP was being 
implemented. Such (mis)representations of the panchayats served many strategic needs 
including addressing the concerns raised by the World Bank in its Mid-Term Review in 
May 2000 – 
It is important that Park staff clearly establish reciprocal action by local 
communities toward conservation in lieu of benefits provided through water 
conservation or else there is a strong possibility that the community could not 
perceive the objectives of the program. (p2)  
In the subsequent supervision report, the Bank found that ‘the Ecodevelopment 
component had made satisfactory progress’ (Work Bank, 2001: 2). 
 
                                                
 
91 As a part of the ongoing IEDP, Project Tiger office in Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve along with Tiger 
Watch (a Delhi-based NGO) organized an International Symposium on Tiger Habitat Conservation: Vision 
2000 and Beyond in September 2000 in Sawai Madhopur. 
92 From this time on the signposts on the work undertaken by IEDP in the sanctuary celebrated the presence 
of kulhadi bandh panchayats in the area through catchy rhymes like – panchayat ne ki prabandh, logon ne 
ki kulhadi bandh! (Through the restrictions of the Panchayat, the people have shunned the use of the axe!” 
93 This is translated from the original document in Hindi. Also see article at http://Karauli.nic.in for a 
similar narrative and claim 
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The official discourse was also used to earn an extension for the project in 2001. In July 
2001 at a public review (part of the project requirement) the Minister of Forest for 
Rajasthan was invited to inaugurate the Interpretation Centre and address a gathering of 
villagers. Although the meeting was the mandated public review of IEDP, the occasion 
was organized at a grand scale and referred to as ‘kulhadi bandh sammelan’. Present at 
the meeting were also the district officials and most EDC heads. Two notes dominated the 
various public addresses: one was that of paying glowing tributes to kulhadi bandh 
panchayats; and the other was a need for the extension of the IEDP in the Sanctuary. As a 
Forest officer present explained, “The Minister has been called primarily to take note of 
the good work that the people are doing here. It is important that he lobbies for the 
extension of the programme!”  
 
It was also no surprise that the flurry of activities undertaken to raise “awareness” 
regarding kulhadi bandh panchayat and the project coincided with the end of the first 
phase of the project when the negotiation for an extension was at a crucial stage. The 
Department conducted a week long padyatra (awareness walk)94 starting the 14th of 
September. According to the Department the walk was undertaken to create a “sense of 
ownership” of EDCs, especially the ban-axe component, among the villagers. It was only 
towards 2002 that the Forest Department reluctantly acknowledged to me on record that 
kulhadi bandh panchayat had been present earlier, i.e. long before IEDP (FD, 2002 pers. 
comm.), but qualified it by stating that pre-IEDP kulhadi bandh panchayats were mostly 
dysfunctional. The corollary to this was that the Department’s interventions enabled by 
IEDP were instrumental in giving the required direction and thus strengthened kulhadi 
bandh panchayats. 
 
People, Participation and Conservation  
 
This section examines the implications the project and its activities for community 
participation and conservation. The section concludes that demonstrable participation was 
achieved by employing non-participatory processes and further consolidated the position 
                                                
 
94 Events like the sammelan or padyatra are comparable to  what  Baviskar (2007) in her study of the State 
Watershed Project  in Madhya Pradesh describes as ‘attempt to manufacture consent through public 
performance of spectacles and the purging of politics from development project’ 
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of the state in the Sanctuary. By establishing ‘proto laws’
95
 the participatory elements 
further illegitimatised the resource-use and access by the people. In essence, by 
camouflaging and legitimising the use of power, participatory processes ended up 
‘harming those whom they are meant to empower’ (Cook and Kothari, 2001). In terms of 
conservation, the project only diluted the forest protection activities of KBP.  
 
Participation: Discourse and Practice  
People’s participation in the project in Kailadevi can be identified with three ‘types’ 
outlined by Nelson and Wright (1995: 6) – as expected ‘beneficiaries’ of programme with 
preset parameters; as contributors of casual labour to help a project achieve its ends; and 
as politically co-opted legitimisers of a policy. The Project does not define participation 
but through its many directives prescribes the modes of participation – local institutional 
building, benefit sharing and contribution of labour. 
 
Much like the experience in JFM
96
, participation as envisaged, understood and 
implemented in the project did not really challenge the core precepts of the exclusionary 
positions or the structures of power of the department. The senior officers are clear on 
their notions on people’s participation. The dominant idea is of “cooperation”; benefit 
sharing extended not to resource-sharing but to ‘incentives’ facilitated through aid. As the 
ACF of KWS put it – 
In my understanding participation can be there in equity and benefit sharing. 
However in this case (a PA) there was very little opportunity for sharing 
therefore it just means cooperation with the work of the Department and that’s 
what the Project is attempting to do (18 November 2000) 
Ironically, for the DCF (Buffer), people were incapable of participation; participation 
served the department’s need of making people aware of conservation –  
People are capable of very little. What can they do with participation? They are 
illiterate. They don’t have the time to come for the meeting. They are happy that 
now they get benefits from the Forest Department through the ecodevelopment 
                                                
 
95According to Randheria (2003) proto laws refer to the concepts and principle that are introduced by 
international organizations like the World Bank that have no formal status of law but in practice often 
obtain the same degree of law. The ‘reciprocal commitment’ clause in the eco-development component that 
made it obligatory for people to sign away some of their resource access rights in return for the investments 
made in EDC can in my opinion be seen as a ‘proto law’. Once the community members signed away the 
right to collect fuel wood in exchange of obtaining gas cylinders at a subsidized rate, its extraction from the 
forests thereafter was deemed illegitimate.  
96 See Jeffery and Sundar (1999) and Jeffery et al. (2001)  
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project. The best achievement so far as participation is concerned is that they 
have become aware of the conservation significance of the Sanctuary. (20 
November 2000) 
Participation as envisaged in the project comfortably keeps its purview well within the 
boundaries that is comfortable to senior level management. According to the CF – 
Participation is of two kinds – direct and indirect. Speaking strictly about 
management issues, participation is not necessary. However, broadly defined, in 
terms of people being people, seeking their co-operation, engaging in dialogue or 
micro-level indirect involvement as is being enabled by ecodevelopment, such 
participation is essential. Direct involvement in management has to have 
sanction – legal sanction. (23 November 2000) 
However as he clarified later, ‘direct participation’ was not possible because “democracy 
should not turn into anarchy. Participation is possible when we have responsible citizens” 
(ibid). Thus as evident, the discourse on participation, that equates it with incentive and 
co-operation, keeps out of its confines issues of decision making or power sharing.  
 
In terms of practice, the Department attempts have largely been to create what Vira (2005: 
5074) terms as ‘bureaucratic participation’. According to Vira (op. cit) Bureaucratic 
Participation “uses standardized, administrative formats; communities are treated as 
homogenous; while commitments to participation is strong in rhetoric, it does not extend 
to the actual consultation of the affected stakeholders prior to the initiation of the new 
programme; bureaucratic procedures are created and targets set up which the 
functionaries of the state diligently set out to meet and where the state is unwilling to 
relinquish control over resources.”  
 
Although the project documents drew attention to participation as a “process oriented 
approach”, in practice participation had been reduced to visible and measurable items – 
establishments of EDCs, micro-plans, 25% contributions by communities and reduction 
in registered forest offences.  
 
It is fair to argue the project of rule in this case promotes adoption of non-participatory 
means. Although the senior forest officers acknowledged that “IEDP was too complex 
and wanted to achieve a lot in a short period of time” and believed that the “targets” were 
impossible to achieve in the given time span, they demanded the same from the lower 
staff. Thus, the brunt of the pressure for performance actually lay on the shoulder of the 
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lower level staff, buttressing Quarles Van Ufford’s (1988b:34) claim – ‘the weakest 
levels tend to receive the burdens the more powerful cannot cope with’.  
 
Hence how participation in terms of ‘bureaucratic procedures and targets’ unfolds is 
dependent on the department’s ‘frontline staff’ – the rangers, the foresters and the forest 
guards who are the link between the State and the people97.  
 
The Staff at this level has the least of facilities, perks and equipment. They are embedded 
as much in their institutional/professional base as in the society – the village communities 
they regulate but are also dependent on both for hospitality and meeting of their 
professional targets. Thus as Vasan (ibid: 4130) writes, “There is a constant interplay of 
power, dominance and acquiescence in relations between the forest guard and villagers.” 
Quarles van Ufford (1986) points out from his own study in Indonesia that it is difficult to 
generalize on the relationship between the field level staff and the people; the lower level 
staff could either be weak or stronger in relation to the people. In India most studies seem 
to suggest that because of their locally embedded, weak social and professional position, 
the field level staff tend to work more in favour of the people than the State (Vasan, 2002; 
Saberwal, 1999). In the case of Kailadevi however the lower staff, largely worked to 
maintain their position within the bureaucracies and subscribe to isolationist conservation 
view. Although, mostly susceptible to bribes, hospitality and support in conducting their 
local level activities, the frontline staff did sometimes overlook several ‘offences’ 
committed by some favoured individuals and groups, those favoured usually being among 
the more powerful in the communities.  
 
With a mindset no different from the senior staff, the impossibility of turning an hitherto 
hostile relationship into an amicable one while undertaking prescribed participatory 
measures and the need to ‘deliver’ on time, the frontline staff largely focuses on the ‘end’ 
and not the means. Consequently itemized targets of participation are achieved by 
employing non-participatory means, including fabrication of data, scuttling of processes, 
                                                
 
97 See Vira (1999;  2005); Vasan (2002; 2006); and Robbin (2000a; 2003)  
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invoking of existing power relationships (between the people and the State), and 
reinforcing the power differentials that exist among community groups98.  
 
Although EDC was used synonymously with KBPs, it was a separate and a project-
prescribed structure, sanctioned by GoR orders. It was to be established at the village 
level. A man and a woman from every household had to be its member and comprise the 
general body. The executive body was to be formed by seven members who were to be 
elected by the general body. The executive body had a 33% reservation for women. The 
project document specifies the formative principles of EDCs – 
The formation of groups should reduce heterogeneity within, thus enabling the 
representative to speak for the entire group, while encouraging heterogeneity 
within groups’ negotiation and conflict resolution to take place between groups. 
However equity considerations require that ecodevelopment committees are 
composed of all members of the village/hamlet and include women 
representatives from each household as well as men. 
In practice this has translated into the co-option of the traditional leadership of the village. 
Owing to political expedience of enrolling collaboration in sustaining representations of 
‘successful’ EDCs as well as the administrative expedience of establishing target number 
of EDCs within a given time frame, the official EDCs typically embody what Sundar 
(2000) refers to as ‘constructed communities’. Most committees comprise of village 
leaders who have a long-standing relationship of patronage with members of the local 
Forest Department and who also command loyalty of a small coterie of village elders. 
Formed by selection and preferences in stage-managed elections, there is little dissent 
amongst the executive members of the committee. Such constructions of “community”, 
underpinned by the need to co-opt consensus, also reinstates the existing power 
hierarchies and authoritarian structures of the village. 
 
Thus in all EDCs, the head or the adhyaksh of the committee are always patels from 
dominant communities of the Gujjars, Brahmans or Meena. In many instances the 
position was occupied by politically active ex-sarpanchs. Given the large sums of funds 
involved and scope for corruption through specific contracting favours, the leadership of 
                                                
 
98 It is important to state that I suggest that frontline staff bear the sole onus for lack of adoption of 
participatory practices. The seniors are aware of this but prefer to overlook it as long as they are getting the 
right kind of reports. It is a case of what Chambers (1992 as cited in Vira, 1999) the ‘self-deceiving state’, 
perpetuated by, according to Vira (ibid), the zeal for achievement of impossible or unrealistic policy/project 
targets by the field staff.  
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the EDC in some places was hotly contested between the politically attuned and powerful 
elite of the village. The executive members almost always comprised the patels of the 
other castes. In some cases members of the lower castes like the Nais or Doms without 
much political clout formed a part of the executive body because of their proximity to the 
adhyaksh. Typical of the village nyaya Panchayats, these committees almost never 
included anyone from the Bhangi community, notwithstanding that the Bhangi with the 
largest herd of goats were seen to pose the greatest harm to the forests. They are blamed 
for lopping down trees to enable their herd to graze on the fresh leaves on the upper 
branches of the tree. Locked into complex forms of power relations (debt, patronage and 
political support), the patels of the less dominant communities usually tend to consent to 
the decisions of the adhyaksh. Since EDC activities are seen as a government process and 
of not much social significance, disagreement between the caste groups are kept to the 
minimum. Besides, the lower caste, most dependent on wage labour, hardly objected to 
the EDC process as in a period of extended drought condition, the EDC held the hope of 
providing them opportunities to earn wages.  
 
In fact, the much-critiqued practice of allowing village elites to represent their community 
is, officially encouraged. It is seen as effective participation as it rules out the possibility 
of conflicts within the committees or the village. When asked about how elections are 
held and whether there are conflicts among communities in the EDC, the Deputy 
Conservator of Forests, Buffer Zone suggested, “…there is no question of conflict. Every 
village has a dominant caste and usually their leaders come up for election”. The rules 
mandate that the committee head be elected every year. However, the politics of 
dominant castes is evident from the fact even in 2002 there had been no change in 
leadership in any of the EDCs since the heads were first elected in 1999-2000.99 The 
election process – primarily a public gathering – involved announcement of names of the 
members already selected. The gathering was given the option to “oppose” any of the 
candidature included. However, as is well known (Mosse 1994), publicly conducted 
‘participatory’ processes are even more strongly informed by the underlying power 
                                                
 
99 Villages like Morechi, where the Department was unable to enroll all the dominant groups because of 
party politics and factionalism within the groups, were dropped from the project.   
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structure of the groups. Thus despite their desire of some groups to do so, nobody 
opposed the selection made by the FD.  
 
 
So far as issues of gender equality are considered, the kulhadi bandh panchayats had 
decidedly restricted the participation of women. They were kept out on cultural grounds, 
arguing that traditionally women were prohibited from speaking in public and political 
spaces considered to be the domain of men. In contrast the EDC circular mandated 33% 
representation of women. Thus every executive body of seven was required to have a 
woman member. In practice however in almost all EDCs their presence was merely on 
paper and they never formed a part of any meetings. Most officially designated woman 
members I encountered or interviewed were not even aware of their membership100 It is 
interesting to note that the only time women’s participation was encouraged was when 
they had to be ‘educated’ on the use of gas stoves and cylinders provided under IEDP.  
Thus as seen in Kailadevi Sanctuary, the processes of institutionalising participation by 
‘building on existing local institutions’ through imposition of uniform structures are akin 
to what Scott (1998) refers to as the ‘simplifications’ technique of modern statecraft 
wherein complex social processes through crass simplification and selective 
representation, are made more legible and thus more controllable by the State. 
 
As for the senior management, the issue of intra-community discriminations or inequity 
was not even a consideration. According to the rules of EDC, the position of the head of 
the executive committee comes up for elections every year. When asked about how the 
elections were held and whether there were conflicts among communities in the EDC, the 
DFO (Buffer) suggested that “there is no question of conflict. Every village has a 
dominant caste and usually their leaders come up for election”.  
 
                                                
 
100 A lot seems to have changed since then. As I learnt in 2003, the EDCs have been restructured in 
accordance new state government circulars. The membership of the executive body has expanded and now 
each committee is required to have at least three women members. Special woman Ecodevelopment 
Officers have been employed in some parks. However restricting women’s’ participation on 
cultural/traditional grounds, dismissing the significance of their agency or reducing their participation to 
tokenism has been a common practice in most of the current trends in decentralised or participatory 
approaches to the management of natural resource management as discussed in Chapter 2.  
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Thus the project’s need for reduction of heterogeneity led to enrolling the dominant 
groups and enabled the co-option of consensus. This enabled the local staff to scuttle 
several prescribed processes of participation and yet get an endorsement of the same on 
paper. This suggested how the staff meets their near-impossible deadlines. Asked about 
the effectiveness of EDC and micro-plan the DCF (Core) remarked:  
You should be questioning the process of making EDCs. Where are the 
guidelines for making the micro-plans? How do we do them? They (the lower 
staff) were literally asked at gunpoint to do them, so they went through with the 
process. The next important question is to find out was who all were involved in 
the making of the micro-plans? Is it a process of making a wish list? Go ask for 
the PRA exercises that were done for Nibhera? In most cases there have been no 
PRA. The question to ask is what came first? Whether it was the PRA first or the 
micro-plan first? (21/06/2001) 
I witnessed the scuttling and manipulation of the process in all key activities that were 
meant to realize the participatory ideals of the project – the most important being the 
Participatory Impact Monitoring. The project required department staff to assist 
community members in assessing the project impacts and its activities with the aid of a 
questionnaire specially designed for the purpose. In Nibhera the initial few forms were 
filled out again by the forest guard with the able assistance of Govind and his coterie of 
loyalists in the village. The rest of the forms were filled out by the two guards themselves 
with changing a few words here and there101. Majority of the villagers had no knowledge 
either about the forms or its requirements.  
 
As is evident from the above statement of the DFO (Buffer) micro-plans were drawn up 
primarily to coincide with the departmental targets in its work-plans – building water 
bodies and enclosures in the long-term interest of creating prey base and watering holes 
for wild-animals. It was made to coincide with the need of the people in a ‘drought prone’ 
and ‘fodder scarce region’. The villagers did not really resist these pre-designed plans 
because as Mosse (1996) points out elsewhere, even where PRA processes are held, 
villagers tend to voice “their needs” in accordance to what they believe the project can or 
intends to deliver (made amply known to them by the project implementers of course, 
either directly or subtly). 
 
                                                
 
101 This was done in September 2001. I have to admit that by then I had stopped expressing any objection to 
these incidents. It was by adopting a nonchalant attitude that I was able to witness these processes. My 
earlier insistence on seeing EDC registers, questioning certain practices or insisting on being present at 
meetings had led to staff becoming extremely guarded in my presence and evasive of me.  
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Enrolment of key community members mentioned earlier is especially valuable for 
affirmative endorsement of the project in public forums. Presidents of the EDCs were 
always summoned to represent ‘the people’ who authenticated the ‘participatory’ nature 
of activities and ‘success’ of the project to evaluating, visiting or mission teams. Thus, a 
trend witnessed in other studies of participatory development practices (Li, 1999; Mosse, 
2005), much care had been taken to choose EDC heads that could represent an ideal 
beneficiary – articulate, literate, and familiar with the department, the project parlance 
and understood the concept of “reciprocal-commitment”102.  
 
It is important to note the role of ‘incentive’ or ‘aid’ in sustaining this participatory 
charade and posturing. The implications of aid for accepting and executing unrealistic and 
unacceptable project goals has been discussed for the higher levels of bureaucracies in the 
earlier sections. At the field level, incentives, especially in terms of cash (earned 
primarily as wage labour) or items, like gas burners, is used mainly as ‘bait’. As per the 
GoR orders, the EDC meetings were to be held every 6 months and the working 
committee had to meet every month. Since these meeting, more importantly the presence 
of the records of these meeting, served as indicators for assessing the ‘participative’ 
aspect of the programme, they had to be held, especially if senior officials were to attend. 
As for the committee meetings, all the necessary paperwork was completed between 
Govind, the Forester and the guards. Reflective of the interest the villagers had in EDCs, 
the bigger meetings often remained unattended. As the Forester put it – 
Meetings with the working committee are no problem. It (the problem) is 
amongst us – amongst people who know and understand. The ‘general public’ is 
difficult to gather for the six-monthly meetings. We have to persuade and tempt 
a lot. Its only when we tell them there is work to be had that there is some 
interest in the meetings.  
He used the idea of the incentive effectively. In a meeting held on the 18 June 2001, the 
Ranger was presiding over the EDC. For the Forester it was important that there was a 
reasonable turnout of people. No work was to be sanctioned in this meeting. The Forester 
however spread the word around that use of gas stoves would be demonstrated (a part of 
the package that the FD was offering as an incentive to reduce the pressure on the forests). 
When Govind, the head of the EDC, enquired as to why the Forester had not mentioned 
                                                
 
102 This is most evident in the public review of the projects, where the seating plans are made such that the 
EDC heads favoured by the department are made to occupy the front rows and are often called by names to 
report on the progress of the project.  
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this to him earlier, the Forester clarified that “it is just a trick. How else will the people 
show up tomorrow? The Ranger is going to be here. The idea of gas stove will also attract 
women to the meeting”. He reminded Govind of the flak he received when for a meeting 
held in October 2000 attended by the DFO very few people had turned up and the 
meeting had to be cancelled.  
 
Aid was also used as a bait to persuade people to register participation and prevent them 
from publicly airing their dissatisfaction with the local FD staff. Prior to the visit of the 
State Minster of Forests, Government of Rajasthan, to the Sanctuary, a meeting was 
called by the CF of all the EDC working committees. The following statement describes 
how aid was used to arm-twist villagers into compliance – 
You may have a lot to complain about local staff. But remember that if you 
make these complaints in public it serves no end. You will definitely kick the 
stomach of the poor guard or whoever but you will also kick your own fate. If 
you complain then we will not be able to ask the Government for extending the 
Project and we can no longer provide for the work that remains to be undertaken 
at the village level. 
To this the DCF (Buffer), who was also present in the same meeting, added – 
You all must show up in big numbers. The Minister has to see that there are a lot 
of people being benefited, only then will he understand that we need more 
money and will ask for this to be extended. 
An understanding in the Department that amenities and material incentives are the 
primary enablers of people’s participation (that is willingness to cooperate and participate 
in departmental agenda) is best demonstrated in the reasons the FD puts forward to 
explain the relative failure of EDCs in the Park vicinity. According to the ACF of 
Kailadevi: 
Ecodevelopment has not been a success in Ranthambhore (National Park) 
because incentives are no longer attractive to the people as a lot of other 
amenities have already been built there for the people in the past. They have 
many more opportunities. In Kailadevi this was the first time where some work 
was done for the people, thus they have shown greater interest. 
The availability of aid reinforces the Department’s position of authority vis-à-vis the 
people even further (cf. Vira, 2005; Baviskar, 2003). Because of the misconceptions that 
have been spread, mostly by the guard, the people believe that the construction work that 
is being sanctioned by the FD is a form of consolidation of the Department’s claim on the 
land. The fears of relocation and disinheritance for villagers has become more real now 
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than before and thus prevents the people from either refuting the FD or getting into 
confrontation with it. 
 
The Conservation Agenda  
 
One of the key aspects of conflict in the debates on wildlife conservation has been 
between the scientists and pro-people conservationist, thus, in turn between scientific and 
indigenous knowledge. As mentioned in Chapter 2, much of the conservation agenda of 
the state has been justified by scientific arguments. However as wildlife scientists 
acknowledge, much of the justification is what Stott and Sullivan (2000) call the big talk 
of science i.e. science in talk alone and not in practice. The scientists point to the 
marginalization of use of scientific research and findings in the management of the park 
(See Saberwal and Rangarajan 2003). In fact, as some scholars point out, the statist 
agenda of exclusionary management is based less on ecological grounds and more on 
wildlife legislations that deem all resource-use activities in PAs as necessarily harmful 
and unsustainable for wildlife conservation.  
 
The conservation significance of Kailadevi was established on the basis that it was the 
buffer area of Ranthambhore and that it would accommodate the tiger spill over from the 
Park. Although the declaration of Kailadevi as the sanctuary has restricted the resource-
use practices of the people significantly, no studies have been undertaken in the Sanctuary 
to establish the extent of impact this has on the habitat. This notwithstanding, the use of 
terms like ‘biotic pressure’, ‘threshold pressure’ and ‘carrying capacity’ are commonly 
used to justify the restriction imposed on resource use. Also, so far as the Department was 
concerned, ‘conservation’ as an idea is a preserve of the ‘scientific’ domain. This 
implicates the residents of the Sanctuary in two fundamental ways. First, the idea of 
conservation as a science is incomprehensible to them, as they are mostly “illiterate”. 
Second, the presence of people is detrimental to conservation. Thus, within this 
framework there are many patronizing narratives of “sitting down with the people and 
making them understand the benefits they would get from the protection of the forests”.  
 
While the higher level officials rationalise conservation in terms of “biotic pressures” and 
“thresholds” for wildlife, the narratives at the field level are telling of the dominant 
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compulsions that set the conservation agenda. The Sanctuary sees as its end objective an 
idyllic conservation resort and as a site for eco-tourism. This lies at the centre of the 
ACF’s desire to “make the Sanctuary an even better place than RNP”. The idea of 
Kailadevi as a conservation resort also feeds into the development aspirations of the 
region as a whole. The Collector address during the Public Review Meeting of the 
Ecodevelopment Project that took place in KWS in January 2001 resounds with these 
aspirations: 
Most importantly, we must make this place very beautiful and along with that, if 
we can increase the wildlife or release wildlife into this region it will be very 
good. There are suggestions for making a Deer Park. I have been told that this 
can be done easily. We can use the funds available in the Project. Some money 
can be made available from the FD, the district administration or even the State. 
The park can be an important attraction for the people who come to see the 
temple103. During the temple fairs nearly 30-40 lakh104 people come. Even if we 
collect a token fee from them for the Park we will be able to generate funds for 
the maintenance of the Park without incurring additional expenditure on our part. 
Additionally, this will also serve as a good attraction for our region as well. 
Also, if the specialty of our forests can be enhanced we can display it on the 
Internet through which we will be linked to the rest of the world. Through the 
Internet, the Deer Park can be advertised as an important tourist site and through 
the Internet we can easily promote tourism in relation this site. (24 January 
2001) 
So what is the local context of conservation? The following conversation between the 
Forest Guard in charge of the Nibhera Forest Block and me offers a glimpse into what 
conservation means to the frontline staff that deals with the villagers on a daily basis and 
form their main source of information on state strategies.  
Me: What was the need for the Sanctuary? This was a Range earlier. Why was it 
made into a sanctuary? 
FG: For protection and conservation. There won’t be any pollution here. 
There will be plants and wild animals. There will be oxygen. That is why they 
are getting money from there – Britain Sarkar. The air from here goes there. The 
oxygen goes there.  
Me: I don’t understand? 
FG: The wind from here goes there, into their atmosphere and cleans it up. That 
is why attention has been given to it. That’s why they made the Sanctuary here.  
For the FD the agenda of conservation are also subject of the larger institutional 
dynamics. For the DCF (Core), the presence of humans cannot be reconciled with the 
imperatives of conservation. By that token he feels that the staff at KWS has 
                                                
 
103 Kailadevi temple, after which the Sanctuary is named, is located just outside the Sanctuary and is a well 
known pilgrimage site and has several annual fairs. 
104 One Lakh =100,000 
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compromised the conservation significance in attempting make the ecodevelopment 
program a success. Contending the success of EDCs in the Sanctuary he states – 
KWS is being maintained for rights and concessions. As for conservation, we 
have done nothing there. We have done nothing for the Sanctuary. It is because 
the objective of conservation has been compromised and people are being 
allowed rights and concessions they are now emphasising doing KBP. KWS 
people don’t have the courage to stop human interference. There is no priority 
for animals in that Sanctuary. What have we done for wildlife? (20th December 
2001) 
In order to stave off such accusations and prove its “conservation worth”, the field staff 
engages in manipulating the animal census. The “worth” is bestowed by the presence of 
the Tiger. Thus every year new claims are made about the number of tigers present in the 
Sanctuary. In the initial status report on Kailadevi submitted to the Bank, it was claimed 
that the Sanctuary has 11 tigers. There was no basis for this and there had been no 
sighting of tigers for years. The first and the only tiger was sighted in the early days of the 
project. It was believed that the tigress had wandered out of the Park and into the 
Sanctuary.  
 
So what did the Project achieve in terms of conservation? The project did little to change 
the isolationist ideologies of the Department. As evident in the above statement by the 
DCF (Core), resource use and conservation are irreconcilable for the Department. Also, 
the ACF believed that ecodevelopment was only a gestation period; only aimed at 
temporarily reducing the pressure on the PA. According to him Ecodevelopment was 
certainly not the answer to the problems that PA management faces. Eventually it has to 
be the relocation of the people. 
 
The project enabled greater penetration of the State and its vigil into the forests. This is 
evident from the following excerpt from a speech made by the DCF (Buffer) at the EDC 
sammelan held in July 2001:  
The primary objective of the project was to enhance the management and 
administrative capacity of KWS. In order that our staff can do the rounds of the 
village more easily, keep greater vigil over the forests and protect wildlife more 
effectively we have constructed several nakas, van pal chowkis, range office etc. 
Some roads have also been constructed and wireless towers have been built. 
Now we have a better reach and control over the area. (5th July 2001)  
While the project did not really add to strengthening the ecological aspects of the area, its 
activities it seems may have posed a threat to it. As implied by DCF (Core) and the 
Mission team the civil works and construction activities undertaken for improved 
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management lacked any scientific basis and may in the long run actually adversely affect 
the ecological base of the area. The Department both in the Park and the Sanctuary 
constructed several water reservoirs. In order to prevent domestic cattle straying into the 
forests for water several water bodies were built close to the habitats. Several others were 
also built inside the forests as drinking holes for the wildlife. According to the critics, by 
constructing so many water bodies the FD may cause the semi-arid habitat to change to a 
wetland.  
 
And finally, the co-option of kulhadi bandh panchayat put paid to whatever efforts were 
being made towards forest protection. As discussed in the previous sections, the 
department by enforcing a literal ban on the cutting of trees in the forests rendered the 
moral authority of the panchayats redundant. Consequently, the panchayats were no 
longer able to regulate the indiscriminate felling of trees. Also, in order to project the 
success of the EDC programs and the reciprocal commitment it had taken from people, 
the department reduced its vigil on felling activities of the villagers. Reduction in the 
numbers of registered forest offences was shown as an indicator of the success of the 
programme.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter focused on the IEDP project and the practices of its implementation by the 
forest bureaucracy in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary in particular and Ranthambhore Tiger 
Reserve in general.  
 
In terms of the discourse, although IEDP professed to provide a participatory approach 
towards addressing the negative impacts of conservation on people, in essence the 
underlying assumptions of the identified “problems” were no different from the Statist 
position. Problem formulations and solutions were underlined by the fact that people and 
their resource were the sole threat to PA and their conservation values. As an approach 
IEDP failed to acknowledge the history of PA management and its implications in 
generating the people-wildlife conflict. It also failed to focus on the complex nature and 
inherent institutional problems of the forest bureaucracy. Although the project made 
heavy demands in terms of the project components and attitudinal changes from the 
 
 
170
Department, its implementation was meant to be undertaken in continuance with the 
existing policing and patrolling functions of the Departments. 
 
Consequently, although the project was readily accepted by the Governments and the 
Forest Departments for the monetary advantages it brought to solving some of the 
institutional needs of the departments, the project prescriptions remained incompatible 
with the PA management agenda. Thus, rather than reforming, the project implementation 
was assimilated into the working practices, agenda and culture of the forest bureaucracy 
and the larger organisational networks of the State.  
 
Consequently, the IEDP that already had received heavy criticism for its faulty 
implementation in other States ran into several problems in Ranthambhore as well. The 
project suffered from the bottlenecks created by Government of Rajasthan in terms of 
delayed fund flows and lack of sanction of many of the project requirements like hiring of 
consultants and creation of other infrastructure. As a result, the Departments in 
prioritizing their traditional role and functions used the projects funds selectively and 
largely to meet only the needs that facilitated the performance of the same. The project 
and funding opportunities were also used in service of inter and intra-departmental 
differences and politics, a part of the larger cultural politics of tiger conservation in India.  
 
Hence while the rhetoric of participation was adopted by the Departments, the practice 
completely belied its principle. The implementation of the participatory components, 
considered too complex and impossible by senior staff was left to be delivered by the 
frontline staff of the Department. The impossible targets at this level were achieved 
primarily through participatory charades and posturing with effective enrolment of the 
privileged and favoured individuals and groups in the communities. Participation was 
reduced to achieving itemized, measurable achievable goals like establishment of local 
institutions, infrastructure development and contributions. The achievement of the same 
was made possible by scuttling all participatory principles and reinforcing the existing 
social hierarchies and exclusionary practices among community groups.  
 
Co-option of a community initiative like kulhadi bandh panchayats (KBP) was of high 
strategic and symbolic advantage in the complex machinations and manoeuvrings 
between multiple agencies and different layers within the forest bureaucracy and served 
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to vindicate the positions of the respective organisations and propping up the “success” of 
the project.  
 
To sum up, the process of co-option of the KBPs into EDCs brings to the fore the 
compulsions and disjuncture that governs the current preoccupation with participatory 
conservation projects in India. Projects like IEDP come with an ambitious agenda – to 
reform management, provide alternative sustainable livelihood, and bring about 
attitudinal change in the Department (which has an institutional culture of over a hundred 
years). This agenda was expected to be achieved within five years with little change in 
any existing policy and institutional framework, including non-addressing acute staff 
shortages in most Protected Areas. However, acceptance of the participatory principle 
within the hierarchical, control-and-regulate and preservationist structure of the Forest 
Department has become a key requirement because of their dependence on the funding 
enabled through such projects.  
 
Thus it is not uncommon for institutions like the Forest bureaucracy to easily adopt the 
rhetoric of participation and manipulate opportunities offered by community-initiatives 
like kulhadi bandh panchayats to demonstrate evidence of their commitment to 
participation. However, in so doing, they not only undermine a local initiative but impose 
state rationality on forest protection. 
  
 
 
172
Chapter 5 
NGOs: Role Playing 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s NGOs
105
 have been encouraged for their potential to engage with 
sustainable development projects that are ‘innovative, participatory and offered 
sustainable solutions to environmental problems’ (Vivian 1994). These NGO 
interventions have resulted in certain broad generalisation about their abilities, strategies 
and activities not just of the NGOs themselves but also donor agencies that actively 
support them. They have become inextricably associated with key terms like participation, 
empowerment, local and community (Fisher 1997) 
 
Environmental NGOs working at the grassroots level in India have been instrumental in 
pushing forward agendas that have attempted to ensure the livelihood rights of 
communities while also trying to address environmental degradation threatened by larger 
commercial interests (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Sundar 2000). Owing to their success in 
lobbying for ‘joint’ agendas for management and conservation, environmental NGOs, 
almost by definition, are attributed certain roles106 in this area. As Sundar (2000) points 
out, the Joint Forest Management (JFM) policy of 1990s represents the recognition of the 
role of NGOs as ‘legitimate brokers with villagers’. Others see them as the ‘third 
dimension’ of conservation programmes (Vira 1999). In India, these organisations are 
also seen as playing a significant role in catalyzing ‘community-wildlife management’ 
and addressing ‘people-wildlife conflict’ (Kothari et al. 2000).  
 
The India Ecodevelopment Project (IEDP), by design provided for the involvement of 
local level NGOs, expecting them to play a significant role in facilitating the participatory 
component of the project, to bridge the divide between the Forest Department (FD) and 
                                                
 
105 The definition of sustainable development outlined by World Congress on Environment and 
Development (WCED) for instance provides a key role for civil society in enabling more equitable and 
sustainable practices of resource management. See Colchester (1995).  
106 The concept of NGO in conservation and forest management includes a diverse range of organsiations 
with different roles, capacities and scale of operation. Here I use the term NGO to refer to local NGOs that 
play a facilitative role and work directly with local communities (See Jefferey and Sundar 1999).  
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the local communities. They were expected to facilitate the establishment of the 
Ecodevelopment Committees (EDC), train Forest Department staff to adopt a 
participatory approach and also ensure, to the extent possible, that IEDP did not 
negatively impact the customary rights and livelihood issues of the communities (World 
Bank 1996; Mott 1996)107.  
 
In Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary there are two NGOs - Society for Sustainable 
Development (SSD) and Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) - that are operational in the villages 
within and surrounding the Sanctuary. While TBS has no formal collaboration with the 
FD, SSD has been enlisted in some of their implementation programs. SSD considers 
itself as the “only local NGO” as it started operating in this area way before TBS and has 
its main office in Karauli, adjacent to KWS. It also has two ‘field offices’ in the 
Sanctuary area, one of which is in the village of Nibhera, the subject of study for this 
thesis. TBS on the other hand, its main office located in Bhikampura, Alwar District, and 
considerable distance away from KWS. Its operations within KWS are mainly co-
ordinated from an office located at Rewali, adjacent to Karauli district.  
 
Both organisations have a stated agenda of ‘sustainable development’ as well as that of 
upholding conservation values of the ‘Protected Area’ (PA) where they find themselves. 
Their primary objective, however, is securing livelihoods of the local people. 
Consequently they focus largely on ‘natural resource management for sustainable 
development’. Their efforts are towards making the broad agenda of ‘people-oriented’ or 
‘participatory-conservation’ a reality.  
 
Following the increased emphasis on involving NGOs in development efforts, there is a 
body of literature that has critically examined the abilities of NGOs to be the effective 
agents of changes (Tendler 1982; Clark 1991; Fowler 1991; 1993; Farrington and 
Bebbington 1993; Edwards and Hulme 1992; 1996; Sen 1999).  As Edwards and Hulme 
(1996: 961) rightly point out the emphasis on the role of NGO ‘rests more on ideological 
grounds rather than empirical verification’.  
 
                                                
 
107 Give some details about how the project afiled to recognize the diversity of organsiations and restricted 
role to faciliatation and implementation. Refer to the previous chapter.  
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Drawing on the above literature, the principal aim of this Chapter is to put into 
perspective the two NGOs operating in Kailadevi and analyse the roles they play in 
participatory conservation in the Sanctuary. Focusing on the processes through which the 
NGOs interact with, and respond to, other interest groups the Chapter raises critical issues 
with regard to the role of NGOs in collaborative management. It questions assumptions 
regarding the NGOs ability to enable better participation, undertake advocacy in favour of 
community resource rights, resolve equity issues within communities, work for their 
empowerment and facilitate collaboration between the communities and the State.  
 
The Chapter primarily argues that in Kailadevi the assumed abilities of NGOs and the 
external support for participatory conservation, has enabled individuals to 
opportunistically establish themselves in the ‘business of NGOs’. Dependent largely on 
donor and government funding, they have been involved primarily in service delivery and 
implementation, with personal and organisational survival as the main objective. With no 
real stake in IEDP, their survival as ‘environmental NGOs’ has also been critically 
dependent on their ability to maintain the representation of being people-oriented to the 
support organisations.  
 
Consequently, in attempting to maintain their multiple and contradictory self-images for 
different audiences that sustain their survival, they often resort to ‘role playing.’ This kind 
of role playing, that rides on the NGO’s assumed proximity and ability to work with 
communities, leads to a less than democratic relationship with the communities. 
Maintaining its images of being community-oriented and community-based where ‘the 
rhetoric of which far exceeds reality’
108
, the NGOs resort to manipulative control of the 
communities, misrepresentation and co-option of initiatives like kulhadi bandh panchayat.  
 
Formalizing KBPs  
 
At the local level, both TBS and SSD have been critical of the Forest Department’s 
handling of the IEDP, particularly of the role of ecodevelopment committees (EDC). 
They label the programme as corrupt and the committees as ineffective. SSD has also 
                                                
 
108 Farrington  and Bebbington (1993) 
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accused the Forest Department of appropriating the credit for the practice of kulhadi 
bandh panchayats. Interestingly, however, the NGOs too tend to co-opt these panchayats, 
but in a less deliberate way. In fact, the co-option is not only more subtle but it is done 
with a sense of moral legitimacy and as part of their ‘appropriate’ role for enabling 
effective community participation and empowerment.  
 
SSD has justified its intervention for ‘sustainable development’ in Kailadevi through the 
pre-existence of kulhadi bandh panchayat. According to the Executive Director, the 
presence of these panchayats attests to the villagers’ ability to look after their forests and 
justifies the case for a participatory approach to sustainable and effective management of 
the Sanctuary. The organization claims to have ‘strengthened’ the kulhadi bandh 
panchayats in the area by effecting minor modifications. 
  
SSD undertakes a range of activities in the region including natural resource management, 
agriculture, poverty alleviation, local governance, micro-finance systems,
109
 health, and 
environment education. The organization operates in the village through establishing 
Village Development Committees (VDC) which are an important aspect of the 
organization’s intervention strategy, but the ownership of which is expected to lie with 
the people. According to the Executive Director: 
We are just a means. They (the villagers) are the main concern here. All the 
work that we do is for them. It is ultimately their development and thus, they 
have to decide how to proceed. The VDC is their organization, for them to 
decide on what development they want and how they want it implemented. It is 
formed by, and for, people’s participation (sehbhagita).  
SSD validates the ‘people-centeredness’ of the VDC by pointing to its intrinsic 
connection to kulhadi bandh panchayats. While it accuses the Forest Department of 
appropriating community initiatives, it sees its own intervention through VDCs as a 
means of strengthening existing local institutions to deal more effectively with 
development and conservation issues. On one occasion the Executive Director stated:  
VDC is nothing else but their existing institution of KBP, another kind of 
informal panchayat. Earlier these panchayats used to talk only of KBP. We used 
to think (because we lacked the knowledge) that we could directly assist these 
villages through these institutions. Then we realized we have to give them the 
shape of Village Development Committees. Essentially, we have formalized 
KBP’s into VDCs. Now all KBP issues are discussed within VDC's. (4/6/2001) 
                                                
 
109 A number of self help groups (SHG) or samhu’s, as they are locally called, have been established in the 
area. 
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Notwithstanding the NGOs claim, the VDC’s or the ‘formalized KBP’ are essentially 
institutions that have been formed at the instigation of the NGO, as per the prescription of 
the NGO and are entirely identified with the NGO. It actively seeks the villagers’ 
attendance and participation in the VDC’s. The reality is that discussions of the kulhadi 
bandh issues in VDC’s are incidental while the KBP continues to be convened 
irrespective of the existence of the VDC. 
 
Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) is the other NGO present in the Kailadevi area. TBS is an 
internationally recognised NGO for exemplary achievement in water conservation 
through community involvement in the revival of johads (village pond) and dry streams 
in Rajasthan. It is also recognized for initiating a community-based democratic process 
for water management through establishing pani panchayats (water councils). In 
acknowledgement of these achievements, the organisation’s founder was honoured with 
the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership in 2001. Apart from its water-
related initiatives, TBS is also credited for working in the Sariska Tiger Reserve (to the 
north of Kailadevi), enabling the establishment of a ‘people’s sanctuary’ Bhaonta-Kolyala 
Wildlife Sanctuary.  
 
Unlike SSD, TBS does not work through any village-level institution, preferring instead 
to appoint a village community worker. TBS has been working in the Kailadevi region 
since 1997 at the behest of SSD, but eventually the two organisations fell out. Since then 
TBS has consolidated its activities in a few villages located at the outskirts of the 
Sanctuary area where it undertakes activities including education, micro-credit and 
watershed management. During the time of my research, its activities in these villages 
were largely confined to the repair and deepening of private and communal pokhars 
(water reservoirs) 
 
In June 2001, TBS undertook a kulhadi bandh panchayat padyatra (march to ban axes) in 
Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary. The stated purpose of the padyatra was ‘to initiate kulhadi 
bandh practices among the villagers’. The seven-day march culminated in a public 
gathering which seemed more akin to a ‘promote Tarun Bharat Sangh’ campaign. For the 
first half of the meeting, the workers of the NGO and the villagers chosen by them 
praised the organization for its efforts. The second half was devoted to seeking a public 
pledge from the participating villagers that they would no longer use axes in their forests, 
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thus firmly put in place the practice of kulhadi bandh’. Summing up the meeting, one of 
TBS leaders declared that through the padyatra the organisation had initiated the practice 
of kulhadi bandh panchayat in 23 villages of Kailadevi. Given its formidable reputation 
in involving communities in natural resource management, few would refute their claim 
of initiating kulhadi bandh panchayats in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary. 
 
While TBS with a single stroke obliterated the history of people’s efforts at initiating and 
sustaining these panchayats, SSD distorted the original institution rendering it largely 
ineffective and therefore in need of intervention.  
 
Mission or Opportunism  
 
The interest of NGOs to be associated with an agenda for community-based conservation 
and initiatives like the kulhadi bandh panchayats needs to be understood against the 
changing profile of grassroots civil society involvement in PA management in India. The 
initial phase of the debate on conflict in parks and sanctuaries between wildlife and 
people saw battle lines firmly drawn between such organisations (like TBS and SSD) and 
pure conservation organisations (like World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Wildlife 
Protection Society of India (WPSI)) and other conservationists. Most NGOs at the local 
level were opposed to conservation and in favour of people’s livelihood and rights. 
However, over the years, donors and other agencies keen on attempting participatory 
conservation of PAs, have been directing their attention towards NGOs that demonstrate a 
combined concern for ‘ecological conservation’ and ‘community participation’ and also 
willing to work with the State.  
 
Consequently, there has been an evolving trend among NGOs to broaden their agenda to 
include ‘ecological conservation’ in addition to those of community livelihood rights. 
TBS for instance was initially widely known as a crusader of people’s right to access 
resources supported by organisations like Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) in 
Delhi and funding from Ford Foundation and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP)  
However, in September 2000, at a workshop conducted in Sariska Tiger Reserve, TBS 
added jangal (forests) and janwar (wild animals) to its existing motto of jan (people), jal 
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(water) and jameen (land). This workshop was considered ‘historic’ for bringing together 
NGOs, communities, social activists and Forest Department officials and the ensuing 
decision to form a Sariska Tiger Reserve Management Committee that would include 
villagers, officials and NGOs (Kothari 2003). As Kothari (ibid: 2) states:  
What happened in Sariska is the cutting edge of a silent revolution that is taking 
place in the way that conservation is envisioned and practiced across South Asia. 
From a centralized, elitist strategy, it is becoming decentralized, participatory, 
and mass-based. From a sole focus on wildlife protection, it is moving towards 
more holistic biodiversity conservation, integrated with livelihood security of 
communities, and stretching across landscapes. 
While for Tarun Bharat Sangh it was an opportune broadening of agenda, the emergence 
of Society for Sustainable Development was more directly linked to the viability of a 
notion like sustainable development. The idea has been carefully cultivated upon to take 
advantage of situations that enable the setting up of such NGOs. The assumptions and 
generalisation regarding the role of NGOs and their abilities in facilitating community 
participation in arrangements for addressing resource conflict issues  is what creates the 
‘niche’ for individuals to establish themselves in the NGO business.  
 
Like any other government or corporate sector there also exists a ‘system’ within the 
NGO sector that enables grassroots level NGOs with an agenda for sustainable 
development to establish itself. There are donor agencies keen to support such endeavours, 
there are NGO support network that can be tapped to scale up the capacity of organisation 
to avail of donor funding and implement projects and then there are individuals who lend 
their names to such organisations in order to legitimise its authenticity. It is not 
necessarily a social cause that motivates an individual to set up a NGO; quite often it is 
the desire to set up an NGO that can drive an individual to find the opportune/ appropriate 
cause. 
 
For the Director of SSD, the agenda for ‘sustainable development’ was the opportune 
cause. The Annual Report of SSD (2000-2001:3) states: 
The Director, during his work as a journalist used to visit the Kailadevi 
Sanctuary Area villages. It was during those visits, that he came across the 
pathetic condition of these villages. He was deeply moved by the abject poverty 
of this area and hence decided to endeavour for ameliorating the conditions of 
these villages… thus Society for Sustainable Development was born.  
This directly links the origin of the NGO to the needs of the villages of the Sanctuary 
thereby justifying the agenda for sustainable development. However, as an earlier 
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interview with the Director (conducted in 1997) suggests, the idea of establishing an 
organisation had preceded any involvement in the Sanctuary area. According to him his 
initial interest in the social sector evolved with his involvement as a volunteer in a 
government run program called ‘Jan Kalyan Samiti’ (Committee for Peoples Welfare). 
The Jan Kalyan Samiti did charity work in the area outside the Sanctuary and the Director 
of SSD worked with this organisation as a Secretary cum Treasurer. It was then that he 
was inspired to set up his own organisation. As he himself states, although he applied for 
registering an NGO, he was not aware of its ‘mode of operation’: 
I decided to get some exposure into the NGO world. What is an NGO, how does 
it work, what will it do?  What will be its aims and objectives?  I applied for a 
job with Centre for Environment and Education (CEE) and started working with 
them in 1992 February until about May 1995. While I was still at CEE I 
suddenly received a mail from the Registrar of Societies stating that my 
organization has been registered. (2/10/1997)  
In the early 1990s CEE was working in the area in and around Ranthambhore National 
Park in an ecodevelopment program that included education for conservation awareness, 
introduction of technologies to make local resources more productive with a view to 
reduce dependence on the forest resources, training people in improved technologies and 
practices, liaison with the Park management, government departments and other NGOs. 
The Director of SSD, then considered as a ‘local person’, functioned as their Field Officer. 
It was his involvement with CEE and the wider network of NGOs with which he 
interacted that led him to change the focus and agenda of his own organisation. As he 
stated in the interview conducted in 1997: 
By the time the registration of the organisation came through I had reviewed my 
focus. Having learnt the potential role of an NGO in conservation, I had started 
taking interest in the Sanctuary area (02/10/2007) 
During his work with CEE, the Director of SSD had understood the issues of people-
wildlife conflict and the significance of the idea of sustainable development. His 
organisation SSD started to acquire the popular trappings of an environmental 
organisation. It adopted as its logo the insignia of an earthen pot which was a slight 
variation of the eco-mark insignia developed by CEE for Government of India to identify 
environment-friendly (or sustainable) products.  
 
In 1995 the Director got acquainted with the team from the Delhi-based Indian Institute of 
Public Administration (IIPA) (of which I was a part) who were to undertake their research 
in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary. The profile of SSD gained significantly from the 
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Director’s involvement in the IIPA research project, the focus of which was to document 
the process of kulhadi bandh panchayat and explore possibilities of collaborative 
management in the area. As a part of this research the Director of SSD had assisted me in 
meetings with villages and with the Forest Department. Although the Director had only 
facilitated the IIPA research agenda, he was to later claim the same agenda as being of his 
own making. Through these activities SSD was able to claim a knowledge base of the 
area and present itself as an organisation that was committed to the livelihood needs of 
the communities as well as the conservation of the Sanctuary. In an interview he 
commented: 
The FD considers the people as a problem for conservation. While I agree that 
conservation is important I don’t agree that people are at fault. It is therefore my 
intention to prove that the needs of people and the environment can be 
reconciled. If the people acquire good livelihood why should they depend on the 
forests? (4/10/2001)  
Through the network of association with IIPA and CEE (and by extension to influential  
individuals associated with these organisations), who strongly believed in the cause of 
promoting grassroots level NGOs that worked towards resolving people-wildlife conflict, 
SSD was able to get its first project funded by Action Aid. Subsequently, it plugged into 
the Rajasthan NGO support network that over time promoted the skills, growth and 
establishment of the organisation. By the time of this research in 2000-02 SSD was 
working with several funding agencies like the Aga Khan Foundation, Inter Corporation, 
Action Aid, Sir Rattan Tata Trust and UNDP. Much of its funding support was predicated 
on its claims of working with kulhadi bandh panchayats and working on alternative 
livelihood options. Both these claims vindicated its position as an ‘environmental’ NGO 
aiming to reconcile the livelihood needs of the forest dwelling communities with the 
conservation imperatives of the Sanctuary.  
 
Impacting People-Wildlife conflict  
 
Notwithstanding SSDs claims, its operations at the field level raise several key questions 
regarding its role and ability to address the basic issues of the people-wildlife conflict. 
Did the field projects, supported by multiple funding agencies, actually serve the broader 
issue of reconciling the livelihood needs of the people and the conservation imperatives 
of the Sanctuary? Even at face value, did these projects actually deal with any of the key 
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issues such as dependence on forest resources, threats to life and property from wildlife, 
issues of rights and access and most importantly the threat of relocation from the 
Sanctuary?  
 
SSD worked largely on promoting livelihood through improving agriculture and animal 
husbandry activities. When we analyse the actual practice of these activities it becomes 
quite evident that the organisation functioned mainly on a project-to-project basis and 
took up projects without factoring in the needs of the people and the conservation 
significance of working in the Sanctuary. It adopted standard and formulaic projects 
designs for addressing the issues, suffering typically from what Vivian (1994) refers to as 
the ‘magic bullet syndrome-looking for simple and neat solutions to a development 
problem’. However, as she argues, unless the deep seated ecological and social 
complexities are not accounted for these solutions will, eventually, prove counter-
productive. I take the example of SSDs intervention in agricultural development to 
highlight the disjuncture between project activities and livelihood needs of the people; 
especially those affected by the establishment of the Sanctuary. 
 
With the decline in pastoralism and traditional caste-based occupation, agriculture had 
become a primary source of livelihood for the villagers in the Sanctuary area. A major 
issue the people faced was the unavailability of arable land and the FD’s refusal to allow 
any further diversion of the forestland for the same. The available land was scarce, of 
poor quality and low yielding. The solution, proposed by SSD with the support of the 
government agricultural extension worker was to promote fertiliser dependent, high-
yielding seed varieties to the local farmers.  
 
The implications of such an approach were multi-fold. First, as the people pointed out 
these varieties were unsustainable in the long run. Despite a shorter growing cycle, the 
new varieties required more water, already a scarce commodity in the Sanctuary. The 
villagers were also not sure the extent to which they could continue to afford the 
fertilisers. Second, these strategies did not appeal to small-scale farmers, as they could  
neither invest in fertiliser nor in better means of irrigation to make up for the additional 
water demand. Third, the organisation preferred prioritising soil and seed quality over 
issues of land rights. It preferred not to challenge the FD’s policies on land issues.  
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Further, while the Director, SSD liberally criticised the FD’s use of scientific jargon like 
‘carrying capacity’ to impose regulations that disadvantage communities, the organisation 
scarcely researched the basis of its own intervention in terms of ecological sustainability. 
Also, the basis for the claim - that people can co-exist with wildlife - was largely 
borrowed from popular rhetoric found in the activist and NGO literature that rally against 
the relocation of people from Protected Areas (Kothari et al. 1996) 
 
SSD’s commitment to the idea of sustainable development, which was generously used in 
project proposals to justify its intervention in the Sanctuary, did not seem to pervade the 
working culture of the organisation that comprised of several rural development 
professionals. While the Director spoke of the need for sustainable development for 
enabling the co-existence of humans with wildlife, the organisation’s supervisors were 
often explaining their activities as attempts to ‘make the villages become like cities.’   
 
These comments were not out place for the project supervisors, since from the time they 
were employed (2000 October); to the best of their knowledge they had been working for 
‘development and natural resource management.’ SSD management did not invest in 
sensitising them on working in an area protected for conservation. They were not aware 
of the ‘do’s and don’ts’ of working in a protected area. Only when a funding agency 
visited the area to enquire about an ongoing controversy between two villages in the 
Sanctuary where SSD worked, was there an attempt made to recognise the rules of the PA 
and their implications for field operations. The funding agency was keen to ensure that 
SSD had not violated the rules of the FD especially since local communities accused it of 
encouraging the encroachment of forest land. The Director, SSD (who had, in fact, 
indirectly encouraged the encroachment of forest land) was keen to impress upon the 
funding agency that SSD was a responsible organisation and fully respected the 
government-imposed sanctity of the Sanctuary. Thus, he felt it necessary to ensure that all 
the workers involved in the project were aware of the rules, lest the visiting members of 
the funding agency should question them on the same.  
 
NGOs are seen as crucial in addressing the problems that arise from people-wildlife 
conflict and affect the management of PAs. In the world of development and conservation 
an assumed, superior understanding of the people-wildlife conflict and genuine concern 
for the concerns of people is attributed to NGOs, more than it is to state agencies. Such 
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attributions have led to NGOs, for no reason other than that they are NGOs, to assume 
abilities and quickly settle down to role-playing. They pre-occupy themselves with 
seemingly significant work towards the longer term objective of sustainable development, 
without necessarily having to spell out the specifics.  
 
Networking Survival and Peoples Agenda 
 
Typical of most NGOs110 involved in ‘peoples struggle for resource rights’, SSD sees its 
role in bridging the gap between the FD and the people that has been created through a 
history of FD’s oppression of the local communities. It projects itself as the champion of 
people’s access issues and rights pertaining to resource use. In practice however the 
interaction between the FD and the NGO are contingent less on the ‘people’s agenda’ and 
more on the political dynamics of the organisational networks of which they are a part. As 
Quarles Van Ufford (1988) suggests, in development bureaucracies, an ‘intermediary 
organisation’ has to simultaneously appeal to two ‘publics’. One is that of the donor 
organisation that makes the funds available and the second is that of the community 
whom the funds are supposed to serve. For an NGO like SSD there are several ‘publics’ it 
has to appeal to simultaneously- the Forest Department, other Government Departments, 
support organisations and individuals and donor agencies.  
 
In the case of SSD, the NGOs charter pertaining to the conflict over resource use 
practices between the people and the FD, and its ability to deliver on this charter have to 
be analysed within the context of the multiple agencies that it operates with, the 
compulsions born of the inter-agency interactions, and the expectations these agencies 
have of the organisation. The NGO’s interaction with the FD whether of compromise, 
confrontation or cooperation, is contingent on what Quarles van Ufford (ibid) terms as the 
‘development context’ within which they operate. A context defined by the relationship 
that the NGO has to maintain with the larger network of its funding and support 
                                                
 
110 Sundar (2000) points out that most decide their agenda for joint management on an assumed ‘historical 
dichotomy between the civil society and the state, as if the villagers and the forest departments previously 
existed in water tight compartments, locked into mutual antagonism’.  Against such assumption Sunder 
(ibid.) argues the recognition of community management and control of forests, being hailed as a new 
phenomenon-‘a manifestation  of civil society work’ had been part of state practice in some pockets even in 
the colonial times.  
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organisations, the relation of these organisations share with the FD, its own power 
dynamics with the FD. Although the real issue is of people and their access to resources, 
the NGOs desire to address these issues are underpinned by its own agenda for project 
‘performance’, sustained funding, maintaining solidarity with support organisation and 
future opportunities for work with the FD.  
 
Consequently, the NGO is unable to provide any real solutions in terms of facilitating a 
collaborative approach or ensuring the resource rights of the people. As some scholars 
point out this kind of dependency cause NGO’s to tailor their activities to funding 
agendas and lose out on certain areas of their stated mission. One of the key areas 
affected by this kind of dependency is the organisation’s ability to take on advocacy 
issues (Edward and Hulme 1992; 1996). NGOs willing to work with the FD enabling a 
‘participatory approach’ have greater currency with funding agencies than do 
organisations that have a radical anti-FD approach (cf. Sen 1999).   
 
In 1996-97, when the FD was given the task of formation of Ecodevelopment Committees 
(EDC) in the preparatory phase of IEDP, the organisation actively assisted the local 
Forest Department officials in conducting meetings with the communities and in 
persuading them to establish EDCs. By design, IEDP had scope for the involvement of 
NGOs and consultants. In Ranthambhore while there was some initial attempt by the FD 
to call for bids, the process was stalled at a later stage. SSD was keen to bid for a role and 
thus invested in building a good relationship with the local FD staff. The organisation 
publicised the Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF) efforts at organising these 
meetings in organisational publications. 
 
In time however the relations between the Director, SSD and the ACF, who was the key 
official prior to the establishment of the more senior post of a DFO, soured considerably. 
The Director had refused to include the ACF’s wife as a member of its governing body. 
In retaliation the ACF, in a key meeting of the project with the local legislative assembly 
members, did not recognise the presence of SSD in the Sanctuary, much to the 
disappointment of the organisation that was keen for official recognition. Apart from 
these instances of personal differences, SSD was also discontent at the way the FD has 
conducted itself vis-à-vis issues pertaining to the Sanctuary. In conversations with the 
Director, SSD I was constantly reminded of the ‘unethical and corrupt practices’ of the 
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FD. Notwithstanding its obvious issues with the FD, the NGO has nevertheless preferred 
a non-confrontationist approach. 
 
The non-confrontationist attitude is more an issue of strategy, than desire for the 
organisation as it also has to maintain its relations with the FD. Given that its working 
area is inside a Sanctuary, the organisation is aware of the need for approval of the FD to 
work in the area. Therefore, it prefers to avoid making any anti-FD issues public at the 
local level. On the contrary, the Director, SSD is almost subservient in his attitude to the 
senior officials of the FD. His offensive against the FD is largely confined to the ACF 
(considerably low in the hierarchy of the FD). On the other hand, relations with the 
Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) who is more senior in the hierarchy, was kept cordial 
and even actively cultivated.  
 
Maintaining a good relation with the FD also conveys an image of the organisation being 
“government friendly” (a term that a local district official had used to describe SSD).  
Such an image not only helps its future prospects with the FD but also enables the 
organisation to take on the agency function of the other district administration 
departments. Government officials, unpopular with the people and unfamiliar with the 
terrain, extensively use the NGOs reach amongst the people to carry out their activities. 
This simultaneously strengthens the position of the NGO with the district officials as well 
as with the people. Departments like Animal Husbandry and Agriculture are able to 
conduct their workshops and vaccination camps among the people more frequently with 
the assistance of the NGO enabling them to meet their annual targets.   
 
The other significant reason for its non-confrontationist attitude is because of the aid 
conditionality imposed by most of the funding agencies for undertaking activities in a 
legal entity like a Sanctuary. None of the organisations that fund SSD want to get 
entangled in legal issues pertaining to the FD’s jurisdiction over forest land. In the event 
that the NGO does get embroiled in such a situation then it not only has to answer to the 
FD but also to its donor agencies. Negotiating its survival through working with these 
complex networks of dependency, conditionality and expectation, often leads to complex 
manoeuvring with the communities bearing much of the brunt.  
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In one such instance, SSD and a donor agency wanted to initiate pastureland development 
in village Chauria Khata located inside the Sanctuary. This involved building an 
enclosure wall around the identified land. In the process the villagers also encroached on 
some forest land and included it within the enclosure. This forest land, though within the 
boundary of Chauria Khata, was in fact being used as a grazing pasture by another village. 
Once the enclosure was built Chauria Khata refused to permit its neighbouring village to 
graze within the enclosure. In protest, the neighbouring village made several attempts to 
break down the wall of the enclosure. The conflict snowballed into physical brawls 
between the villagers followed by life threats, with the issue eventually being brought to 
the notice of the FD. The ACF was quick to take advantage of the situation using it to 
condemn the operation of SSD inside the Sanctuary. It accused SSD of not only 
interfering with the ‘traditional rights regime’ of the people but also of violating forest 
regulations by encouraging villagers to enclose forest land.  
 
Unfortunately for the NGO, a young ambitious ‘technical expert’ who at the time of the 
conflict was assisting the NGO, made this conflict public and bringing it to the notice of 
the donor agency. The donor agency in turn, working on an agenda for understanding 
issues of ‘conflicts’ over natural resource management, saw this as ideal case study. 
However, as it turned out the greater interest it took in the case the less sympathetic it was 
to the role of the NGO. In their view the NGO had a key role in initiating the conflict as it 
failed to take an inter-village consensus prior to building the enclosure and it also failed 
to inform the FD about enclosing forest land. The NGO was instructed by the donor to 
settle the case as far as possible within the framework of the given regulations. With little 
support the NGO was left to settle the issue on its own. 
 
Under such circumstances, the good relations with the FD resulted in an amicable 
settlement for the NGO. SSD, keen to pursue its agenda for the enclosure ultimately 
settled its problems with the Department by negotiating a strategy of ‘mutual benefit.’ 
Under IEDP the FD had undertaken the construction of several enclosures for pasture 
development inside the Sanctuary, though they served little purpose for the local 
community. SSD promoted its case with the Department by proposing that if the FD gave 
the NGO permission to continue with the enclosure in Chauria Khata it would be an 
example of community-initiated participation in the agenda of the FD. Finally, it was 
decided the FD would allow the enclosure to continue on condition that the village 
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organise itself into an EDC and execute the task as a part of the EDC agenda. The NGO 
and the villagers immediately took up the offer and thus were allowed to continue with 
the construction. The FD gained popular mileage for expert handling of a conflict issue. 
In its report to the World Bank the FD reported that the people, inspired with the success 
of the EDC,  had voluntarily taken up the  tasks of building enclosures and promoting 
pasture development.  
 
The case also served the ‘people’s agenda’ for the NGO.  The Director of SSD was elated 
at having convinced the FD to allow the people to build an enclosure for the pasture. The 
Director stated that this was an “ideal example of how with cooperation and persuasion 
the FD could be brought to work with the people. This is the role that the NGO should 
play”.  This was a “victory of the NGO to get the FD to recognise the rights and needs of 
the people”. Adopting a ‘people’s agenda’ is important for the NGO to strengthen its 
credibility with the community by being seen to oppose the FD. At the same time it is 
also important to retain the support of the organisation and activist groups that support a 
people-oriented conservation approach and rely on NGOs at the ‘grassroots level’ to 
champion the cause of the communities against the ‘unfair practices of the FD.’ The 
initial foundation of the organisation was largely built on the strength of such 
organisations and individuals. Having adopted a non-confrontationist position the NGO 
pursues these agendas through indirect channels and outside the purview of the FD. It 
regularly supplies local newspaper correspondents’ information on the corrupt practices 
of the FD. It has also contributed articles that are highly critical of the FD's functioning to 
research organisations that are interested in issues of ‘resource conflicts’ and 
‘community-based management’. In fact it has been sent as a case study on the ‘EDC 
conflict’ stating that the people are not satisfied with the FD and thus have an issue of 
conflict with the FD. Such sources do not have any direct bearing on the operations of the 
NGO or the FD at the field level and thus does not create any direct conflict between the 
two. 
 
Notwithstanding the positive outcome of the case as far as the NGO and the FD were 
concerned, the real tragedy played itself out with the communities. The settlement 
allowed Chauria Khata to refuse access rights to its neighbouring village. Following the 
conflict the NGO terminated all its activities in the neighbouring village. Having lost the 
official battle against Chauria Khata the neighbouring village continued to break the walls 
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of the enclosure and engage in physical assaults. In 2002 I was informed by a SSD staff 
member that someone from Chauria Khata had killed a man from the neighbouring 
village over the same issue. 
 
Representation of ‘success’ of these kinds, achieved at any cost, are vital for the 
organisations and are underpinned by the larger politics of funding agencies and aid. 
NGOs that are dependent on external aid, in order to sustain their viability with the donor 
agencies, have to continually demonstrate their ability to achieve project objectives, 
irrespective of whatever operational difficulties they may be encountering at the 
implementation level. As a representative of a middle-level funding agency on a 
monitoring mission pointed out to the Executive Director of the Society for Sustainable 
Development: 
You must tell us about the success you have achieved. It is critical that you 
publish. You have to publish or you perish. Rajasthan is now increasingly 
unpopular with the donor agencies. They see it as an over-funded state. In order 
to sustain our support to you we have to justify to them that you are doing 
successful and innovative work. These are rules of the game you have to play by 
in order to survive. It is the same for us. We need something to show, something 
to replicate (March 27th 2001) 
 
Representing Communities   
 
NGOs by definition assume a moral legitimacy about their work and representations of 
community they make. Unlike that of the State or other agencies the legitimacy of the 
representations made by NGOs are rarely questioned. However, as can be seen in the case 
of Kailadevi, NGO representations are framed more by their own organizational needs 
and strategies, notwithstanding its cost to the communities. These representations are 
dictated by the need to aggrandize their own role and achievements. Consequently, the 
communities remain in need of reformation and intervention in order to realize their 
potential. The added danger of such discourses is that being legitimized by the NGOs 
they lend themselves to appropriation by the biased state agencies to reinforce their 
negative stereotypes of the efficaciousness of community-initiatives.  
 
Organizations like Tarun Bharat Sangh, that have already established their reputation 
beyond refute, are able to appropriate the community with much more ease and 
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legitimacy, even if it needs to engage in false propaganda. One such example is of 
Jagdish Gujjar, a resident of Nibhera and a community worker of TBS. In his early days 
of recruitment he was asked by senior TBS staff to pose as a former illicit liquor brewer 
for the benefit of a visiting donor representative. The story that was pedalled to the visitor 
was that Jagdish was a wasted young man who used to brew illicit liquor till TBS found 
him and rehabilitated him into a community worker. Jagdish was unaware of the legal 
implications of such fabrication and it was this fear that had brought him to me. Such 
stories formed a part of TBS strategy to showcase the quality of their efforts. In order to 
upscale its activities it was keen to add more number to the statistics of villages it worked 
in.  
 
Both TBS and SSD employ the essentialist discourse on the place and the Gujjars to 
justify their intervention and display the efficacy of their interventions. Project problems 
are often explained away by the ‘tendencies of the Gujjars.’ One often heard explanations 
like: “they (the Gujjars) are quite lazy, they don’t want to work and want everything free” 
or “one has to be very careful of Gujjars, they’re a community you should not trust.” TBS 
has liberally used the idea of the Sanctuary area being a ‘dacoit prone region.’  
 
India Today, a popular weekly news magazine, in its June 2002 edition carried an article 
on Tarun Bharat Sangh. The article claimed that TBS had yet again revolutionized 
people’s lives through their ‘water movement.’ As an example, it profiled four individuals 
from villages in the Sanctuary area. In the article TBS had claimed that these individuals 
were dreaded dacoits in the region who had plundered villages at will. Apparently it was 
the lack of water that had turned these individuals into dacoits. However, with the coming 
of TBS to the region and its efforts to revive water management, these men had a change 
of heart and given up being dacoits preferring to join the TBS-initiated water movement. 
The article extolled TBS and its founder has the ‘modern day messiah.’ It falsely 
brutalized the life histories of these individuals and making them vulnerable to exploits of 
the local police department. As far as TBS was concerned, this was an attempt to 
reinforce the reputation it had built by claims of enabling poachers to surrender their 
weapons in Sariska Tiger Reserve. 
 
The idea of ‘communities’ or ‘people’ serve as the principal means of challenging the FD 
indirectly on a more regular basis. Whether in the case of the conflict in village Chauria 
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Khata or in Nibhera, SSD has often sought to either challenge or appeal to the authorities 
by instigating actions amongst the villagers against the FD. In the case of Chauria Khata, 
when the ACF was seen supporting the neighbouring village, the Director organised 
meetings in Chauria Khata and decided the strategy the villagers would have to take with 
the senior FD officials. It would dictate letters and direct action but did not come to the 
forefront until the point that his intervention was unavoidable.  In Nibhera too, on the eve 
of July 15, 2001 when the Forest Minister, Government of Rajasthan, was to visit the 
Sanctuary and the FD was caught up in making a best possible case for presenting a 
‘success case’, the NGO staff and the Director instigated a few people to write a petition 
exposing the corrupt practices of the FD and to hand to him personally at some point 
during or after the meeting. Even in the meetings of the EDC held in the village the NGO 
staff made their reservation felt on certain issues by quietly instigating the villagers. They 
would also employ a similar strategy in dealing with the other government departments.  
 
What I have referred to as the ‘indirect’ means of intervention is described by the 
Director, SSD as acts of empowerment: “Our presence has enabled to the people to act for 
themselves - to stand up against the authorities.” While this may seem to be a convincing 
argument, it becomes questionable when one analyses the processes through which the 
NGO engages in these activities. Putting the community forward is tactically a non-
confrontationist approach. The Director, SSD encouraged the people of Chauria Khata to 
take on the authorities on the assurance that it would back them up. However, when the 
event attracted bad publicity the NGO immediately disowned its role in the act. In the 
case of the Chauria Khata conflict it was the NGO that had encouraged the people to 
enclose forest land. However, when it was accused of flouting regulations the Director, 
SSD claimed that it had no knowledge that the villagers were going to enclose forest land.  
Having disclaimed its role to the officials, it sees its involvement in a situation which, 
though not of its making requires its intervention to serve the best interest of the people. 
If however these indirect interventions yield results it is quick to claim credit as it, 
eventually, did in the case of the Chauria Khata conflict.  
 
Perhaps one can justify the means if the strategy of intervention undertaken by the NGO 
ultimately serves the needs of the people. It is important however to point out that the 
issues that the NGO may instigate do not always serve the interest of the communities nor 
does it have the consensus of the majority. These interventionist strategies may perhaps 
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serve the needs of the NGO more than that of the communities in whose name the 
intervention is made. In trying to expose the FD in front of the Forest Minister the NGO 
took advantage of the differences that exists between the Gujjars and the Brahmans in 
Nibhera.  On the eve of the visit of the Forest Minister, Government of Rajasthan, the 
Director, SSD dictated a letter to the President of the Yuva Mandal (youth group),  a 
young Brahmin boy who teaches at the primary school in a neighbouring village. The 
letter, signed as ‘villagers of Nibhera’, exposed what the people saw as the corrupt acts of 
the FD official and declared the EDC as a farce. The letter was written and attested in the 
presence of a small congregation of Brahmins who were politically active and also 
maintained that the EDC was a corrupt institution. However, since Govind Gujjar was its 
head he was unwilling to expose the FD. The Brahmin men involved in signing the letter 
had earlier failed to challenge the position that Govind enjoys in the EDC. This was their 
opportunity to expose the FD and in some sense get back at Govind.   
 
The letter was to be personally handed to the Minister at some point during the public 
meeting. However, it never reached its recipient as the guards intercepted all villagers 
who were keen to offer petitions to the Minister. The Director, SSD later claimed that the 
meeting was well orchestrated to prevent the people from exposing the FD and cited how 
the ‘people of Nibhera’ missed the opportunity to hand over the letter. Whether ‘the 
people of Nibhera’ really wanted to expose the FD remains circumspect. As I have 
analysed elsewhere most people in the village that I spoke to were fully aware of the 
‘corrupt’ practices of the FD but did not want to complain because the FD’s operations in 
the village at least gave them wages which was highly valuable at a time when labour 
opportunities in the area were hard to come by. Shortly after the Minister’s visit when I 
enquired to find out actually how many people were aware of the letter most denied 
knowledge of any such letter while others said that they would not have bothered with it. 
 
In view of the above discussion and the appropriation of kulhadi bandh panchayats 
discussed in the earlier sections, it becomes clear that rather than the NGOs being the 
enablers, it is the community initiatives that enable the NGOs to expand and consolidate 
their standing in the region. Rather than alleviating the community position, NGOs tend 
to reinforce them in the process of justifying their own intervention or parading their 
‘success.’  
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Polarised Participation  
 
In contrast to the eco-development committees, the NGO-led village development 
committees have a wider social base, with space for debate and negotiation. However in 
terms of its structure and function the latter is as formalised as the former, underpinned by 
a prescribed mandate and driven by external agendas. The village development 
committees are modelled to reflect the popular concept of community-based organisations 
that have standardised and fixed parameters. The way the community structures manifest 
themselves within the NGO-led local institution is largely instigated by the organisation 
itself, whose working at that level is governed by project compulsions.  
 
Through ‘streamlining’ the existing institutions, the NGOs metamorphose them into 
‘local institutions’ that are mostly incomprehensible to local communities, who 
subsequently shun its ownership and identify it with organisations that shape them. As I 
demonstrate, these institutions projected as ‘peoples institutions’ actually serve as a 
means for ‘instrumental participation’111 i.e. bases for the NGOs to better execute their 
projects amongst the communities. Decision-making and consensus are often reached by 
creating loyal cadres within these institutions, with whom negotiations are reached mostly 
outside of the institutional context.  
 
Most projects mandate the establishment of local institutions, often in unrealistic time, 
putting the NGO under pressure to deliver. To set up local institutions, have the consent 
of its members, and undertake project works, all within a given time-frame compels the 
organisation to take on board those community members who are willing or already enjoy 
its goodwill. Thus like in eco-development committees, because ‘it’s just simpler and 
faster to work with village elites’ (Baviskar 2003), it is mainly the economically and 
politically more powerful families who dominate the working of the Village Development 
Committees and monopolizes the benefits. The benefits to the less privileged are 
governed by the discretion and patronage of the more powerful members.  
 
                                                
 
111 Macdonald (1995) 
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In Nibhera, like in most revenue villages, (see Chronin in Sunder and Jeffery 2000) there 
already exist several committees (smaitis), mostly as a part of the formal Gram Panchayat 
structure. To add to them are the EDC (set up by the FD), the VDC (set up by SSD) and 
at least two more samitis. In Nibhera the VDC was established in 1997. It was amongst 
the first ones that SSD set up in any village in the Sanctuary. Subsequently, the NGO has 
also set up several SHG's in the village, which are referred to as samhus. Having gained 
momentum with funding from Sir Ratan Tata Trust, by the time I left the field in March 
2002, there were at least 16 SHGs operating in Nibhera. In 2001 there was another 
committee added – the Village Development Assembly (VDA). VDA was an outcome of 
the splitting of VDC. VDC became the executive body with memberships restricted to 
SHG members while VDA included the general body of the village.  
 
The office bearers of the VDC comprised of a president, a treasurer and a secretary. From 
the beginning the office bearers of the Nibhera VDC have been Brahmins. When it was 
started, Kirori Pandit became its head and the treasurer was Jagdish Sharma, the local 
school teacher referred to as Masterji. Masterji succeeded Kirori Pandit and his cousin 
brother Radha Raman Sharma became the treasurer. The Brahmin community of the 
village is seen as the most educated community and one that tends to be most hospitable 
to outsiders (including people like myself) The two families were the first stops for 
outsiders (both have been my hosts at different points in time) Both Kirori and Masterji 
also enjoy a lot of political clout in the village. Kirori is amongst the weighty patels and 
enjoys the confidence of the village elders in being capable of dealing with outsiders. 
Masterji tends to attract the younger males of the village. Both also have a good rapport 
with the Gujjars, despite the ongoing conflict.  
 
For the Director of SSD the first point of entry to the village were also these two families. 
It is through several meetings held in the courtyard of Kirori’s house that he established 
his foothold in the village. Kirori is able to command the support of the heads of the Teli, 
Nai, and Gaud Brahmins. Thus if he is amenable to the NGO so are these communities. In 
the manner that the village issues are dealt with, Kirori always consults with Bhanta, the 
accepted representative of the Gujjar community. It is mainly through the consent of these 
two individuals and in turn the heads of the some of the other communities that SSD 
started its operation in the village. There were no separate consultations with the Dom, 
and Chamar communities. Although these two communities rarely formed a part of the 
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gathering at Kirori’s house, their consent was just assumed. Thus the ‘mobilisation’ of the 
‘community’ largely took place through acquiring the confidence and willingness of the 
few powerful members of the village leadership.  
 
Brahmin domination of the VDC leadership meant that the Gujjar patels tended to stay 
away from its meetings. The exception to this was Govind Gujjar. Being the head of the 
EDC he had always sought the support of Kirori Pandit. The other more powerful leaders 
of the Gujjar community had to be pleaded with to attend some of the VDC meetings, 
specifically when their presence considered was indispensable to expediting certain 
project activities.  
 
For example, the land identified for building a well facilitated SSD, had already been 
encroached upon by Bhanta’s son. The work had been stalled as no one wanted to directly 
confront Bhanta or his son. The VDC members were also unwilling to start work on the 
desired date, as they were not happy with the amount sanctioned for the well. The NGO 
was aware that if Bhanta appealed to the members (especially since Nibhera is 
predominantly a Gujjar village) not only would his son vacate the plot but the members 
would also agree work within the sanctioned budget. Thus, despite the unwillingness of 
the Gujjar leaders to participate in VDC meetings, because of the strategic value, the 
NGO invited them to represent the village on all important occasions (like facilitating the 
District Magistrate when he visits the village).  
 
As a consequence of co-option of political elites into the VDC, the inequities inherent in 
village politics also pervaded the workings of the VDC. The powerful leaders and their 
favoured people became the first beneficiaries of the NGO-led VDC projects in the 
village. The VDC did not provide scope for its members to assert their interests or right to 
benefit independent of the village power equations, The VDC and its decisions were 
always negotiated between the Brahmans and the Gujjars. Although the members from 
the other caste groups articulated their reservation in private, they did not openly 
challenge the decisions taken by these two communities.  
 
This was especially evident is the decision pertaining to the appointment to the post of 
‘mate’ for the well construction project. The role of the mate is to appoint the labourers 
for the day, maintain the roster and supervise the ongoing work. Masterji canvassed the 
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case for Radha Raman to be appointed as mate. The NGO workers had reservations 
regarding the appointment of a paid post but chose to use the incompetence of Radha 
Raman for raising its objections in the VDC meeting convened to discuss the issue. The 
representatives of the Chamar community suggested the name of Manphool Chamar for 
the post. Manphool was considered the most skilled mason in the village. Hoping to raise 
a dispute between the Gujjars and Brahmins and do away with the post altogether, the 
NGO suggested the name of Govind Gujjar. Unwilling to get rid of the post the members 
at the end of the meeting reached a ‘consensus’ to appoint Govind Gujjar for the post.  
 
After the meeting was over, when I asked Manphool, who is also among the poorest in 
the village, why he did not volunteer his own name, he said that although he was keen he 
would not dare to take on the controversy. According to him the Gujjars and Brahmins 
are aware that he was best suited but still did not choose suggest his name. If he had 
insisted on including his name it would have created bad vibes between the communities. 
Buddu Chamar, the Sarpanch of Nibhera, added that these are the ‘games’ of caste that 
are played out. As far as the Chamar community was concerned it was enough if they got 
some opportunities for wage labour. Thus while the NGO continued to justify projects for 
the ‘poorest of the poor’ there was no serious attempt to involve them (cf. Farrington and 
Bebbington 1993). This was especially the case because most projects for individual 
benefits required a 50% contribution from the beneficiary.  
 
Also, as a ‘natural’ process, the Bhangi community, the traditional outcastes of the 
villages, are kept out of the fold of these institutions. The Brahmin and Gujjar expressed 
their sense of fairness by asserting that they took care of the ‘poor Chamar community.’ It 
was understood that it was not possible to include the Bhangis in community work, as the 
other caste members could not work alongside with the ‘untouchables.’ Besides as Kirori 
often justified: “They are a rich community! They don’t have to depend on wage labour 
so they don’t show much interest!”  
 
The Bhangi community, as I found out, were not even aware of the existence of the VDC. 
They knew that a sanstha (organisation) worked in the village but were not aware of what 
its main operations were. What underlies their non-participation is the baggage of 
discrimination that would accompany their participation. Although they live in the village 
and abide by its social norms of keeping away from the other caste groups other than the 
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Chamars, they resent their isolation. Jagdish, a young man from the Bhangi community 
who worked in Delhi for a few years as a domestic help, was annoyed at the 
discriminatory practices of the other castes: 
In the cities they don’t care where I come from. I worked in homes as a cook but 
they did not treat me as an outcaste. The people in the village are illiterate and 
old fashioned. They don’t know the ways of the city. I don’t care much for them. 
I keep out of their affairs. We are doing well. They are jealous of us. They know 
they can’t do anything to us. We have won all the fights we have taken up. Now 
we have access to the village pond and the hand pump. They tried to prevent us 
but we went to the courts and since then they dare not bother us (6th September 
2001).  
The participation of women is also contingent to an extent on what the societies permit 
for their women. Also there was a tendency to equate ‘gender’ with ‘women only’ 
approach. The NGO had initiated several Self Help Groups (SHGs) in the village.  
Amongst the 16 SHG’s functional in the village, 11 of them belonged to women. In some 
of them some women have managed to remain members despite their husband’s 
disapproval. These women managed to collect their contribution of Rs.10 either by saving 
from household expenses or their wages. A number of the women SHGs had opened up 
bank accounts and had received small grants from the governments scheme to promote 
SHGs. Encouraged by their success in SHGs some of the women had started taking keen 
interest in other village matters. Their sense of empowerment however remains confined 
to the women forums alone. They were unable to participate in joint (along with men) 
decision making in the VDC. The NGO workers, justifying as an act of safeguarding the 
interest of the women, discouraged women from voicing their opinions in the VDC 
discussions.  
 
This was evident in the decision that was taken on the construction of the well in the 
village. In the VDC meeting where the final decision had to be taken over the location of 
the new well, Halki the wife of an influential Gujjar decided to speak for the women. She 
argued that since women were the ones who were responsible for collecting drinking 
water, the well should be constructed according to their convenience. The response from 
the men present in the meeting was telling. The Gujjar and Brahmin men took offence to 
the fact that Halki even had an opinion on the matter. The others laughed and jeered at her 
at which point she walked out of the meeting. The meeting proceeded without any more 
comments from the other women present. Later the NGO person in charge of the VDC 
and the SHG in the village went over to Halki’s house and called for separate meeting. He 
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empathised with her and said that it was really unfair of the way the men had treated her. 
He however also instructed her not to attend VDC meetings anymore and concentrate on 
her SHG work.  The women refrained from attending the VDC meetings held thereafter. 
They were summoned only to those meetings where wages were to be distributed.  
 
To sum up, although NGOs derive their legitimacy for enabling effective participation of 
local communities (cf. Korten 1990), their own need to get the communities to participate 
and deliver by project deadlines compels them to co-opt the existing power hierarchies in 
the village polity.  They promote certain favoured individuals who serve as brokers 
between the NGO and the rest of the community. Reinforcement of the existing power 
equations often works to the disadvantage of the poorer and weaker communities. 
Creating favoured communities in the village who are willing and eager participants in 
the NGOs activities, enables the NGO to create its ‘mission villages.’ These are villages 
where donor missions are brought to display the NGOs ability to work with communities 
and project the successes of their operations.  
 
Limits to Empowerment  
 
Participation as ‘empowerment’ is meant to allow the ‘participants’ to be in-charge to 
decide the course of their own development. The case of Nibhera throws up several key 
issues on the disjunct between participation and empowerment. First, and perhaps the 
most seminal issue is of choice - did the villagers have a say either in the choice of the 
organisations working ‘for them’ or in the projects they are meant to participate in? Even 
NGO-led development projects seem imposed in which the villagers have little choice but 
to ‘participate.’  
 
The VDC and the many SHG’s are, as the Director, SSD, points out “…are for the people 
and by the people!” Practice, however, ran contrary to this rhetoric.  Despite the fact that 
SSD had been functioning for at least 5 years in Nibhera, the villagers, even those who 
were active members of the VDC, did not seem to have enough information on its 
working. Even the members of the VDC were not aware of the sources of funding of the 
various projects that SSD executed through the VDC. Owing to paternalistic attitude 
adopted by the SSD workers towards the villagers, most people wondered as to why the 
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organisation was doing ‘free service’ for the community i.e. working without any returns.  
Despite being aware of these apprehensions, the SSD made no efforts to clarify these 
issues, making the villagers even more suspicious of its motives and intentions. 
Compounding the villagers’ confusion was the fact that SSD had adopted different 
approaches in different villages for the same kind of work. 112  
 
Given the lack of information and patronising of the more privileged and powerful 
individuals in the village, there were also allegations of corruption against some of the 
SSD workers. Most individuals I interviewed had a complaint against the functioning of 
SSD in the village. Wondering why the people still worked with the NGO despite their 
dissatisfaction, I received an insightful response from Kiori Pandit, the VDC president:  
So what if we don’t have all the answers? What choice do we have? They will be 
here in our village and they will bring work. If I don’t support them then 
someone else will. The organisation is at least bringing something to the village. 
It is better than having nothing.  
The above response reflects the extent to which villagers perceived institutions like VDCs 
and organisations like SSD as ‘inevitable’.  This was also evident in some of the rumours 
doing the rounds owing to the proliferation of such organisations in the area. One such 
rumour had become a cause of worry:  
There are Arun (SSD representatives) and Tarun (TBS representatives) but now 
we have heard that there is a third organisation. I believe they mainly work on 
people’s farm land doing levelling and bunding (field boundaries). If the farmer 
does not want to get work done on his farm then I believe that they put him in 
the jail! They release him only after they finish work on his field. (As told by 
Bhanta Gujjar).  
Despite my efforts I could not establish either the existence of this ‘organisation.’ 
Irrespective of its authenticity, the content of the rumour reflects profoundly on the 
understanding communities associate with NGOs.  Like government programmes or the 
FD, NGOs have their agendas to carry out in the Sanctuary, whether or not the 
‘beneficiaries’  understand it or desire it, they have to be a part of it. It is a case of 
‘imposed’ development; the NGOs need the communities to sustain their own existence 
and agenda in the area.  
 
                                                
 
112 In village Chauria Khata SSD, being funded by AKRSP, had the provision to allow villagers to use 
tractors for the earthwork involved in its soil and water conservation activities. In Nibhera similar work was 
being funded by CRS but because the funders wanted to generate livelihood through generating wages, they 
had insisted that the earthwork be done manually.  
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The second issue with regard to empowerment pertains to the issue of ownership and 
decision making. Although the Village Development Committees adopt a much more 
participatory approach than Eco-Development Committees, issues of ownership and 
decision-making still remain the domain of the NGO. However, the process of asserting 
authority tends to be very subtle. In fact, it becomes apparent when the organisation fails 
to get the committees to agree with it on a particular issue.  
 
Notwithstanding the claims of VDC being a ‘local institution’, its ownership is identified 
with SSD. In April 2001 Masterji, the president of VDC, was in charge of the project of 
building a common village bund (embankment). The manner in which the project 
progressed made several issues of ownership quite apparent. Although the project was 
talked of as ‘community initiative’, to be implemented through the VDC, most villagers 
saw the project as the sole responsibility of the Masterji and the community-worker of 
SSD. The rest of the villagers saw it only as a source of wage labour. As per the project 
rules the wage payments were to be made in instalments, something that made the 
villagers unhappy. Some of them started casting aspersions on Masterji’s integrity and 
accused him of making money from the project. Unhappy with these allegations he 
drafted a resignation letter addressed to the Director, SSD and handed it over to SSD staff 
who supervising the project at the village level. The supervisor was reluctant to accept the 
resignation. He asked Masterji to tend his resignation to the VDC and not to SSD. It was 
Masterji’s reply that put in perspective the ownership of the VDC: 
The VDC is ours for you to say. But, in fact, you are the one running it. 
Ultimately we know that it’s all yours. I am the head of the VDC but beyond me 
you are also there. You handle all matters and you take all the final decisions. 
For us you are the owner of the VDC.  
Another example is that of constructing the new well in the village. The work was being 
supervised by the watershed committee of the village. The NGO was keen to live up to 
the expectations of NGOs of being more cost effective and efficient than government 
systems (Vivian 1994). SSD had set ambitious timeframe and unrealistic budgets for 
completing the project through community participation. Hence it was unwilling to permit 
the hiring of a mate. This would have undermined the organisation’s position vis-à-vis the 
Public Works Department (PWD), the members of which already begrudged the fact that 
government work (that should have rightfully been undertaken by them) had been given 
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to a NGO. SSD, on the promise of voluntary labour of the communities had managed to 
get the project at a much lower bid than the PWD.   
 
In the VDC meeting convened to discuss this issue, it was clear that most members 
present felt that a having a mate would enable them to get the work done more efficiently. 
A mate was necessary because the committee members (who were being asked to take 
charge of executing the project), would not have been able to devote much time to the 
project as the time would overlap with the sowing season for the summer crops.  
 
SSD first opposed the idea on the basis that the person chosen as the mate reflected caste 
bias and nepotism (an issue discussed in the section on ‘Polarising Structures’). In 
response, the watershed committee agreed that they would change the person but retain 
the position of the mate. Since this clearly defeated the purpose of the NGO, its staff 
argued that having a mate made them no different from the government mode of working 
and if that’s the mode the community wanted to adopt then they would have to dissolve 
the watershed committee, a move unanimously opposed by the villagers. Its dissolution 
would mean an insult and the undermining of the authority of the committee that had 
been chosen by the VDC and included the heads of most caste groups. Bhanta Gujjar was 
categorical at the VDC meeting:  
If we dissolve the committee then it would affect the presence of the village 
identity in the project. It would lead to a total dismissal of the community in the 
project. It will also mean complete defamation (manhani) of the village and its 
administration. (Bhanta Gujjar) 
The agricultural engineer of SSD, who prided over his acumen at dealing with the 
villagers, was in charge of the project.  His strength, as he himself put it, was “the 
confidence that I can get the villagers to do any work I want them to!” He was convinced 
that hiring a mate was a reflection of “villagers trying to get the better of SSD”. The 
VDC’s reluctance to dissolve the committee gave him the leverage he wanted. He argued 
that a community-based project could either have a committee or a mate and the VDC 
had to choose between the two 
 
The VDC and the committee members argued it was a common practice to have a mate 
for such kind of activity. They said that they had done their share by sending a member of 
their family for voluntary labour. They reasoned that since mate was going to be a paid 
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position the individual in charge would get compensated for the time he would spend in 
doing the job. The engineer remained adamant. Faced with this choice, amidst much 
discontent the VDC decided to retain the committee. This incident left the village feeling 
very bitter towards the NGO. Bhanta Gujjar reasoned with me the day after the meeting: 
The NGO people didn’t do a good thing yesterday. They challenged the very 
identity and authority of the village. This is like forcing us to do what they want. 
We are helpless and they have resorted to arm-twisting. What can we do? We 
want the well and they have the might.  
As predicted by the committee, the work of the well construction suffered. No one took 
the responsibility as none of the committee members could devote the required time. 
When the deadlines were not met, SSD stalled payment. The members were told that the 
Collector was unhappy and would not release money, as he wanted the work completed 
by January of 2002. When SSD did not relent, a few of the committee members 
proceeded to meet the Collector. It was only then that they learnt that it was SSD and not 
the Collector who had set the deadlines for the project. In February 2002, when I finally 
left Nibhera, the well was only half-constructed and the work had been stalled.   
 
If empowerment of people is seen as the NGO’s mission, it is also its greatest dilemma. 
Rather than an ideology, ‘empowerment’ comes defined by project prescription and 
identifiable project targets. However even when project processes go through the rituals 
and motions of enabling such notions of ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ as Mosse 
(2004:239) suggests in another context, they tend to ‘open up liberating spaces beyond 
the control of the project’. Consequently, the processes of empowerment have a two-fold 
effect on ‘participating community’. At one level it enables them to participate in the 
village development committees, take stock of accounts in the self-help groups and 
mobilize against ineffectiveness of the government services. At another level it also 
enables them to intervene in the operations of the NGO in the village, oppose some of its 
proposals or question some of its activities. While the NGO is happy to publish and 
trumpet the former as its achievements’ on ‘community empowerment’, it labels the latter 
as the villagers trying to make ‘trouble’ or being ‘ungrateful’.   
 
A NGOs ability to empower communities is also constrained by its needs to foster 
dependency (Bebbington et al. 2007). Hence when VDC members requested SSD to 
 
 
202
make VDC into an independent registered body so that could bid for government projects 
directly, the NGO predictably ignored their request.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The agenda of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘collaborative management’ of natural 
resources provides scope for NGOs to facilitate the effective participation of local 
communities. In India, expectations come from the fact that a diverse range of NGOs 
have significantly influenced policy and practice of JFM in community forest 
management. This has led to a broad generalisation of the abilities of NGOs to enable 
better participation and empowerment of the local communities as well as to effectively 
facilitate the collaboration between the communities and the State.  
 
An examination of the case of NGOs operating in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary concludes 
that the effectiveness of local level NGOs cannot be predicated on broad generalisations. 
The extent to which NGOs can be effective is contingent on context specific issues, 
personalities, organisational history and objectives - both hidden and stated (Haynes 
1999).  
 
In Kailadevi, the scope for NGO engagement in resource conflicts and their resolution has 
enabled individuals to opportunistically establish themselves in the ‘business of NGOs’. 
With the organisational survival and maintenance as their priority, the NGOs in Kailadevi 
are dependent on and answerable to several publics-the government, the donors and the 
network of people-oriented advocacy groups. The NGOs thus attempt to simultaneously 
play multiple roles that are at most times inherently contradictory. The brunt of such 
manipulations and role playing is often borne by the very communities the NGO’s seek to 
empower. 
 
Community-based conservation and community representation, for NGOs like TBS and 
SSD, is valuable stakes to be upheld for their own survival. Their saleability lies in 
projecting themselves as ‘successful’ in enabling community-initiatives and participation 
in community-based conservation. Consequently, both organisations tend to appropriate 
credit for community-initiatives in which they have had no role to play. While the locally 
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based NGO claimed to have made them more effective by formalizing the panchayats as 
Village Development Committees, Tarun Bharat Sangh claimed to have initiated them in 
23 villages. In projecting their credibility with and proximity to communities’ they not 
only misrepresent the communities’ merits and undermine their interests but also 
represent them as being in need of interventions by NGOs to guard their own well being 
and interests.  
 
NGOs ability to work for the interests of the people is contingent on the political 
dynamics of the larger organisational networks of which they are a part.  Although the 
issue is of people and their access that are at stake, SSD’s ability to address these issues 
are underpinned by its own agenda for project ‘performance’, sustained funding, 
maintaining solidarity with support organisations and future opportunities for work with 
the FD. Consequently the NGO is unable to take up any advocacy or confrontational 
issues directly. Its instigation of community action against the State becomes either a 
means in the power play between the organisation and the Forest department or an action 
to affirm its legitimacy as an advocacy organisation to the network of support 
organisations that expect the same from it. In the balance, however, it has no real impact 
either in facilitating a participatory approach or in ensuring the rights and livelihood 
issues of the people vis-a-vis the Forest Department. 
 
Participation is mostly instrumental in nature i.e. essentially to facilitate the smooth 
implementation of the pre-planned projects. Making people participate is the most 
important factor for the NGOs own survival. Just as in the case of the FD, the NGO also 
need to demonstrate to its funding agencies a willing participation by the people. 
However, contrary to the popular assumption (much of which generated by NGOs 
themselves) ‘communities’ are not necessarily willing participants in the NGO 
programmes. 
 
Administrative exigencies of the NGO lead them to co-opt local power structures in the 
local institutions like village development committees, thus reinforcing the existing social 
hierarchies and inequities in the village. Although the process of decision-making is done 
through convening of the local institution and in the presence of the communities, the 
expression of the communities is straight jacketed into that which is expected of them by 
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the donor or the state. The malleability of the community in the hands of the NGO is 
maintained by lack of transparency and misinformation.  
 
Empowerment is limited to meeting project prescribed items i.e. establishment of local 
institutions or SHG groups etc. The NGO’s survival is dependent on fostering 
dependency of the communities. Most importantly while the NGO encourages 
communities to seek accountability and question the functioning of the State at the village 
level, it views communities questioning of the NGOs working as ‘trouble making’ and 
being ‘ungrateful’. 
 
In conclusion, I submit that the effectiveness of NGOs as active partners in participatory 
conservation approaches have to be analysed within their local contexts of origin and 
operations. While their work may seem credible, and enabling a community-based 
approach, in effect the NGO can also be subtly perpetuating the very hurdles to ensure its 
own survival and sustainability. It may just be shifting of assumed control over 
community from one hand to the other. Thus it is suggested that rather than seeing NGOs 
as the closest to community aspiration and legitimate brokers, the communities 
themselves should be directly involved in negotiating their fates. Rather than dealing with 
politics at the NGO level, it would serve better to deal with the politics at the community 
level in enabling community participation and participation in conservation and other 
developmental projects.   
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Chapter 6 
Communities: Perceptions, Strategies and Disenchantment 
 
 Introduction  
 
The primary thrust of the India Ecodevelopment Project (IEDP) was to reduce the 
negative impacts of conservation policy and practice on the people by adopting a 
participatory approach to develop viable alternatives to resource use and dependence. 
This Chapter focuses on the interpretations and responses of the communities based on 
their understanding of the concept and implementation of IEDP. In analysing the 
perceptions of the communities and their engagement with external agencies, the paradox 
of participatory conservation attempted through IEDP is attempted to be brought out.  
 
The first three sections of the Chapter provide a brief history of Karauli forests and the 
changing policies over rights and wildlife management. The purpose is to underscore the 
fact that external interventions that do not consider the local socio-political history of the 
issues they seek to address, either fail or are inadequate in addressing the issues 
effectively (Ferguson 1990; Sivaramakrishnan 1999). In the case of IEDP, prescriptions 
are ahistorical in nature. The starting premise is that local communities, especially their 
resource dependence, have an adverse impact on the PA. The communities, on the other 
hand, accept the project-related activities of the Forest Department (FD), and its impact 
on their lives, in continuity of, and in relation to, the history of control exercised on the 
forests by the different regimes over time, starting with the princely state of Karauli.  The 
crux of the perceived people-wildlife conflict remains the issue of resource use and rights 
and the impact of wildlife on livelihoods. Irrespective of all the rhetoric of conservation 
and participation that the Project may have adopted, for the communities the impact of 
changing regimes on these two issues remain central to how they perceive the ongoing 
activities.  
 
Section four focuses on the Project’s attempts at institutionalisation of participation 
through the formation of Ecodevelopment Committees (EDC) In analysing its impact on 
the practice of kulhadi bandh panchayat, it has been demonstrated that the processes and 
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principles of external attempts at local institutional building, only serve to create localised 
project institutions that serve to co-opt people and their resistance to the implementation 
of externally defined agendas (Sundar 2000, Hailey 2001, Vasavada et al. 1999).  Local 
communities, unable to relate to the prescribed and imposed structures of the Project, 
identify them not as their ‘own’ but as of the ‘other’ (external agencies). It also focuses 
how the emergence of external institution redefines the people-forest relations and 
weakens their own attempts at forest protection.  
 
Section five focuses on the agency of people themselves.  It answers questions raised in 
the first chapter as to why communities, despite being severely disadvantaged by the 
Project and gaining no real benefit, still choose to collaborate with the external agencies 
in sustaining the success stories of their intervention. The last section focuses on the 
communities continued efforts at forest protection and concludes that the community-
initiative at forest protection is indispensable to their own survival needs and will remain 
their domain with, or without, the support of the State and external projects.  
 
State and Communities  
 
In analyzing the community response to the conservation initiative by the Forest 
Department, the thesis presents an analysis of the communities in relation to the state and 
in no way suggests a binary opposition between the ‘State’ and the ‘communities’ (See 
Chapter 1).  While earlier development critique and subaltern studies may have suggested 
such an opposition (Chatterjee 1993; Guha 1989), it is no longer argued that such divides 
are simplistic and that ‘society/communities’ and  ‘state’ are mutually constitutive of each 
other (Sinha 2008; Chatterjee 2004; Gilbert and Nugent 1994). This becomes even more 
apparent in the critiques on participatory development and conservation discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
 
The analysis of the participatory conservation initiative in Kailadevi done in this study 
resonates with Sinha’s  (2008:84) argument in his analysis of the government programme 
on Community Development in India  as a process and outcome of what he refers to as 
the ‘transnational regime’ (rather than just postcolonial or national): 
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“Community” and “state” far from being mutually exclusive became mutual 
conditions of possibility; the state makes certain forms of community possible, 
just as incorporating the communities become a mode of exercising state power.  
 
In Kailadevi the EDCs formed by the state, with the participation of communities, served 
not only to entrench the Department in the villages, but also enabled both the re-
articulation communities’ self-initiated forest protection discourse and the reinforcement 
of existing power inequities within the communities. Simultaneously, the KBPs and the 
‘community’ became a central category in the states conservation paradigm and discourse.  
 
In representing the ‘state’ and the ‘communities’, one of the principle analytical premise 
of the thesis, is to  see the ‘communities’ and ‘state’ (largely represented by the Forest 
Department) not as monotheistic but in their disaggregated self. This has been discussed 
in some detail in Chapters 3 and 4. It is in this disaggregated interaction between the two 
agencies that boundaries blur, making any binary opposition unlikely. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the lower cadres of the government (in this case the Forest Department) 
emerge from and remain entrenched in village communities. Equally, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, ‘communities’ get entrenched in the State through engagement with village 
functionaries and local officials for potential political and economic gain. Referred to as 
‘mediators’, ‘intermediaries’ or ‘brokers’, such groups or individuals tend to reproduce a 
‘shadow state’, blurring the divides between actual ‘state’ and ‘society’ (Pattenden 2011; 
Shah 2010; Lewis and Mosse 2006).  
 
Ironically the analysis of the ‘state’ in the thesis (Chapter 4) as a disaggregate of people, 
levels and inter and intra-institutional complex of relationships compels this author to use 
the word ‘state’ in this Chapter, even though it is largely used to refer to the Forest 
Department. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Department may be the implementing body, 
but its logic of operations and ideologies are borne from its internal and intra-
organizational compulsions. The participatory conservation models embodied in IEDP 
and its implementation are more akin to what Sinha (2008) refers to as the ‘transnational 
regime’ – driven as much by international and national ideologies, interests and operation 
in conservation, as by regional and local interests. The forest operations of the erstwhile 
State (as discussed in Chapter 2) remained implicated in the larger colonial politics 
played out in hunting as a sport, emerging international ideologies of conservation and its 
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own need retain power and sovereignty. Thus, the Department in its position vis-à-vis the 
communities, not only represent its many facets but also encompasses the multiple facets 
of the international, regional and other local governmental interests and conflicts.  
 
The concept of ‘communities’ has been used interchangeably with ‘people’ in this 
Chapter. This does not necessarily contradict the analysis of community as a disaggregate 
as done in the preceding Chapters or in this one; it does not intend to deny the differences 
based on competing interests, age, caste, class, political or economic power. In fact 
Chapter 3 demonstrates the oft cited concerns, found in the literature on community 
management and co-management of natural resources, that in heterogeneous and divided 
communities, strengthening of traditional systems or instituting of new systems of 
management does not necessarily ensure the equitable distribution of resources among the 
community groups (Agrawal 1997; Jodha 1996). On the contrary as demonstrated in the 
case of the Rebaris in Kailadevi, while enabling a better management of the resources 
through partnering of residential communities of Kailadevi and the Forest Department, 
the inequities within communities get reinforced wherein the relatively politically weaker 
non-residential communities of the Rebaris tend to be denied their rights to access the 
resources by the newly instituted authorities.  
 
The analysis of the relation between the state and communities in this chapter underscores 
Singleton’s (2000) argument made in acknowledgement of the understanding that many 
co-management regimes grow out of a prior history of conflictual relations, “...while co-
management can reorder relations between different sets of actors in a variety of ways, it 
should be viewed as a continuation of conflicts, rather than a resolution of them” (ibid: 
10). Further, where there is a prior history of conflicts, “a pattern of opportunistic and 
adversarial may have already been established and in that context such actions may be 
seen by actors themselves as either ‘acts of resistance’ (if done by community users) or 
‘upholding proper management practices (if done by state managers).” Also relevant to 
understanding the relation between the state and communities in Kailadevi is Singleton’s 
(ibid.:6) observation of “how actors are constituted affects their relative bargaining power 
and the outcomes of conflicts”.  
 
In analyzing the communities’ responses and interaction, this Chapter elaborates the 
history of forest management in Kailadevi to focus on the changing regimes of 
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management and in turn the changing practices and perceptions of the communities vis-à-
vis the ‘state’. The principal argument the Chapter makes that while external 
interventions deny both politics and history of the interactions between the state and the 
communities, their responses and strategies are shaped by: a) their history of interactions 
with the state and b) the communities’ varying perception of how the state is constituted 
and the changes therein. It is not that the state is most powerful, but so far as the 
communities are concerned both historically and in the context of IEDP, their attempts to 
appeal to authorities other than the Forest Department have yielded little results. This in 
turn has lent to the communities perceiving the Forest Department as being the final 
authority on all matters related to resource use within the Sanctuary.   
 
The final point in understanding the relations between the state and the communities is of 
politics and society. Although the communities’ in Kailadevi perceive the state as a 
powerful authority and choose strategies of evasion, false compliance and other non-
confrontational modes of response, it still functions as what Chatterjee (2004) refers to as 
a ‘political society’. According to Chatterjee (ibid.:4) “political society is a notion that 
helps understand the entanglement of elite and subaltern politics - especially the politics 
that emerges out of the developmental policies of government aimed at specific 
population groups”. According to Chaterjee, groups in political society claim rights and 
entitlement that are not necessarily due to them by mobilizing themselves and by 
networking outside the group i.e with other groups under similar circumstances, with 
governmental functionaries, influential people, political leaders etc. Usually authorities 
“cannot ignore …such groups receive attention from those agencies according to 
calculations of political expediency” (op cit.).  
 
In understanding the potential of the communities of Kailadevi as a political society there 
are two important pointers. First, as most theorist’s on state –community interaction 
acknowledge, while political power is interactive in all such interactions, it involves a 
continuous process of contestation and negotiation, that are tenuous and subject to fragile 
political calculations and not all political societies can mobilize support nor do they 
always get their claims (Chatterjee 2004; Gilbert and Nugent 1994; Scott 1994; 1990).  
Mallon (1994:70), in analyzing the everyday forms of state formation as a ‘hegemonic 
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process’
113
, states – “ politics at all levels become nested arenas of contestations, where 
power is being contested, legitimated and redefined. Some political projects are always 
winning out over others, some factions are defeating others”. The second point to 
understand is that not all contestation or resistance necessary leads to a ‘revolution’ (see 
Scott 1994; Knight 1994) Non-revolutionary resistance in the case of Kailadevi comprises 
of what Knight (1994:70 citing Scott 1990) refers to as “subversive attitudes...under the 
mask of docility”. Resistance that precludes the use of any single measure for its 
subversion.   
 
It is widely acknowledged in the literature on participatory conservation that co-
management constitutes a context of unequal power relations. What strategies are adopted 
or how rule is resisted is a continuous process and is informed by the strategic needs of 
the communities; their relative power positions and perception of what is negotiable or 
non-negotiable in terms of accessing resources. In the case of Kailadevi, the communities 
have to try to garner support from other authorities to undermine the imposition of the 
regulations by the Forest Department. For instance, they have repeatedly approached the 
Revenue Department for regularizing the forest land they have encroached for agriculture. 
All efforts however have always been overruled by the Revenue Department by citing 
legislations applicable to the Sanctuary.   
 
The communities’ strategies are also informed by their learning from the experiences of 
the communities in Ranthambhore National Park (RNP) In RNP the Meena114 
communities have been able to mobilize their strength and network with their caste 
brothers in politics and government to oppose the Forest Department in Sawai Madhopur. 
This has led to several clashes and heightened the vigilance of the Department, including 
the building of a concrete boundary wall around the Park. The clashes in Ranthambhore, 
however, are for accessing resources of the forests from the ‘outside’. (In RNP all villages 
have been relocated from the core area, four villages remain in the buffer area). Learning 
from this experience, where years of protest could not prevent relocation, in Kailadevi the 
                                                
 
113 Mallon borrows the term from William Roseberry (1994). In this usage ‘hegemony’ is seen as an 
endpoint or outcome of a hegemonic process. Mallon (1994) uses this term to understand how popular 
culture interacts and inform the elite culture and how state formation is a co-produced process rather than 
an imposition of an elite culture.  
114 Meena is a Schedule Tribe community that wields considerable power in the state of Rajasthan. They 
have significant presence in politics and in the Government of Rajasthan.   
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communities’ prefer ‘everyday forms of resistance’ while a confrontationist stance is 
more strategic and therefore no less political. Also, it is important to note that state-
community relations over access and control of resources in Kailadevi are an ongoing, 
dynamic process that, at the time of this research was continually being negotiated. 
Therefore, it cannot be definitely concluded as to whether at a later stage their resistance 
will change its face, garner strength and mobilize opposition to the Department’s 
impositions.  
 
History of the Forests of Kailadevi: Administration and Management 
 
Karauli has a history dating back to the 10th century, when it was established and ruled by 
the Jadon Clan.
115
 Thereafter, the State fell into the hands of the rulers of the Slave 
dynasty116, followed by the Mughal Empire,117 and the Marathas.118 A treaty between the 
Marathas and the East India Company (dated 9th November 1817) brought Karauli under 
British protection. Notwithstanding annexation by other forces, the Jadon Clan continued 
to rule Karauli State until the Independence of India in 1947. In 1949 it was merged with 
the State of Rajasthan (Prasad 1982, District Gazetteer 1983, Imperial Gazetteer 1901).  
 
The earliest documented history of the forests of Karauli State is from early 20th century 
which describes the area (c. 516 sq km) being bereft of any ‘real forests’ and ‘valuable 
timber’ (Imperial Gazetteer, 1901). At the time forests were managed by the Bagar 
Department, a subsidiary of the Revenue Department, with a Forest Officer, Forest 
Inspector and several Forest Guards (referred to as rundhiyas). The principle functions of 
the Department were: 
1. Supply grass and firewood for State elephants and cattle 
2. Find and preserve game for the King and his followers 
                                                
 
115 Jadon, the ruling clan of the Rajputs, consider themselves to be the descendants of Lord Krishna, a 
popular Hindu god. 
116 Between the 10th and the 17th century the Slave Dynasty had ruled Karauli. Slave dynasty refers to the 
various Muslim dynasties that ruled in India in the 12th and 13th century. (See Habib and Raychaudhuri 
(eds.) 1982 ) 
117 The Mughal Empire lasted from 1526 to 1857 (See Richards, 1993). 
118 Marathas were Marathi-speaking people of West and Central India, known for their ability as warriors 
and their devotion to Hinduism. They rose to power in the 17th century and helped bring about the fall of the 
Mughal Empire but also opposed British supremacy in India. The Imperial British army waged several wars 
with the Marathas finally subjugating them in 1818 (See Stein 1998). 
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3. Provide revenue by exacting grazing dues.  
 
Other than securing these interests of the State, the forest management was not given 
much importance. The section on ‘Forest’ in the State Administrative Reports from 1885-
1908 focus only on the revenue received from the Forest Department. In 1912 the first 
forest survey of the area was undertaken by JH Lyall, an Imperial Forest Officer 
appointed by the Political Agent of Karauli, who reported “no systematic management of 
the forests” (1914: 12) Other than game reserves and fodder enclosures (rundhs), the rest 
of the forests were not well protected, and Lyall made several recommendations for the 
management, survey and commercial exploitation of the forests. However, because of 
financial constraints the State was unable to implement any of his suggestions,119 with 
practically no exploitation of forests during years of State rule.120 In 1944 contracts were 
given for the first time for manufacture and export of katha,121 firewood and charcoal. 
However, this system of exploitation was dismissed later for being “unsystematic, non-
profitable and unscientific.”
 122
  
 
In 1948-49, under the State of Rajasthan, the Forest Departments of four princely states 
(Bharatpur, Alwar, Dholpur and Karauli) were merged to form the Bharatpur Forest 
Division, with Karauli and Sapotra Ranges covering the forests of Kailadevi. The two 
defining features of this phase of management are the settlement of the forests and the 
systematic exploitation of the forests for revenue generation. 
 
The Rajasthan Forest Act was promulgated in 1953 and shortly thereafter, in 1955-56, the 
first Forest Settlement of Rajasthan was undertaken. As a part of the Settlement process 
Forest Blocks were demarcated and areas notified as ‘Protected Forests’ to be managed 
for revenue generation. At that time the principal forest products (katha, firewood, 
charcoal, and bamboo) were exploited by auctioning annual forest coupes to local 
contractors. In 1979 the Karauli and the Sapotra Ranges were moved from Bharatpur to 
the Tonk Forest Division.  
 
                                                
 
119 Report on the Administration of the Karauli State for year 1932-1933. 
120 Management Plan, Bharatpur Forest Division (1968-78) 
121 An edible extract of the Khair (Acacia catechu) 
122 Working Plan of the Tonk Forest Division (1955-56 to 1974-75) 
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In 1983 the Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary was declared under the Wild Life (Protection) 
Act, 1972, followed by the creation of the Karauli Forest Division in 1984. As a 
Sanctuary, the forests were managed for conservation and protection of biodiversity, by 
the Territorial Wing of the Forest Department. In 1990-91, the management of the 
Sanctuary was brought under the Project Tiger Office in Ranthambhore, Sawai 
Madhopur.123 In 1996 the Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve was selected under the World 
Bank-supported India Ecodevelopment Project (IEDP). Between 1997 and 2000 three 
more Forest Ranges were added to the Sanctuary area and the post of the Divisional 
Forest Officer (DFO) was created in Karauli, leading to a significant enhancement of staff 
and the infrastructure.
124
 
 
Through these various phases, the State has put on ‘many faces’ represented by 
Departments and mediated by informal and formal policies. The communities have 
assessed these regime changes in terms of impact on their resource use practices and by 
the events that have unfolded at the village level. In the narratives of the communities 
there are three distinct comparative phases of State interventions. These are: Rajan ka Raj 
(the period of rule by the King of Karauli State); Congress Raj (the period of Congress 
party rule)
125
; and the time when the ‘EDC people came.’
126
 
 
The history of forest management of the area has not informed the formulation of the 
Project. But as Sivaramakrishnan (1999: 273) rightly argues ‘present problems of 
conservation cannot be diagnosed and hence cannot be prescribed for without a situated 
understanding of the historical process that moulded them’. In the village of Nibhera the 
people’s interpretation and response to external intervention are shaped by their lived 
histories of interaction with the State in the past. People tend to understand present 
intervention in forest management by constant reference and comparison to the past 
systems of management. 
                                                
 
123 Ranthambhore Management Plan 1991-1995 
124 Ranthambhore Management Plan 2002-2012 
125 Since Independence the Indian National Congress has dominated state politics in Rajasthan. Besides, as 
the older generation remembers, it was the people of the Indian National Congress that visited their villages 
to announce Independence from the British and the end of the Rajan ka Raj. Thus the generation always 
refer to the Government of Independent India as Congress ki Sarkar (for the advent and rule of Congress in 
Rajasthan see Narain and Mathur, 1990) 
126 Similar narratives of the changing regimes are also found in other parts of Rajasthan (See Gold and 
Gujjar 2002)  
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As is evident from the historical records and the narratives of the communities, the State 
and the communities have always had a conflicting agenda of protection and resource use. 
The communities’ means of resource use and management however seem to have always 
taken into account the State’s authority, management and control over the resources. With 
every passing regime the State, represented by the FD, has become less accessible and 
amenable to the people and their needs. The advent of the forest bureaucracy and its 
transition to the current management structure of the Sanctuary has increasingly alienated 
the people from the State in two key aspects affecting their existence in the forest area - 
resource access and perils of wildlife.  
 
For the communities, the fundamental change in their relation with the State, and 
subsequently with their resources, occurred with the demise of the Raj. The new systems, 
starting with the Congress and up to the time of EDCs, have introduced elements that, 
while maintaining some continuity with past systems, have radically redefined the 
boundaries of interaction between the people and the State.  
 
People and the changing regimes of access and rights  
 
There is little evidence indicating that the legal ownership of the forests of Kailadevi have 
ever been with the local communities. Prior to Independence, ownership primarily rested 
with the King and to some extent with the baoptadars and the jagirdars,127 who paid 
tribute to the King but also enjoyed profit accruing from the sale of grass and firewood. 
Although technically there was a concept of ‘village forest’, no such demarcations had 
taken place (Lyall, 1914). Following the Settlement of Forests and Land Revenue in 
1955-56, the jurisdiction of the forests and the land therein fell within the purview of the 
Forest Department and the Revenue Department. Currently, the villages of Kailadevi are 
classified by the Forest Department as ‘island’ villages i.e. revenue villages surrounded 
by forest land.  
 
                                                
 
127 Forms of land tenancy introduced in India by the early sultans of Delhi in the early 13th century. Under 
the system, land, its revenues, and the power to govern it was assigned to an official of the state. 
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The regime of rights and access of local communities are not on record. For instance, 
Lyall (1914: 16) categorically states:  
There are no rights; grazing, green wood for agricultural and other purposes and 
dry wood for fuel are concessions, though time and custom may have caused 
them to be considered rights.  
Felling green wood was strictly prohibited. Caste groups such as carpenters had to pay a 
sum to access a limited amount of green wood and fencing material. Grazing fee was 
applicable only for camels and goats. Following the Forest Settlement, the rights and 
concession of the people were laid down block-wise.
128
 While most of the rules of 
Karauli State were retained, use of forest land for agriculture was curtailed. Unlike earlier 
when a farmer could cultivate land anywhere so long as he paid taxes, agricultural 
expansion on forest land without prior permission of the department was no longer 
permitted. Each village was given a designated grazing area. There was no restriction on 
grazing cattle in the forest area (Block settlement Records, 1956; IIPA 1997).  
 
While restrictions on resource use have been imposed by every regime, people’s access to 
resources has been shaped by how the State has sought to wield its authority. It is in this 
sense that the FD of the EDC phase (associated with the establishment of the Sanctuary) 
is markedly different from the period of the Raj or Congress. The State has always been 
all powerful, and continues to be so, but the terms of its interaction with the local 
communities has changed significantly.  
 
The Authoritarian State 
The oldest generation of Nibhera have seen the rule of the last two Kings, Bhompal Pal 
(1927-47) and his son Ganesh Pal (1947-84). Dhanbai Gujjar one of the oldest women 
alive in the village reminisces the all encompassing power of the State: “In those days 
whatever the raja said was final!” Within this authoritarian regime, there were apparently 
no haq (rights) that the people had. Access to resources was in terms of manjuri 
(permission) The Rajas’ sepoy or the rundhiya (guard) were also carriers of messages 
from the King. According to Bodya: 
                                                
 
128 During the Settlement process, the forest land was divided into units called blocks for the purpose of 
administration and management.  
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They would come and tell us that from now on you are not allowed to get this or 
go there in the forest (in relation to new grass preserve or game preserve that 
would be set up) Those days wherever they wanted they would make a new 
rundh. Once the rundh was made we could not go there. This was the law of the 
State and if we broke it then punishment could be severe. 
The State as the sole power over their forests continues to the present times, except that 
the States powers have multiplied (cf. Divyabhanusinh 1998). As the people put it- “now 
only God knows how many Kings there are!” In the recent times the villagers have seen 
many senior officials visit the area including the DFO, the CCF, even the State Minister 
of Forests. Today, the concept of haq or ‘rights’ is no different from the times of the Raj; 
villagers are aware that these rights can be taken away at any time.  
 
The supremacy of the FD’s authority vis-à-vis other authorities has been time and again 
established in front of the village. The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, deems that only 
those activities permitted by the FD may be carried out in the PA. Thus in many public 
meetings the District Magistrate, considered to be the highest authority at the District 
level, has been tactfully denied permission by the FD to carry out some infrastructure 
development activities inside the Sanctuary. Govind Gujjar, the EDC head states: “The 
right over the forests still remains with the Forest Department, like there was no one 
above the King, now no one seems to be above them.”  
 
It is because of the perception of FD as sole authority and arbitrator of all issues on rights, 
even when communities have an opportunity to claim rights through other channels, they 
do not bother. In 1997 there was a Supreme Court ruling to complete the pending legal 
processes of establishing PAs across India.129 Given the indifference of the FD to 
complete legal procedures, most villages in Kailadevi were not even aware that a legal 
process was underway. It was the local NGO, the Society for Sustainable Development  
that took the initiative urging people to file claims over existing rights, but most people 
declined from doing so. Bhanta explains the disinterest: 
                                                
 
129 In India, The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, governs the establishment and management of Protected 
Areas (PA). There are 13 legal steps between declaration of intent and final notification of an area as a PA. 
Many of the PAs in India are erstwhile Protected Forests (PF) or Reserved Forests (RF), and it is assumed 
that the procedure of settlement of rights would have been completed under the Indian Forest Act prior to 
their declaration as PF or RF. However, to declare an area as a PA, such as Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary, 
the 13-step legal process has to be followed to settle all existing rights over resources. Thus, while the 
intention to declare the area was made in 1983, it was not until 1998, following an order of the Supreme 
Court, that the final notification for Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary was issued.  
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We have seen many such initiatives in the past, but nothing comes of them. If the 
FD says no, it is a no! Why should we insist and invite the hostility of the FD? 
Tomorrow they will change some words here and there and we will have to wash 
our hands off whatever little we have. We would rather avoid having anything to 
do with such claims. 
 
Lack of Space for Negotiations  
What differentiates the period of the Raj from the current authority of the FD, is the space 
for negotiation available to the villagers. Jania Gujjar, well into his sixties, has seen times 
change: 
In the past the people acknowledged the authority of the Raj over the forests. 
The siphais (police guards) and the rundhiyas (forest guards) would come by 
regularly. Whoever would dare to disobey the King would be severely punished. 
People feared the siphai! But even in those days the Raj was not like the FD is 
now. The Raj honoured the needs of the people. If the people would ask for 
something at least the King would give them an audience. Now everything is 
according ‘paper’ (law), and they always tell us that the law cannot be changed. 
In one instance the villagers wanted to exchange forest land (which they claimed had 
been cultivated by their ancestor) with wasteland130 outside the jurisdiction of the FD, but 
were told that such an exchange is not permissible under the law. According to the 
villagers, under the Raj, despite the regulations and the prohibitive taxing structures, there 
was always space for negotiations. There was scope for the appeals of villages to be 
granted by the durbar (King’s court), such as the village boundary of Nibhera and their 
exclusive grazing rights on the badi kho. These were granted as a reward for the valour of 
Baba Balram, a Gujjar ancestor, had displayed in battle.  
 
A significant event in the Congress phase was the coming of the doriwale (literally, the 
‘people with the thread’ or land surveyors)131 to the village. This marked the beginning of 
a system whereby the State was no longer amenable to the needs of the communities. 
Haricharan Gujjar, a respected man of Gujjar community vividly recalls: 
When the doriwale came everything changed. They measured our land, divided 
it into various bits, and said: ‘this bit belongs to the janglat (Forest Department), 
this to sivaychak (Revenue Department).’ 
                                                
 
130 Das 1997 
131 Doriwale in fact refers to the tools & instruments of land surveyors, who were responsible for physical 
measurement and demarcation, as part of the Settlement process of the mid-50s. 
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The division of the land was accompanied by restrictive and inflexible regulations 
pertaining to its use. Unlike earlier when farmers could cultivate land anywhere as long as 
they paid taxes, expansion of agriculture into forest land, without permission of the FD, 
was no longer permitted. Each village was given designated areas for its agriculture and 
grazing. Most importantly, the land ownership was no longer legitimised by its use but by 
possession of a pata (ownership deed) that Jania described as “numbers on a piece of 
paper!”  
 
The all-pervasive legal system of current times leaves no space for negotiation as in the 
case of rejecting the request for ‘exchange’ of land. Instead the law is conveniently 
interpreted by the FD to exercise total control. For instance, although the law does allow 
for some human use in a Sanctuary, the Forest Guards will treat Kailadevi Wildlife 
Sanctuary at par with Ranthambhore National Park, making any human presence or use of 
resources illegal. The predominance of legal idioms in interaction increases the distance 
between the FD and the people. They simply do not understand the language in which 
their resources are now being talked about, especially under a programme like the IEDP. 
 
Omnipresent State 
According to the villagers the most evident difference between the times of the Raj and 
EDC, is the omnipresent and all pervasive nature of the State represented by the FD. The 
permitted use of forest resources always falls short of the required need of the 
communities. At the same time, openly breaking the law has always meant strict action 
unless one resorted to bribing the local officials and guards. The punishments were 
particularly severe during the time of the Raj.
132
 In recent times, apart from being fined, 
some villagers have also been physically assaulted by the FD for what they perceived as 
violating the regulations of the Sanctuary. The people have nonetheless always managed 
to meet their needs from the forests (even of small timber, despite the fact that it has 
always been prohibited even in the time of the Raj). This they have done, to put it in their 
own words, by stealth (chori - chippe) or hoodwinking the FD (janglat ki aankh bachake). 
                                                
 
132 Bodya Dom recalled how offenders were tied to cots and had stones trampled into their palms and feet. 
Sometimes the guards would confiscate the offender’s cattle and land. In some cases the offender would be 
fined so heavily that he would leave the village and become a fugitive.  
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Thus, irrespective of de jure rights, villagers have defined their access issues by 
establishing their de facto rights.133  
 
The problems that people face are less on account of the changes in their de jure rights 
and more because of the effect the new governance of the FD has on their de facto rights. 
The expansion of the Departments into the forests through, nakas and chowkis (check-
post) and the presence of guards at the village level have made their de facto use of 
resources more visible. The intrusive presence of the FD is best captured in the words of 
Jania Gujjar:  
In the times of the Raj, the sipahis (guards) would come once in a while. They 
would be few in number, yet their approach would be immediately known in the 
village and people would become alert. There were dense forests close to the 
village and we would get what we want without having to in too deep. One never 
had to see the siphai if he didn’t come to the village. These days the guards are 
all over…they have made check-posts and towers and now they stay in the 
village all the time. They have their eyes all over …now getting things from the 
forests is difficult, every other day they catch hold of some one or the other. 
During the Raj there were many de facto rights that were not necessarily illegal. Although 
the Raj remained the owner of the forests, the villages had the de facto rights to exert their 
ownership over forests vis-à-vis other villages. Between them they could buy, sell and 
mortgage land. They had the freedom to give other villages access to their resources and 
themselves use any part of the forests as they pleased.  
The exclusivity of village territory was first impinged upon during the Forest 
Settlement, with the FD carving out Forest Blocks to improve forest 
administration. Each Block, however, included the forests of several villages. All 
the villages included in the Block would have grazing rights in the same area. 
(ACF 2002: pers. comm.) 
Despite the Forest Settlement, the villages had continued to function as they had done 
under the Raj. The FD did not seem to interfere much and up until the advent of IEDP, 
the PA was rather neglected. With the declaration of the Sanctuary and advent of IEDP, 
the FD has imposed strict restriction on use of resources by villages located outside the 
Sanctuary.
134
 This seriously impacted the reciprocal arrangement the villages within the 
Sanctuary had with the villages of the plains, especially for meeting the shortage of 
                                                
 
133 The prevalence of de facto use and rights is common to most resource rich areas. It is these practices that 
challenge the ability to implement law effectively (Saberwal 1999; Peluso 1992).  
134 Similar, almost identical impacts have been noted by Neumann (1997) on buffer zone management and 
eco-development in East Africa. Similar impacts of establishment of PA have been noted by Karlsson 
(1999) in India.  
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fodder and water during the lean season. Also ownership of forest areas like the badi kho, 
conferred to the village in the time of the Raj, was now under threat. The setting up of 
cattle camps in the forests was made illegal, and villagers refrained from getting the use 
of forest land for agriculture regularized
135
, lest such a claim attracts the undue attention 
of the FD. In effect, under the present governance system practically all de facto resource 
use practices have been rendered ‘illegal’.   
 
Unable to negotiate de jure rights, villagers expand the arena of de facto rights through 
false compliance, bribing, avoidance, misinformation and feigned ignorance - strategies 
that Scott (1985: 29) defines as the “everyday forms of resistance… ordinary weapons of 
relatively powerless groups.” The ‘illegal’ nature of de facto rights and the constraints of 
de jure rights is what spawn maximum corruption and exploitation of local villages by the 
FD frontline staff (cf. Robbins 2000). The nexus that they have with villagers either 
because of political and economic might or because of long standing inter-personal 
relationship plays a significant role defining the access issues of the people.  
 
Radhacharan Nai, the 21 year old community worker for the local NGO, was among the 
few people in the village with whom I could openly discuss issues of encroachment on 
Forest land.  According to his lists (that I later confirmed with others) the only families 
who had been consistently cultivating Forest land illegally were the economically well off 
Gujjar families. According to the other villagers, these Gujjar families have the forest 
guard and the patwari on their pay roll. Thus as Radharaman, a young Brahmin youth and 
a master at the primary school in the neighbouring village, put it:  
The officials know about it but tend to turn a blind eye to it…these Gujjar 
families are rich and they are also very powerful…in our village  there are 
different sets of rules for different people…might is right here it has nothing to 
do with rules 
Seeing the operations of the FD and how the people tend to meet their needs through non-
confrontation and yet in violation of the laws of the FD, I noted in my Field Dairy (dated 
21 May 2001): 
It seems to me that what the Forest Department now deems illegal is (and has 
been) a ‘way of life’ for people so far as resource use practices are concerned. 
How can people be the prime stakeholders of the Project when they can’t even 
                                                
 
135 Under the provision of the Forest Conservation Act of 1980, ownership of land encroached before 1988 
and under possession for more than 12 years could be regularized.  
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be upfront about what their stakes are? In what terms does the Project assess the 
impacts of the PA on the people when the FD lives in denial of the actual 
resource use practices of the villagers? If the villagers can’t even claim their 
stakes, how are they meant to get them? By letting the World Bank believe that 
the FD is doing fine under the IEDP are they not legitimizing the FD regime of 
rights that deny villagers basic access to resources?  Full of misconceptions and 
a servile attitude towards authorities, why are they choosing to function in a 
system, an illegal system that leaves them vulnerable at all times?  
Clearly, opportunities like the IEDP that are supposed to offer opportunities for people to 
stake their claims, through its implementation process, is being construed by communities 
as one that further jeopardises their claims to their sources of survival. It is evident in 
these processes of implementation of the IEDP, that in participatory projects like this one, 
the contesting stakeholders are not engaging in dialogues that have a common idiom of 
understanding. 
 
People-wildlife Conflict 
 
In this section, in reference to the concept of ‘people-wildlife’ conflict detailed in Chapter 
1, I analyse the situation, as it exists at Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary with a ‘view from 
below’.  There are two main issues that emerge in this context. The first, affirms a general 
assertion made in the recent literature on the ecological history of India,136 in KWS the 
peoples relationship with wildlife is largely influenced by the policies that the State 
adopts towards wildlife and the impact these policies have on the people’s livelihood and 
survival. Consequently, what is seen as ‘people-wildlife’ conflict is probably a conflict 
between two sets of people (the FD and the local communities) mediated largely by the 
policies of the State.  
 
The second issue, that partly ties in with the first, questions some of the arguments 
employed to lobby for the ‘inclusion’ of people in PA management agendas. As the case 
in KWS shows up advocating ‘inclusion’ without analysing the historically contingent 
and constantly changing specific socio-political and cultural contexts that shape people 
relationships with wildlife would do little to serve the cause either of the communities or 
of wildlife conservation.  It is important to understand that these relationships are 
                                                
 
136 This argument has been made more vehemently in the context of the environmental policies of British 
India. However, for similar assertions made in a contemporary context see, among others, Saberwal et. al. 
(2001) and Guha and Gadgil (1992).   
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dynamic and circumstantial; contingent on the nature of the livelihood, lifestyles of the 
communities and the significance of wildlife (or the lack of it) therein.  This is reflected 
in the ironical situation that exists in KWS today. While the local wildlife population is 
significantly smaller compared to the erstwhile state, the threats from them seem 
potentially larger and thus the conflict more pronounced.  
 
Rajan ka Raj: Alluding significance  
In the erstwhile Karauli State there was an abundance of wildlife and the threats they 
posed to human lives, cattle and crops were perhaps much more frequent and real. 
However, the narratives of the people of the past on wildlife reflects not the outright 
hostility that is seen today, but one where there is more tolerance and an ethic of mutual 
respect, accepting that wildlife have equal rights to live in the forest just as much as 
humans do.  In recalling the past of abundance of wildlife there is sense of awe and 
grandeur. There is also a lamentation at the drastic reduction of the wildlife population 
over the years. This, however, does not suggest harmonious relations between humans 
and wildlife, as is often suggested by some of those who argue for participatory PA 
management. Interspersed with these narratives of the Raj are also those of loss of human 
lives and cattle to wildlife. However, in the balance of the ‘inevitability’ of living in close 
proximity to wildlife, the dangers of wildlife were partially offset by the significance it 
had for the people. Also available were several means of controlling and protecting 
themselves against wildlife.   
 
Writing about the ‘wealth’ of wildlife in Karauli in 1895, Brockman in the Medical 
Gazette wrote: 
Tigers and panthers are to be found within most parts of this State, especially the 
latter who inhabit caves and holes, which exists in such abundance in most of the 
rocky hills to be found and almost everywhere in this State. Hyenas and bears 
are also met with, as also occasionally wild dogs. Chinkara (ravine deer) as well 
as black buck are to be found in fairly large numbers (p. 386) 
Typical of the erstwhile days, wildlife hunting was a royal sport both for the British and 
the Indian aristocracy. Much of the forests of Karauli were maintained as shikargah or 
hunting reserves exclusively for the King and his guests137. As is evident from the various 
                                                
 
137 As many of the environmental historians of India have argued, in Princely States, hunting had a 
symbolic significance in the political relations between the rulers with his Imperial Administrator. 
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administrative reports the State, the British political agents and their representatives to the 
State were all taken on shooting expeditions. Tiger was considered the ‘royal game’. The 
animal adorned the royal crest of the most popular ruler of Karauli, Bhanwar Pal (1887-
1927), who also kept two tigers as pets and made them sit on either side of the King’s 
throne. The older residents of Karauli claim that this greatly enhanced his royal position 
with the British; they were impressed with his bravery of having tamed two tigers.138 The 
extent of shooting carried out is evident from a statement made in of the administrative 
report of the year 1913-14 (p 15) - “The total number of tigers that have fallen to His 
Highness’ gun since he ascended the Gaddi (throne) in 1886 is 213.” 
 
Although the forest of the present KWS did not comprise the main shooting camps of the 
rulers,139 the khos with their dense forests and rich reserve of wildlife were seen as 
attractive hunting grounds.  As was the case in most princely states, wildlife preserved for 
game hunting by the rulers posed great dangers to the lives and livelihoods of the people 
(Rangarajan 2000; Saberwal et al. 2001; Gold and Gujjar 2002). In Nibhera many people 
of the older generation have suffered severe losses at the hands of marauding wildlife. As 
family histories reveal, losing a family member at the hands of the tiger was a common 
occurrence. So far as crop raiding was concerned, blue bull, wild pigs and sambars were 
of great nuisance value. Jania Gujjar, now in his late sixties, recalls the havoc of wildlife: 
“They troubled us a lot. They would ruin our crops, carry away our cattle …we always 
had to be on our guard!” Ramkilan Gujjar, the head of the Gujjar clan living in Jheelan ka 
Pura, gives an account of the fear evoked by a tiger: 
Whenever there was a tiger in the vicinity the buffalo would make a noise and as 
for us, our hair would stand on end! We were more frightened of the tiger than of 
persons like you coming from outside. The tiger is the king of the forests. He 
would be fearless. The tiger would roam around the jungle and kill both cattle 
and humans that crossed its path! 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Following the significance the imperial rulers attached to game hunting as a sport, the rulers of the Princely 
State entertained the British guests by allowing them to hunt in their game reserves. These gestures were a 
token display of the loyalty of the ruler of the Princely State to the Imperial ruler, helped the ruler to be on 
good terms with the  representatives and ‘added to the zeal of princely protection’ (Mackenzie 1988; 
Rangarajan 1996;Rangarajan 2001). Hunting was also critical in self-image of rulers who were not allowed 
to wage war (See Waghorne 1994). 
138 This perhaps affirms Rangarajans (2000: 32) assertion that taming the wild animals through hunts was 
‘symbolic of their coercive strength’ (especially since local rulers   under British protection were denied the 
power to wage war or acquire territories). Also see Divyabhanusinh (1999).  
139 There are no records available of the shikargahs of Kailadevi.  
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Hunting wildlife was the exclusive prerogative of the durbar.  The rulers were strict about 
enforcing the game laws against the local communities. The oppression suffered on this 
account was a moot point in the covert political revolt140 against Bhanwar Pal in 1921: 
The increase in the population of tigers and panthers, their merciless devouring 
of farmers and their cattle, the heavy fining and jailing of farmers on killing 
them, taking away from the subject the right to self-defence is the second 
important cause of the poverty of the subject in your state (Memorandum by 
Madan Singh to Bhanwar Pal, in Prasad 1982: 43) 141. 
Despite the evidence of these oppressions suffered by villagers in KWS area, their local 
narratives, unlike those studied by Gold and Gujjar (2002) in another part of Rajasthan, 
refer to these atrocities only partially and in the passing. Recalled in the context of the 
wildlife problems today, and notwithstanding the atrocities and loss in Nibhera, the 
narratives on wildlife in the erstwhile State of Karauli focus on the other, more positive 
meanings it had on their lives142.   
 
The hunting expeditions of the State were an important aspect of the relationship of the 
village with the State; it offered an opportunity to the villagers to directly engage with the 
King and his activities. The hunting expeditions to Nenia ki Kho always passed through 
Nibhera. Rukmini Gujjar (mother of Govind Gujjar and possibly over 80 years) 
remembers that women would gather along the path that the King took to Nenia ki Kho 
bearing milk and curd for the entourage. The King’s sepoys emptied out their pots and the 
king would put a silver coin into them. The men were required to clean the path, provide 
water and do any other task they were asked. They would also accompany the hakka (the 
systematic process of flushing out wildlife from a forest) 
 
                                                
 
140 This revolt was also partially motivated in support of the National Congress for the Independence of 
India from the British. Madan Singh who had spearheaded the revolt was linked to some of the regional 
freedom fighters that clandestinely operated in the area (Ishwari Prasad 1982). In some cases these 
oppressive measures, like in British India, resulted in popular local agitation For popular agitation of local 
communities against the forest policies of British India see Guha and Gadgil (1989), Nandini Sundar(1997). 
For the cases of popular agitations in Princely India see Rangarajan (1996). Also see Gold and Gujjar 
(2002). 
141 The main instigator was Madan Singh was the son of the Kings favourite minister He is known as a 
legendary freedom fighter in the popular local history of Karauli. He wrote regularly in the local papers 
about indignity and losses suffered by local people because of the durbar’s ban on killing of wildlife by 
villagers. 
142 The playing down of the possible atrocities in the narratives can also be understood in terms of the 
politics of representing the past. As Tonkin et al. (1989:5) suggests ‘in order to account for the present, to 
justify it, or criticise it, the past is selectively appropriated, remembered, forgotten or invented’. In the case 
of KWS policies of the FD on wildlife in the Sanctuary while bearing no positive significance, threatens the 
basic survival of the communities in the area.  
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Often the King conferred honours on villagers for acts of bravery during these 
expeditions. Many people in Nibhera recall how Bhanta Gujjar’s father, late Shivlal, 
managed to trap three tigers in Kudka ki Kho and then informed the durbar about it. The 
King’s hunt was successful and Shivlal was presented a gun as a reward, making him the 
first person to possess a gun in the village. These individual honours conferred by the 
State elevated the social and political standing of that particular village in the region 
considerably. In some cases a long-term relationship was established between the King 
and the individual.143 
 
Most importantly it was in these meetings with the King that people were able to 
negotiate their access and rights to land and water sources.  The king held a durbar with 
the people in the village itself, where he would hear the case for enhanced access to 
resources. In Nibhera the oldest well was granted by the King on one such occasion. 
Troubled by the shortage of water, the village poet sang a eulogy to the King and 
requested for the well.  Similarly, on other occasions the King was known to have given 
grants of agricultural land and grazing land.  
 
Additionally, communities were also able protect their fields from crop raiding by 
engaging the nomadic hunting communities known as Moghiyas144 during the harvest 
season.  The farmers provided food and temporary shelters near the agricultural field, and 
it was the job of the Moghiyas to ward of animals by using muzzle loader rifles. 
According to Bodya: 
Other than tigers the Moghiyas would kill everything. Even if they didn’t kill 
them they would ward the animals off by firing in the air. People gave them 1-10 
pesari145 grains in exchange for their services. 
                                                
 
143 It has to be mentioned that in most studies of princely state of Rajasthan, the participation of local 
communities in the hunting activities have been described as instances of conscripted, often unpaid, labour 
or begar. Their participation was seen as forced and oppressive (Rangarajan et al. 2000, Gold and Gujjar 
2002, Johari 2003).  Begar was largely confined to the Bairva, for whom the days of the Raj were a ‘hated 
past’ in most aspect. Most of the other castes, however, speak of their participation with a sense of duty, a 
chance to participate in the affairs of the State. The atrocities of the state are mostly recalled in terms of the 
prohibitive land tax and the punishment for shooting wild animals. The many narratives of the hunting 
expedition were mostly of the grandeur and the largesse of the King.  
 
144 Similar ties of farmers with local hunting communities have also been noted for other parts of the 
country (Rangarajan 1996; Sivaramakrishnan 1999).  
145 Pesari was a measure for grains. It referred to a standard tin that carried about 1 kilogram of grains. 
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Moghiyas were noted marksmen and were often drafted into service to the King. 
According to some of the villagers, the Moghiyas used to ‘fix’ the sights for the King’s 
guns. Their assistance in the hunting expedition is also recorded in the 1923 
administrative report of the State of Karauli. Wildlife was also kept at bay by the hunting 
activities of the Kings themselves. As was common in princely states, the Kings partly 
justified the shooting of large predators and mammals (even wild pigs) on the grounds of 
protecting the cattle and crops of the communities. As Kishen Pal
146
 claimed: 
Shikar (hunting) was a part of life… it was not only a source of entertainment 
and pleasure but also relief to the villagers the animal population of the area was 
so much that it required to be culled and controlled. Some tigers played havoc 
with the lives of the villagers - especially when they took their cattle to 
waterholes that were 1-2 km away from the settlement. Since the forest was 
dense, cattle lifting and man-eating tigers were an omnipresent threat.  
Irrespective of what the ulterior motives of the ruler might have been, it seems these 
measures, albeit in a limited way, did alleviate the fears of the communities and offered 
some of the measures by which they sought to protect themselves from wildlife.  
 
Congress Raj: Manageable Threat  
With the demise of the Raj and advent of the ‘Congress ka Raj’, the threat of wildlife was 
made more manageable. Like in other parts of the country, in Karauli too, in the period 
immediately preceding and following the Independence of India saw an unprecedented 
destruction of forests and hunting of wildlife that hitherto received protection from the 
erstwhile rulers.
147
 The Working Plan of Bharatpur Forest Division, under which the 
Karauli forests were managed till 1979, is the first official record on the forests of the 
post-merger era that identifies some of the main causes of loss of forests and wildlife: 
                                                
 
146 Kishen Pal Deo Bahadur, son of the last ruling King of Karuali Ganesh Pal Deo Bahardur (1947-1984), 
lives at his residence Bhanwar Vilas, which has now been converted into a heritage hotel. He has played a 
significant role in advocating for the establishment of Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary and is also its Honorary 
Wildlife Warden. This is an extract from an interview conducted with him on 08th November 2000. 
147 Such activities were a fall out of several political, social and economic compulsions that marked the 
processes leading to the Independence of India and the consolidation of the political powers therein. Some 
of the key factors that unleashed, what is referred to as a ‘free reign’ of all possible destructive forces on the 
forests and wildlife, included the availability of fire arms on account of the Second World War; the 
breakdown of the protective measures of the erstwhile ruler; the ruthless tree felling and hunting by ex-
jargirdars in anticipation of losing their ownership of the resources to the government of Independent India; 
the economic compulsion to provide better agricultural facilities; and the political compulsion (or ambition) 
to realize India as a ‘modern’ and industrially advanced nation (Mackenzie 1988; Guha and Gadgil 1992; 
Rangarajan 2000; 2001). Also see E.P Gee (1964). There was also a general laissez faire on wildlife 
hunting till the early 1970s (See Sankhla 1978). 
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…on the whole the population of wild life has dwindled from the pre-
Independence days mainly due to the indiscriminate felling of ex-jagir and 
zamindari forests and also due to poaching and unauthorized shootings. (1968:  
34) 
Although Nibhera was not a jagirdari village, its forests were not spared the fate that was 
meted out other forests of the region. The local narratives detail the trends as they 
manifested in their forests:   
After we were told that there was to be no Raja (King) and the Congress had 
come into power, all sorts of people came to our forests and hunted no end. They 
would have guns and gola barud (explosives). There were thekedars, there were 
zamindars, and there were also gorelog (white people or foreigners). Long after 
the Raja was gone the gorelog would come to hunt tigers. They used to come to 
hunt even during the time of the King but obviously they had his permission, for 
we rarely heard anything being said to them. The King stopped hunting with the 
end of the Raj but the foreigners continued to come. They used to take pictures 
of the tigers, then shoot them, then take pictures again with themselves besides 
their kill!”(Kajjoria Nai, 70) 
In the forests of Nibhera and the adjoining region, hunting and poaching seemed to have 
continued even as late as the early 1980s, indirectly and unintentionally aided by the 
policies of the FD. When the forests were managed by the State Trading Circle, hunting 
and poaching was rampant. According to the villagers of Nibhera, the dwindling 
population of the wildlife of this phase offered considerable relief to the people from the 
threats of wildlife.  
 
Wildlife Sanctuary: The most threatening redefinition of the people-wildlife conflict 
In the winter of 2001, Prabhu Gujjar of Bhattin, when camping in badi kho lost a buffalo 
to what the villagers felt sure was a panther. In February 2002, the village was abuzz with 
the news of a tigress being sighted in the kho. The Forest Guard lent credence to the belief 
by producing the plaster cast of a pug-mark of a tigress. There was already news that the 
tigress had attacked a buffalo in neighbouring village of Beherda. The people of Nibhera 
made sure that all the able bodied men in their families spent the night in the cattle camps 
in the badi kho. These events were a great source of anxiety to the communities. Gathered 
around a fire outside Haricharan Gujjar’s house a group of men were airing their fears 
about things to come. Shaking his head, Haricharan spoke despairingly, “…now they 
(wildlife) will only increase…they will increase…this is what the range people want!” 
 
In the conversation that followed between the community and me, it was made clear why 
the people find co-existing with wild animal much more problematic now than before. It 
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seems it is not wildlife per se that is more threatening, but the policies of wildlife 
preservation being implemented through the establishment of the Sanctuary that make it 
so. Although the Sanctuary has legally been in existence since 1983, practically no one in 
the village was aware of its existence, till 1996. Some like Govind Gujjar had heard it 
being mentioned in passing. When I started to ask about the Sanctuary in 1996, some of 
the elderly assumed that it was “gameshri”148 I was referring to.  
 
In 2001, there was a lot more awareness amongst the people of the word ‘Sanctuary’ but 
its precise meaning still remained as obscure. Interpreting it in terms of the activities of 
the FD (mainly the regulations and the restrictions that are imposed in the name of the 
conservation), the Sanctuary defines itself to the people in a manner in which it pits their 
survival against the survival of the wild animals. Therefore, wildlife for the community, 
poses not only the threat of crop raiding and cattle-lifting but also of physical relocation. 
Purshotam Sharma, 35, shared his confusion: 
I don’t know when it came into existence. But I’ve been hearing about it for the 
last 2-3 years. There was even talk of relocating the village among the people 
and they said the Sanctuary was here so we may have to go. The Range Office of 
the FD told us that the Sanctuary was for wildlife, for which they will need to 
remove the communities and then they will start releasing animals inside the 
area.  
Bhanta Gujjar’s understanding of ‘sanchuri’ best captures the general understanding 
villagers have of the Sanctuary and the activities of the FD therein:  
A system (sic) where the land gets taken away, land cannot be cultivated, one 
cannot cut wood etc. That’s how the land has come under the Janglat. They are 
doing all this to leave wildlife inside here.  
Although, the Forest Department has denied the possibility of relocation, it is a threat that 
is irresponsibly and frequently used by the lower level FD staff. These fears are also 
reinforced both by increased restriction on resource use and the deluge of infrastructure 
construction that has accompanied the implementation of IEDP. 
 
The conundrum of information or the lack of it, rumours and misinformation following 
the advent of IEDP also fuel the apprehensions of the people. Notions like ‘sanctuary’, 
‘wildlife conservation’ and ‘forest protection’ under the new charter of biodiversity 
                                                
 
148 Associating the question with the obvious increase in the FD presence, some of the people assumed that 
perhaps the government was re-establishing the game reserves (as in the days of the King) and it would now 
be called “gameshri”. 
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conservation are ideas and concepts most people are unable to rationalize within their 
existing framework of understanding. Consequently these ideas are quite easily 
misunderstood and misconstrued and significantly influence how people interpret the 
project and in turn engage with it. For example, there is a popular belief amongst the 
people that the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had sold their forests to the ‘foreigners’ 
in the 1970s and now the ‘white people’ (represented by the World Bank) are returning to 
stake their claim. Thus, it is popularly believed that the FD is safeguarding somebody 
else’s interests against that of the villagers. This feeling of abandonment and alienation is 
most succinctly conveyed in the words of an octogenarian who has witnessed changing 
regimes since 1940s: 
The King was ours. He looked after us in our good and bad times. This 
Department belongs to nobody…it cannot be anybody’s government (kissi ki 
Sarkar nehi). They look at their own interests. They listen not to us but to 
foreign (bidesi) governments.” 
The Sanctuary, and by association wildlife, also poses the biggest impediment to 
receiving the much needed developmental and drought relief schemes in the area. Other 
than land, all requests for roads, pisciculture, electricity, water, mining leases and other 
alternative of development have been denied on the grounds of that these activities are 
incompatible with the conservation imperatives of the Sanctuary. These issues have made 
the younger generation of men and women particularly hostile towards the FD and its 
activities.  
 
The presence of the Sanctuary has also largely altered the protection measures available 
to the community earlier. Branded as ‘outright poachers’, the FD has banned the entry of 
Moghiya community into the Sanctuary. In a widely publicised incident in 1993
149
, it was 
alleged that two Moghiyas had killed a forest officer in Ranthambhore National Park. 
Subsequently the FD set about clearing the presence of the Moghiya in the Reserve on a 
war-footing. A former Ranger, by his own admission, set fire to many Moghiya 
settlements.  
 
In the post-Independence era, whenever required the people were able to kill a wild 
animal in self-defence with relative ease. Even in the erstwhile state, although there were 
strict bans on killing as Bodya put it, “…people would kill small game on the sly. The 
                                                
 
149 Rangarajan (2001). 
 
 
230
guards were few and were not so vigilant!” This too has become difficult because of the 
increased vigil of the FD:   
Now it is impossible to use the gun easily. The Range Office has come to stay at 
our threshold…they have made inroads everywhere…a gunshot goes a long 
distance. If you fire a shot someone or the other, it is bound to be heard. 
(Radheshyam Gujjar, 32) 
Crop-raiding in the area is an acute problem. In 2000 Purushottam lost 95% of his winter 
crop. The impact of crop loss is further magnified by the frequent droughts in the area.  
As Dhapo Sharma, a Brahmin woman in her 50s put it, “…even if the rains are merciful, 
the wild animals don’t spare us!” In 2001 her entire standing crop was raided by wildlife.  
For most people, the only means of protecting their crop is to sleep on temporary 
machans (elevated platform) and keep a nightly vigil on their fields. Even this is only 
partially effective, requiring several able bodied persons per household who can be 
engaged for the activity. The main danger lies when they have to engage in physically 
chasing a herd of animals out of their fields. The FD has schemes for compensating loss 
of crops and cattle. However the monetary compensation offered is paltry and 
bureaucratic procedure for making claims, tedious. It also involves the bribing lower level 
officials. Hence people do not make much of these schemes and do not bother with filing 
claims.   
 
It is of no mean significance that the contradictory stand of the FD that confounds the 
people understanding of the significance of wildlife conservation. As Bhanta asked me on 
one occasion, “…if wildlife preservation is good, then why did they allow the killing of 
so many wild animals in the past?” They seriously doubt the integrity of the FD so far as 
conservation is concerned. This is also largely to do with corrupt practices of the FD. 
Kirori doubting the motive of the FD asked: 
There is nothing sacred to the FD. Their words have neither father nor mother. 
On one hand they tell us not to pilfer, not to cut, and not to hunt and on the other 
they said the outsiders who indulge in these very same activities. We have seen 
this with our own eyes, how the Range Office people have cut down our trees 
and helped hunters. 
Threatened by wildlife, the only other means available to opposing the FD’s attempt at 
wildlife conservation and protecting themselves against the same is civil disobedience. 
There are strict instructions from the FD that the villagers should report any incident of 
poaching in the forests. The people however prefer not to do so even if an incident does 
take place. Thus while the FD claims that it has no problems of poachers anymore, Kirori 
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contends that occasionally, especially in the monsoons, they hear guns being fired in the 
forest. He asserts that these are definitely shikaris (hunters) who come into the Sanctuary 
from the neighbouring state of Madhya Pradesh across the river Chambal. When asked 
whether he reported these incidents to the FD, he conveniently replies that it happens in 
the cover of darkness and he has no evidence to back his claim. Chiranji (50) however is 
more daring as he retorts, “If we report them to the FD, then who will save us the next 
time they come around?”  
 
Notwithstanding this attitude, the communities do understand the strategic significance of 
‘wildlife conservation’. Besides they are also aware that any attempt to harm wildlife 
would lead to fines and imprisonment. Thus, there are no overt attempts at defying the 
wildlife laws or challenging the FD’s stand. On the contrary, the people are quick to learn 
the rhetoric of the FD and have started claiming that wildlife protection was also one of 
the objectives of kulhadi bandh panchayat! 
 
EDCs: Forest Department’s ‘Localised Project Institutions’ 
 
Against what I had witnessed in 1996-97, during my visits to Kailadevi in 2000-01 I 
found that the people had actually distanced themselves from kulhadi bandh panchayats. 
As part of the political and social system of resource management in the village, three 
significant factors sustained the practice at the village level. First, it was important for the 
people to be able to relate to the organisation enforcing forest protection. Second, kulhadi 
bandh panchayats were administrated with a sense of ownership of both the institution 
and the forest resources it sought to protect. Third, the community controlled the 
arbitrating powers that came with the sense of ownership of the institution.  
 
The appropriation of the kulhadi bandh panchayat by the IEDP prescribed institution 
EDC negated each of these factors. The EDCs were constituted as per prescription of a 
Government of Rajasthan circular that specified structure, composition, function and 
operation of the institution (See Chapter 4). The imposition of a preconceived model and 
the mechanical processes of its formation are reflected clearly in the description given by 
Govind Gujjar, (the head of the EDC) of how the committee was initiated in his village: 
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The Forest Dept. told us that we should have an EDC now as the government is 
planning to spend a lot of money in the village and it can only be done by 
forming the committee. They read out the requirements for EDC formation from 
an official Government notice. They told us that a man and a woman from every 
household would be its members. We would then have to choose a working 
committee of seven members, with one member functioning as head. That is 
how we made our EDC in Nibhera. 
The co-option of kulhadi bandh panchayat into a ‘committee’ structure for IEDP had 
little parallel with the original community-initiated local institution. Instead, it was 
perceived as a ‘local project institution’ by the villagers. ‘Local project institutions’ like 
the EDC are a premeditated model and impose their structures on local institutions. It 
deliberately trims out from the local institutions all aspects that are not in the interest of 
the Project. The adverse consequences of such action were acknowledged even by the 
World Bank:150  
In recent years working with groups has become the fashion of all government 
and non-government programmes and as a result the fundamental features 
required for sustainability of a group and the formation of a group which really 
has the capacity to develop into a viable institution, have got lost (cited in 
Vasavada et. al. 1999: 166) 
The ownership of EDC was clearly identified with the Forest Department. It was common 
for people to refer to EDC as janglat wali sanstha (the organisation created by the Forest 
Department)
151
 and not as one that is their own or gaon ki sanstha (organisation of the 
village).152 The process of formation and operation of these committees is largely 
responsible for these notions that people have. Meetings and the work done under the 
aegis of such these committees are all initiated by the Forest Department and not by its so 
called members. Although the head of the committee is a co-signatory for disbursement 
of project funds, the money is granted as per the Forest Department’s discretion. The 
Department pre-determines the nature of the work that an EDC can undertake at the 
village level. The villagers either select one task from a given menu or are consulted only 
                                                
 
150 Project document on Rural Women Development and Empowerment Programme.  
151 In the initial days of research for this thesis there were few people in the village who had any idea what 
EDC stood for. The exceptions were Jagdish master (the primary school teacher with an active interest in 
external agencies) and Govind Gujjar (head of EDC) There was also no Hindi translation of the term.  Most 
villagers when asked about “EDC” didn’t seem to be aware its existence in the village. However as I 
realised later, most villagers related to EDC not by its name but as janglat wali sanstha” (the organisation 
of the Forest Department). 
152 The fact that it is identified with the external government and not the village is also reflected in the use 
of EDCs as a political platform in the village, akin to one afforded by the Panchayati Raj system. Thus just 
as caste politics are played out in Panchayat election, most EDC composition and elections were marked by 
inter-community conflicts.  
 
 
 
233
about the location of the work (most which involved construction of physical structures 
for natural resource management). This seems to have been a common practice in the 
other Protected Areas under IEDP as well (Karlsson 1999; Baviskar 2003) Further, 
although on paper it remains the executive committee’s prerogative to convene EDC, 
most meetings at the village level, were convened by the Forest Department as per their 
schedule or their required need to fulfil a project agenda.  
 
Identifying the ownership and the authority of village ecodevelopment committee with 
the Forest Department had significantly altered the relation people had with forest 
protection activities. The villagers in the Sanctuary area have never been inclined to take 
the responsibility of managing or protecting anything that belongs to, or has been 
constructed by, the Department. With a few exceptions, in practically all the villages that 
I have visited in the region, one could see the stark difference in the maintenance of 
fodder enclosures built by the people and those built by the Department. The former were 
well guarded and maintained by the people while the latter is most places, if not 
maintained by the Department itself, were in a state of ruin, mostly destroyed by the local 
people themselves. The difference in attitude to the Department owned structures hinges 
on the issue of responsibility. People, without exception of age, gender or caste feel that 
anything that the Department initiates is its own responsibility; a responsibility the 
Department staff are paid to take up.153 As a young Gujjar man of 32 Nibhera, who takes 
active interests in the works initiated by the Department, commented: 
We have a hundred things to do. They (the forest officials) are paid to maintain 
these structures…why should we do it for free and save them their work? We 
don’t get paid for looking after these things. It is their job and they should be 
doing it. 
This resentment and disregard for structures built by the Department also stems from the 
lack of faith in the Department and its intention. For instance, in many villages some 
members of the community accused the village level forest staff of selling stone slabs 
from the enclosure walls built from IEDP funds to some of the powerful and wealthy 
Gujjar families. Thus villagers resented taking the onus of protecting Department-led 
initiatives which the Department staff themselves were willingly destroying. In a similar 
vein, communities who perceive the EDCs as the Department’s organisation with an 
                                                
 
153 A similar point is noted by Karlsson (1999) in the context of the ecodevelopment project in Buxa Tiger 
Reserve, West Bengal 
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assigned responsibility of forest protection left the onus of forest protection to the EDC. 
In 2000 when I would ask people if they were still practising KBP, many replied “The 
EDC has its duty now… the janglat (FD) will do kulhadi bandh now!” 
 
The other reason why people do not want to take the onus of forest protection through the 
committees is because of the institutional shift of the arbitrating authority. The 
Department usurped the decision-making and arbitrating powers of the communities in 
the trial of forest offences. As one Gujjar patel, lamenting the erosion of the powers of 
their institution put it, “What kulhadi bandh panchayat will we do…now the janglat 
makes all the decisions.” 
 
In imposing its own version of participation, the Department reinforced the existing 
power structures within the village systems while simultaneously eroding the spaces 
available within the system to negotiate these inequities. In EDC the arbitrating powers 
are appropriated by the Department through the adhyaksh whose election is engineered to 
the Department’s preference.  The committee led by the adhyaksh hardly ever allow any 
space for contesting or debating the decisions taken.  
 
Imposed Reciprocity: Disenchanted Communities  
 
As mentioned earlier (Chapter IV) the discourse of participation in IEDP does not directly 
engage with the issues of rights and access to livelihood. Simultaneously, however, the 
ecodevelopment processes accompanied the State’s takeover of community rights 
(Baviskar 1998a).  This take over is either direct, where people sign off their rights in 
exchange for petty material benefit or indirect through the creation of what Jeffery and 
Sundar (1999) term a ‘new moral economy’ whereby issues of access and use of 
resources are articulated mostly in the context of ‘reciprocal commitments’ and not as 
rights (customary or otherwise). As a FD official pointed out, insisting that the wildlife 
laws applicable to a sanctuary and a national park are the same: 
Since the time we have the ecodevelopment project the people are not allowed to 
use anything. But these are poor people so the government, in recognition of 
their good work done in co-operating with the Department and protecting the 
forests, have allowed them some concessions. 
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But much of this reciprocal commitment is ‘enforced’. In appropriating kulhadi bandh 
panchayat, the Forest Department has redefined the practice of kulhadi bandh. 
Legitimacy of kulhadi bandh panchayat as a ‘success’ of the project is sustained by 
enforcing reciprocity.  
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayat was essentially a movement to ban indiscriminate felling by the 
people themselves. It was not an institution to deny people access to resources for 
meeting their basic needs. Contradictory to the communities’ ideology behind the practice, 
the Department takes it for its literal meaning of ‘kulhadi bandh’ (or ban on use of the axe) 
In the name of kulhadi bandh panchayats it has now banned any sort of cutting in the 
forest and people caught with axes are fined and risk having their axes confiscated. Since 
kulhadi bandh panchayats were represented as ‘reciprocal actions for conservation’ and 
had legitimised the Department’s access to project resources, it took up the onus of 
enforcing the projected or imagined kulhadi bandh panchayat ideology through coercive 
measures. Coercion was necessary, as the ‘success’ story of kulhadi bandh sustained by 
the local level staff at Kailadevi remained constantly threatened by the possibility of a 
senior official spotting a ‘villager with an axe’ during their visits to the Sanctuary. Also 
the enforcing officers were unwilling to give a chance to their rivals within the 
Department who doubted the effectiveness of kulhadi bandh panchayats and were keen to 
prove it so. Moreover as a part of the ‘success’ story the officials were keen to show signs 
of regeneration of forest cover that could be achieved only at the cost imposing a strict 
ban on any ‘illegal’ felling. Thus the Department’s enforced reciprocity and imposed 
interpretations of kulhadi bandh panchayats did not take into account the livelihood needs 
that were central to the people’s concept of the kulhadi bandh practice. As one of the 
villager most succinctly put across the basic point of contradiction between the 
communities and the Forest Department’s view of kulhadi bandh panchayat, “What’s the 
point of protecting our forests…if we are not allowed to use them?” The inability to 
harvest, the very resources they have been protecting, serves as a great disincentive 
robbing the movement of the zeal it displayed in the earlier years.  
 
The EDC takeover of KBP weakened the ability of the villagers to regulate their own 
resource use practice; while this served the immediate interest of the villagers it proved 
counter-productive to FD’s aims at protecting the forests. Under the prevailing drought 
conditions, it had not been possible to curb any villager from extracting tree fodder from 
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the forests. Hence by holding EDC responsible for regulating resource use, they were able 
to absolve themselves from the responsibility.  
 
The direct takeover of rights was done through what Randheria (2003) refers to ‘proto-
laws’. According to Randheria (2003) proto laws refer to the concepts and principle that 
are introduced by international organizations like the World Bank that have no formal 
status of law but in practice often obtain the same degree of law. The ‘reciprocal 
commitment’ clause in the ecodevelopment component that made it obligatory for people 
to sign away their legal access to resources in return for investments made in an EDC 
would be an example of a ‘proto law’.  
 
In order to reduce the dependence on fuel wood, the FD has been distributing gas stoves 
and cooking gas cylinder connections at one-third the market price. However, all those 
who avail of this facility are required to forfeit their rights to collection of firewood from 
the forests. In many instances, people gave a signed undertaking to that effect.  As the 
ACF specified, if firewood was to be found in the houses of those who had received gas 
stoves, they would be liable for legal action. It is important to point out that the alternate 
measures provided by the project to reduce the impact of the Protected Area on the 
community, are based on what the Department assumes to be the impacts of the 
community on the Sanctuary and are based on an universalised understanding of what the 
solutions might be (usually entrenched in the hegemonic conservation ideologies that 
underpins the project principles). Consequently, sometime the communities get imposed 
upon to adopt measures that are most inappropriate for their circumstances and thus are 
unsustainable (cf. Crewe and Harrison 1998) 
 
While most people bought gas cylinders and stoves as a lucrative investment, or to pass it 
on to their family members staying in cities, they knew from the start that this was not a 
realistic option.  Given the extent of use of their hearths, a cooking gas cylinder was most 
likely to last no more than a fortnight. Not only would most people be unable to afford the 
frequent refilling required (at the rate of Rs.220 per cylinder) but transporting the 
cylinders to and fro from the nearest Kailadevi village would have been a ‘headache’ 
complained the local people.  With a limited bus service, restricted only to main road 
frequent refilling of cylinders was not going to be an easy option. Most villages are 
located away from the main road and are connected to it by paths that stretch over couple 
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of kilometres through forested and undulating terrain which often get blocked during the 
rainy season.  
 
Similar restrictions were imposed on their fodder use practices. Under the EDC in 
Nibhera the Forest Department built a fodder enclosure and even before the enclosure 
could be completed the FD without any due consultation with the people imposed a ban 
on the setting up of cattle camps (khirkaries) in the forest area. The FD argued that it has 
provided the fodder enclosure as an alternative, to which Haricharan Gujjar of Nibhera 
counter-argued: 
What purpose do these enclosures serve?  How many days are they to serve us? 
We use enclosures only when the grass begins to dwindle in the forests. Is there 
any comparison? All these are efforts at gradually making our existence in the 
forest impossible!  
While the resource rights are being gradually chipped away, by the admission of the FD 
official, there are no real livelihood alternatives being fostered. The District level 
committee, which was to facilitate inter-departmental coordination and convergence 
required to develop livelihood options for the villagers of the Sanctuary area, was set up 
at a very late stage. In the one year that was available to it, because of inter-departmental 
differences, no progress could be made. In the absence of any additional funding, other 
departmental authorities were unwilling to put in any effort to facilitate an endeavour that 
would benefit the Forest Department alone. Also, because of the unwillingness of the 
Government of Rajasthan and the FD to hire consultants, the component of developing a 
corpus fund for future sustainability of EDCs could not be implemented.  
 
In essence, while the IEDP was effective in addressing the impact of local people on the 
PA, it only aggravated the impact of the PA on the people. Hence, as evidenced in other 
integrated conservation and development programmes in India and other countries 
(Karlsson 1997; Li 1997; Neumann 1997; Baviskar 2003) in Kailadevi too, the 
ecodevelopment project operations resulted in furthering the State’s control over 
community resources and lives.  
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 Community Consent: A strategic response  
 
The Forest Department is not alone in touting the successes of kulhadi bandh panchayats. 
The representation of success is sought to be sustained by the public display of consent by 
‘members of the communities’ who are also members of the executive committee or the 
President of their respective village EDCs. This consent is usually not imposed on the 
members, instead they become willing collaborators. Even non-members rarely refute 
such claims in public forums. 
 
In the initial days of my doctoral fieldwork in 2000 the villagers were keen to impress 
upon me three key issues. First, that the ecodevelopment committees functioned well in 
their village; second, that these committees effectively served the functions of kulhadi 
bandh panchayats and third, that the people rarely carried axes into the forest any more. It 
would be simplistic to assume that these impressions were entirely true. Perhaps it was 
more likely that they are reinforced owing to the influence of the powerful members of 
the committees, who usually are keen to endorse such initiatives because of special 
favours and benefits they might receive from Department officials. Consent, even in the 
face of deep-seated disaffection about IEDP, was a key coping and survival strategy. It 
was what Li (1999) refers to as ‘practical political economy’ i.e. direct and indirect 
strategies that rural poor, especially in the case of resource conflict, use to obtain access 
to resources.  
 
The communities gradually came to understand that it was the appeal of kulhadi bandh 
panchayats that had attracted the funds of the foreigners (the World Bank) and other 
NGOs. According to their reasoning, practising kulhadi bandh gave them a strategic 
advantage at a time when their very survival in the Sanctuary was under threat. Thus, 
although the project imposed several restrictions on resource use and offered no long-
term or sustainable livelihood alternatives, the communities knew from FD officials that 
if they were to present the IEDP in bad light then the World Bank could stop ‘giving 
money’. The communities’ decision to support the Project was thus influenced by their 
own potential gains. This is evident in the remark made by an executive member of the 
EDC on why villagers chose not to air their grievances about the project publicly: 
The money belongs to the Government. It is their servants who are eating it. 
What have we got to lose? We get a few benefits from it, why should we 
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complain and stop that as well? The government should know how to handle its 
servants and save its money if it wants. Not like if we complain the money will 
become ours! 
It was common knowledge that if the villagers complained against the project practices, 
they would jeopardise these short-term but critical material benefits they received from it. 
In Karauli, the dang area was worst hit by the droughts in Rajasthan from 1999-2002. The 
wages generated by the IEDP through work undertaken at the village level has been 
critical for their survival. Further, in a water scarce region the water harvesting structures 
that had been built through Project funding (although they were yet to be tested) held out 
some hope for the people. 
 
Apart from garnering material benefits, affirming the Department’s claims on kulhadi 
bandh panchayat, especially the claim that axes were no longer carried into the forest, the 
people led the Forest Department to believe it was not necessary for it to increase its vigil 
on the forest areas and in turn their de facto resource extraction practices. Cooperating 
with the Department has also had the additional advantage of getting them to control the 
problem of the Rebaries.154 An important aspect of their apparent collaboration was the 
fear of the might of the Department. Given their perception that the FD is all powerful, 
they did not wish to antagonize them openly.  Instead, through false sense of compliance 
they hoped to avert the threat of relocation, in itself a far bigger issue.  
 
Forest Protection: The Domain of the People  
 
Although the practice of kulhadi bandh had lost much of its initial momentum and its 
scope to protect the forests, and despite the people’s collaborations in the 
misappropriation the communities continued to maintain their own practice of kulhadi 
bandh panchayats, independent of the Forest department and the IEDP.  
 
                                                
 
154 See Baviskar (1998) for a similar account of the project as implemented in The Greater Himalayan 
National Park. It points out the strategic use of certain self-representations by the villagers and their 
collaboration with the State to legitimise their claims while excluding the claims of the competing migrant 
graziers and labourers. .  
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While still dependent on its resources, the communities realize that forest protection 
remains a crucial aspect of their survival and needs to be done with or without the Forest 
Department. They have little faith in the Forest Department and its effectiveness, holding 
it responsible for the loss of forests in the past. Citing examples of the Department’s 
corruption and ineffectiveness, it brings into question their ability and intentions of 
protecting forests in the present. Their own long history of extracting resources in 
defiance of existing restrictions also tells the people that forest protection can be effected 
only through their genuine willingness and participation. As Buddhu Chamar put it:  
What will the Department do? They only how to take bribes and get the forests 
cut. If we decide to destroy the forests we can do that too. It is only because we 
have protected it that the forests have survived. 
Neither the Forest Department nor an NGO can substitute the kulhadi bandh panchayat’s 
role as a socio-political organisation that is crucial not only to managing the communities’ 
resources but also the wider web of relations that are otherwise exclusively ‘a matter of 
the village’. This is the essential source of the kulhadi bandh panchayat’s resilience. 
 
In limiting the role of the external interventions, communities categorized different forest 
issues as belonging to distinct forums. The EDC as a forum was earmarked only for 
discussing issues of resource access and extraction that were subject to the regulation of 
the Forest Department. Discussions in the VDC were dominated by strategies to garner 
support from the NGO on contentious issues pertaining to the Forest Department. 
Discussions of inter-village or intra-village forest management issues and conflicts in the 
VDC were mostly incidental. These issues were considered a part of internal issues and 
thus something that they first discussed in their preferred forum, that is, kulhadi bandh 
panchayat. 
 
The extent to which the VDC serve the role of kulhadi bandh panchayat is well captured 
in the words of Kirori Pandit, who also served as the VDC head in his village for five 
years: 
Now the sanstha (NGO) people constantly call for meetings and thus we get 
together. Having done that, we also discuss any issue we might have with regard 
to kulhadi bandh panchayats. People are so busy –they don’t have time to meet 
again and again. So when we meet for the sanstha we use the opportunity to 
discuss other issues (other than those pertaining to the development works in the 
village) like kulhadi bandh. 
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Kulhadi bandh panchayats were often convened immediately after the meeting of the 
VDC, even if it ran the risk of continuing late into the night. During one such late night 
meeting, on the encroachment in their pasture enclosure by Morechi village, when I asked 
Bhanta Gujjar why the issues of inter-village conflict had not come up in the committee 
meeting earlier in the evening, he remarked that “…this conflict (with Morechi) is a 
village matter. They (the VDC) have different matters to discuss.” 
 
The above remark by Bhanta Gujjar points to the difference between external agencies 
and the people in understanding issues of ‘resource management’ and ‘conservation’.  
Despite the rhetoric of ‘indigenous/local’ resource management practices in the 
development and conservation paradigms, these issues continue to be seen in isolation to 
the larger social practices of the communities. The interpretative grid is largely oriented 
towards ‘conservation’ and ‘resource management’ and issues of inter-village conflicts 
are rationalised accordingly. Such aspects of conflicts receive only perfunctory attention 
as material for the increasingly popular field of ‘conflict management/resolution 
mechanisms’, aspects the various ‘projects’ are keen to record. This may be of use 
elsewhere in other similar project contexts (See Chapter V). Thus the villagers prefer their 
own forums as such conflicts and their resolutions are embedded in a history of social and 
cultural relationship that exists between the villages.  
 
The communities tend to perceive externally initiated committees, whether EDC or VDC, 
as representing something belonging to an ‘outside world’ (anth ki duniya-an idea often 
used to convey the complexities and vastness of the world outside of their region) and not 
to the village. Even with inter-village disputes, it is only when negotiations fail at the 
inter-village level that the Forest Department is called to intervene. Such external 
interventions are seen as a ‘moral breakdown of the village system’. Also, as Kirori 
Pandit put it, seeking external intervention was like “…invitations to a monkey who will 
get away with the loot, over which two cats, are fighting!”  
 
To conclude, the villagers did not believe that the array of institutions that actively sought 
their participation would actually safeguard their interests in the forests. They were 
convinced that the forest protection and management for their own purpose (as an 
indispensable resource base) still remained an agenda of the people and was best served 
by their own kulhadi bandh panchayat. Attempting to romanticize the communities’ 
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commitment towards conservation or suggesting that conservation should be handed over 
to the communities would be impractical. Forest protection with, or without external 
support, remains a crucial part of the survival of resource-dependent communities. The 
people are aware, especially in the face of commercial interests and illegal felling, that 
effective forest protection needs the support of the Forest Department. Such support, they 
feel, is never forthcoming, especially if interventions like IEDP are all the support that the 
Forest Department can practically offer.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Although projects may ignore the significance of the history of people-wildlife conflicts 
and the manner in which it implicates the state in generating much of the conflict, 
communities’ response to current project activities are informed by such pasts.  Over the 
past hundred years, the forests of the Sanctuary have been subject to three distinct 
management regimes. The period of the ‘Raj’ under the erstwhile state of Karauli; the 
‘Congress ka Raj’ representing the evolution of the forest bureaucracy in post-
Independence; and finally the ‘ecodevelopment committee period’ in which new 
principles of governance are being applied by the Forest Department.  
 
Issues of resource access and the dangers posed by wildlife are central concerns of 
communities living in PA. Project’s ability to provide an alternative and solicit the 
involvement of people therein has to address these issues upfront. No amount of rhetoric 
or posturing can convince the communities otherwise. Within a comparative framework, 
with every passing regime, it is in these two issues that the state, represented by the Forest 
Department, seemed to become less accessible and less amenable to the people. The 
forest bureaucracy that unfolded with the advent of the IEDP had alienated people from 
their resources the most. People suggested that with the implementation of the IEDP, the 
laws and regulations have become all-pervasive, leaving little scope for negotiations. 
While the Project provides no alternative means of livelihood, through the enactment of 
reciprocal commitment it has systematically clamped down on all their other resource use 
practices. Thus, the new EDC phase is seen as further strengthening of the state control 
on forests and aimed at ultimately at relocating the villages out of the Sanctuary area. The 
interpretations of the communities’, and in turn responses to the ensuing activities of the 
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FD under the Project, are framed within an understanding that rather than reducing the 
impact of PA on the people, the Project activities actually exacerbate them.  
 
The Project in its attempts to institutionalise participation that involves mere charades and 
posturing brings about a paradoxical situation, wherein apparent initiative at soliciting 
local participation in conservation alienates the communities and weakens an existing 
community-initiative at forest protection.  EDC and VDC are externally designed 
institutions. Despite claiming to build on local institutions like kulhadi bandh panchayats 
they come with premeditated structures and modes of operation. Institutionalisation of 
participation through prescribed structures and imposed principles fail to create any 
ownership among the communities. By co-opting kulhadi bandh panchayat into EDCs, 
the Department, in the name of reciprocal-commitment, has put a complete ban any form 
of  tree felling and thus defeats the very purpose of sustainable use for which the 
communities had initiated kulhadi bandh panchayats in the first place. Consequently, 
communities no longer able to regulate or arbitrate resource use practices, weaken their 
hold on kulhadi bandh panchayats and its forest protection function.  
 
Community participation in IEDP and their enrolment is sustaining representation of 
Project success, despite being aware of the realities, is a means of creating their 
negotiating space for survival. Through a show of compliance and collaborating in 
propping up images, the community primarily aims not to jeopardise the petty material 
benefits that accrue to them through the Project activities. More importantly, however, by 
playing to the ‘gallery’ (of the FD’s show of people’s cooperation) they hope to keep at 
bay the vigil and intrusion of the FD into their de facto resource use. Show of compliance 
is also a means of preventing the FD from invoking the relocation option that it constantly 
threatens the communities with.  
 
Unlike the State, forest protection for communities is not an outcome of political, 
administrative and economic exigencies. It is an important aspect of resource 
management for ensuring sustainable use and availability. Given the contradictory stances 
of the Department who earlier allowed hunting and led-large scale commercial 
exploitation of forests and now insist on saving and protecting the same, communities are 
extremely circumspect of the FD intention and ability to protect the forest. Their 
apprehensions are reinforced by the corrupt manner in which the field level staff permits 
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the exploitation of restricted resources. Hence, people concur that forest protection can be 
achieved only by community intent and initiative. Thus, away from the attention of the 
FD, the communities attempt to continue their regulating practices of kulhadi bandh 
panchayats. Although the EDC interventions have weakened their ability to regulate the 
resource use practices within the village, protection of forests from neighbouring village 
is still considered the domain of the village community.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
In India the discourse for participatory management of protected areas has been 
articulated from the early 1990s, just as in much of the rest of the developing world. 
Policy level discourse on participatory approaches to conservation has also gained 
significant ground. Although effective community initiatives aimed at forest and wildlife 
protection have been prevalent in India for a long time (Kothari et al. 2000) scholars and 
practitioners have contributed significantly to the increasingly popularity of participatory 
and plural-governance system of resource management. Officially, community-based 
conservation has received recognition mainly in the form of Joint Forest Management 
initiatives, restricted to non-PA forest (Kothari et al. 2000) Despite the emerging trends in 
participatory conservation as a middle-way, from strict preservation to complete hand 
over of natural resources to community management, the debates on participatory 
conservation in PAs continues to be divided. 
 
Despite a lack of consensus and reluctance of the State in India to involve communities in 
PAs, international support for community-based conservation in parks and sanctuaries has 
given it a moral legitimacy and appeal for donor agencies. Governments and agencies 
otherwise less inclined to participatory approaches are increasingly taking up initiatives 
such as the World Bank supported India Ecodevelopment Project. This IEDP was seen as 
a sign that the Government was beginning to show an inclination towards participatory 
management of protected areas. However, participatory conservation approaches have not 
been restricted to Governments alone. A number of initiatives undertaken by NGOs and 
grassroots organisation predate state-supported JFM and IEDP initiatives. In fact, NGOs 
are seen as crucial players in enabling participatory conservation.  
 
Two aspects of international discourse on participatory conservation, in both PA and non-
PA forests, has been striking in the Indian context. First, is the emphasis on 
institutionalising participation at the local level, leading to the formation of local 
committees at an unprecedented scale. Second, is the emphasis on the compilation of 
‘success’ stories of community participation in conservation, including advocacy, 
research, funding and NGO initiatives. The issue of ‘institutionalising participation’ and 
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the claims of ‘success’ in the context of participatory conservation of PAs have been the 
main focus of this study. Today participatory conservation is believed to be the solution 
to the vexing issue of people-wildlife conflict. Claims of success suggest that these 
initiatives or projects have been able to prevent the loss of livelihood and habitats of 
affected communities, some of whom are amongst the most marginalised groups. They 
also suggest that effective conservation of biodiversity was, in the absence of a 
participatory conservation approach, threatened by the very local communities who under 
the participatory approach emerge as the vanguards of conservation. 
 
This leads us to inquire into policy change and stories of success that followed the 
introduction of participatory conservation. How are divisions and contentions over issues 
of management and participation resolved, when hitherto divergent parties like the State 
and donor agencies such as the World Bank, adopt ‘successful’ participatory approaches? 
How do NGOs, who have emerged as significant actors in the conservation scenario, 
parallel their success in setting the agenda for sustainable development, make the crucial 
difference in enabling participatory approaches? To what extent do these approaches 
address issues raised in the debate of ‘people-wildlife’ conflict? What does it mean for the 
communities and their survival?  
 
The thesis has analysed one case of a ‘successful’ initiative in participatory conservation 
in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary in Rajasthan, India. The same area is also known for a 
community-initiative in forest protection and a hub for NGOs working on sustainable 
development. Informed by theoretical traditions of political ecology and a new 
ethnographic approach, the main aim of the thesis was to analyse how participatory 
conservation initiative/practices/initiatives operate in practice.  The thesis focuses on the 
multiple initiatives undertaken by government and non-government agencies and 
examines its implication for both biodiversity conservation and community participation 
therein. It examines how and why a people’s initiative for forest protection, kulhadi bandh 
panchayat, started mainly to enable sustainable use of their resources, was subsequently 
appropriated and undermined by external agencies like the FD and the NGOs in order 
claim ‘success’ of their respective donor-aided participatory conservation initiatives. It 
analyses the implications such processes of appropriation have for the rhetoric of 
participation and conservation employed.  
 
 
 
247
The study has taken an actor-oriented approach to analyse how each agency - the 
communities, Forest Department, NGOs and the World Bank - engages with participatory 
conservation in relation to kulhadi bandh panchayat. The thesis focuses on the oral 
histories of community representatives, ethnographic analysis of organisational culture 
and operations and the specificities of project processes. It analyses project and policy 
text, intra and inter-agency interactions and multiple domains of interaction outside of the 
project design. Through identifying specific interests, stakes, compulsions and 
interpretations that inform the engagement of different and differentiated agencies, the 
thesis unfolds the complex micro-politics involved in the field level operations of such 
claimed ‘successful’ participatory conservation initiatives. The thesis attempts to make a 
case for contextualising participatory conservation discourses, operations and outcomes 
within the broader political dynamics of Indian wildlife conservation, as embodied in 
Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary in general and the multi-caste village of Nibhera.   
 
Kulhadi bandh panchayat initiated by the villages of Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary 
emerged in response to a resource crunch owing to frequent droughts, dwindling forest 
resource and the need to secure their resources against competitive demand by migratory 
sheep herders from western Rajasthan. The functioning and operation of kulhadi bandh 
panchayat as a means of securing and managing resources, was inextricably linked and 
embedded in the social, cultural and political relations within the village and in the wider 
region. It had several pre-requisites and attributes of ownership, reciprocal exchange, 
livelihood dependency and consolidation of identities through territorial claims.  
 
Forest protection activities through the kulhadi bandh panchayat were aimed primarily at 
resource use and not ‘conservation’. Kulhadi bandh or ban-the-axe meant that people 
could harvest only as much as they needed and not as much they willed. The institution 
existed inclusive of the hierarchies and conflicts within the communities that manifested 
in the practice of kulhadi bandh. The practice had its own limitations including 
deliberately keeping out certain groups, being gender-discriminatory and contested by the 
goat-graziers, leading to it being intermittently dissolved. In essence the panchayat defied 
all essentialist ideas of ‘community-based conservation’; it was nonetheless a community-
initiative embedded in their everyday livelihoods and an attempt to self-regulate resource 
use.  
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Also, the community initiative for forest protection and their emplaced sense of life and 
identities posed no dualities to their aspirations for better lives and development 
opportunities in the area. Experiencing economic hardships owing to the depleting forests 
and changing livelihoods, communities endeavour to maximise the opportunities and 
options available. Wage labour and migration to distant cities for employment, debt and 
borrowing, salaried employment are all important and indispensable means of meeting 
their livelihood needs.  
 
IEDP in Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve was implemented by the Rajasthan Forest 
Department. The Project tried to simultaneously address the concerns of the various 
groups across the divide on participatory conservation and ended up with several inherent 
contradictions. While it adopted the rhetoric of participation, ideologically its ‘problem 
identification’ and proffered solutions embodied the statist position of perceiving the 
resource dependent communities as the most important threat to wildlife conservation. It 
did not, however, explicitly recognise the conflict ridden history forest management, the 
complex institutional problems inherent in the functioning of the Forest Department and 
most importantly expected to be implemented within the existing policing functions of the 
Department. In failing to acknowledge these factors the Project placed nearly impossible 
demands on the Forest Department to deliver, despite staff shortage, bottlenecks in 
release of funds and approval of sub-proposals by the Government of Rajasthan.   
 
In focusing on strengthening the Forest Department’s traditional functions, IEDP failed to 
meet many of the Projects other objectives, especially those on research, training and 
facilitating the participatory component of its mandated village level institutions 
Ecodevelopment Committees. Half-way through the implementation of IEDP, the World 
Bank deemed Rajasthan as a non-performing State and cut the Project budget by half. The 
state of implementation of the Project in Ranthambhore added to body of criticism of the 
World Bank received for how IEDP was designed and implemented.  
 
The Project budget cut affected not only the Forest Department staff at the Park 
Headquarters but also threatened the aspirations of other officers in Kailadevi Sanctuary. 
They had hoped to use the opportunity for undertaking significant infrastructural 
development and retrieve the status of their offices and the Sanctuary from living in 
shadows of the more famous Ranthambhore National Park.   
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The dilemma of incompatible Project goals with existing Departmental mandates, the 
floundering Project and the need for its extension (to salvage the budget cuts) was 
retrieved through co-opting the existing institution of kulhadi bandh panchayats. The co-
option was of both strategic and symbolic advantage in addressing the complex and 
contradictory needs of the Department at multiple levels and redressed some of the 
expectations of the World Bank. It was a visible testimony of participatory conservation, 
a core mandate of the Project, and lent itself to interpretation as a Project-initiated success. 
Co-option of the panchayats into the externally designed EDC framework was both 
textual and physical and was a means of imposing state demand for forest protection. The 
process, implemented primarily by the frontline staff was undertaken with much 
posturing and charade of participatory activities, achieved either by exercising its 
authority using threats of relocation  or through the complicity of the few favoured 
members of the communities, with whom the frontline shared a long-standing 
relationships.  
 
In terms of participation, the Department was clear that the role of the communities 
should only be restricted to participating in the local level implementation of the Project 
and not in the management aspect of the Reserve. In practice, however, participation was 
reduced to itemized, measurable, achievable goals of establishing local institutions, 
infrastructure development and contributions. The pre-determined process of instituting 
local institutions through which the Project activities was to be undertaken at the village 
level, depoliticised the process and reinforced the existing social hierarchies and 
exclusionary practices inherent in the communities. Also through obligatory ‘reciprocal 
commitments’ to be made by the EDCs, in return for the benefits provided by the Project 
(construction of water bodies, wage earning opportunities, distribution of gas burners and 
LPG cylinders ) the Department abrogated the access to key resources like grazing and 
fuel wood collection. While the Project provided some short-term material and monetary 
benefits, because of delayed implementation, lack of interdepartmental cooperation and 
lack of specialist inputs, the Project failed to develop any long-term alternative livelihood 
options for the community.  
 
In terms of conservation, while the ecological arguments were constantly employed to 
justify the participatory approach i.e. to reduce pressure of the people on the forests, the 
 
 
250
Department did not undertake any new research towards conclusively establishing 
whether it was a problem in the first place. Despite the availability of Project resources no 
research was undertaken towards drafting a new management plan for the area. Some 
experts commented that the excessive investment of Project funds in constructing water 
bodies within the Reserve threatened to change the ecosystem of the area with permanent 
effect. In Kailadevi Sanctuary, inflated tiger census figures were constantly used to 
leverage funds for additional infrastructure and protection activities. Through 
construction of guard posts and vigilance towers, the Department created its stronghold in 
the forest interiors and in close proximity to the forest villages. 
 
The NGOs in Kailadevi, claiming to work towards sustainable development and 
community forest management, instead worked primarily towards maintaining their 
system goals of organisational survival and maintenance. The NGOs for their survival 
and reputation depended on a network of agencies - government, donors, activist groups 
and NGO-support organisations - that have different and often contradicting expectations. 
In attempting to maintain their multiple and contradictory self-images for different 
audiences of the network, they often resorted to role playing i.e. presenting themselves 
and their work in terms of what was expected of a NGO in the field. In projecting 
themselves as enabling ‘community participation in conservation’, both NGOs working in 
the area attempted to claim the practice of kulhadi bandh panchayat as the achievement 
of their respective interventions in the area. While one NGO claimed to have initiated the 
panchayat, the other claimed to have strengthened it and made it effective.  
 
The local NGOs ability to work in the interest of the community was conditioned by its 
own need for funding, meeting project targets and prescription of the donors, maintaining 
solidarity with support organisations, maintaining a reputation of being ‘government 
friendly’ and ensuring future work opportunities from the Forest Department. 
Consequently, it was unable to take up any advocacy issues upfront and skirted 
confrontational issues. Consequently, it had no real impact either in facilitating a 
participatory approach or lending support to the communities to resist the Department’s 
restriction on accessing resource and developmental benefits.  
 
The NGO equally (as the frontline staff of Forest Department) constrained by the needs of 
funding and meeting time bound projects, and maintaining its legitimacy in the multiple-
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organisational framework on which it depended, had less than democratic relationships 
with the communities it claimed to represent. All the processes and norms of participation 
were adopted in its establishment of local institutions, consultative decision making and 
recruitment of facilitators from among the communities. Participation was primarily 
instrumental in nature and most decision-making that was eventually steered to meeting 
the externally mandated project prescriptions. Unrealistic expectations imposed by 
funding organisations, based on the expected role of NGOs to being cost-effective and 
efficient, was eventually met at cost to the communities. Community empowerment was 
limited to meeting project prescribed objectives and overall the NGO preferred to foster 
dependency of communities rather than any real empowerment.  
 
While project interventions tend to view conflicts as apolitical and ahistorical, for the 
communities the past remains firmly entrenched in the politics of the present, and informs 
their interpretation and response to project activities. The forests of Kailadevi have been 
under various regimes - the erstwhile state of Karauli, as parts of Forest Division of 
Bharatpur and Tonk in Independent India and as Sanctuary managed by the Wildlife 
Wing of the Forest Department. The local communities refer to them as ‘Rajan ka Raj’, 
‘Congress ka Raj’ and the ‘EDC walle’ respectively. The changing regimes are 
interpreted in terms of the impacts they have had on their resource use and access 
activities and the space for negotiation available with the State that has been perceived as 
the sole authority over forest matters. More than rights, communities have navigated their 
resource use and access issues through its de facto use. Ironically, the EDC phase is seen 
as most restrictive, intrusive and least relenting in that sense. In this phase the spaces for 
negotiation is perceived to have diminished by the all prevailing and pervasive idioms of 
laws and regulations. The Department has become omnipresent by erecting its posts and 
towers, coming down heavily on all their critical resource use practices. While the 
presence of wildlife earlier bore the possibility of affording an audience with the King 
and negotiating their resource access issues, in the EDC phase other than the increase in 
the dangers it posed it terms of crop-raiding, attacks on humans and cattle-lifting, it 
threatened their very existence. Wildlife protection to be effective could possibly require 
their relocation from the Sanctuary, a threat used often used by the frontline staff of the 
Forest Department.  
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The co-option of the panchayat into the EDC fold, the FD has redefined a means of 
regulating resource use to one that restricts all forms of extraction - defeating the very 
purpose of their forest protection activity. Through the process of co-option and 
imposition of pre-determined structures embodied in EDCs, the Department has usurped 
the arbitrating authority the communities and has abstracted the significance of the 
panchayat from its wider social and political bearings. It also asserted its claim on the 
ownership of the process and the resources it regulated.  
 
The intent and the strategic advantage of both the Department and NGO in co-option of 
their initiative, was not lost on the communities. Nor were the misrepresentations of their 
initiative. The apparent complicities and affirmation of upholding the co-opted images of 
kulhadi bandh panchayat involved a complex set of strategies and reasoning, primarily of 
the more dominant members of the communities and brought to bear on those who relied 
on their ability to deal with the ‘outside world’ which comprised NGOs, the forest 
officials and the host of foreigners their respective projects brought to the village.  
 
While opposing the co-option openly would get them no real benefit and instead invite 
the threats of relocation, upholding the representation of the panchayats as a success of 
EDC or VDC brought them petty material benefits, much needed wage labour, some 
infrastructure in terms of the water bodies. The NGOs presence helped them to strategise 
their covert attempts at opposing the Forest Department and accessing ‘free funds’ for 
infrastructural development, otherwise hard come by owing to the regulation of the FD.  
The compromise with the FD helped to avert the attention of the FD from their de facto 
use of resources. It helped to compromise the hard line stand of the frontline staff for 
whom, complicity of the communities helped to sustain claims to their seniors. These 
complicities were also done to avoid the evoking the possibilities of relocation. Most 
importantly, in the time of fodder scarcity, when it was becoming difficult for the 
panchayat to impose regulation on use of fodder resources, shifting responsibility to 
EDCs and VDCs absolved the communities, especially the arbitrating head of the 
panchayats, from the responsibility of the futile task of regulation either for self or the 
others.  
 
Notwithstanding the claims of EDCs and VDCs as community forums for management, 
for the communities it remained the ‘other’- strategic for dealing with issues of project 
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implementation. Their own panchayat, convened separate to the EDC or VDC remained 
key to regulating the wider social and political functions of kulhadi bandh panchayat. 
Aware of the charade, posturing, corruption among external agencies, the kulhadi bandh 
panchayat, although much diluted in its effectiveness, remained an important forum for 
forest protection, an activity only which they would undertake honestly as their survival 
depended on it.  
 
The analysis generates several important insights. The practice of participatory 
conservation in Kailadevi demonstrates that as a legitimate goal of international agencies, 
participatory conservation has become a form of symbolic capital serving to advance the 
needs and negotiating agenda of various agencies. As a result, while policies of 
community participation embodied in projects (whether governmental or of the NGOs) 
remain hegemonic, superficial in their scope and unrealistic in their implementation, 
project processes are largely driven by the need to sustain a coherent representation of 
their ‘success.’ The pressure of short project cycles and a political context marked by the 
particularities of local conservation history, the vicissitudes of statist management 
regimes, forest bureaucracies, the politics of international aid and the growing scope of 
civil society organizations, make the representation of ‘success’ vital and, therefore, 
strategic.  
 
Success, though ubiquitously upheld, serves different purpose for different actors and 
leverages varying and relative advantages in a contested terrain. It demonstrates 
effectively the paradox of participatory conservation wherein ‘success’ of community 
participation leads to both further entrenchment of an authoritarian regime (undermining 
community interests in a far more insidious way), and to weakening/destabilizing of the 
very community-initiative on which various success stories ride. Such representations are 
maintained by the very systems and relations of power that participatory initiatives claim 
to challenge and reform. In practice, a project-oriented approach generates its own 
pressure to demonstrate success within a given time frame. The need to meet financial 
expenditure targets, administrative exigencies and project outputs within a set time frame 
leads to implementation practices being governed by the existing organisational cultures, 
attitudes, interests and social relationships within and between the agencies involved. For 
instance, eco-development committees are formed more as an ‘official mandate’ that 
villagers are compelled to comply with – the underlying threat being a failure to comply 
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would result in withdrawal of privileges afforded to the villagers by the Forest 
Department. Thus, notwithstanding the existing conflicts within the community groups 
and prevailing confusions regarding eco-development committees, the target of 
establishing the committees was met in record time.  
 
Looking at the multiple ‘networks’ and ‘partnerships’ that the agencies establish between 
and among themselves, the analysis  brings to bear that in the practice of a participatory 
approach, authority and control is fragmented and narratives of ‘success’ are achieved 
through effective collaboration, negotiations and representations. It brings to bear the 
‘stylized swordplay’ and the  “subtle shifts of accommodation as groups respond to each 
other” in trying to arrive at common idioms (of success and participation) amongst 
varying actors, agendas and interests (Baviskar 2003; 268) It is this need for enrollment 
that affords negotiating power even to the ‘powerless.’  
 
Most significantly, the thesis highlights the implications of reduction of popular 
participation to formulaic approaches to local institution-building. The study 
demonstrates institutionalisation of local participation in that it both necessitates and 
facilitates the subversion of the participatory ideals through the production of success 
stories. As has been argued local institution building is a complex political process, 
especially as it needs to reconcile varying and conflicting interests of its multiple interest 
groups. Project prescriptions with their time bound targets do not allow time or space to 
engage with the complexities. Participation is ‘depoliticized’ by avoiding ‘unruly people 
and awkward places’ (Baviskar 2004; Chhotray 2004).   Thus in favour of administrative 
expedience, communities and institutions are propped up through evoking authoritarian 
exercise of power and non-participatory methods. The paradox involved in the process 
and practice of institutionalising participation is well explicated by Mosse’s (2004: 665) 
observation that “the practices of project workers erode the models that they also work to 
reinstate as representation”.  
 
Reduced to formulaic and prescriptive formats, local institutions become the most 
demonstrable and visible evidence for claiming success. As Mosse (2005) argues that 
success of policy is claimed by the interpretation of events then the formation and 
existence of local institution are the most facilitative events, they lend themselves to the 
most credible interpretations and claims of success. In Kailadevi the mere presence of the 
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local institutions was the fundamental basis for all claims of participation and 
empowerment by the various agencies-irrespective of actual practice. It is thus that 
‘meetings’ and ‘public events’ or as  Baviskar (2007) puts it ‘spectacles’ and ‘show 
places’, around these organisations were the most significant and celebrated aspect of the 
various initiatives. Local institutions lend themselves measurable targets - counting the 
number of local institutions formed and the amount money transacted through them.  
 
Agrawal’s (2005) discussion on the creation of environmental subjects through the 
technologies of power and technologies of self is perhaps relevant to the context if only to 
underscore the significance of the issues of resource use, ownership and control in 
enabling any meaningful participation. This is even if it means communities willingly (as 
against coercion or imposition) govern the environment as desired by the government. 
The principal focus of Agarwal was to demonstrate that the variation among residents of 
Kumaon about their belief of forest protection was related to the extent of their 
involvement in regulatory practices pertaining to the forests rather than socio-cultural 
location in terms of caste and gender. The work clearly underlines the role that ownership, 
use and management of forests by the community plays in the establishment of the forest 
councils in the first place. The acceptability of the forest councils and the willingness of 
the communities to participate in the forest councils are largely due to the fact the rules of 
establishment of the forest councils “reaffirmed the propriety and legality of villagers’ 
possession of forests. They recognized that villagers have a stake in what happens to 
forests.” (Agrawal 2005: 11)   
 
The case of Kailadevi clearly poses a contrast and counter point to the making of 
environmental subjects in Kumaon through a government at a distance. The making of 
environmental subjects (in establishing the community-initiated practice of kulhadi bandh 
panchayats) in Kailadevi was related to a desire on the part of the community (and not 
government) to protect commonly owned forests with an intention to enhance and 
maintain their self-interest that was threatened by uncontrolled use by the village, 
neighbouring villages and Rebaries (the sheep and camel herding pastoral communities) 
However, the government attempt to enforce environmental protection through 
establishment of Eco-development Committees that tried to appropriate kulhadi bandh 
panchayats, without due recognition to the resource use needs of the communities and 
their ownership of resources, led to the breakdown of kulhadi bandh panchayats and 
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rendered the EDCs ineffective. Thus, the attempts at institutionalisation of participation 
for conservation actually proved counter-productive. The only subjectivities produced 
were in relation to the politics of participation implicit in the formation of EDCs. Short-
term interests of developmental benefits led people to project themselves as conforming 
to the rules and ideologies of EDCs, especially in the public domain - an instance of use 
of technologies of self against the technology of power.  
 
Finally, in view of the micro-politics that underpin conservation practices on the ground, 
this case study underscores the need to question the very intent of external agencies that 
claim to enable and empower local institutions through participatory processes. Largely 
driven by the need to meet fiscal needs from donor funding, most of these institutions 
exist to satisfy project mandates and enable project operations. Their operations are often 
guided by expediency and quick-fix solutions to prop up success stories.  
 
Participatory conservation, though popular with international policy makers and donors 
cannot be assumed to be inherently appropriate to fix complex problems. It needs to be 
analysed in the broader historical and political context of conservation in which the 
various agencies involved may be implicated. Such an understanding is critical to 
knowing what can or cannot be achieved by self-proclaimed successful conservation 
initiatives. In the case of parks and sanctuaries that impinge on local communities’, in 
their differentiated self and dependence, lives and livelihoods, participation has to be 
defined in terms of addressing the issues of conflicts, contested claims, the issue of rights, 
of long-term survival as the basis of the models proposed, institutional change and 
reforms and different episteme, aimed towards long-term solutions. Investing in 
programmes to legitimize state policies in the name of participation may only provide 
temporary succour from conflicts that are bound to re-emerge sooner or later and possibly 
with greater vigour and worse repercussion for both communities and conservation of 
biodiversity.  
 
The postscript to this entire thesis is indeed tragic. In 2005 (Shahabuddin & Rangarajan 
eds.) reported the virtual disappearance of tigers from the Tiger Reserves of Rajasthan. 
All the effort and investment of the government, external donors and NGOs had failed 
tiger conservation. The response of the government was to set up a Tiger Task Force to 
examine underlying causes and suggest remedial measures. The Task Force suggested 
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using a scientific approach to planning PA management, a transparent consultative 
process to justify relocation of villages from PAs, economic incentives to local 
communities as a means of ensuring their participation in conservation. There were both 
supporters and detractors of the Tiger Task Force report. 
 
The situation raises several questions, some of which have been touched upon in this 
thesis but require far more rigorous analysis. At least two of the key actors – the 
government and the community – need to be disaggregated for better understanding. 
There is a need to understand policy imperatives of state and central governments better 
as to how matters are discussed and decisions taken. The complex of actors engaged with 
in this thesis allowed only marginal understanding of the differentiated impact of 
conservation initiatives on communities.  
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Epilogue 
 
The World Bank-supported India Ecodevelopment Project was operational from 1994 
until 2004. Subsequently, significant changes have taken place in the research context, 
mostly contrary to the expected outcome of the Ecodevelopment Project as a whole.  
Ecodevelopment was designed to depart from the prevalent exclusionary approaches to 
Protected Area management in India. The Project acknowledged the existing people-
wildlife conflict upfront and an attempt was made, for the first time, to accommodate the 
interests of the local community impacted by wildlife conservation. However as 
Shahabuddin (2010:168), concludes: 
 
Ten years later, the ecodevelopment programme had left little impact in most project sites. 
The scattered available evaluations (Karlsson 1999, Baviskar 2003, Shah et al 2002, 
Woodman 2002, Sethi 2004, Das 2007, Varma 2009) revealed that most of the official 
project aims remained largely unfulfilled. In most sites people-management relations 
seemed as embittered at the end of the ten-year period as at the beginning. 
 
As is evident from the above comments, the implementation of the Ecodevelopment 
Project from all sites was similar to experiences of Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve, 
discussed in detail in this thesis. Evaluating the component of economic development and 
alternate income generation initiated by Ecodevelopment, Gubbi et al. (2009) found that 
most activities initiated during the Project period were financially unsustainable and thus 
ceased to operate within a few years of the Project’s closing (See Sethi 2004). In most 
sites the Project was characterised by inadequacy of staff numbers, lack of adequate 
training of implementing staff and an unwillingness of the Departments to adopt a 
participatory approach. Given the scale of infrastructure development that took place 
under the Project, many conservationists felt that it did more harm than benefit, to the 
parks and its ecosystem (Shahabuddin 2010).  Local institutions built under the Project 
suffered from lack of ownership, exclusion of the most marginalised groups and lack of 
effective participation (ibid.; Baviskar 2003; Shah et al. 2002; Pande 2005).  
 
What really made the experience of the India Ecodevelopment Project in Kailadevi 
distinct was the existence of kulhadi bandh panchayats, prior to the initiation of the 
Project. Some of the desired outcomes of the Project, especially in terms of community-
led resource conservation, were quite similar to what the kulhadi bandh panchayats were 
already achieving in their respective communities. The existence of a local initiative and 
its subsequent incorporation into the EDC framework followed by its gradual decline in 
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effectiveness in protection of the forests, demonstrate the counter-productiveness of the 
project and makes more apparent the  statist positions that underlined its implementation.  
 
Shortly after the end of the India Ecodevelopment Project, a series of unconnected events 
unfolded in Sariska Tiger Reserve in 2005. This led to the resurgence of the exclusionary 
approach both in terms of policy and practice. Sariska Tiger Reserve, located in the Alwar 
District of Rajasthan, lies to the north of Ranthambhore and, although not a part of the 
Ecodevelopment Project, it is considered as significant for Tiger conservation as 
Ranthambhore.  Sariska, like Ranthambhore, has a long history of changing conservation 
and management regimes, including existence of villages within its core area and 
relocation of some villages from it in the past (See Johari 2003, Shahbuddin and 
Rangarajan 2007). The NGO, Traun Bharat Sangh also has a long history of association 
with the area and had initiated village-based water and forest conservation activities 
inside and adjacent to the Tiger Reserve. Prior to 2000 TBS was considered as a pro-
people and anti-conservation organisation. As mentioned in the thesis, in September 2000 
it joined hands with the Forest Department to adopt the agenda of participatory 
conservation. Among others, one of the most publicised outcomes of this position was the 
initiative of encouraging 11 poachers in the area to surrender their weapons and give up 
poaching.  
 
In February 2005, it was widely reported that all tigers in Sariska Tiger Reserve had 
either died or been killed
155
. While most believed that it was a consequence of excessive 
poaching, there were others who saw it as a disaster in the making attributed to the 
gradual degradation of the forests and bad management (See Shahabuddin: 2010). This 
news was, predictably, received with considerable alarm by the Government and the 
conservation lobby. A slew of activities ensued in the immediate aftermath in responding 
to what was considered a crisis, including the bolstering of the protection of the reserve 
with police and paramilitary forces. Even the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 
otherwise meant to handle cases of organised crime, was engaged to investigate the 
incident (The Hindu, 2005).   
 
                                                
 
155 See Shahbuddin and Rangarajan 2007; Hindu, 18 March, 2005; CBI 2005 
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The events in Sariska demanded a focus on the overall issues of tiger conservation. The 
Government set up the Tiger Task Force (TTF) comprising a panel of experts. Through 
wide consultation and debate, the TTF recommended a set of measures for effective 
conservation of tigers and to prevent recurrence of the situation like Sariska in other Tiger 
Reserves. The TTF report published in 2005 reiterated the adverse impacts of a ‘guards 
and guns’ approach. It also reiterated the need for scientific and social inputs in 
management of tiger habitats. The report suggested that where the co-existence of human 
and tigers was found untenable (based on scientific and socio-economic studies), 
relocation of villages could be considered but based on a participatory and consensual 
approach (GoI 2005). Based on the popular belief that poaching was responsible for the 
extinction of tigers in Sariska, the Rajasthan Forest Department had already initiated the 
plan for relocation of villages from the Reserve (Shahabuddin 2007).  The prevention of 
poaching became the focus for the future action plan for all Tiger reserves156 that led to a 
resurgence of the traditional exclusionary practices, notwithstanding the TTF 
suggestions
157
.  
 
Following the recommendations of the TTF, in November 2006 legal amendments were 
made to the Wildlife Protection Act 1972 also referred to as the ‘Tiger Amendments’, 
which enabled the creation of the National Tiger Conservation Authority (NTCA)158. The 
new amendments also provided for the establishment of Critical Tiger Habitats (CTH) in 
the buffer zone of existing Tiger Reserves to be managed as inviolate areas. In November 
2007 the NTCA issued an order for the notification of CTHs across the country within 10 
days. Parallel to the process of notification would be the process of relocation of human 
habitations from the CTH. Thus, the NTCA also issued guidelines for relocation, 
resettlement and rehabilitation from Protected Areas.  
 
The process of CTH notification and subsequent ongoing processes of relocation and 
rehabilitation, led by MoEF and respective State Forest Departments has been done in 
                                                
 
156 Following TTF suggestions, the Tiger and Other Endangered Species and Crime Control Bureau was 
established with special powers to investigate to wildlife crime. 
157 It would appear that there was only a selective implementation of the TTF recommendations; primarily 
those suggestions have been implemented that allowed for greater policing power and exclusion of local 
communities from Tiger Reserves through the establishment of ‘Critical Tiger Habitat’. TTF made several 
other recommendations aimed at settlement of rights and inclusion of communities in the decision making 
process. 
158 The Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act 2006  
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violation of provisions in the Tiger Amendments and the Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006. Also known as the 
Forest Right Act, this legislation also provides for the creation of Critical Wildlife Habitat 
or CWH (Bijoy: 2011, FCN: 2010, Kalpavriksh 2011), but has rarely been used. The 
statutory processes to be followed for formation of these habitats and ensuing relocation 
under both Acts are almost the same, except under FRA no land from CWH can be 
diverted for other purposes. The same has not been specified in the WLPA 2006.  
Kalpavriksh (2011: 5)159 in its legislation brief on ‘Recognition of Rights and Relocation 
in relation to Critical Tiger Habitats (CTHs)’ has formulated a checklist based on the 
mandatory procedures under the WLPA, 2006 and the FRA, 2006.  
As per the WLPA, unless the relocation is voluntary and on mutually agreed terms & 
conditions, and provided that such terms and conditions satisfy the legal requirements laid 
down in both the Acts, no Scheduled Tribe or other forest dwellers shall be resettled or 
have their rights adversely affected for the purpose of creating inviolate areas for tiger 
conservation. As per the FRA, the forest rights recognized within Critical Wildlife 
Habitats of National Parks and Sanctuaries, may subsequently be modified or resettled, 
provided that no forest rights holders shall be resettled or have their rights in any manner 
affected for the purposes of creating inviolate areas for wildlife conservation except in 
cases where all the conditions laid out in the Act are satisfied. As per both these Acts, the 
following conditions must be satisfied before any relocation can take place. (This means 
that if all the following steps have not been completed then the relocation is in violation 
of the law).  
 
• The process of recognition and determination of rights and acquisition of land or forest 
rights of the Scheduled Tribes and other forest dwelling persons has been completed. 
 
• The concerned agencies of the State Government, with the consent of the Scheduled 
Tribes and other forest dwellers in the area, and in consultation with an ecological and 
social scientist familiar with the area, have established that the activities of the Scheduled 
Tribes and other forest dwellers and their presence in the area is sufficient to cause 
irreversible damage to wildlife and shall threaten the existence of tigers and their habitat; 
 
• The State Government, after obtaining the consent of the Scheduled Tribes and other 
forest dwellers inhabiting the area, and in consultation with an independent ecological and 
social scientist familiar with the area, has come to a conclusion that other reasonable 
options of co-existence are not available;   
 
• The resettlement (or an alternative package) has been prepared and it provides for 
livelihood for the affected individuals and communities and fulfils the requirements given 
in the National Relief and Rehabilitation Policy; 
 
• Free informed consent of the Gram Sabha concerned, and of the persons affected, for the 
resettlement programme, has been obtained in writing; 
 
• The facilities and land allocation at the resettlement location have been provided under 
the said programme (If not then their existing rights shall not be interfered with).  
                                                
 
159 http://www.kalpavriksh.org/images/Documentation/Advocacy/Recognition of Rights and Relocation in 
relation toCTHs.pdf  
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• If any of the above steps has not been completed then the forest dwelling scheduled tribe 
or other traditional forest dweller shall not be evicted or removed from the forest land 
under his/her occupation. 
 
 
Also, the WLPA 2006 mandates three processes to be followed for the declaration of 
the CTH (ibid): 
• identification /delineation of core or CTHs as per scientific /objective criteria and involving an 
Expert Committee 
• Identification/delineation of buffer or peripheral area in consultation with specific Gram Sabha 
and the Expert Committee 
• Creation of inviolate area on the basis of identified core or CTH through relocation as per the 
statutory process (outlined above)  
 
Till date 38 CTH’s have been notified in 17 States, including Ranthambhore Tiger 
Reserve in Rajasthan. 31 CTH’s were notified in December 2007, i.e. within a month of 
the Order issued by the NTCA for the same. 762 villages are scheduled to be relocated 
from the notified CTH in phases, affecting over 48,549 families (Kalpavriksh 2011). 
Under this procedure, relocation has already taken place in Sariska Tiger Reserve. The 
relocation process is ongoing in several other CTH’s including Ranthambhore National 
Park and Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary (See Shahabuddin 2010; Bijoy 2011; Kalpavriksh 
2011).   
 
Independent evaluations (Bijoy 2011) and studies by Future Conservation 
Network(2010)
160
 of the relocation process have established that the Forest Departments 
across the States are undertaking the process in violation of the provisions of the WLPA 
2006 and FRA 2006. In no cases has the notification of the CTH followed the due process 
outlined above. Also, the prior informed consent of the Gram Sabha, required for the 
entire process for notification, viability of co-existence and approval of the relocation 
plan has not been obtained anywhere.  
 
                                                
 
160  The Future of Conservation in India (FoC) is a network of ecological and social organizations and 
individuals committed to effective and equitable conservation of biodiversity. FoC’s objective is to foster 
dialogue and engagement in complex conservation issues, and help tackle the increasing threats that both 
biodiversity and people's livelihoods face. This includes joint action on areas of agreement, and attempts at 
evolving common understanding on issues where there are differences. FoC is not an organization, but a 
forum where organizations and individuals can meet, dialogue, and take joint actions  (FoC 2010)  
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More importantly, relocation has been carried out without the recognition or settlement of 
rights mandated by the WLPA 2006 that requires the statutory process of the FRA 2006 
to be followed. According to Bijoy (2011: 39): 
Completion of recognition of forest rights has not been reported from any tiger reserve till 
date. Instead the process itself has not been initiated in most cases and where initiated it 
has been vitiated by violation of the procedures as prescribed in the FRA  
 
However, the Forest Departments have claimed that the requirements of the FRA are 
being complied with. A detailed study of the relocation process in four PAs - Sariska 
(Rajasthan), Melghat (Maharastra), Simlipal (Orissa) and Achanakmar (Chattisgarh) by 
Kalpavriksh (2010: 8), a part of the Future Conservation Network, pointed out the 
contradictions between the claims of the Departments and actual practice at the field level:  
 
Forest Department Claims: Forest Department has certified to NTCA that rights 
recognition process has been completed by villages that are to be relocated in Sariska. In 
Melghat relocation will start once the claim process is completed. In Melghat the 
Department has also claimed that 5 villages were scheduled to be relocated in the first 
stage as no claims have come from there under FRA. Relocation is underway in Simlipal 
and Achankamar also.  
 
Observations from the Field: In Sariska the Forest Rights Act has not been implemented 
at all. In Simlipal claims have been submitted on which the final decision is pending but 
relocation has continued. In Melghat though Forest Rights Committees161 have been 
formed, nothing has moved beyond that. Some villagers are aware of FRA granting 
individual pattas (land title deeds), most are unaware of any other provisions, particularly 
related to community rights and developmental facilities. In Achanakmar only individual 
claims have been filed and granted, there has been no recognition of community rights at 
all. Where people have received such rights it is being seen as first step towards starting 
the relocation process rather than giving people an option of continuing to stay if they 
wished so. Such households are therefore being seen as “legitimate” household who can 
now be relocated as their FRA claims had been settled.   
 
There are also several problematic issues regarding the relocation package itself. The 
proposed resettlement package for the communities who chose to be resettled from 
CTH’s has two options as per the format issued by the NTCA (MoEF 2008): 
 
Option 1: Payment of the entire package amount (Rs.10 lakh per family) to the family in 
case the family opt so, without involving any rehabilitation/relocation process by the 
Forest Department. 
 
Option II: Carrying out relocation/rehabilitation of village from protected area/tiger 
reserve by the Forest Department.  In case of Option II, the following package (per family) 
is proposed at the rate if Rs. 10 Lakhs (USD 2226.36) per family: 
 
                                                
 
161 Forest Rights Committee are set up under the provisions of FRA 2006 are set up at the village level to 
decide on the claims of  rights by individuals or communities of the village.  
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Proposed Compensation Package per Family (@Rs. 10 lakhs) under Option II 
 
(a)  Agriculture land procurement  
(2 hectare) and development  
35% of the total package  
(b)  Settlement of rights  30% of the total package  
(c)  Homestead land and house construction  20% of the total package  
(d)  Incentive  5% of the total package  
(e)  Community facilities commuted by the family (access road, 
irrigation, drinking water, sanitation, electricity, tele-
communication, community center, religious places of worship, 
burial/cremation ground)  
10% of the total package  
 
As per the statutory process, the compensation was meant to “ensure the agricultural, 
livelihood, development and other interests of the people living in tiger bearing forests of 
a forest” (Section 38 (V) 4, WLPA 2006). The Guidelines however stipulate a uniform 
package across all states, whether or not it adequately meets the need. For instance, the 
landless do not receive compensation for land. More importantly, most areas are opting 
for Option 1leaving the villagers to their own fate once they receive the cash amount. The 
Act also insisted that relocation will take place only when all the facilities have been 
provided in the identified area for relocation but, as evidenced by the studies mentioned 
above, this provision has not been met anywhere (Also see Shahabuddin 2007 for 
relocation in Sariska). 
 
In Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve, following the creation of Critical Tiger Habitat in 2007, 
almost 1,000 sq km has to be made inviolate. The process of relocation has started but 
little information is available in the public domain. As of June 2010, there was no official 
data available on the names and number of villages that are to be relocated. The villagers 
of Kailadevi have submitted a request to the District Magistrate asking for this 
information. Aravalli, another organisation supporting peoples need for transparency in 
the process of relocation and rehabilitation is also filing a Right to Information (RTI) 
application with the local Forest Department. The information presented in this text has 
been put together from the information available at the press conferences held by the local 
Forest Department on different occasions.  Some information has also been put together 
from the first hand data collected by the staff of Aravalli and a local NGO, Gram Shiksha 
Kendra (GSK), Sawai Madhopur.  
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According to local reports
162
, 66 villages with a population of about 4,000 have been 
identified for relocation from in and around Kailadevi Sanctuary. Till June 2010 over 20 
villages were visited by the forest officials. It is assumed that villages around the 
Sanctuary that are dependent on the forest resources will also be relocated. 10 other 
villages have been identified for relocation from the part of the Reserve in Sawai 
Madhopur District (both Sawai Mansingh Sanctuary and/or Ranthambhor Park).   
 
The details on the extent of relocation are not fully known. According to the information 
collected by GSK, in Kailadevi Wildlife Sanctuary 58 families of Machan Ki village have 
already been relocated The Forest Department has paid out Rs. 2 lakhs
163
 per family as 
the first instalment towards the compensation for resettlement and relocation but no 
written document has been given to the relocated families so far. According to the local 
newspaper, so far the Forest Department has distributed a total sum of Rs 1 crore and 54 
lakhs According to DFO (Buffer) Mr. OP Gupta, relocation process has been initiated in 
Sankda and Vishwanathpura villages of Sawai Madhopur District.  
 
According to a firsthand report filed by Mr. Rahul Banerjee, an activist from Madhya 
Pradesh, a major conflict situation has emerged in the Tiger Reserves in Rajasthan as a 
consequence of faulty or inadequate implementation of the provisions of Wild Life 
Protection Act 2006.  It seems that the National Tiger Conservation Authority has 
unilaterally decided, on the basis of research data not specific to the protected areas in 
Rajasthan, that it is necessary to create tiger reserves of 800 to 1,000 sq kms and make 
them free of human habitation. The process of declaration of these critical habitats has 
been done without conducting Gram Sabhas and without consulting the communities 
likely to be affected by it.  
 
The issue of settlement of forest rights, preparing and implementing a site specific 
relocation plan and compensation for development facilities have not been considered in 
the ongoing relocation process in the Reserve. According to some of villagers of 
Kailadevi Sanctuary area, the local Forest Department staff are unilaterally pressurising 
the people to accept Rs 10 lakhs per household and vacate their villages.  
                                                
 
162 These are unpublished field reports drafted by GSK and Aravalli (See Das et. al 2010) 
163 One lakh is equivalent to Rs. 100, 000 and approximately £1250. 
 
 
266
 
The Forest Department staff has stopped other state departments like the PWD (Public 
Works Department) and the cooperative banks from constructing roads and advancing 
credit to the people. The Rural Development & Panchayati Raj Department has been 
advised against implementing works under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS). The local understanding is that if they do 
not relocate now then in the future they will be forced to relocate but without any 
compensation. Thus, the current resettlement and rehabilitation process in Ranthambhore 
Tiger Reserve is not only violating the provisions of the WLP Act 2006 and FRA 2006 
but also of those of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act 1994 and Panchayat Extension to 
Scheduled Areas Act 1996 (PESA) and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
2005 (NREGA) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.   
 
The people in Ranthambhore currently face the following problems (Das et. al 2010:4) – 
 
 There is a provision in the WLPA that prevents outsiders from entering the protected areas without 
the permission of the forest department. This effectively means that the residents in these areas, who 
are mostly ignorant of the various legal provisions that give them rights as citizens, are being denied an 
opportunity to secure these rights. Without being made aware of any of their entitlement or rights the 
people are being made sign a ‘shapat patra’. The shapat patra as the name suggests is essentially a 
declaration of the signatory’s consent to relocate by accepting one of the two compensation package 
being offered. The ‘patra’ also declares that the signatory has been made aware of the R&R process 
and its implication by the FD. The official process being undertaken is deceptive and completely 
unconstitutional.  
 
 The compensation package currently being offered does not adequately address the livelihood 
needs of the people of the area. The affected people are agro-pastoralists and are dependent both on 
land as well as cattle and in turn the forest resources for fodder. The current compensation package 
Option II,  that requires the FD to undertake the resettlement process for the displaced family, offers 
compensation for land and does not take into account the livelihood afforded by pastoralism.  Also 
villagers are being asked only to opt for Option I of the relocation package outlined above as, by the 
admission of the Forest Department officials, Rajasthan Government does not have land to offer for the 
relocation process under Option II.  
 
 The entire process is being conducted in a non-transparent process and people seem extremely 
confused, uncertain and agitated.  
 
  It is not known whether in providing compensation the Forest Department is following the 
definition of ‘family’ outlined in the NTCA Guidelines. According to the information available from 
local agencies, the compensation is being provided only to the head of the household, irrespective of 
the other adult members residing in the household. This does not follow the definition of an eligible 
family164 
                                                
 
164 According to the revised guidelines for relocation issued by NTCA (2008) The following are to be treated as separate families 
even if they currently live together:  
1. A major (over 18 years) son irrespective of his marital status  
2. Unmarried daughter/sister more than 18 years of age  
3. Physically and mentally challenged person irrespective of age and sex  
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Nibhera is among the 20 villages that have been identified for relocation. No relocation 
has taken place yet. Over the years I have been in touch with many families in Nibhera 
telephonically as well as with staff that worked in Society for Sustainable Development. 
According to my long time host, Masterji, in the last 2-3 years several families from 
Nibhera have moved out to Kailadevi town. He along with his wife and children now live 
in Kailadevi while his parents continue to stay in Nibhera village as they are hoping to 
receive the relocation compensation package. According to him the older Gujjar and 
Brahman generation will continue to stay till they are physically moved out. The younger 
generation is willing to take cash compensation and move out. The implication of the 
cash compensation means that the families and the different communities that comprised 
Nibhera will be scattered; each having to find their own place. Perhaps in a couple of 
years the village of my research work will no longer exist. The cultural and social 
displacement is bound to take a huge toll on the lives of people who will thus be 
dislocated. Economic impoverishment is sure to follow as it has done in the case of 
Sariska and in case of earlier relocation that took place from Ranthambhore National Park 
(Shahabuddin 2007; also see Shahabuddin 2010 on the impacts of relocation from PAs).  
 
Given the current situation in the Tiger Reserves one is compelled to ask -what the India 
Ecodevelopment Project achieved? The extinction of Tigers in Sariska and the ensuing 
shifts in the policy and management of Tiger Reserves has, once again, brought back the 
conservation and co-existence debate to centre stage. Since it followed soon after the 
completion of the India Ecodevelopment Project, the extinction of tigers from Sariska has 
lent legitimacy to the advocates of the exclusionary management approach to debunk the 
participatory and co-existence approach, sought to be espoused by the Project. In the 
wake of the debate, the former Deputy Conservator of Forest of Ranthambhore wrote an 
article (Reddy 2008: 259) focussing on the absence (what he called ‘unreported 
extinction’) of tigers in Kailadevi, based on the findings of Wildlife Institute of India 
(David et.al 2005)165:  
                                                                                                                                            
 
4.  Minor orphan who has lost both his/her parents  
5. A widow or a woman divorcee 
165
 
The officials of the Tiger Reserves in India  are responsible for conducting and reporting the annual tiger census. However the 
official reporting failed to detect the disappearance of the tigers in Sariska and thus brought into questioning the basis, validity and 
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The WII study results clearly highlight that Kailadevi WLS is an ‘empty forest’ devoid of 
wildlife and recommends that it could be termed as a paper sanctuary as whatever 
remains of wildlife populations found here seem to be based on ‘chance survival’. The 
people’s institution (kulhadi bandh panchayats), the government’s effort of provisioning 
for alternate economic development, the active involvement of civil society and the 
amicable working relationship between various partners played very little role in 
preventing the ecological extinction of prey and predators from the Kailadevi Wildlife 
Sanctuary 
 
   
This thesis, focussing on how the project worked, becomes extremely relevant in 
countering the co-existence argument based on Ecodevelopment experience and the 
resurgence of the exclusionary practice as evidenced in the select implementation of the 
recommendation of the Tiger Task Force. The above argument is not only a misreading of 
how the project worked but also the misreading of the conservation and management 
history of Kailadevi. As outlined in the thesis the loss of wildlife in the area has its 
antecedents in sport hunting by the British, the erstwhile state of Karauli and the 
unregulated sport hunting after World War II almost until 1970. Also, as concluded in the 
thesis Kailadevi was a ‘paper sanctuary’ from its inception. It suffered inadequate 
management focus and resources. It was never managed for co-existence; 
Ecodveleopment extended to take advantage of kulhadi bandh panchayat , more in the 
interest of the project success rather than facilitating better conservation. Most 
importantly, as the thesis has shown notwithstanding the project policies on participation 
and co-existence, the implementation of the project continued to be underlined by statist 
exclusionary policy; that neither enabled effective participation nor economic alternatives. 
This observation continues in the vein of the Departments traditional approach of 
ahistorical and apolitical analysis of ‘people-wildlife’ conflict and holding the presence of 
people in the PAs as the sole cause of loss of wildlife.  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
 
reliability of the assessment and reporting of census data by the Forest Department. Consequently, the TTF assigned the WII the task 
of assessing wildlife populations using state of the art techniques (Reddy 2008) 
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